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Abstract / Lay Summary 
This thesis explores the major transformation of the Chilean juvenile justice 
system that was implemented in 2007. However, this is a much longer 
process that involves analysing the inter-relationship between polity building, 
the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule after 17 years of 
authoritarian regime over the 1970s and 1980s and the legitimation of 
democracy in the 1990s.  
Theoretical approaches to understanding the evolution of crime control and 
State punishment mechanisms usually refer to elements such as 
globalization (Newburn and Sparks, 2004), late modernity (Garland, 2001), or 
political economy (Dignan and Cavadino, 2007; Lacey, 2008). However, 
theory has also highlighted how the reform of justice systems forms part of 
broader processes of social transformation which, even though they involve 
an interaction with the wider world, are also dependent on their historical and 
local context (Melossi, Sozzo and Sparks, 2011). Nevertheless, most of what 
is known has been produced in developed, English-speaking democratic 
countries (or in relation to them) and rather less based on analysis of 
countries from the global south. The present work aims to reduce this gap. 
Based on documentary analysis and interviews, this thesis demonstrates the 
key symbolic role of juvenile justice to legitimate the new democratic rule in 
times of transition; how the impact of the continuation of authoritarian 
practices, people and ideology into democratic polity building can shape 
crime control and State punishment; and how the temporal, historical and 
cultural conditions of a given context can alter the meaning of what we 
believe are globally understood concepts and processes. 
 
In consequence, this research allows the understanding of a case that has 
not featured in the wider literature of penal transformation: a developing 
Latin-American country. It also offers the opportunity to analyse to what 
extent the existent research and theory of penal transformations can help to 
explain the drastic change in a context which is different to those where it is 
usually applied. In doing so, it contributes to the theoretical discussion of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to explore the major transformation which 
took place in Chilean juvenile justice as the country transitioned from 
dictatorship to democracy over the 1990s and 2000s. In doing so the thesis 
analyses the extent to which existing theories of penal transformations 
(mostly derived from studies of the global north) can help to explain the 
developments in Chile, while contributing to the theoretical discussion of 
penal transformations with empirical research.  
As the thesis will show, the process of democratisation in Chile has, 
somewhat paradoxically, been accompanied by continuities in punitiveness. 
Indeed, despite the radical changes made to the institutional infrastructure of 
juvenile justice, the era of reform resulted in a system that was as punitive as 
the previous system that worked since 1928, over the 1970s and 1980s 
dictatorship and in the 1990s democratic order. Whilst Chilean developments 
do mirror aspects of the ‘punitive turn’ in juvenile justice that a number of 
theorists of penal transformation have identified in the global north over a 
similar time frame (see Bottoms, 1995; Goldson, 2002; Muncie, 2005; 
Goldson and Hughes, 2010; Chaney, 2015), the drivers and outcomes of 
juvenile justice reform in Chile owe much to the ways in which more localised 
social and cultural practices played out in the context of political transition, 
expansion and legitimation of the new democratic order. 
Based on interviews with a range of key players in the juvenile justice reform 
process at that time and on documentary analysis, the thesis will argue that 
the shifts in Chilean juvenile justice were the result of attempts by a new 
democracy to assert its authority to rule: that youth became the object of a 
reforming zeal as a way of distracting attention from the wider social and 
economic inequalities which continued to beset Chilean civil society; that the 
resulting juvenile justice system strongly relates to the continuity in the close 
networks of politicians who had predominated at the time of the dictatorship, 
and the continuity of authoritarian logic even during democratic times. The 
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thesis thus also highlights how there is no simple read off between 
constitutional infrastructure and the ethos and principles of governance: that 
clientelism and paternalism continued to shape the practice of juvenile justice 
and helped to shape the reforms which took place over the first decade of 
democracy and into the mid-2000s.   
This opening chapter provides a context for the broader thesis, giving an 
overview and timeline of the key changes which occurred in Chile from 
dictatorship to democracy and a short history of juvenile justice. Chapter two 
of the thesis explores and critiques the wider literature on penal 
transformation. Chile has rarely featured in this literature but there is an 
important and growing body of work which has examined countries in 
transition as for example Cheliotis and Xenakis (2016) on Greece. Chapter 
three describes and discusses the methods used within the research, and the 
main empirical findings are set out in chapters four to six including an in-
depth discussion of the drivers behind the reform and how they shaped the 
ethos and practice of the new system. The thesis concludes in chapter seven 
with a review of the empirical and theoretical implications of the findings. 
 
The Chilean Juvenile Justice System 
 
The old juvenile justice system of the country was based in the Protection of 
Minors Act or Law of Minors published in 1928 (Law 4,447). This Act set the 
ethos, institutions and procedures to deal with young people in trouble with 
the law and in need of protection. It was then modified in 1967 (Law 16,618). 
Although the law 16,618 can be considered more an update than a reform, 
as it built over what existed, keeping most of the core elements (such as 
ethos, institutions and procedure) the same. The Acts of 1928 and 1967 set 
in place a tutelary system (to be described in the following subsection) that 
worked for over 70 years.  
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However, in the early 1990s, at the same time as Chile tried to solidify the 
democratic order that resulted in the transition from the dictatorship of the 
1970s and 1980s, the national attention shifted towards juvenile justice and 
the need to perform radical changes at all levels. Laws associated with the 
legal situation of juveniles were modified from the beginning of the 1990s, 
starting with the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
[UNCRC] in 1990, drafts for a new juvenile justice started being produced 
around 1996, the legislative discussion started in 2002, and the new 
Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act [LRPA] that completely reformed the 
previous Acts was approved and published in 2005 and implemented in 
2007. This new juvenile justice system which built on the responsibilization of 
juveniles, due process and the protection of the procedural guarantees; 
radically differed from the tutelary approach previously in place.  
 
1. The tutelary system 
 
The Law of Minors worked under a protection and educative model. The 
main purpose was the protection of children and young people. As a result, 
there was no formal punishment, no standardized procedure or guarantees, 
and no discussion about guilt (Sepúlveda, 2004; Pavez, 2005; De Ferrari, 
2006; Couso, 2009; Langer and Lillo, 2014).  
This law dealt with all under-16 years old in both protection and offending 
cases, making no distinction between them. However, juveniles between 16 
and 18 years of age who presented offending behaviour had to go through a 
‘discernment test’. The purpose was to determine if they had the capacity to 
tell right from wrong, if they were aware of the implications of their actions. 
Therefore, all young people under 16 years of age were not criminally liable, 
and the situation of those between 16 and 18 years of age had to be clarified.   
The discernment test was usually directed by a psychologist or a 
psychologist and a social worker and it did not have clear guidelines. Thus, 
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the strategies and methodologies used for the test varied between 
professionals and cases. The discernment report, usually made in the 
Centres for Observation and Diagnosis [Centros de Observación y 
Diagnóstico, COD], was then sent to the judge of minors. It was part of the 
duties of the Judge of Minors to determine, based on the case background, 
consideration of the report, the defendant (if there was one), and after talking 
to the young person, if they had ‘discernment’ or not. If they were found as 
not having ‘discernment’, they were dealt with by the Minors’ Court with the 
rest of the children and young people. However, if they were declared to 
have ‘discernment’, they were sent to the criminal court where they followed 
the standard procedure for adult offenders. This implied an investigation, the 
determination of guilt and sentencing. The only difference was that, if found 
guilty, they would receive a sentence one degree lower than an adult would 
receive under the same circumstances (Protection of Minors Act, 1967).  
Under the tutelary system, the possible measures could be to return the 
young person with those in charge of their care after an admonition; 
probation; the transference of the care of the juvenile to another person 
under supervision; or internment in a special centre for their education. All 
these measures were indeterminate in length, because even if the Judge of 
Minors had initially set a period of time, they could modify their decision at 
any moment (Sepúlveda, 2004). As a consequence, the whole process was 
the result of the judge’s discretion (García-Méndez, 2001; Sepúlveda, 2004; 
Couso, 2006; De Ferrari, 2006). 
Initially, the main institution in charge of young people in trouble after the 
Minors’ Court had decided what would happen to them was the General 
Direction of Minors’ Protections. This was a technical institution (as in mostly 
constituted by professionals with some level of expertise in the area to create 
technical guidelines) dependent on the Ministry of Justice in charge to 
provide professional diagnosis and the coordination of the Reformatories and 
Houses of Minors. The Houses of Minors worked with the General Direction 
of Minors Protection but could be private or run by NGOs. They acted as a 
care home and were in charge of educating children and young people when 
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the Judge of Minors decided that principal carers had to be stripped of that 
responsibility, which was then handled by the State (Bley, 2002). Therefore, 
the tutelary system was mostly about the State raising children and young 
people than anything else. Nowadays, Houses of Minors still exist but mostly 
for protection measures when the carers are considered dangerous. Usually, 
it is preferred that family members take this responsibility, and efforts are 
directed towards making Houses of Minors only as a last resort and short-
term measure, whilst keeping children involved in the general community, for 
example going to a regular school.  
In 1979, during the dictatorship of General Pinochet, the General Direction of 
Minors’ Protection was replaced by a new institution. The National Service of 
Minors [Servicio Nacional de Menores, SENAME], which remains to this day. 
This is a centralised multi-disciplinary State institution dependent on the 
Ministry of Justice that worked under an approach of assistance, 
compensation and charity towards vulnerable youth (Zanzi, 1992b). It is also 
in charge of creating guidelines and providing subsidiary funding for the 
NGOs that carry the protection, adoption and juvenile justice programmes the 
State determines (SENAME, 2015). Only the youth centres for custodial 
sentences are directly controlled by SENAME with no participation of other 
public or private institutions, except from personal from the national 
gendarmerie to guard the perimeter and internal emergencies (such as 
violent conflicts between juveniles). The names of these centres have 
changed over time and according to the legislation to fulfil different principles 
and priorities. Therefore, what in the past was known as Centres for 
Behaviour Rehabilitation [CERECO] are now known as Internment in Closed 
Centres with Social Rehabilitation Programmes [CRC].  
During the period covered by the Law of Minors, the CERECOS were the 
place to intern juveniles when other measures were considered to have failed 
or the actions of the young person were considered too serious despite the 
lack of ‘discernment’. These centres were supposed to provide rehabilitative 
programmes. However, the resources were never enough to actually 
generate programmes according to the need of this population (Morales, 
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2012). Thus, in practice, offenders were only kept isolated in controlled and 
closed environments.  
Therefore, in practice, the tutelary system was a closed process that allowed 
the participation of few figures and left high discretionary powers in the figure 
of the Judge of Minors, which led to indefinite long term interventions and the 
excessive use of institutionalization as a protection measure. For example, in 
the early 1990s 50% of the young people in closed youth centres were under 
protection measures (Álvarez et al., 1993). In this same line, there was no 
recognition of an active role of the young person in their legal process, and 
the authority and duties of parents were erased to be assumed by the state 
(Sepúlveda, 2004; Pavez, 2005; De Ferrari, 2006; Couso, 2009; Langer and 
Lillo, 2014). 
The result was a punitive system, as it confounded protection and 
punishment (Contreras, 2003). It was also discriminatory, because according 
to Cortés (2009), Judges of Minors tended to privilege children in ‘irregular 
situation’. That means they tended to ‘protect’ the children of the poor. As a 
result, marginalised families were at greater risk of having their children taken 
away to be ‘re-educated’ in institutions supported by the State (Aguirrezabal, 
Lagos and Vargas, 2009; Dionne and Zambrano, 2009). For example, almost 
all imprisoned young people in Latin America belong to lower socioeconomic 
strata and from marginalised sectors (Carranza, 2013). Finally, the Law of 
Minors was paternalistic as well, because young people were seen as 
objects of rights under the responsibility of the State (Sepúlveda, 2004; De 
Ferrari, 2006).  
What is more, given the lack of effective rehabilitation programmes and the 
permanence of juveniles in crowded centres not specifically dedicated to their 
needs of protection or intervention, youth institutions were perceived as not 
stopping crime but making it worse by criminogenic contact and, 
contradictorily, leading to impunity as children were being placed under 
protection measures instead of punishment, fuelling complaints regarding the 
15 
 
ineffectiveness of the justice system (Cortés, 2009; Couso, 2009; Langer and 
Lillo, 2014). 
Following from McAra (2010), the Tutelary System is more in line with what 
has been described as a welfarist approach, working under a more needs-
oriented and child specific process (Goldson and Hughes, 2010). The 
difficulties of the system also reflect the main criticisms of welfarism, such as 
notions of being too soft, not promoting the responsibility of young people, 
overcontrolling, expanding an interventionist State, legitimating the target of 
non-offenders based on discriminatory ideas of ‘troubling’ behaviour, and 
authoritarian (Muncie and Hughes, 2002). In fact, García-Méndez (1998), an 
Argentinian expert in juvenile justice in the Latin American region, claimed 
tutelary systems worked very well with the authoritarianism that characterised 
Latin America between the 1960s and 1990s. This was because military 
regimes used their power to correct any sort of disruption under the image of 
doing the best for the country, bringing security and protection, erasing 
citizens’ voices and leaving all decisions in a super powerful figure: the 
dictator. Hence, tutelarity and authoritarianism followed a similar logic. 
However, after most of the dictatorships had ended in the 1990s, the general 
context of over controlling practices and a highly interventionist State 
changed. At the same time, the UNCRC was ratified by all Latin American 
countries, and it became part of their National Constitution around 1990 or 
1991 (García-Méndez, 2000). Most countries in Latin America had juvenile 
justice systems that came from the 1920s and 1930s and all of them worked 
under a similar tutelary logic (Beloff, 2006), however, since 1990, starting 
with Brazil, there was a wave of juvenile justice reforms in the region. Of the 
20 countries, 16 reformed their juvenile justice systems in the 1990s and 
2000s under liberal democratic rules. According to García-Méndez (2004) no 
other region in the world developed such a strong social movement after the 
UNCRC came into play.  
As I will explain in chapter four, during the authoritarian regime Chile faced 
extensive human rights violations, including torture, murder, illegal detentions 
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and the disappearance of people. This led to reports and pressure from the 
United Nations Organization and other international institutions and 
governments to change the situation. As a result, when the dictatorship 
ended it was in the midst of Human Rights discourses and promises of ‘never 
again’ (García-Méndez, 2000). Rights came to be understood as the basic 
element of what democracy meant (Cillero, 1998).  
Following from this local reality, the regional phenomenon of juvenile justice 
reforms and after the country ratified international agreements, such as the 
UNCRC in 1990 and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José 
of Costa Rica Pact) in 1991, experts and institutions like UNICEF were quick 
to realise the new guidelines were not being respected by the tutelary 
system. For example, regarding due process or the minimum use of custody 
(Santibáñez and Alarcón, 2009), as the tutelary system did not follow a 
formal procedure, the presence of defendant lawyers was not needed, and 
the measures decided by the judge under their personal criteria did not have 
a set length. As a consequence, international suggestions for a reform 
started. 
According to most interviewees and in the legislative debate of the new law, 
in Chile, similarly to what was happening in the rest of the Latin American 
region, it was the UNCRC that started the reform process. Before that there 
was no debate on the matter. Later chapters will question if the reform was 
indeed the result of the UNCRC and regional pressure. Nevertheless, the 
next section will follow from that starting point in 1990 to describe the key 
moments and events that marked the reform process to be analysed in 
chapters five and six. 
 
2. Timeline of the reform 
 
From 1967 until the implementation of the current juvenile justice system 
there were few changes to the legislation that dealt with young people who 
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presented offending behaviour. However, after the ratification of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the early 1990s together with the return to democracy, the 
Ministry of Justice created a commission to study what was needed in order 
to follow the agreements (Cillero, 2006; De Ferrari, 2006). However, it did not 
reach conclusions strong enough to promote reform. 
Nevertheless, children’s rights took a predominant role in political and expert 
discourse in the early 1990s, to be addressed in more depth in chapter five. 
This gave more strength to the voices opposed to the logic and failures of the 
tutelary system demanding reform. At the same time, there was direct 
international pressure on the matter. For example, in 1994 the Committee of 
the UN made clear their concern regarding the slow progression in terms of a 
juvenile justice reform in Chile (De Ferrari, 2006). 
At the same time, a series of other institutional changes took place. Amongst 
the key elements that altered the legal situation of young people and paved 
the way for the reform, we can find the creation of the National Council to 
Control Drugs [Consejo Nacional para el Control de Estupefacientes, 
CONACE] and the increase of resources and staff in Carabineros de Chile 
(the armed police) (Law 19,006) in 1990. In 1993 the law 19,221 established 
the age of legal adulthood at 18 years of age. In 1994, the law 19,343 
forbade young offenders and adults to serve their sentences together. This 
measure had the intention of removing young people from prisons, creating 
centres solely for them. This was particularly relevant, as in 1993-1994 there 
were over 4,000 children and adolescents in adult prisons, 31% of them were 
between seven and 15 years of age (SENAME, 1995).  
Parallel to these developments, in the second democratic government after 
the dictatorship, with President Frei (1994-2000), the Minister of Justice of 
the time (Soledad Alvear) called an expert commission to diagnose the 
juvenile justice national legislation. They worked together with UNICEF, and 
it resulted in a guideline to write the project of a new law (De Ferrari, 2006). 
In 1995 some experts were contacted to build the first draft of the project as 
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an urgent request of the Minister of Justice, with the aim of submitting it that 
same year. The project was written and delivered, but it led to further 
development of drafts instead of legislative discussion (Duce, 2003). 
By 1998, eight drafts of a new juvenile justice law had been produced. The 
last one was published and presented to the international community and 
broadly discussed (De Ferrari, 2006). The drafts were always described and 
understood as following the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
ensuring guarantees in the legal process, and the exceptionality of 
imprisonment as a measure. In fact, in 1998 juvenile justice was still being 
considered as belonging in the family court (Cortés and Vásquez, 2005) or 
making decisions based on judges from both the family and penal realm. 
The greatest changes started in the year 2000, when the third post-
dictatorship democratic government with President Lagos (2000-2006) 
began. The Penal Procedure was reformed in a progressive process that 
took five years to implement, that is until 2005, in the whole country. This 
reform involved the modification of the penal code, shifting from inquisitorial 
to adversarial. It also required the creation of new institutions, such as the 
Public Ministry that is now in charge of prosecution, and the Public Defendant 
responsible for the defence. The new regulation left no space for under 18-
year-olds to enter the adult system.  
However, due to the concentration of interests and efforts in the Penal 
Procedure reform, all talks about a juvenile justice reform halted. The Penal 
Procedure reform was priority and was already being discussed (Gobierno de 
Chile, 1999; Sepúlveda, 2004). Only once it was already in the 
implementation stage, political discussions to create a new Juvenile Justice 
System started, with youth offending taking more national relevance than 
ever before.  
The project of a new juvenile justice system was presented to the Deputies’ 
Chamber in the Congress in 2002. It was modified and approved to then 
continue the legislative process in the Senate in 2004, where it was modified 
again. Nevertheless, the Deputies did not approve the changes, and a 
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‘Mixed’ Chamber [Cámara Mixta] formed by both Deputies and Senators was 
formed. Various authors agreed that even though at the beginning the project 
was closely linked to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in the 
Senate Chamber in the legislative process it became something more 
punitive and closely linked to the adult justice system, eliminating most of the 
elements that made it a differentiated specialised system (Werth, 2005; 
Cillero, 2006; De Ferrari, 2006; Bustos, 2007).  
This result can be associated with the increase throughout the 1990s, of 
perceptions of growing youth offending both in terms of prevalence and 
seriousness, especially after the emphasis on Human Rights had faded a 
little. Moreover, as chapter five and six will show, youth offending and the 
control of young people’s behaviour came to take a predominant role in the 
political and media discourses, transforming into a central element of political 
campaigns around election periods. The topic went from being almost no 
one’s concern to feature amongst the top three worries of the population in all 
opinion polls (López, 2000; Dammert and Lunecke, 2002; Duce, 2004; 
Dammert, 2005) and demands of fast and effective actions plagued public 
speeches. Chapter five will evidence its growing presence in presidential 
speeches over time.  
It was in this context that, in 2005, a year of presidential elections, the 
modification of juvenile justice towards a specialised system that deals with 
14 to 18-year-olds who display the offending behaviours considered by the 
Penal Code of the country, was approved in the Congress.  
However, the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act [LRPA] did not come into 
effect in the same year of its approval as had been intended. Political 
disagreements and modifications of the project, together with the lack of 
appropriate infrastructure to cover the new sentencing options, postponed its 
implementation until 2007, in the meantime an expert commission to analyse 
the conditions for implementation was created (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 
2005; SENAME, 2012). In the time between the publication of the LRPA 
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(2005) and its implementation (2007) there were other two key institutional 
changes.  
Firstly, in 2005 the Family Law (Law 19,968) was implemented. It also 
shaped the situation of young people in trouble. This new regulation 
assumed the responsibility of the care and protection of all under 18-year-
olds, relocated the age of criminal responsibility at 14 years of age (under the 
tutelary system 16 was the age to test the young persons’ discernment and 
perhaps to send them to the adult system), and dealt with minor offences of 
14 to 16-year-olds. That year, and with the Penal Procedure Reform 
implemented in the whole country, the old institutions in charge of dealing 
with children and young people in trouble or in need of protection were 
completely left behind and became unable to work with juveniles anymore. 
Secondly, in 2007 before the LRPA was implemented, it was reformed by the 
Law 20,191. This new legislation, for example, increased the mandatory 
minimum time of imprisonment determined by the LRPA (Law 20,191, 2007). 
The following charts illustrate the reform process. The first chart presents the 
system to deal with young people in trouble in its three main moments of 
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3. The LRPA: The current juvenile justice system in Chile 
 
Juvenile justice went from the tutelary approach presented in subsection one, 
to a responsibility system based on due process. This meant a series of 
changes. Firstly, regarding the population the system dealt with. While the 
Law of Minors dealt with all under-16-year-olds and those between 16 to 18 
years of age who had been declared ‘lacking in discernment’, the LRPA dealt 
with all 14 to 18-year-olds who were reported to the authorities to have 
committed the offences stated in the Penal Code. All under-14-year-olds 
were considered to have no criminal liability, and all protection cases were 
dealt with by the Family Court. As a consequence, there was a separation of 
functions between punishment and protection, and a clear age gap was 


























































Figure 2: Timeline of the juvenile justice reform 
22 
 
Secondly, instead of being about protection, the LRPA’s ethos is promoting 
juveniles’ responsibility for their behaviours, which includes respect for 
societal rules, social integration of juveniles and the avoidance of recidivism 
(LRPA, 2005). Following this line, the sentence was thought to be educative 
rather than punitive (Duce, 2009; Berríos, 2011). However, while the focus of 
the tutelary system was in the moral re-education of children and young 
people, the LRPA sees the sentence as an educative process to teach 
responsibility. Therefore, instead of implying a process of the State raising 
the child, it means teaching them a lesson. In consequence, there was also a 
consideration of the principle of parsimony, which refers to sentence for the 
shortest possible length of time whilst making sure the educational principle 
is fulfilled (LRPA, 2005; Santibáñez and Alarcón, 2009). 
Thirdly, the legal institutions were replaced. The Court of Minors and the 
Judge of Minors were replaced by the same institutions created for the adult 
penal system in the reform of the Penal Procedure in the late 1990s. Now 
there was a Public Defendant, a Prosecutor, two Penal Judges, a Guarantee 
Judge and an ‘Oral’ Court (in the previous system everything was written 
while in the new one the trial involves the recorded verbal presentation of 
evidence, prosecution, defence and sentencing). SENAME continued to be 
the technical institution in charge of applying or coordinating the measures 
determined by court.  
Fourthly, the procedure was radically transformed. The tutelary system left all 
decisions in charge of only the Judge of Minors, there were no clear formal 
rules to follow, so it depended on their personal notions of the risk and need 
of protection the young person was facing. The LRPA, instead, was 
subjected to the penal procedure reform. It established clear guidelines to 
follow: if the offence was minor, it could be solved without trial. If the offence 
was serious the prosecutor had to gather the evidence, with help from the 
police, to be later presented in the Oral Court in front of the three judges. The 
judges do not have access to the evidence before the hearing. Juveniles are 
also represented by a public defendant. Moreover, while under the tutelary 
system the protection measures were undetermined, the LRPA offers a 
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series of possible penalties according to the offence and they have a 
determined length.  
Therefore, now there was a focus on formal interventions, an adversarial 
system with a fixed catalogue of offences and possible sentences, due 
process and the guarantees for the accused. Nevertheless, this has 
generated criticism because when specialized professionals are not 
available, those who work with only adult population can be called, which 
means professionals are not fully dedicated to juveniles and their special 
needs (Santibáñez and Alarcón, 2009, Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
2015). Likewise, prosecutors, defendants and judges keep working in both 
systems, which leads to an overload of cases and handling the legal process 
under the same logic instead of two separated understandings of offenders 
(Werth, 2013). In fact, even though the professionals that work in the system 
are supposed to be trained to work with juveniles, most times it does not 
happen as the training is not provided or mandatory in practice. In 
consequence, just as the tutelary system falls in line with a welfarist 
approach, the LRPA seems to share the downsides of justice approaches as 
identified by some commentators (McAra, 2010), such as facilitating just 
deserts and individual responsibility (Muncie and Goldson, 2006) and 
favouring the adultization of young people (Goldson and Hughes, 2010). 
However, as Goldson and Hughes (2010) highlighted, usually juvenile justice 
systems do not follow one exclusive approach. In fact, according to Cortés 
(2009) the logic of the tutelary system was never fully abandoned. For 
example, when young people are considered as in need of care and 
protection, and their behaviour as the effect of experiences of vulnerability, 
they are usually dealt with by the family legal system, avoiding their 
interaction with issues of responsibility and ‘guilt’, but privileging therapeutic 
indefinite measures. In the LRPA is it also possible to find the authoritarian 
and punitive remnants of the institutions and tutelary logic as I will mention 
below and in chapter six. At the same time, managerial principles affect the 
performance of the justice system (McAra, 2010), because the therapeutic 
programmes are subject to assessment of their effectiveness, and are also 
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required to justify intervention approaches based on evidence. As a result of 
all of this, a contradictory mix of protection, responsibilisation, diversion and 
effectiveness can possibly be seen in the Chilean juvenile justice system. 
The result is that all the blame is located either on the young person or on the 
parents, while the role of the State or social structures remain unquestioned.  
As a consequence, the result has been another punitive system, with high 
use of custody measures for long periods of time (Cillero and Espejo, 2008; 
Couso, 2009; Berríos, 2011; Werth, 2013; Langer and Lillo, 2014). The main 
difference with the previous system is that now their institutionalization is due 
to a sentence instead of protective measures. The statistics also show an 
increase in young people having contact with the system, from 7,097 in 2007 
to 15,521 in 2010 (SENAME, 2012), and of juveniles having contact with the 
police, from 53,386 in 2008 to 54,932 in 2012, reaching 57,227 in 2011 
(Beloff and Langer, 2015), a year of student demonstrations where the abuse 
of detention measures called the attention of the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2015). 
Moreover, the situation of imprisoned young people in Chile has been widely 
criticised, firstly based on overcrowding rates (SENAME, 2012); the length of 
their sentence, which does not answer to the proportionality principle 
(Berríos, 2011); and the bad conditions they live in (Cillero and Espejo, 2008; 
Dionne and Zambrano, 2009). The infrastructure of youth custody centres in 
2012 could not ensure clean water, individual beds, or educational 
programmes for all interns (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
2011; SENAME, 2012). 
Furthermore, in smaller cities the same building serves as an adult prison 
and all youth custody centres. Thus, the separation of adults and juveniles is 
only ensured at night (Santibáñez and Alarcón, 2009; Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 2011). The use of pre-trial custody has also 
been analysed. In the tutelary system it was used in 70% of cases waiting for 
the ‘discernment’ test, of those, less than 30% would be considered to have 
‘discernment’ after the test (Langer and Lillo, 2014). In the new system there 
25 
 
seems to be a significant reduction in pre-trial institutionalization, and most 
lead to a sentence. However, pre-trial detention now lasts for a longer period 
of time (Berríos, 2011), and there has not been a global reduction of 
institutionalised young people, because those sentenced to custody for 
longer time periods have increased (Langer and Lillo, 2014; Beloff and 
Langer, 2015). Moreover, Beloff and Langer (2015) highlight the substantial 
increase of juveniles convicted to confinement in a 121% from 2006 to 2012, 
while there is no indication of an increase in juvenile arrests. In terms of 
effectiveness, recidivism rates were around approximately 50% (SENAME, 
2012). As a result, the situation of the young person as a developing and 
thus less responsible person is not ensured (Couso, 2012).  
 
This research will attempt to explain this radical penal transformation from a 
tutelary juvenile justice focused on children considered to be in ‘irregular 
situations’ under unlimited judicial discretion, based on an unrestricted 
protection paradigm where Children became objects of State power, to a 
justice approach based on responsibility for pre-determined offending 
behaviour, the procedure designed for adult offenders, the international 
guidelines of due process, and with a focus in the social reintegration of the 
young person. The purpose is to understand the reasons behind this reform, 
how did it take place, and how this change ended up being considered 
punitive as well.  
Following from this, chapter two will situate this study in the context of penal 
transformations literature: What does it tell us about how and why justice 
systems change? Can this literature provide some clarification regarding the 
elements underlying the Chilean juvenile justice reform? What challenges 





































Chapter 2: Penal transformations 
 
The previous chapter presented the ethos, institutional and procedural 
changes that took place in Chilean juvenile justice. These changes seem to 
imply a break from the past. However, the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility 
Act still had a strong presence of a tutelary logic and its own share of punitive 
practices which did not go in line with the international agreements ratified by 
the country in this regard. Therefore, it seems there are some elements of 
continuity as well, despite the radical reform of more formal aspects of the 
juvenile justice system (such as the procedure, for example). This leads to 
questions of how to explain the complexity and dynamics of the juvenile 
justice transformation, understanding it as a mode of transition from older to 
newer and, as this thesis will evidence in chapters five and six, a symbol of 
the social transitions that were taking place from authoritarianism to 
democracy.  
Within the sociology of punishment there is now a substantial body of 
literature which has researched the drivers of penal transitions. Much of this 
literature has focused on the impact of the transition to late modernity on 
penal forms, with some commentators such as Wacquant (1999) and Muncie 
(2005) claiming that there is a degree of convergence between jurisdictions, 
including a punitive turn. Others, as for example Melossi, (2004; 2011), would 
claim that more localised structures and cultures have mediated global 
pressures and reinforced differences between jurisdictions. However, it 
becomes relevant to know how can this literature help to explain transitions 
within Chile, as for the most part its empirical focus has been western liberal 
democracies in the global north. 
Importantly, there is a small but growing number of studies in Latin America 
and in those European jurisdictions which have transitioned from 
authoritarian to democratic regimes (for example Greece, Spain and Central 
Europe; see Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2016; Medina-Ariza, 2006 and Brandariz-
García, 2018, and Haney, 2016 respectively). As this chapter will 
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demonstrate, key focal points in this literature are the high level of 
ambivalence in penal aims that sometimes accompany these transitions and 
the role that the power to punish plays in attempting to build a new 
consensus (see for example Sozzo, 2016 and Super, 2016).   
Latin America is a region that had an important presence of authoritarian 
regimes and re-democratization processes in the second half of the 20th 
century, as 14 out of 20 countries experienced authoritarianism in the 1960s 
and 1980s, while four of the 20 countries were under dictatorships in the 
1950s. However, as I will show, the characteristics of penal regimes differ 
post transition, and Chile itself may at first sight seem an example of penal 
exceptionalism. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present what is known about penal 
transformations, evidencing the gap of knowledge my own research will 
attempt to address, by focusing on a specific case study that has not featured 
in the wider literature, and thus allows to question its reach and even how the 
main drivers described by the literature of penal transformations and State 
punishment tend to be understood. In consequence, I will start by presenting 
these drivers of penal change. This will be followed by a section dedicated 
specifically to penal transformations in societies that have experienced recent 
transitions from authoritarianism to democratic regimes. Finally, I will broadly 
refer to the contribution of this research.  
 
I- Drivers of penal transformations 
 
There is a growing body of research in sociology of punishment that attempts 
to identify drivers of penal transformations. Within this literature, some 
commentators contend that forces associated with late modernity have led to 
greater convergence between penal systems -driven by factors such as 
globalisation, impacts on public opinion and the media; others contend that a 
number of more localised structures and cultures have mediated these wider 
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forces and reinforced differences between jurisdictions (such as different 
constitutional arrangements or political economy models -see for example 
Cavadino and Dignan, 2006 and Lacey, 2008; 2009). 
The purpose of this section is to present these main elements that theory has 
associated as shaping and constraining penal transformations. They will be 
divided in two broad categories, as convergent trends when they imply 
elements that have been described as promoting similarities in crime control 
and State punishment across different societies; and as divergent when they 
refer to elements that make jurisdictions – even those with similar 
backgrounds – differ. 
Nevertheless, it is key to understand that convergent and divergent trends 
and factors do interact with each other. Convergent trends put pressure over 
the jurisdiction, or spread some ideas over others, make suggestions and 
influence the local reality. However, the shape this influence takes is 
mediated by the particularities of the jurisdictions, the elements that make it 
diverge (for example in terms of institutional resources). Therefore, there is a 
permanent feedback between convergent and diverging elements, co-
developing the direction followed by reform processes.  
 
1. Convergent trends 
 
a) Transitions to late modernity 
Late modernity has come to refer to the feelings of insecurity and anxiety that 
have been appearing and expanding in modern societies (Garland, 2001). 
These feelings imply a change in the interaction between the people living in 
modern societies and the world, leading to the growth of fear, individualism 
and exclusion (O’Malley, 2007). Modern societies and the feelings they seem 
to generate have been associated to changes in the ways of production and 
their impact in economic mobility, working stability, the distribution of salaries, 
social status and community solidarity (Young, 2007). They have also been 
linked with less control and increased perceptions of risk of people of being 
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harmed whatever directly or indirectly, increasing in turn the amount of stress 
of unknown situations or people (Garland, 1998; Simon, 2010). This has led 
to less tolerance and higher demands of control, with the purpose of regain 
security (Hancock and Matthews, 2001; Hughes and Follett, 2006; Muncie 
and Goldson, 2012). 
Following this line, Hope and Sparks (2000) have identified the risk of crime 
as one of the main topics in late modern societies. Evolving into a new 
political strategy that Simon (2006) termed ‘governing through crime’. Crime 
and punishment have been claimed to effectively impact on election results, 
as the general population seems to request and support tougher approaches 
in order to calm their fears and anxieties (Garland, 1996; Tonry, 2004b; 
Muncie, 2005; Simon, 2010; Koch, 2017). In consequence, politicians started 
fighting for attention through reactions to crime, risk and fear (Hope and 
Sparks, 2000). The result has been the development of populism as key in 
late modern politics (Sparks, 2003), leading to the privilege for more punitive 
measures (Garland, 2001; Roberts and Stalans, 2000; Simon, 2006). For 
example, in England actions such as loitering have come to be punished, 
despite not being illegal, under the logic of preventing moral and social 
transgressions in young people (Muncie and Goldson, 2012). 
Therefore, the feelings of risk, fear and anxiety described in late modern 
societies answer to a series of elements and have encountered responses 
mainly in the penal realm. I will now present the main elements associated to 
the direction followed by crime control and punishment in late modern 
societies, and how they relate to the negative feelings already described.  
i. Globalization 
The concept of globalization, complex and lacking a specific definition, has 
been understood in terms of the mobility of knowledge, practices and trends 
that cross boundaries and spread around the world, such as the adoption of 
other economic, social, or cultural elements. Rising or decreasing crime rates 
in many different nations in the same period or the fluctuation on immigration, 
easier in a more flexible globalised world, have also been described amongst 
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the effects of the modern world and as meaningful in shaping local criminal 
justice.  
This has resulted in more heterogeneous societies (Pratt, 2008b), which 
have been claimed to impact on social cohesion, hierarchies, security, the 
organization of a given community, and the capacity of welfare policies and 
institutions to deal with new increasingly diverse populations (Wacquant, 
2012). For example, Fonseca (2018) highlights how in Europe there was a 
resurgence of the anxiety towards minority groups, increasing requests for 
their control. The author claims that feelings of insecurity are fuelled by fears 
of limited social mobility, and a response to it is the strengthening of crime 
control and punishment. This is also visible in Brandariz-García (2018)’s 
research regarding Spain. The author points out how political discourses 
about crime gathered political traction in connection with the increase in 
migration, as it impacted on general perceived feelings of security.  
Economic international trends and fluctuation of capital at a global scale have 
also been associated as shaping offending and crime control patterns, as 
they impact on prosperity, growth or financial depression (Morrison, 2000). 
This implies the influence of economic agreements and the demands or 
requirements of international monetary institutions to access to their 
resources, such as the World Bank for example. As they could also drive 
jurisdictions towards similar guidelines of economic, social and crime control 
policies, privileging the development of policies more based on international 
market-principles than in local social values (Muncie, 2012). 
Another of the ways in which globalization promotes convergence, is through 
policy transfer. This refers to the incorporation in some places of the policies 
that other localities have designed and implemented, leading to the growing 
interconnection between jurisdictions (Pakes, 2010). This means the 
increased similarity in the way different jurisdictions address certain issues –
as youth crime, for example - becoming closer whatever in terms of 
architecture, underlying principles, approaching paradigm, discourse or 
practice (Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Muncie and Goldson, 2012). 
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For example, globalization has been used to explain the punitive turn in 
western jurisdictions, in what has been called the ‘Americanization’ of policies 
in the United Kingdom (Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Muncie and Goldson, 
2012). This is due to the expansion and export of penal policies from the 
United States to Europe after the welfare crisis, which has been mostly 
addressed in terms of the import of ‘Zero tolerance’ (Wacquant, 1999; Rivera, 
2005; Muncie, 2005; 2012). This import has also been described in Latin 
America (Chevigny, 2003; Wacquant, 2003; Dammert and Malone, 2006; 
Pinheiro, 2007; Becket and Godoy, 2008; Müller, 2012; Carranza, 2013), 
where it has been associated to the increasing imprisonment rates in the 
region (Carranza, 2013; Hathazy, 2015; Fonseca, 2018). Becket and Godoy 
(2008) for example, identified an average rising of 62% between 1998 and 
2008, which reached 305 inmates per 100,000 habitants in Chile and Brazil 
(Müller, 2012). 
Therefore, globalization is a complex and multifactorial element of modern 
societies, as they are more connected and have greater interaction with the 
wider world. Globalization can influence developments in local crime control, 
institutions and policies by privileging the expansion worldwide of some 
ideas, models and rules over other, promoting heterogeneous societies, and 
impacting on the local economy through the flux of international markets, 
which influence the feelings of anxiety, individualism and fear associated to 
late modernity.  
ii. Public opinion 
This has been understood in terms of the expression of emotions and 
interests that become collective, such as for example concerns with security 
and victimization (Garland, 2001). Also as the emergence of organised 
pressure groups with specific purposes, for example victims’ rights (Lacey, 
2008). Regarding public understanding of ‘youth’, it has been described as 
divided in at least two colliding stereotypes. If they are children or victims of 
crime, they are viewed as innocents who need protection against harm. 
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However, if they have presented any kind of offending behaviour, then they 
are regarded as fully responsible adults (Jewkes, 2011).  
The complexity of this is the lack of balance and nuance. The personalized 
stories and explanations of youngsters’ attitudes and life experiences are 
usually lost in daily communication, while perceptions of them as an 
undistinguishable dangerous, risky and intimidating group that erodes public 
spaces expand (Stenson, 2000; Nash, 2006; Halsey and White, 2008). Public 
perceptions have also been associated with increased feelings of anxiety 
towards a perceived greater permissiveness in a context of softer legislation 
(Hall, 1978). Softer legislation can be understood as the preference for 
rehabilitative and decriminalising approaches, and it is considered to 
generate rejection from the general public (Tonry, 2004b). In consequence, 
young offenders are stereotyped, and further control is promoted to decrease 
the risk or disturbance they represent.  
Other elements considered significant in terms of public opinion are 
‘language’ and ‘subjective meaning’. The public acts and understands the 
world according to previous ideas, which are crystallised by language, which 
also allows individual notions to expand as moral and social explanations of 
the behaviour of others. This has been usually associated with labelling 
processes (Rock, 2012): the social definition of an act as criminal and certain 
individuals as offenders (Becker, 1963), influencing their future possibilities, 
relations with general society and behaviour (Cohen, 1972). Because once 
individuals and actions have been labelled as deviant new policies and 
measures are generated to target them, despite other factors involved on 
their behaviour.   
There are also studies that highlights how little the public actually knows 
about the causes of crime and the legal processes; and how they privilege 
softer measures and rehabilitation when directly asked (Indermauer and 
Hough, 2002; Gillespie and McLaughlin, 2003; Allen, 2006; Hough and 
Roberts, 2012; Sellers, 2015). According to Christie (1977) this lack of 
knowledge relates to the professionalization of justice systems which took the 
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knowledge away from the general population, denying them full participation 
in justice processes and locating it on a closed group of expert professionals 
who speak technically, making access and understanding of the process 
harder.  
In fact, Gillespie and McLaughlin (2003) conclude on their own research that 
the public’s views can change if the situation is presented to them while 
stimulating moral ambivalence, or if the life story and underpinning factors for 
offending are explained. The authors recognise that some deeply rooted 
punitive attitudes are hard to change, because they are sustained on beliefs, 
values and a vision of the world developed during childhood. However, 
personal experience or hearing others’ personal experiences can make 
people vary the way they interpret further information around this topic. In 
fact, participation in community measures and increased social trust relate to 
less fear of crime and a more neutral attitude towards crime and young 
offenders (Dammert and Lunecke, 2002). Likewise, according to Tonry 
(2004b), the public is divided between wanting criminals punished and 
treated. Consequently, people appear to expect contradictory outcomes from 
justice systems (Indermauer and Hough, 2002). Thus, public opinion might 
be more varied and softer than expected, people can change their 
perceptions, providing them with some nuance and balance (Tonry, 2004a) 
that has not been properly recognised. Following this line, public opinion 
extracted from polls and surveys is neither absolute nor straightforward.  
Furthermore, Sprott (1999) claims that public’s interest for imprisonment as a 
response to youth crime has more to do with the belief that other measures 
are ineffective, rather than real trust in custody. Hence, the real knowledge 
that the public may possess is usually unknown and unconsidered by policy 
makers, and according to Roberts and Stalans (2000) quite sophisticated and 
contrary to politicians’ expression or media portrayals of it.  
Nevertheless, public opinion has also become increasingly used as a tool for 
political competition. This means that politicians use the abstract concept of 
‘public opinion’ to manifest they have the support of voters for certain policies 
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or for changing or strengthening the direction policies are following (Roberts 
and Stalans, 2000); or that politicians refer to the suffering of the common 
citizen to justify their policies (Koch, 2017). That means politicians use the 
‘imagined’ public opinion based on the understanding of what ‘the mass’ is 
supposed to want, or the ‘represented’ opinion spread by means such as the 
media, which role will be properly addressed below.  
iii. Media 
The media has been mostly identified in the literature as having a role of 
intermediate between politics, the national and international context and 
public opinion, acting as the official channel of communication and a 
widespread source of information about the world – including crime (Hough 
and Roberts, 2004; Greer and Reiner, 2012). For example, in Latin America 
where the interaction between the political elite and citizens has been 
identified as weak, the media has become a key mediator which can promote 
fear, insecurity and hostilities (Dammert and Malone, 2006; Pinheiro, 2007; 
Santander, 2010). 
Consequently, the media defines what the general population knows about 
crime (Garland, 1998). Thus, influencing public and political reactions by 
defining youth crime in certain specific ways, usually in terms of negative 
stereotypes, biased constructions of the events and people involved, the 
support for punitivism and the maintenance of the status quo (Cohen, 1972; 
Hall, 1978; Jewkes, 2011).  
Youngsters are usually portrayed as evil (Jewkes, 2008), dangerous 
(Goldson, 2006) and fully responsible individuals (Phoenix, 2009; Fox, 2015), 
who cannot change or rehabilitate (Jewkes, 2008). Their offending is 
presented as violent, constant and random attacks over undeserving victims 
(ibid); and it had been associated with a lack of social values and self-interest 
(Maruna and King, 2009).  
Therefore, young offenders become ‘other’, someone who is not like the rest 
of society and does not belong (Jewkes, 2008). Thus, the behaviour answers 
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only to them instead of to greater social issues. Moreover, the images 
selected usually relate to the lower and more deprived sectors of society 
(Pitts, 2003), their habits, places and fashions (Cohen, 1972), also impacted 
by demographic characteristics such as gender, age and race (Kidd-Hewitt, 
2002). Therefore, offending and evilness came to be associated with ‘bad 
neighbourhoods’ and ‘the poor’. This leads to the criminalization of 
youngsters, and their exclusion of certain social spaces and opportunities. As 
a result, the quality and objectivity of the information spread have been 
widely questioned. 
Moreover, the constant representation of the world as a dangerous place 
(Altheide, 1997) increases perceptions of risk of future victimization, feeding 
into the anxieties of late modern societies. This can lead to pressure for 
security and public protection; and support for more punitive and controlling 
justice measures despite the needs of youngsters, in order to ensure adult’s 
feelings of security (Hughes and Follett, 2006). This can result in targeting 
those with previous history in the justice system, who remain as ‘suspects’ 
despite their real present behaviour (McAra and McVie, 2005). Therefore, the 
media acts as a platform to spread inclusion or exclusion (Jewkes, 2008). 
This is especially complex when we consider the ownership of the media is 
strongly concentrated, as in Latin America, where it tends to act as an 
extension of the conservative right-wing (Santander, 2010). 
In consequence, media portrayals have been identified as intentioned 
constructions of social life (Cohen, 1967; Kidd-Hewitt, 2002; Jewkes, 2004; 
Surette, 2011), which respond to the ideological and political context (Egan et 
al., 2013). Media influence expands by the fact they also act as the main 
source of information of what the public is supposed to want, assuming the 
role of the representation of public opinions and interests to politicians as well 
(Green, 2009). So, the media would have a double informative role impacting 
on crime control measures (Greer and Reiner, 2012). 
Nevertheless, media influence is complex, and its study has not been 
exempted of controversy. Initially, the media was considered to be highly 
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influential and directive over a passive public (Kitzinger, 2004; Carrabine, 
2008). However, given the lack of evidence supporting that statement, the 
audience came to be recognised as at least active enough to interpret the 
information provided (Gillespie and McLaughlin, 2003). This active role 
gained recognition and lately the public was understood to both interpret and 
select media consumption based on interests, experiences and world vision 
(Kitzinger, 2004; Carrabine, 2008). Thus, media influence would be 
reinforcing instead of challenging, because it would strengthen those views 
that led to that media selection on the first place (King and Maruna, 2006; 
Green, 2009).  
Then, media ‘frames’ came at the centre of the discussion. These work as 
guides of how to analyse new events (Green, 2009), acting as definers of 
new situations based on previous knowledge and information, which was 
also provided by the media. Hence, media impact was understood in terms of 
shaping the topics for public discussion (Altheide, 1997). As such, media 
influence would be significantly more subtle than was initially thought to be, 
though it is generally associated to defend the status quo, reinforcing 
structural ideological biases, or adapting to public interests in order to profit in 
a competitive economic framework (Kidd-Hewitt, 2002). 
b) International rights discourses 
International rights discourses, conventions, agreements, treaties and 
guidelines provide a common cosmopolitan framework to all countries that 
ratify them, and a reference of what is worldwide expected to those that do 
not comply to them. The difference with the elements presented in the 
previous subsection is that the strength of these rights documents and 
discourses depends on the active willingness of a country to accept them. 
Otherwise, they do not have strong impact in the local context and can be 
mostly dismissed, for example the United States has not ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child [UNCRC]. However, this has not 
impacted on their relationship with other nations as market, policy and 
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migration fluctuations could do, with or without national acceptance of those 
particular conditions. 
Regarding juvenile justice, we can find the already mentioned UNCRC, the 
United Nations Standard Minimal Rules for the Administration of juvenile 
justice (the Beijing rules), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines), the United Nations Rules for 
the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the JDL Rules), the 
American Convention on Human Rights (San José de Costa Rica Pact), and 
others which also depend on jurisdictions’ spatial location. All these 
documents provide a basic framework to be applied no matter the local 
context. All of them emphasise, for example, the need for differentiated 
treatment of young people from that of adults (Junger-Tas, 2008; Muncie, 
2012).  
Furthermore, they have promoted debates about core issues relating to 
juvenile justice systems, including young offenders’ needs and rights. For 
example, the Beijing Rules emphasise the importance of consistency 
between penal and civil rights and responsibilities (Goldson, 2013). This has 
evolved to a highly significant and widespread debate about the age at which 
young people can be considered responsible for their actions, and the degree 
of responsibility that competes to them. 
International conventions also emphasise on the need of due process, 
recognising the rights of young people to actively and knowledgeably 
participate on their legal process, while promoting decriminalization 
(Goldson, 2013). This refers to decreasing their contact with the criminal 
justice system. The reason behind this is that research has shown how 
previous experience in the system makes further involvement more likely, 
stigmatizing children and young people, even if the first contact was under 
protection grounds instead of offending (McAra and McVie, 2005). The result 
of this emphasis has been the recognition of diversion as a better response 
to minor offences (Pitts, 2003). 
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Even though these documents do not imply mandatory changes in each 
jurisdiction, they do involve reports, evaluations and suggestions of the path 
juvenile justice should follow. Moreover, as the previous chapter evidenced, 
they can become a source of pressure or the starting point for a reform. The 
closeness between these regulations and local justice institutions impact on 
the perception of jurisdictions as punitive or not. It also impacts on the 
alternatives that are more supported in terms of approach, for example by 
privileging welfare and justice paradigms (McAra, 2010), focusing not only on 
protection but also rights, and identifying custody as a last resort (Goldson 
and Muncie, 2006). Therefore, as Pakes (2004) stated, criminal justice 
systems are less self-contained than in the past, being influenced by the 
demands to apply the guidelines.  
 
These trends of convergence establish a connection between what is 
happening in many jurisdictions at the same time, facilitating the exchange of 
knowledge and the transference of ideas. However, their explanatory power 
is limited. For example, late modernity and globalization are complex 
concepts, lacking one specific definition. Moreover, most jurisdictions -if not 
all- are subject to global pressures and present feelings such as fear and 
insecurity. However, the world presents a high variation of penal policies, 
justice system and crime control approaches, and not all jurisdictions have 
turned more controlling, populist or punitive (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; 
Tonry, 2007; Lacey, 2008; 2009). 
Furthermore, Tonry (2007) claims that fear and insecurity appear to respond 
to the social and economic local context that interacts with a broader global 
framework of pressures (for example, economic competition), while 
comparing their performance with other better valued nations. Similarly, the 
convergence or transference of knowledge is also transformed in the 
process, changing and adapting to the new setting (Garland, 2011; Melossi, 
Sozzo and Sparks, 2011; Nelken, 2012). In the words of Newburn and 
Sparks: ‘It is in the socio-political and cultural context in which ‘transfer’ 
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occurs that has the most profound effect on the eventual shape and style of 
the policy concerned’ (2012:5). According to Melossi (2004), this is due to the 
impossibility of correctly translating such measures from one culture to 
another. This is also interfered by local previous approaches, values, 
concerns or even national budget framing the possibilities of policy 
implementation. This have been claimed to relate to the status of the 
sovereignty and self-definition of a given jurisdiction, in terms of the capacity 
it shows to be more or less influenced by external pressures. For example in 
terms of ‘negative policy transfer’, because the result of the external influence 
is the rejection of a given policy (Newburn and Sparks, 2004). Therefore, the 
effects of convergent trends are mediated by local circumstances and 
developments, which are not equally receptive to these influences. 
 
2. Elements of Divergence 
 
This subsection will refer to the elements I found in the broader literature that 
could be understood as defining the local characteristics of each jurisdiction, 
such as cultural processes that mediate the need to make changes (McAra, 
2005), or institutional dispositions that imply differentiation in the way 
jurisdictions work.  
a) Political Economy 
The concept, despite being understood differently by varied authors, has 
always implied the influence of economy into politics. In consequence, even 
though there are common philosophical or structural elements in other 
jurisdictions, the resulting product is based in the internal decisions of local 
actors, governments, institutions and processes. The political economy has 
been identified as relevant because of its impact on elements such as social 
capital, the power relations, class divisions, labour distribution, distinctions 
and interaction within the community, which in turn shape crime control 
policies (Reiner, 2007). 
41 
 
The local economic system, such as capitalism, is relevant as it regulates the 
market in terms of consumption but also production and employment (labour 
market), impacting on the economic position of communities and individuals 
within a society. This could lead to the expansion of feeling of security or 
insecurity, put at risk social stability and alter the interaction between social 
classes, such as interests and possibilities of ‘going up’ or fears of ‘falling 
down’ (Young, 2007; Wacquant, 2012). Moreover, according to Melossi 
(2004), the economic organization can impact on a context of competition, 
strengthening a relationship between punishments and rewards as part of the 
logic in which society functions. De Giorgi (2007) associates this with the 
utility of penal strategies to control the value of human labour, preserving the 
economic system and the relations of production.  
Local economic organization has also been linked to patterns of offending 
behaviour. For example, property crime has been described as increasing in 
times of recessions, crime rates being higher in poorer sectors and prisons 
being filled with people from low economic backgrounds (Morrison, 2000). 
Similarly, the economic situation a determined jurisdiction is facing has been 
associated to the punishment and justice apparatus. For example, Rivera 
(2005) highlights the connection between fiscal crisis, the expansion of 
punishment and the birth of ‘nothing works’, which resulted in the 
development of new approaches such as sentencing guidelines and the 
business of security and penal companies. Simon (2010) also highlights the 
growing business of security and the profit it has brought to private 
companies.  
Regarding politics, it is a very broad concept that involves, for example, the 
structuring framework of a jurisdiction, such as the political order (for 
example authoritarian regime or liberal democracy). Politics has been 
recognised as a key driver of crime control due to its symbolic power. 
Politicians can generate new meanings, lead debates, define the interaction 
with other jurisdictions, and decide which topics are to be considered as 
central (Jones and Newburn, 2004). For example, political discourse about 
crime and justice can impact how crime is understood and what is considered 
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the best way to deal with it, thus influencing the future of criminal justice. A 
good example of this is the politicization of victims’ movements, which 
brought about a new shift in political discourse towards the recognition of 
victims’ rights. In some countries this resulted in the recognition of Human 
Rights in general and increased participation of victims on their own legal 
processes, and in others it implied the polarization of crime control practices 
by opposing victims to offenders (Garland, 2001; Pratt, 2008b).  
Therefore, politicians can influence perceptions of crime and possible 
solutions. The current trend – started in the United States (Downes and 
Morgan, 2002) – has been to mobilise public concerns and attention from 
other social problems to crime and punishment as a scapegoat (Hope and 
Sparks, 2000; Sparks, 2003; Tonry, 2004b; Simon, 2006). This has been 
mostly described in societies where the trust in state institutions is low, and 
where values such as individualism are stronger (Lacey, 2008; Pratt, 2008b). 
In jurisdictions that have evolved towards punitive practices, politicians are 
seen as constantly reminding people how risky the world is, making the 
public more receptive to crime control strategies (Tonry, 2004a), and thus 
more dependent on politicians and elite power to feel more secure and 
protected, which in turns facilitates the continuity of the status quo. 
The influence of political economy in crime control has been analysed, for 
example, by Cavadino and Dignan (2006) who generated a classification of 
four types of political economies (neo-liberal, conservative-corporatist, social-
democratic corporatist and oriental corporatist), with their impact on 
punishment, welfare and social rights. According to their analysis, neoliberal 
societies are more prone to punitive approaches. Lacey (2008) also 
attributed an essential role to political economy in explaining the differences 
in penal practices, mediating the interaction between workers (according to 
their skills), economic security and status, thus impacting in the level of 
inclusionary or exclusionary practices of justice systems. Moreover, in her 
work she highlights how the economic exclusion of some also imply exclusive 




According to Wacquant (1999) the upper classes turned to demands of a 
stronger and more involved penal apparatus to contain the social 
consequences of neoliberalism, such as poverty, inequality, marginalization 
and social unrest (For example in 2003 he published a paper in relation to 
what he termed ‘the dictatorship of the poor’ in Brazil). He highlights how 
modern penal common sense criminalizes poverty and becomes a tool to 
sustain the neoliberal conditions of low wages and increased marginality. 
Thus, being a tool to maintain the economic status quo and distribution. 
According to the author, the impact of neoliberalism has been stronger in 
Latin America than in other regions of the world. Following this line, De Giordi 
(2011) claims the institutions and policies of social control are key in the 
reproduction of the ‘capitalist relations of production’ (p. 114). While 
according to Melossi (2011), penalty is a part of the overall project of political 
economy, acting as a mechanism to govern people’s behaviour. 
At the same time, neoliberalism has been associated to certain values that 
expand to the penal realm, such as individual responsibility. According to 
Muncie and Hughes (2002), whose research is based in the United Kingdom, 
juvenile justice, for example, moves between protection principles (set in 
international guidelines and deference to childhood) and responsibility and 
punishment. Muncie (2005), who writes mostly about western reality, also 
highlights that where free-market principles have spread, incarceration rates 
have increased. The author claims (2012) that juvenile justice moved towards 
a justice approach due to the progressive abandon of welfare in neoliberal 
societies. The effects of neoliberal privatization and reduction of the State 
have also been associated to the need of a redefinition of the role of the 
State, which has led to the expansion and harshening of penal intervention 
(Wacquant, 1999).  
Nevertheless, there are different types of political economies, and even 
jurisdictions that share the same overall classification of modes of political 
economy, differ in their implementation based in the local culture, social and 
political institutions (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; 2007; Lacey, 2008). For 
example, O’Malley (2012) refers to the difference of the neoliberalism being 
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applied in Australia in relation to the one of the United States. Therefore, it 
becomes key to take into consideration the broader political landscape being 
shaped by the economy. Otherwise, it is hard to grasp how the same model 
can be implemented in varied ways and how deep it permeates in terms of 
local power distribution or social values.  
For example, in highly hierarchical societies, individuals who are considered 
to belong to the marginalised lower group, might be more likely treated in 
ways that have less respect for their civil rights, decreasing their guarantees 
or the interest for investing on offering them new options, such as diversion 
or rehabilitation. While in most equalitarian societies, it may be more likely 
that the concerns and solutions involve the social group as a whole, trying to 
privilege more standard goods instead of the interest of those in higher 
positions only (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). Thus, it can impact on the 
population being criminalised, the ways they come to be treated both by state 
agencies and by other members of the social group, how the causes of crime 
are being understood, and possible prevention strategies.   
In consequence, political economy represents a highly complex element. 
Moreover, politicians have been claimed to create the same problems that 
then they try to address, shaping popular expectations that then in turn 
become guidelines and/or limitations for future political processes (Lacey, 
2008; People and Smith, 2010). 
b) Constitutional infrastructure  
The constitution provides the parameters for both legal and political power. It 
provides the framework to organise social and civil institutions, it sets the 
guidelines to the relationship between citizens and the State, the rights of 
citizenship, the limits of sovereignty and State power, the rules to create new 
laws and institutions, and the national values and priorities to be protected 
(for example life or property). Therefore, the constitution provides the logics 
underlying punishment, because it allows to identify what can be considered 
as going against social values and moral, thus, criminalised. It also 
determines the characteristics of local crime control by setting the rules of 
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representation, power and institutionalization of State’s authority (Rivera, 
2005; Lacey, 2008). In consequence, it can facilitate or block the 
representation of different interests, being those the maintenance of the 
status quo or the promotion of equality among citizens, for example. If 
citizens’ participation is only limited to voting in public elections every certain 
amount of years, and if all those in powerful political positions belong to a 
social or economic elite, it is not the same than supporting legislation by 
public consultation to the citizenship, or granting the possibility for regular 
citizens to reach powerful political positions.  
Following from Miller (2016), accountability is the key concept regarding 
crime control and punishment trends. The author claims that if there is a 
greater engagement of citizens and political accountability in a given 
constitutional system, it is less likely they will resort to repressive practices 
such as the expansion of imprisonment. Similarly, places with a greater 
division of parties or political members who come from different sectors and 
need greater consensus to take decisions, would be less affected by 
temporary moods around offending, especially if the people involved in the 
application of justice measures are civil servants instead of politically 
appointed. On the contrary, countries who depend on bipartisan systems 
appear to be weaker to the influence of key actors or the interests of any 
common member of the public, tending towards populism and punitivism. 
Thus, they are more malleable to momentary or personal interests in spite of 
long term less popular but more effective approaches (Tonry, 2004a; 
Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Lacey, 2008).  
According to Rivera (2005), the post war emphasis on a constitutional 
framework was based on the need to guarantee a certain quality of a political 
system, especially in terms of limiting State power. Therefore, as Lacey 
(2008) stated, it can be used as a tool or as a constraint, having a significant 
role underpinning the power relationships within a given context. Moreover, 
as constitutions are the result of long and intense social and political 
processes and changing them is usually hard, they involve an interesting 
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element in terms of what a society decided was relevant enough as to set as 
their ‘permanent’ rules, rights, duties and principles.  
c) The lagged effect of Previous crime control and justice institutions and 
policies 
The past logics and institutions over which new policies, State punishment 
and criminal justice are built are another factor to keep in mind. McAra (2010) 
describes how justice discourses, for example prioritizing welfare of juveniles 
or risk reduction, can impact on the understanding of the people who 
becomes involved with justice agencies, and possible explanations for their 
behaviour, their autonomy and responsibility, and also in the relationship 
between citizens, communities, the state and crime control agencies, such as 
the police.  
Criminal justice institutions and policies also interact with the characteristics 
of the national context (such as crime rates, most common offences, and 
high connotation events), the amount of knowledge and research about the 
topic, the opinion of experts in the field, the principles present in the national 
constitution and international agreements that have been ratified by the 
country. All these elements determine the goals of the justice system, where 
we can find elements such as public protection, rehabilitation, prevention or 
deterrence. The lack of comply between past crime control institutions and 
policies with new rules and expectations can lead to reform, for example, as 
it happened with the UNCRC and the questioning of the tutelary system in 
Chile as shown in the previous chapter.  
Therefore, justice institutions mediate the understanding a given community 
has on crime, and the network of public or private institutions related to crime 
control. In turn, they also play a role in constraining the future directions that 
reforms and changes may follow. This happens because old institutions set 
the parameters for new reforms and regulations, and what have happened so 
far is that the old and the new tend to mix together, instead of erasing 
previous approaches towards crime and offenders (Brants and Field, 2000; 
Muncie and Hughes, 2002; Pinheiro, 2007; Goldson and Hughes, 2010).  
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Nevertheless, authors like Lacey (2008) or Garland (1996) highlight that 
justice and crime control institutions cannot solve the crime problem on their 
own. Garland (1996; 2000) has identified strategies such as giving 
responsibility back to citizens in order to complement state power. While 
Wacquant (2012), for example, makes the connection to changing and 
integrating poverty and inequality policies together with justice measures. 
Therefore, treating criminal justice agencies as one more element working 
around an issue that is much bigger than just offending behaviour itself.  
In this context, the trust on crime control agencies and justice institutions 
becomes highly significant because it also impacts on interpersonal trust, 
increasing the anxieties and fears already described as associated with 
modernity, the consequences of neoliberalism or the uncertain economy. The 
result can be the support of any new measure, regardless of its effectiveness 
or damaging consequences in the long term, as long as they help to 
decrease those feelings of insecurity (Dammert and Lunecke, 2002). 
Likewise, the lack of trust could impact on the stability of democratic orders, 
because it involves the questioning of the decisions of authorities, the 
concern of their performance and the requirement of more effective 
measures or more capable people in charge. 
d) Culture 
Culture is a very broad and contested concept that involves a wide variety of 
elements, such as habits, values and beliefs, attitudes and behaviours, webs 
of meaning, and also how the marginalised and criminalised members of 
society are seen, and the way institutions are constituted (Brants and Field, 
2000; Garland, 2006; 2011; Dignan and Cavadino, 2007; Pratt, 2008a).  
According to Melossi (2004; 2011) the cultural context is an essential part of 
policies and practices around crime control. The author talks about 
embeddedness, referring to how institutions cannot be ‘conceived separately’ 
from the historical evolution, traditions and development of social actions 
within which they emerged. Thus, as shown in the previous subsection, they 
cannot be simply mobilised to a new context. Moreover, the author states 
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that the way punishment is conceived also depends on the cultural 
background. For example, in his 2004 study, he analyses the influence of 
religion in shaping crime control. He compared the strength of the Catholic 
Church in Italy with the role of Protestantism in the United States, for 
example regarding moral norms and what attitudes can or cannot be 
tolerated. He concludes this has an important impact on the tolerance and 
severity of penal responses. In this context, culture acts as a ‘repertoire’ of 
motives.  
Culture also impacts on other processes associated to youth crime, such as 
transitions to adulthood, or expectations defining cultural goals, for example 
to become independent, have a successful career and a family (Smith, 
2010). Therefore, the culture can shape the general social practices and 
processes which could then imply future constrains to the direction of 
changes, for example regarding what is expected on children, what is 
considerable acceptable as punishment outside and inside the criminal 
justice system, what actions are considered violent (a good example of this 
are demonstrations, which in some places are considered a civil right and in 
others a violent display, regardless of the characteristics of the demonstration 
itself). As such, if cultural values such as individualism are strong and the 
identity the members of the social group is weak, it is easier to turn to hard 
punishment, because it seems as justified by the fault on the own citizens to 
respect those values (Young, 2007; Green, 2009).  
 
To summarise this section, it is possible to say that there are a series of key 
elements that interact with each other, driving, shaping, and constraining 
changes in crime control and justice. The impact of convergent trends 
depends on local elements such as institutions, models, political and cultural 
context and so on, which in turn are not sealed off from the influence of late 
modernity with its effects in public opinion, the media, and the populist use of 
crime and security.  
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Even when sometimes they can look very alike, the combination of crime 
control institutions, policies and outcomes tends to be very unique and 
specific. Thus, increasing the complexity of understanding and explaining 
specific changes, to comprehend how, for example, global trends interact 
with local elements, and to explain reform processes. Therefore, a detailed 
account of the local characteristics of a jurisdiction and how they have been 
influenced (or not) by external forces into play becomes relevant. Especially 
because each location has specific historical elements that set their context, 
but also the receptivity to convergent trends. However, not all realities have 
been taken into account in research of penal transformations or when 
analysing the elements mentioned in this section. The reality of recent 
democracies or transitional societies is one of those that has been mostly left 
outside of the theorization of penal transformation. The following section, 
then, will refer to what is known about them.  
 
II- Penal transformations in recent democracies and/or 
transitional societies 
 
Cheliotis and Xenakis (2016) highlight the impact of transition from political 
systems, especially from dictatorship to democracy, in the developments of 
crime control and State punishment. However, this is a reality that has been 
mostly overlooked by the broad literature of penal transformations, which 
tend to focus in developed democratic countries of the global north. 
Nevertheless, some authors have identified links between local punitiveness 
and the ‘thinness’ of democracy (Becket and Godoy, 2008). This, because 
they grant fair elections, for example, yet the State responsibility to guarantee 
basic rights is minimal and political participation is limited. Point also 
mentioned by O’Donnell (1993) in his analysis of Latin American 
democracies and by Cheliotis and Xenakis (2016) in relation to Greece.  
The small but growing body of research about penal transformations in 
recent democracies and societies that have experienced transitions from 
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authoritarianism to democracy is not always clear about what are the initial 
and eventual developments in crime control and punishment, or how reforms 
develop. Some studies, such as Medina-Ariza (2006) regarding Spain, 
highlight an initial period of new policies aligned with democratic notions of 
Human Rights, the respect of freedom and the rule of law, distancing from 
previous authoritarian practices. Nevertheless, there are some cases such as 
Argentina, where the approach towards crime control reforms and policies is 
more ambivalent and strongly reliant on the political and economic stability or 
crisis of specific moments in time (Sozzo, 2016).  
Overall, in Latin America, Greece, Spain, South Africa, Serbia and central 
Europe, research has highlighted the turn towards punitive measures. In 
some cases, this turn has been associated to the return of authoritarian 
practices, as Haney (2016) describes for central Europe. In Greece, for 
example, it has been associated to the continuation of authoritarian practices 
but predominantly directed towards immigrants (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 
2016). Regarding Latin America, Müller (2012) has described a more violent 
penal culture, while several authors highlight the increase of punitivism and 
populism regarding crime control and justice in the region (Dammert and 
Malone, 2006; Pinheiro, 2007; Becket and Godoy, 2008; Iturralde, 2010; 
Müller, 2012; Hathazy, 2015; Carrington, Hogg and Sozzo, 2016; Sozzo, 
2016). For example, through the expansion of terms such as ‘Iron Fist’ [Mano 
dura] against crime (Chevigny, 2003; Dammert and Malone, 2006; Pinheiro, 
2007; Becket and Godoy, 2008; Müller, 2012; Carranza, 2013). 
This is relevant because research emphasizes that unstable and changing 
political contexts decrease the public’s trust on the capacity of the state and 
public institutions to deal with national issues, negatively impacting on their 
legitimacy, and with that in the hegemony of the social order (Gramsci, 
1988). Moreover, different authors highlight the link between punitive policies 
and rhetoric to deal with legitimacy crisis of a given government, the political 
elite and even the political order of a given jurisdiction (see for example 
Garland, 1996; Sparks, 2000; Koch, 2017). Therefore, the strengthening of 
punitive systems has been associated to the weakness of democratic states 
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(Pearson, 1983). Garland (1996) associated the limitations of sovereignty to 
a series of crime control strategies, such as the responsibilization of citizens 
for their own protection, redefining organizational success and punitive 
responses to re-stablish sovereignty. 
For example, in the Latin American context, the expansion of tough rhetoric 
against crime in the public and political realms has been explained as the 
consequence of these crises of legitimation. After the authoritarian regimes of 
the second half of the 20th century there was a need to validate and 
strengthen the new political orders or the new political elites in a context of 
high inequality and limited granting of social services by the State, need 
heightened by contested political elections that required to find a topic for 
struggle that could reach all voters (Chevigny, 2003; Pinheiro, 2007). In this 
context, the focus on crime control and punishment acted as a diversion and 
consensus strategy, being thus associates to political weakness and a 
weakened rule of law (Chevigny, 2003; Dammert and Malone, 2006; 
Pinheiro, 2007; Iturralde, 2010; Sozzo, 2016).  
As previously shown in relation to late modernity and populist politics, the 
focus on crime control and punishment has been described as effective as it 
helps to control feelings of risk, insecurity, vulnerability and anxiety in the 
population by strengthening perceptions of control and order, while 
strengthening notions of power and effectiveness from the State (Garland, 
1990; Zedner, 2000; Sparks, 2000; 2003; Koch, 2017). Moreover, by creating 
a common enemy, it unites people, facilitating social cohesion (Melossi, 
2000; Zedner, 2000; Muncie and Hughes, 2002). Therefore, criminal justice 
acts as a symbol of state sovereignty (Crawford, 2011). In consequence, it 
becomes a useful tool in times of transition, especially in societies that were 
divided by the previous authoritarian regimes, such as Chile as chapter four 
and five will demonstrate. 
Moreover, following from Pearson (1983), the advance of democratization 
processes widens social tension, especially in relation to the discipline of the 
working class, and the new freedoms of the common people. Which brings 
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especial attention over young people’s behaviour, who under a generalized 
common sense have become worse in terms of amoral and violent 
behaviour. However, there is little evidence of that fact and it seems to be 
more about widespread amnesia of the past than present reality. Under any 
circumstance, given these perceptions of increasingly dangerous youth, new 
forms of discipline have come to be developed and implemented, which in 
the process are also adapted to the new socio-political settings of modern 
and/or transitional societies. 
The study of societies that have experienced recent transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy is also relevant because the consolidation of 
the new political order is elusive (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2016). In 
consequence, it is not clear if reform in crime control, State punishment and 
justice are the evidence of clean breaks from the past, or in fact continuity 
under a renewed, more modern, shape. For example, Becket and Godoy 
(2008) highlight how the political use of crime worked as a strategy to limit 
citizens’ rights, all while appearing democratic and keeping the support of 
part of the population, mostly those fearful of the possible loss of past 
benefits, lack of control, or the expansion of power in other groups that had 
been previously oppressed. Likewise, other authors, associate the increase 
of punitivism as a strategy to control and repress the poor, justifying the 
continuation of authoritarian practices, the exclusion of citizens and the 
disrespect for their rights (Wacquant, 2003; Pinheiro, 2008; Müller, 2012). 
Thus, it appears criminal justice systems served the purpose to expand the 
new democratic order while limiting the freedom of the recently freed citizens. 
Some authors also highlight the role of corruption, the lack of trust in the 
police and their lack of involvement in the community and violence as 
increasing fear and limiting trust towards the criminal justice system and 
crime control institutions, all elements that can also be considered a 
continuation of authoritarian practices (Chevigny, 2003; Wacquant, 2003; 
Dammert and Malone, 2006; Pinheiro, 2007; Iturralde, 2010). 
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Moreover, the predominance of crime and punishment in public discourse 
distracts the audience from other societal concerns. This facilitates the 
introduction of conservative policies on different fields that are not being 
widely covered, despite the public interest they may generate. The emphasis 
is on greater political visibility and leads to the prioritization of punitivism over 
effectiveness, knowledge or evidence supporting ‘softer’ long-term 
approaches (Bauman, 2000; Goldson, 2002). The result are contradictory 
policies in order to look efficient in front of any crime control situation, but 
also influenced by international conventions, the structuration of the justice 
system and the legitimation of punishment within a rights’ discourse.  
Therefore, the transitional or democratization context alters the influence of 
the convergent trends and divergent factors described in the previous 
section, becoming a key aspect to keep in mind. Moreover, explanations of 
penal transformations or trends in State punishment in transitional societies 
are many times studied in relation to these convergent or diverging elements, 
but they do not necessarily explain how the local context shapes and 
constrain the influence of more broad theoretical elements. For example, 
various authors link the neoliberalism imposed in many, albeit not all, the 
Latin American authoritarian regimes, with the increased punitivism in the 
region, as they also influenced -and perhaps determined- the significant 
levels of poverty and inequality in the region (see for example: Chevigny, 
2003; Wacquant, 2003; Pinheiro, 2007; Becket and Godoy, 2008; Iturralde, 
2010; Müller, 2012; Carranza, 2013; Sozzo, 2016; 2016b). However, the 
implementation of neoliberalism and the co-shaping processes between the 
political economy and the transitional context are not explained. The political 
economy is treated as a completely separated element from the context, 
following the dominant approach of western developed democratic countries, 
or the two elements (authoritarianism and neoliberalism) are shown as 
present, but their interacting dynamics are absent. The need to explore how 
these dynamics works is central because, as some authors who have studied 
Latin American transitional societies highlight, the broader literature does not 
quite fit to explain other regional processes that distance from where most of 
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the theory has been developed (mostly the United States and the United 
Kingdom) (Chevigny, 2003; Becket and Godoy, 2008). 
However, as highlighted in the previous section, the local politics, culture and 
previous institutions shape the demands, needs and expectations associated 
to justice systems and State punishment. For example, according to Iturralde 
(2010), the impact of elements such as neoliberalism or globalization is 
indeed a consequence of the regional delay in most aspects due to the 
authoritarian regimes. Following from Dammert and Malone (2006) there is 
also a strong fear of crime in the region, which has become a top political 
priority, as a result of the economic, political and social insecurities brought 
by the landscape of inequality and poverty already mentioned.  
Nevertheless, most of what is known about the underlying context, drivers 
and dynamics that shape penal transformations in recent democracies, 
especially regarding comparison between the past and the present, is limited 
by the lack of systematic registry of data in general and regarding crime and 
punishment in specific in the Latin American region (Weaver and Maddaleno, 
1999). Interestingly, this has been at least partly explained by the 
dictatorships’ efforts to hide and control information (Chevigny, 2003; 
Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2016). In consequence, the body of research 
dedicated to analysing and explain processes of penal transformation in 
recent democracies is fairly limited. Moreover, the existent literature does not 
usually provide clear in-depth explanations of the influences of the past, all 
the local factors playing a part in the reform process, and how the dynamics 
of influence and co-shaping with global trends and international pressures or 
guidelines work. How much does the authoritarian past impacts on the 
present decisions to reform crime control mechanisms? Are reform 
processes defined by the authoritarian past or they evidence a break from it? 
For example, as chapter four will demonstrate, Chile kept the Constitution 
and a substantive group of the political elite from the authoritarian regime. On 
the contrary, Spain created a new constitution in 1978 to distance from 
Franco’s regime in their process of democratic consolidation. This of course 
alters the characteristics of a jurisdiction, how it interacts with the wider 
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world, how accountable it is, the power of the State and the power of the elite 
to decide, for example, the local implementation of new crime control and 
punishment policies.  
 
III- Understanding the transformation of juvenile justice in Chile 
 
The present research intends to contribute to the gap of knowledge regarding 
Chile in the literature of penal transformations. In doing so, I will also 
contribute to the discussion of penal reform regarding the reality of a Latin 
American (I.e. global south) and recent democracy example. By privileging 
an in-depth approach through interviews with key actors and the analysis of 
key documents, it will consider the local historical, political, economic, social 
and cultural context, and the impact of external elements and convergent 
trends over the country. Therefore, it will focus on explaining the reform of 
the juvenile justice system together with the dynamics between both the past 
and the present and local and global elements. The purpose is to provide a 
clear understanding of the reform process, a comprehensive explanation of 
the elements behind penal reforms and their dynamics of interaction and 
impact, avoiding oversimplifications and reductionisms that could lead to 
misunderstandings of the role of the different drives of change, due to the 
lack of knowledge about the particularities of the jurisdiction and processes 
under study. 
Moreover, Chile is a particularly interesting site to explore penal reform, as it 
provides elements than differ from other case studies. For example, at the 
time of the debates and implementation of the juvenile justice reform, Chile 
differed from the concern identifies in European countries regarding 
immigration (Lacey, 2008; Wacquant, 2012; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2016; 
Fonseca, 2018). Moreover, other Latin American countries might be 
considered similar regarding the processes of penal transformations. For 
example, given the generalized context of authoritarian regimes and the 
wave of juvenile justice reforms in democratic times over the 1990s and early 
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2000s. However, Chile had one of the lowest rates of victimization in Latin 
America (Dammert and Malone, 2006), although, together with Brazil, it had 
the highest rates of imprisonment in the region (Müller, 2012). Moreover, 
while other countries experienced economic crises, such as Argentina and 
Brazil for example, Chile was an unusual case given its economic success. In 
fact, Chile has been described as having an outstanding growth all over the 
1990s (Weyland, 1999; Silva, 2002; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006; Borzutsky, 
2017). This is also interesting because Cheliotis and Xenakis (2016) highlight 
the role of economic success in the perceived consolidation of post 
authoritarian democratic regimes. But if that was the case in Chile, does it 
mean the country has followed a different trend to the one described for the 
Latin American region? Yet, as shown in the previous chapter, national 
studies in juvenile justice highlight the presence of a preference for punitive 
approaches as well (Cillero and Espejo, 2008; Berríos, 2011; Werth, 2013). 
At the same time, juvenile justice is a particularly important area of change. 
For example, most research focuses on imprisonment rates. However, the 
resulting imprisonment is a consequence of broader criminalizing, judging 
and sentencing processes that are relevant to be studied. So far, even 
research that take processes into consideration, only refer to the policies that 
succeeded and prevailed, instead of considering in their analysis all the 
conflicting ideas and what was left behind (Garland, 2004). Moreover, the 
juvenile justice system, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is a more 
pervasive civic institution that talks about building a society and the future 
they aspire. Thus, it can inform in greater detail about the underlying social 
and cultural situation. For example, juveniles and their behaviour have been 
described as becoming the focus of social attention and anxiety at times of 
change by other authors (Pearson, 1983; Muncie, 1999).  
In consequence, the present research contributes with empirical research to 
the understanding of a new example, the broader discussion of penal 
transformations, and to analyse the extent to which what is known so far can 
help to explain the emergence of a new juvenile justice system in Chile.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
As outlined in the first chapter, this research sets out to explore the major 
reform of the juvenile justice system in Chile, learning about why and how 
this process came to happen. This, to be explained in more depth along the 
chapter, was done through documentary analysis and semi-structured 
interviews with key actors in the reform process. Interviewees were initially 
identified through the transcription of the legislative debate of the reform and 
then I followed a snowball technique. The data was analysed using adaptive 
theory and a sociological history approach. This gave me the chance to 
conduct a substantive explanatory empirical analysis to fulfil the main 
objectives of this research:  
1. To explain the radical reform of the Chilean juvenile justice system in 
the mid-2000s, 
2. To analyse to what extent research and theory of penal transformation 
can help to explain the drastic change in a context which is different to 
those where it is usually applied.  
3. To contribute to the theoretical discussion of penal transformation with 
empirical research. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the reasoning behind the methods 
selected and how they developed throughout the research and into the 
analysis, explaining how I generated and gathered my data, the problems 
encountered, the limits and scope of this research. As I will show, 
undertaking the research highlighted the significance of policy networks and 
family connections within Chilean political life. Just as the power dynamics 
identified by my research in the transition from dictatorship to democracy 
highlight the importance of clientelism and paternalism, so too my capacity as 
a researcher to access interviewees and key documents depended very 
much on my personal links to key gatekeepers. 
I will start by presenting how I set the limits to my research. Then I will 
proceed to explain my methodological strategy, divided in documents and 
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interviews, including elements such as sampling and access. This will be 
followed by a section on ethics. The fourth section will address the analysis. 
Finally, I will refer to the challenges faced, and lessons learned in this 
process. 
 
I- Setting the limits to my research  
 
One of the first complexities I found in the research planning stage was to 
identify when a process of transformation actually starts. I knew the 
legislation (2002-2005) was a key moment, because it is when Senators and 
Deputies debate the draft of the new law, make modifications and finally 
approve the new law to be implemented. Without this step there would be no 
reform. However, to focus only on those three years would be problematic. 
As evidenced in chapter one, the first drafts of the Adolescents’ Penal 
Responsibility Act [LRPA] were written in the mid-1990s, and debates about 
the need to reform started as soon as the country ratified the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child [UNCRC] in 1990.  
1990 was also key in terms of national history. As I will show in the following 
chapter, from 1973 until 1989 Chile was under a dictatorial regime where 
juvenile justice was not a focus of concern. In fact, the focus was on the 
internal enemy, which had been defined by the regime as the communist and 
radical left thinkers (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 
2008). However, as I will evidence on chapter five, once democracy returned 
youth offending and juvenile justice came to the forefront as an outward 
manifestation of the concerns of citizens after two radical changes in the 
political order and all the social and cultural alterations they implied.  
Therefore, it became important to understand why a topic that had not been a 
concern for the 17 years of authoritarian regime suddenly became so 
relevant, and why the ratification of the UNCRC became key in starting a 
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slow but definite process to radically reform juvenile justice in Chile. In 
consequence I needed to go back to trace the origin of this pivotal moment, 
trying to understand the political, social and historical origins. Thus, the 
moment I chose as starting point for this research, and to understand the 
underlying national context, was the beginning of Pinochet’s authoritarian 
regime in 1973, which will be addressed in chapter four.  
Another important issue to solve was to identify when transformation 
processes end. Officially the law was published in 2005, but it was not 
implemented until 2007 and in those years, changes were still made. 
Moreover, justice institutions are not static not permanent either, they are 
constantly subjected to new processes of adaptation, modification, and 
changing practices (Jones and Newburn, 2004), thus they continue to evolve 
during and after implementation. Nevertheless, as the purpose of this 
research is to track the origins and developments of the new system as set 
out in the LRPA (the radical change in ethos, institutions, procedure, and 
definition of young people in trouble with the law), I decided the 
implementation in 2007 was a suitable end point of my research. The 
decision was also made so I had a set range of years to focus, given the 
implementation of the LRPA was a clear moment identifiable in time.  
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that even though I was able 
to set logical starting and closing points for this penal transformation, there is 
not one clear ordered series of steps, but many events and people who 
collided in a chain and a parallel of situations with many gaps in it. I focused 
on the 17 years of the dictatorship to understand the national context. While 
in the following 17 years of democracy my attention was on the context but 
also in the events and gaps that could help me discover what shaped the 





II- Methodological strategy 
 
This research attempts to explain why and how the juvenile justice reform in 
Chile came to happen. This involves understanding the logic behind the 
reform and the elements shaping and constraining the decisions being taken 
in each stage of the process. Therefore, I required strategies that could, first 
of all, help me generate explanatory data to answer my questions, and 
second, could help me grasp the whole process and its complexities. For 
example, I required to access the characteristics of the national context 
before and during the reform, and to be able to understand the role of the 
actors involved in a process that lasted over a decade. In consequence, I 
needed a method that could grant me flexibility, reflexivity, depth, nuance and 
richness. This would allow me to identify key themes and pursue new ones 
that could emerge at different stages of the research, but also access the 
hidden underlying connections between the national context of the 1970s-
2000s Chile and the juvenile justice system. Hence, I chose a qualitative 
approach as understood by Guest, Namey and Mitchell (2013), as a method 
that is ‘employed to answer the whys and hows of human behavior, opinion, 
and experience’ (p. 2). 
Flexibility proved to be an essential starting point, as the selection of 
methods to research this penal transformation was on itself a challenging 
process. This, because as I will show in different sections of this thesis, 
preliminary online research evidenced that in Chile there was very little 
research, no systematic data collection, and reduced access to what little 
existed regarding the situation of youth offending and juvenile justice. Which 
led me to another problem: where do I start? Where can I find some 
information regarding the juvenile justice reform in Chile or the national 
context at the time?  
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A key document at that stage was the ‘Historia de la ley 20,0841’ [the ‘History 
of the law’, document made by the Chilean Congress that contains the 
transcription of the debates, discussions and drafts of the projects over the 
legislative stage. It is common practice to do this with all laws published]. 
Another key document was the ‘Historia de la ley 20,191’, the history of a law 
to reform the LRPA published in 2007, before the new Juvenile Justice 
System was put into practice, and thus meaningfully altering its 
implementation. 
The ‘Historias de la ley’ mentioned some sources used as a reference in the 
discussion, such as reports and studies. Moreover, as they are the 
transcription of the legislative debate, they provided me the names of the 
members of the Constitution, Legislation and Justice Commissions of the 
Congress2 in charge of the LRPA draft; the representatives of other state 
institutions involved in the discussion; invited actors; and other centres and 
NGOs with active participation. Furthermore, politicians also made reference 
to some documents and statistics.  
Therefore, I considered the best approach was to start from the ‘Historias de 
la ley’ and deepen from there. In consequence, I decided to find the actors 
mentioned in the legislative process in the different roles and ask them about 
their experiences, their struggles and ideas, how they came to be involved in 
the process of change, and the role they had. This would give me access to 
at least what had happened, what had changed (institutions? Laws? Views 
and understanding of youth offending?), and some insight about who and 
what was being taken into account. This because even though the ‘Historias 
de la ley’ had the transcription of the political debates, the underlying reasons 
 
1 The Law 20,084 is the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act. That is its official number 
and it is officially known by both name and/or number.  
2 The Chilean Congress is divided in two Chambers, Deputies and Senators. Each Chamber 
is also divided in Commissions. The Commissions are formed by a reduced number of 
Deputies or Senators -depending the Chamber-, and they oversee all the laws that fall into 
their category. The Commissions are in charge of presenting the law to the rest of the 
Chamber and work in the modifications, which are then voted by the whole Chamber. If the 
law project is approved in the Chamber where it started, it will go to the other Chamber, 
where the same Commission will analyse, present and modify the law before returning it to 
the original Chamber.  
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for their arguments and decisions were not stated. I had only access to their 
official speeches at the time. Moreover, the participation of other experts was 
mentioned but not detailed. Thus, it was not clear the amount of influence 
they had in the reform process or if they were just an informed audience.  
In order to explore the level of participation these key actors had in the 
reform process, their views of it, to be able to adapt to varied levels of 
involvement and be able to develop my own understanding of why and how, I 
opted for semi-structured interviews as a research method (Guest, Namey 
and Mitchell, 2013; Della Porta, 2014). This is a method that allowed me to 
explore participant’s experiences in the reform process, and to access to 
their underlying opinions, attitudes and beliefs over the different stages of the 
development of the new juvenile justice. It is a format that let me explore in 
detail issues that were important to individual participants, while still 
connected to history, because those who participated in the reform were 
witnesses of a specific event at a specific time (Guest, Namey and Mitchell, 
2013). Moreover, this method allowed me to adapt to the particular conditions 
the participants in the reform were facing in their present lives. After all, some 
of the names found in the ‘Historias de la ley’ were from older people (over 
80 years of age). In fact, a couple were dead. In consequence, I needed to 
be prepared for people that could be in delicate or vulnerable conditions. 
At the same time the two ‘Historias de la ley’, despite being a limited 
resource because they only referred to the legislative process, were 
documents worth analysing as well. I was researching a process that 
happened more than 10 years ago, which made highly likely the memories 
participants have will not be precise, especially regarding the role, words or 
actions of other actors in the reform process. Therefore, by bringing together 
data from the interviews and documentary analysis I was able to triangulate 
the information (Rubin and Ruben, 2005). Moreover, the transcriptions of the 
debates provided me a first approach of the juvenile justice reform and the 
topics being discussed (or abandoned). Thus, they could help me to 
complete the picture of what happened in those years, and a different 
perspective on the same research point, including for example opinions being 
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portrayed, the main ideas and sources of knowledge. Besides, I was not 
certain I could access politicians for my interviews, and the ‘Historias de la 
ley’ were a way of having their official public statements on the matter at the 
time. Hence, I added documentary analysis.  
Moreover, the participants in the reform process would not necessarily be 
good informants about the socio-political and cultural changes that took place 
in Chile during the authoritarian regime and the democratization period, or 
they could refer to many other contextual events I may ignore. Hence, in 
order to clarify the national context and landscape preceding and surrounding 
the reform process and taking into consideration that the authoritarian regime 
refers to events that happened in the 1970s, I decided to conduct some 
historical sociological analysis based on documents as well.  
Here I encountered the first main difficulty of doing research from a distant 
location: all those people and most of the documents (too old and not 
digitalised) were in Chile. Thus, I decided to conduct five months fieldwork 
(from the 14th of January until the 11th of June of 2017) to conduct interviews 
and use the archives.  
Before my fieldwork I started contacting possible interviewees. I also tried to 
access all documents I could find online. Once in Chile, I spent my fieldwork 
trying to establish contact with more possible interviewees and went to 
different libraries to access the documents I needed. The processes of 
sample selection, access and data generation and gathering will be 
presented now in the following subsections according to documents and 
interviews.  
1. Documents  
 
a) Sample selection  
In this research, I had two main elements I needed to grasp. Firstly, the 
national historical, social, political, and legal context of Chile during the 
authoritarian regime and in the 17 years of democracy before the 
64 
 
implementation of the new juvenile justice system. Secondly, the reform 
process itself, triangulating the information generated in the interviews.  
For the second task the ‘Historias de la ley’ were key. As previously 
mentioned, they were a transcription of the legislative debates in the 
Congress and the modifications of each draft after legislation started. 
Moreover, the ‘Historias de la ley’ mentioned some reports or studies. 
Politicians also used data to validate their arguments. However, most times 
Deputies and Senators would not reference the source they were quoting, 
and they would often contradict each other. In consequence, I decided to 
review all documents directly mentioned during the legislation. Finally, in 
order to make the search more effective, I would check the sources used by 
documents that were highlighted by the interviewees as the most influential 
for them during the reform. Towards the end of the process, the sources and 
documents used started to constantly repeat. Thus, I also searched those 
specifically. 
Understanding there may be more key documents I was not aware they 
existed. I also conducted online research of the official websites of all 
organizations mentioned in the ‘Historia de la ley’ to have participated in the 
reform process (for example as audience, giving statements, conducting 
studies). There I looked for or requested –depending on their availability- the 
documents they had in juvenile justice. I also looked for books dedicated to 
Chilean juvenile justice, which involved the revision of the catalogues of 
national libraries that hold legislative reports and information. This libraries 
were: The National Congress Library (two headquarters, one in Santiago and 
one in Valparaiso); the Public Defendant Library; the Comptroller Library; the 
Supreme Court Library; the National Library; the Prosecution Online 
resources and Library; the National Service of Minors Online resources and 
Library; the Ministry of Justice archives; the Police (armed and civil) and the 
Gendarmerie official websites for their Online Journals, reports and statistics. 
Using this method, I was able to retrieve some documents and reports online. 
This involved mostly downloading files of websites such as www.sename.cl; 
www.unicef.cl; www.fiscalia.cl; www.bcn.cl; www.dpp.cl; among others. 
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At the same time, in order to develop an understanding about the historical, 
social, cultural and legal background of Chile before and at the time of the 
juvenile justice reform. I decided to review all national reports, surveys and 
official information regarding the national situation over the authoritarian 
regime and in the first 17 years of democracy. At the same time, and in order 
to get a sense of the political landscape and the prevalence of youth 
offending and juvenile justice in public discourse I decided to include the 
government programmes of the candidates to presidency over the period and 
their annual speeches.    
The documents were chosen based on their official institutional or academic 
role, accessibility and their public nature, understanding them as informative 
about the construction of particular social realities (May, 2001), and also as 
the knowledge base experts and politicians of the country had at the time.  
b) Access 
The first difficulty I faced after defining what documents I wanted to work with 
was the absence, in some websites, of any information older than ten years. 
As I started my research in 2015, this left out everything that happened 
before 2005, the year the reform was approved. Therefore, I contacted via e-
mail public institutions such as the Ministry of Justice and The National 
Service of Minors, asking them for internal documents and reports. This was 
a slow process as most time the institutions would not reply. In consequence 
I had to request information through the Transparency Law. This Law 
commands most public governmental institutions to provide any information 
requested. It requires to fill a form and wait up to 40 days.  
Initially I only received two documents from the Ministry of Justice. However, 
this did not match the information I had found in the ‘Historias de la ley’ and 
the online documents I had already managed to access. In consequence, I 
had to make a second request through the Transparency Law which provided 
me with 11 more documents. I was not successful in obtaining any more from 
the Ministry of Justice.  
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Regarding the National Service of Minors [Servicio Nacional de Menores, 
SENAME], they sent me 18 documents and the contact details of the people 
in charge of their archives. I directly contacted them and received 2 more 
documents and statistic data. The communication with them was fluid and 
helpful. Nevertheless, they were not able to provide me with any more of the 
documents I was trying to obtain. This was problematic because it meant that 
I could not gain access to all the original sources I wanted. 
In fact, those two public institutions did not have a catalogue, making it hard 
to find out what else might be there that could help in my research. For 
example, the first pre-projects of the LRPA were not available. Even the 
people who wrote them had no copy of them now. The only existing draft was 
that of 1998 (the 8th version), the last one before it was presented in 2002 to 
the parliament. 
Therefore, access to documents was more complex than expected. For 
example, sometimes documents that appeared in the catalogues could not 
be found once in the library, or some of them were stored in a different 
location and I had to request them with an exact number of days of 
anticipation. Some libraries had very restrictive timetables, and in occasions 
they would be closed even though officially they had to be open. One of them 
was in a different city and only opened for a few hours twice a week. They 
had no technology to scan the documents in the place, no computers to 
review the catalogue once being in the library, and copies, if they had the 
option, were expensive. What is more, as an external researcher from a non-
Chilean university, I could not take books home with me and could not review 
more than three books at the time. I could not find any reports or institutional 
information during the dictatorship. Even the government plans of candidates 
for presidency in the 1990s and mid-2000s and the presidential annual 
speeches were hard to find. Sometimes, one year would be missing, or the 
projects of less famous candidates would not be available. 
I also directly contacted NGOs and think tanks asking them for documents 
that were mentioned in their internal libraries but not available online. 
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Sometimes I got a reply sending me the files. Sometimes I was told they did 
not have the book anymore. In occasions I received no answer at all.  
Thus, it is worth mentioning that I could not find all the sources I wanted. 
There were unexpected complications to find and access documentary data. 
There were a lot of lost documents, and the lack of catalogues evidences 
some disorganization and lack of clarity regarding what they had in the 
archives of some State and private institutions (this happened with media 
archives as well, as I will comment in a later section). There was also a lack 
of policies and practices of digitalization, making matters more complicated. 
This could be connected to the practices of the authoritarian regime, where 
the military government did not want records of their actions nor citizens 
informed, as it will be seen in more depth in chapter four. This is a practice 
that, even though toned down, continued into democratic times. Perhaps this 
could also be understood as disorganization instead of an institutional culture 
against accountability. But under any circumstance it talks about lack of 
access to information and faulty practices of conservation of national past 
knowledge, which makes harder to research national history and processes. 
However, when the sources had been used in other works, I could still have a 
notion of them. For example, when the original statistic report is missing, but I 
could find other documents referencing the data and results. Although this 
implies the data had been already selected and analysed with a purpose by 
another author. Therefore it involved the extra step of using different sources 
that reference that set of data to develop my own understanding of it, and 
also the consideration of the characteristics of the document where it was 
quoted, such as the institution to which the author belonged, the purpose of 
the article or report, political motivations underneath, among others.  
This implies taking into consideration the political and social context in which 
the data was produced (Tracy, 2010; Finfgeld-Connett, 2014). This is key as 
some of the external foundations and institutions that generated studies for 
the juvenile justice reform are directly linked to some political sectors (for 
example Libertad y Desarrollo [freedom and development] is linked to the 
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conservative right-wing of the country that was strongly connected to the 
authoritarian government). Moreover, as it will be evidenced in the following 
chapter, Chile was under strong political polarization at some moments in 
time. This makes it relevant to be aware of the situation and be sceptical of 
the information contained in the documents retrieved, especially regarding 
the times of the authoritarian regime, as they could have been written by 
supporters or detractors of the dictatorship. Moments close to presidential 
elections were also tricky, as squabbles between the two major political 
coalitions in the country increased.  
In consequence, I needed to make sure I could identify the moment in time 
the documents were written and the political affiliations of the authors, not 
taking them as a mere description of facts but as a possible political 
instrument as well. This also meant I tried to confirm with more than one 
source of different authors and hopefully different political viewpoints the data 
being referenced. Especially because there were a few contradictions 
between the results and conclusions of different authors regarding the 
amount and characteristics of youth offending, for example. Thus, if I could 
not be convinced of the source of the data, if it really had existed or it was a 
generalization or part of political rhetoric, or the methodology was dubious I 
preferred not to use it, or to clearly point out the information as coming from 
that specific source. For example, when politicians used figures to strengthen 
their arguments, I would add it as a quote, highlighting there was not further 
evidence. 
c) Data gathering 
In terms of gathering documents, the main step was to go to the libraries for 
the reports and articles found in their online data base. It implied accessing 
around 40 journals, more than 40 books, around 20 reports, and 10 
dissertations. However, given the huge amount of material that I needed to 
cover in my five months of fieldwork; in order to have access to the 
documents at any stage of my research in case I needed to re-read or to 
quote something; and due to the highly restrictive availability of documents 
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described in the previous subsection. I chose not to read the documents in 
the library, but to do a quick review of their content and then scanned them 
with a portable scanner, storing them in an external hard drive (the list of 
scanned and saved documents can be seen in Annex 5).  
In general terms, the documents gave me access to a broad overview of the 
national context at the time, together with opinions and developments of the 
Juvenile justice reform and key topics associated to it, for example regarding 
the approach towards the suggestions of the UNCRC. Furthermore, the 
‘Historia de la Ley 20,084’ and the ‘Historia de la Ley 20,191’, besides the 
statements of the opinions of those who participated in the legislative 
discussions, provided me some broad presentations and summaries made 
by some experts, the votes of politicians and political parties during 
legislation, and the explanation and arguments sustaining their decisions. For 
example, this provided me their understanding of why young people present 
offending behaviour or what they attributed to be increasing public demands 
of a reform.  
Finally, the annual presidential speeches and the government programmes of 
the main candidates for the presidential elections of 1999 and 2005, all 
documents found online, helped me to gain insight on the political landscape 
regarding juvenile justice. It allowed me to evidence the growing focus over 
the topic and the direction public debate was following, based on the 





As previously mentioned, the ‘Historias de la ley’ provided me with a series of 
names of participants in the reform process, the institutions they belonged 
and the extent of their presence in the legislative debates. Therefore, I looked 
at the different involvement people had. For example, regarding how many 
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times their names were repeated, in which parts of the process they 
participated, their level of participation (just voting the project, or actually 
making changes to it) and leadership (how influential they seemed to be in 
relation to others, representing institutions with more power over the 
decision, being in a higher hierarchical and/or technical position, or shaping 
the opinion of many participants).  
I used this to identify key actors because the ‘Historias de la ley’ name more 
than 150 people. Moreover, even though the law projects are voted on by all 
120 Deputies and 38 Senators of the Congress, it is only the members of the 
Commission of Constitution, Legislation and Justice who can write 
meaningful suggestions and make actual changes to the project. That means 
13 members in the Deputies’ Chamber and five in the Senators’ Chamber. 
There were also representatives of the Prosecution, the Public Defendant, 
SENAME, NGOs that work in the field, workers of the Ministry of Justice and 
some professors who participated in the draft writing of the law or gave talks 
in the Congress about youth offending and juvenile justice.  
In this preliminary analysis I identified 34 people as central and those who 
were my priority to interview. They were all people that had a shaping role in 
the juvenile justice reform (Richards, 1996). In consequence, I used 
purposive sampling, choosing the participants in this research based on their 
involvement in the reform process (Layder, 1998; Guest, Namey and 
Mitchell, 2013).  
The first thing that called my attention at this stage was the variety of actors 
and institutions in the group of the 34 identified key participants. These can 
be divided in two main groups: politicians (members of the Congress or the 
Executive Power, most of whom are defined in popular elections); and 
professionals or experts (people who were involved because of their roles as 
advisors or representing institutions such as the Prosecution or think tanks 
and foundations). However, as the legislative decisions are in hands of 
Deputies and Senators, I wondered about the extent of participation other 
actors had. Were they included just to be aware of their future roles? Or were 
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they actively involved in the discussion? Had they the power to make actual 
changes? Or to influence politicians to make those changes?  
b) Interview design 
Based on my research objectives and the process I wanted to understand 
better, I identified the main themes to cover in the interviews and 
brainstormed different questions that could help me to address them (Guest, 
Namey and Mitchell, 2013). These related to interviewees’ participation in the 
reform, the limitations and influence of their actions, the underlying reasoning 
for their decision and suggestions, and all elements that could indicate me 
why the new juvenile justice evolved in the way it did since drafting to the 
final product being implemented. 
However, I did not have a set of fixed pre-planned questions that all 
interviewees had to answer. This, because their positions and the extent of 
their participation was different for all. What I did was starting by asking about 
their participation in the reform process and continuing from there until I had 
addressed all the main themes. This also gave me the flexibility to deepen in 
any new theme that could arise from interviewees responses. There was also 
no opportunity to run a pilot on the interviews, but they were discussed with 
my supervisors, and the key themes were reviewed and adjusted after each 
interview to ensure the instrument worked effectively.  
c) Access 
This proved to be a demanding and sometimes frustrating task. I had no 
knowledge of where the participants I had identified as key informants for my 
research were now, more than 10 years after their participation in the juvenile 
justice reform. Therefore, the first action was to look for them following their 
digital presence. In the process I discovered most of those professionally 
involved had changed jobs not only after the reform was implemented, but 
also since the law drafting process in the mid-1990s. For example, one of the 
interviewees worked in four institutions actively involved in juvenile justice 
between 1990 and 2007.  
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Another thing that called my attention is that most of those professionally 
involved are now in academia. This could relate to the fact that many 
positions have an established period, for example the director of The 
National Service of Minors [Servicio Nacional de Menores, SENAME] 
changes every four years. At the same time, many of the actors that had 
important positions representing institutions such as the Prosecutor or the 
Public Defendant were already at the top position they could reach in that 
institution at the time of the discussion. 
Arguably, their switch to academia may be because they were considered to 
be experts as a result of their professional background and experience in 
high positions in State institutions; legitimising their social status as experts 
while allowing them to continue their career. Besides, their names become 
visible, making them part of a qualified small group which grants them better 
access to new opportunities and projects within the same circle, and 
academia could offer easier mobility, increased possibilities of collaborative 
work, and institutional support.  
In contrast, most politicians had remained in politics. That means they were 
active politicians who had been re-elected at least once since the legislation 
took place (2002-2007). Although is important to point out that at least two 
active members of the legislative debate in the Congress had disappeared 
from any visible participation in political or social organizations due to political 
scandals, and I was unable to find them3. It is also relevant to note that 
Ministers are non-elected politicians who can be changed at any moment of 
the presidential period, which leads to the replacement of central internal 
positions as well. Likewise, they usually change with each new president. In 
consequence, only one of them continued in a political position inside the 
Executive at the time of my fieldwork. 
 
3 For example, María Guzmán, Deputy for National Renovation [Renovación Nacional, RN, 
a right-wing political party] was involved in a political scandal after her public comments on 
the Spiniak case, the legal case against a businessman for child pornography and 
prostitution, where three Senators were identified though eventually found innocent as 
implicated. RN did not renew María Guzmán candidacy after that and since then she 
abandoned her political life.  
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In order to contact all these people, I designed a presentation letter. I sent it 
to the public e-mails that I had been able to find. Most of them were 
institutional e-mails associated with their current workplace, although some of 
them had private websites with the required information. I used this method 
to contact them first because I was still in Edinburgh. However, I only had a 
few replies and managed to coordinate only a couple of interviews using this 
approach.  
What worked substantially better was to contact interviewees through 
gatekeepers. Especially because they were well connected to people I 
already knew. For example, I discovered one of my distant relatives worked 
in one of the organisations that attended the LRPA’s legislative sessions, so I 
asked her about it. She knew some of the people I wanted to contact and 
allowed me to use her name as a reference. Likewise, one of my professors 
during my studies in Chile directly participated as an expert inside the 
Ministry of Justice. I contacted him and even though I was never his student 
directly. He remembered me and agreed to participate. He also directed me 
to some other people that was on my list. 
Then, when I was already in Chile, the professor introduced me to a high-
ranking manager of an NGO that actively participated in the juvenile justice 
reform, and he was key in granting me access to other interviewees. After I 
talked to the NGO manager and explained about my research, he sent my 
presentation letter to many of the people on my list and some others who 
were now considered experts in the topic. His help may have been related to 
the fact that I worked in that institution in the past (although never directly 
with him because he was the manager of my boss), that the professor of my 
Chilean university mediated my introduction to him, that he considered the 
topic and my interview interesting and worth sharing, and/or that he also 
researches and understands how important and at the same time hard it can 
be. 
Under any circumstance, my networks proved to be essential, even though I 
just realised I had them once I was working on my research. These networks 
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gave me an initial access and granted the willingness to most of those 
contacted through a gatekeeper to participate. Without them, it is very likely I 
would have not progressed further with my interviews. Interestingly, this 
resonates with the data generated. Networks are key in Chile for both legal 
and policy making. I quickly discovered that most of those who are now in 
academia belonged to the group of experts during the transformation 
process, and I was moving inside that small specific network. Another thing 
that caught my attention was the background that connected them. They all 
knew each other very well, many of them had worked together in the past 
(many times before even the discussion of the Adolescents’ Penal 
Responsibility Act [LRPA] started), and some of them had even studied 
together. In fact, a few of them now work in the same university as 
academics together. I traced that network, how they had come to be involved 
in the transformation of the juvenile justice, and realised many times the 
involvement of some people was because they were called or recommended 
by other people already in the process. 
This was probably influenced by the fact that the amount of people in position 
to contribute to the reform were a small group. There were few experts in 
juvenile justice, and not much knowledge about the needs of this population 
or how to carry out such a big change. It was a small world, so it was easy to 
know each other. The same people who drafted the reform were then called 
as experts; people who had worked together and shared views on juvenile 
justice were later in different jobs that required their involvement as advisors, 
organising and presenting information to people taking the decisions. 
Moreover, the group of politicians involved was also small at the end, 13 
members in the Deputies’ and five in the Senator’s chambers, and finally the 
mixed commission was formed with Deputies and Senators from that same 
group.  
Therefore, with this I discovered how important networks are, at least in big 
political processes and reforms, in the Chilean context. In fact, ‘who you 
know’ is also important for researchers. If I had not contacted a few insiders 
at the very beginning of my research (some on my own, some through the 
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discovery of the connection of my distant relative and my university 
professor), it is likely the number of interviews would have been smaller. 
Moreover, ‘who you are’ is another issue to keep in mind. Because my own 
situation as an outsider/insider was probably also taken into account when 
deciding to help in my research and to consider it worthy. This may have 
something to do with my interviewees being experts and thus highly busy 
people. The relevance of networks, their implications and what they meant 
for this reform process will be addressed in more detail in chapter six.  
Under any circumstance, once my connection with a small group of people 
had been granted through my gatekeepers, I could continue using a snowball 
technique to identify other key participants in the juvenile justice reform 
(Richards, 1996; Guest, Namey, Mitchell, 2013). At the end of each interview, 
I asked each participant if they could identify any actor I should consider in 
my research, and if they had the means to contact them or I could use their 
names as a reference. This confirmed that my idea of who was key was more 
or less right when after a few interviews the names were constantly repeated, 
and few new ones would appear. Most times the participants in this research 
re-directed me to my gatekeepers to find the contact information, but they 
allowed me to use their names if needed.  
In this process the role of the key actors I had identified was clarified, some 
people who appeared as relevant in the ‘Historia de la ley’ were not as 
central as some others, especially politicians. Also, six more people were 
added to the original 34. They were identified by almost all interviewees as 
experts with a very meaningful involvement in the reform. As a result, I had a 
new list of 40 people. From that group, those identified as most important in 
terms of determining the rules of the discussion, guiding the transformation 
process (although not necessarily in the same direction) and shaping 
conflicts by the majority of interviewees were those in charge of writing the 
first project that was presented to the Deputies chamber, as they created the 
base for the discussion; the Ministers of Justice who represented the 
Executive Power; and the Senate, that had the legislative power to make the 
final decisions with the project. Of those 40 actors I was able to contact 33, 
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and effectively interview 18. The difference is divided between three who 
directly explained they were not available, and those who never replied or 
gave an initial positive response but never specified availability.  
Once I was in Chile other means used to try to contact participants, besides 
e-mail and snowballing, were delivering a hard-copy letter when there was a 
public institutional address; phoning when there was a public phone number 
associated; and contacting institutions and/or political parties where they 
participated, informing them who I was trying to contact and why, requesting 
personal e-mails or asking them to re-send the invitation. However, these 
techniques were not as effective as being directed by someone from the 
same network. 
Therefore, at the end, snowballing was the most effective way of access 
when it came to interviews. Whenever the interviewee was contacted through 
another participant of my research the reply was fast and most times led to 
the effective setting of a date and time (although there were a couple of 
exceptions when even mediated contact led nowhere). In those cases, my 
status as a researcher had been considered validated by the approval of 
someone who the interviewee considered close. The positive aspect is that it 
helped me to make new contacts, accomplishing a key advance in my 
research. The counterpart is that most of the people I was able to access 
were close with the others, they belonged to the same group of friends/co-
workers and it worried me they would have a very similar understanding of 
the events I was researching instead of representing varied positions and 
arguments in the discussion, leading to only part of the story. Moreover, a 
part of the story that would appear strong and solid because it was 
represented by all the people I accessed through the same network. 
Therefore, this could bias my understanding of the reform process.  
My concern was increased by the almost non-existent contact between the 
experts and civil society with politicians. I noticed this because my 
gatekeepers directed me towards experts, but they told me they did not have 
the access to politicians. Then, when talking to other interviewees, they 
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would mention some politicians as key actors, but when asked they would 
state they did not have a way of contacting them or would direct me to the 
official information in the Congress website if they continued as Deputies and 
Senators.  
On the contrary, if they recommended that I to talk to other experts, they 
could at least point me to my gatekeeper to stablish direct connection with 
them or would provide me their current workplace so I could find them. 
Therefore, politicians and experts may have worked around the same topic 
and even in the same meetings in the past, experts may keep track of what 
politicians are doing, but they do not keep contact. In consequence, I could 
only resort to communication via institutional means, which as I said before 
were not effective.  
Moreover, as the access to public institutions such as the Congress or the 
Ministries is highly controlled and restricted for regular citizens I was only 
capable of reaching active politicians directly four times, all of them thanks to 
my networks that provided me their official personal phone or direct e-mail, 
instead of going through previous barriers -where the main reply was a 
standard dismissal of any interest in participation on any kind of students’ 
research due to their highly compact schedules, mostly obtained through 
telephone contact with their secretaries. As my networks in this regard were 
not influential, I received direct dismissals or a broad recognition of interest 
that never materialised. As a result, I had two very contrasting set of replies. 
Almost all those key actors who now work in academia, despite their previous 
position, replied fairly quickly and agreed to participate (there were only two 
exceptions). On the contrary, all those working in politics at the present time 
did not replied or rejected participation. 
Given this scenario, I was not able to access active politicians, whether or not 
their role had changed since the transformation of the juvenile justice system. 
As a result, my data comes mainly from the group of those who after working 
in different positions during this process (public defendant, prosecutor, 
advisor, among others) now were in academia. As previously commented, it 
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meant I only had a partial perspective about the reform process, missing 
politicians’ opinions and experience. Therefore, I feel like part of the story is 
missing, the politicians’ side. Even though, the vision of them as a 
counterpart is mostly influenced by the narratives of my interviewees, who 
presented them (mostly Senators and some Ministers of Justice) as the 
powerful villains, while they were overpowered heroes. However, this was not 
to the point where they could not recognise any mistakes and present 
themselves in only good light. They all admitted failure in one or another 
element, referring how they could have done more or at least different.  
In consequence, the only way of having some access to the perspective of 
Senators, Deputies and Ministers of Justice was through their transcribed 
opinions in the ‘Historias de la ley’. This implies I could get a sense of their 
opinions and arguments back then, but not much about the underlying 
reasons, unless they openly stated them. Moreover, all the elements shaping 
their decisions at the time could be only inferred after analysis. This could still 
be accessed through all the documents I gathered and reviewed, but I lost 
the richness of their own perspectives and understandings of their 
experience and how they could reflect nowadays on the process. Albeit it is 
important to keep in mind as well that being politicians, and being 2017 the 
year of my fieldwork, a year of presidential election, politicians could have 
taken the chance to make political statements that apply to the present or to 
reinforce their stance and the one of their parties, instead of actually delving 
into their past actions.  
Finally, my interviewees can be broadly described the following way: three 
people who actively participated writing the law draft, in the legislative 
discussion, conducted research in juvenile justice, and/or advised other 
actors; four who worked for the Executive Power; three belonged to 
NGOs/foundations that had an active role in the debate and transition; two 
ex-politicians; and representatives of governmental institutions such as the 
Prosecution, the Public Defendant and from SENAME. This involved a varied 
group of high rank functionaries from institutions associated with youth crime 
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law enactment and policy writing. Their general information and way they will 
be identified in this research can be seen in the following chart: 
List of Interviewees 
IDENTIFICATION PROFILE 
A Member of the legal division of the Ministry of Justice 
during the legislative process of the LRPA.  
B Member of the legal division of the Ministry of Justice 
during the legislative process of the LRPA.  
C Member of the Institute of youth during the legislative 
process of the LRPA.  
D Deputy of the Constitution, Legislation and Justice 
Commission. Participated in the legislative discussion 
regarding the implementation date of the LRPA. 
E Project coordinator of NGO that works directly with 
SENAME providing intervention programmes for young 
people.  
F Member of the team writing the first projects of the 
LRPA.  
G Legal assistant of the Ministry of Justice during the 
legislative process of the LRPA. Leader of the minors’ 
department of the Ministry of Justice. 
H Current academic expert on the topic of juvenile justice 
in Chile. 
I Participated writing the first projects, lawyer of 
SENAME at the time.  
J Member of the minors’ department of the Ministry of 
Justice during the legislative process of the LRPA, 
representor of the public defendant in the same 
process.  
K Expert in the juvenile justice reform in Costa Rica, 
which was used as a model by the Chilean juvenile 
justice reform. Presented the Costa Rican reform to 
Chilean authorities.  
L Researcher and representative of a highly influential 
think tank in the legislative process of the LRPA. 
Member of the expert commission to assess the 
conditions for implementation of the LRPA. 
M UNICEF consultant. Member of the writing team of the 
first projects of the LRPA.  
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N Member of a research centre that dedicates to 
offending and security topics.  
O Member of a foundation that worked with young people 
in trouble. Oversaw the programmes that deal with 
substance abuse of the time and participated in the 
assessing commission of the implementation of the 
law. 
P Member of the Department of juvenile justice in 
SENAME at the time of the legislative process. 
Q Deputy from the Family Commission that worked in 
topics of childhood and adolescence, Member of 
CONACE [The National Council for Narcotics Control]. 
Was in charge of the Juvenile Responsibility 
Department of SENAME.  
R Representative of the Public Ministry (the Prosecution) 
during the legislative process of the LRPA.  
 
d) Data generation 
Most of the interviews were conducted in the working place of the 
interviewees, with the exception of one meeting in a small café and one in 
the house of my older interviewee (80 years old, thus I opted to adapt to this 
person needs and comfort). There were no unexpected events during the 
interviews excepting some interruptions due to phone calls the participants 
received, although they would dismiss them and continue with a small 
reminder of their last words before it happened. The time used in each 
interview was between one and two hours and it involved the presentation of 
the informed consent form (Annex 2), where I explained my intention to voice 
record the interviews for example, and some preliminary conversation 
(usually questions about my project and studies). The length of the interview 
and line of questioning varied depending on the involvement each person 
had with Juvenile Justice and the specific process.   
The dynamic during the interview also proved to be very interesting. The 
interviewees were open about their personal experience. They were willing to 
tell their own stories and provide information about the process. Most of them 
needed a very small number of questions and probes in order to keep talking 
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about the reform. They also provided their own analysis of what they believed 
had driven the juvenile justice reforms in one or another direction, and 
referenced some of their publications or public participation, all in a way that 
made me feel they have done this many times, some of them also mentioned 
being informants in research about the LRPA before.  
However, almost all of them requested extra information about my 
background, establishing my connection with the person who had linked me 
to them. At the beginning of the interview I heard many times things like ‘I 
imagine you have managed to look at the statistical data’. This acted as both 
a way of testing my knowledge and also as a way of discretely emphasizing 
their opinion about something, implicitly stating that such opinion was almost 
a fact, while avoiding explicit criticism. These remarks decreased significantly 
as the interview progressed. I believe this relates to keeping control of a 
situation where their participation could be questioned and criticized, 
because they all judged the current state of juvenile justice as negative.  
The belief they had an initial tendency to assume a leading attitude in the 
interview was reinforced by how they approached it. Most of them, after the 
first open question about their experience in Juvenile Justice, would provide 
me a very long answer stating not only their involvement in the field, but 
immediately their participation in the reform, their opinions of how the 
process evolved and many times their suggestions of what should be done 
now. After this monologue (that I allowed so they could relax and I could start 
deepening the information from what they had already said), many finished 
saying: ‘and that’s it’, as if implying ‘that’s all’. Despite this, when I continued 
asking about more of their experience, they continued the open attitude and 
started making more reference to the participation of other actors, their 
opinion on their interactions, and unveiling the dynamics between the people 
who participated and the characteristics of the reform.  
There was only one interviewee who was evidently nervous and defensive at 
the beginning, stating he did not remember much so he could not help; with 
him I had to be more directive with my questions. This may be explained 
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because he was contacted directly, with no reference to other participants; he 
was not involved in academia and he had worked closely advising politicians 
of the time. Nevertheless, I approached him by asking more about his 
personal experience and opinion, not making reference to other actors unless 
he had made the connection first. As a result he relaxed, his answers 
became longer, and my intervention decreased. At the end of each interview 
all participants offered to help with everything they could. This makes me 
think they felt comfortable with being interviewed and also considered the 
research was worthy of sharing with others who could help. 
Regarding participants’ accounts, they followed a similar structure. They 
started describing the career path that led them to work on juvenile justice to 
then deepen in their participation in the reform process. In all cases the 
legislative process had a central part in their description of the events and 
personal experience. This can be explained by the way I started the 
interviews, asking about their participation in the reform and juvenile justice 
topics. However, in many occasions I was left with the feeling of a pre-
arranged structure to tell the story or an agreed version of what had 
happened. This mostly happened in the cases that, as I previously 
mentioned, they had been informants before, and also in those of people who 
had worked together writing reports or papers about the topic. This suggests 
to me that interviewees had developed an ‘official’ discourse about how the 
reform happened, and the role played by different actors. Perhaps as a result 
of consistent dialogue between people with similar opinions. I do not know 
when this consensus emerged, but it is another reflection of the small and 
tight networks they belonged to and their relevance. Many of them had 
worked together at the time of the reform, some even worked together at the 
time of the interviews as well.  
Moreover, participants described the reform as something from their past, an 
event in their careers to which they are no longer involved. Not in the sense 
they stopped working in juvenile justice, though some of them did. But in 
terms of now working under the rules of the new system with the good and 
bad instead of around juvenile justice policy or trying to change how it works. 
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They mostly took a detached attitude, not letting strong emotions appear, nor 
in actions, tone of voice, or open disqualification. Even when most of them 
attributed the responsibility for the negative aspects of the LRPA to 
politicians, some added comment to neutralise any aggressive implication 
that could be read from this (‘It is not a criticism of any person in that position, 
it is an institutional thing’ (M., 2017)). Other ways of making emotional 
distance were generalisations, changing from first to third person at key 
moments in their accounts, placing strong emphasis on their happiness with 
the change despite how much they complained about almost every aspect of 
it, giving an institutional discourse when talking about conflicts, and also 
referring to the topic in terms of actions instead of personal opinions or 
emotions. For example:  
‘All the richness of the discussion in the Deputies’ Chamber, which was very 
good, a very high level, and in terms of concepts in the whole juvenile 
system, everything was so well installed in the first version of the project. 
Then we have a very political year, influenced by the elections and the issue 
of young people and youth crime are always seen as a threat, a black 
monster let’s say. But in the Senate the project is dismantled, and it 
transforms in the final product’ (L., 2017). 
Thus, it was possible to see underlying conflict in how this process was for 
them, despite the descriptive way in which this was addressed. For example, 
their frustration and anger was usually addressed in terms of how they 
decided to stop working in the reform and take another career path, or at 
least take a break from it, as one interviewee commented: ‘I left my 
consultancy there, among other things because I realised there wasn’t, let’s 
say, much interest’ (I., 2017). 
The anger was mostly associated with the inability to make their voice heard 
in the official outcome. Experts were invited to the Congress to present and 
discuss about their own ideas, but these did not permeate the legislative 
discussion at the very end. The final decision was not theirs, and the 
differentiation they were trying to make from the adult system, the 
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specialisation they wanted to promote in juvenile justice were rejected, 
privileging a Juvenile Justice that was not well valued by these experts. The 
conflicting emotions they have towards this process is also visible in the 
efforts they made to highlight the positive elements the change had, 
especially at the end of the interviews, when most of the criticisms had been 
already exposed. Most times they mentioned many things they disliked and 
then ended adding something positive, although contradictory. For example: 
‘I have no doubt the law is positive, but it didn’t have the institutional support 
according to the spirit and objectives of the law’ (D., 2017). 
e) My role as an interviewer 
Another key factor to consider in the data being generated was my situation 
as an insider/outsider, which probably facilitated communication with some 
people and made it harder with others. On the one hand, I am Chilean, I 
studied in the same university most of them did and then worked in juvenile 
justice as well. On the other hand, I am younger and even when they 
assumed I had the knowledge (for example adding comments like ‘you know 
how this is/works’), I always asked them to explain how they were 
understanding different situations. This generated a setting that, relying in the 
age and position difference, allowed me to obtain many concrete examples 
that founded their personal opinions.  
At the same time my research is conducted in a known University of an 
English-speaking country. In Chile international institutions are often better 
valued than national institutions, the same happens with universities, and if 
they are from countries that speak English it is considered even better. They 
have reputation of being more serious and objective in terms of research. 
Moreover, it could imply a connection to broaden their network. 
Finally, this insider/outsider situation was probably the main difference that 
made it possible to talk to people who work in the field but not to politicians. 
In order to access them I would have probably needed some political 
connection in each party or someone with a strong influence inside the 
current government, and I lacked such resources. This showed me that the 
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Chilean political world is quite closed, and again, who you know matters, not 
only in terms of getting an important job position, but also to talk to them 
about their work. Nevertheless, I believe it was the same lack of those 
resources that helped me to be seen as someone trustworthy by my 
interviewees, someone more neutral and wiling to follow the information 
available from a more external perspective. Because I was not associated to 
any political ideologies and I am young enough to have studied and lived in a 
democratic Chile, doing my undergraduate studies in a recognised university. 
Therefore, I had some status of a ‘credible researcher’, someone who would 




This research was conducted under the ethical protocols of the University of 
Edinburgh, it received clearance at level two. This is because it involved 
interviews with human subjects. The forms filled for the ethics panel can be 
seen in Annex 1. The people I had identified could be considered elite 
interviewees (Richards, 1996; Smith, 2006), given their political, professional 
or academic positions that granted them a high social and hierarchical status. 
Therefore, the process of ethical clearance implied reflecting on the possible 
risks and conflicts I could foresee regarding the particularities of my sample 
and my fieldwork and suggesting ways of handling them. No interviewee was 
contacted before clearance was obtained.  
In the planning stage of this research the main ethical issue I could foresee 
was confidentiality. I identified my interviewees from a public document 
based on their open participation in a big national reform. Therefore, even if I 
avoided names and positions of informants, others could guess their 
participation. I addressed this by clearly stating in the informed consent that 
anonymity could not be fully ensured (Annex 2). Nevertheless, 
acknowledging this difficulty and the respect for their privacy I attempted to 
remove the identifying characteristics that were not relevant for the results. 
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For example, by changing their names for letters as presented in the list of 
interviewees of page 79 in this chapter. Their genders were also omitted as 
the presence of more male than female could facilitate their identification. 
Following this line, their organizational roles are only mentioned, if 
necessary, to illustrate a point that cannot be evidenced otherwise. Likewise, 
participants were asked about the way they wanted to be referred in anything 
produced during or after this research.  
The informed consent also clarified they could withdraw from the research at 
any stage, which was verbally reinforced before starting the interviews. All 
participants signed the informed consent before proceeding. There was only 
one exception because he was an international expert who helped in the 
process but does not live in Chile. Therefore, in order to address the distance 
problem, I resorted to technology. We used Skype (popular, free, easy to 
use, only requires a good internet connection and the interviewee had it 
already installed in his computer). More importantly, it simulates face-to-face 
contact (Booth, 2008), facilitating the access to his experience beyond what a 
phone call or a written interview could do, even though not to the level of the 
other presential interviews as body language was lost (Guest, Namey and 
Mitchell, 2013). In this particular case, the informed consent had been 
previously sent by e-mail, we verbally discussed it, and both the consent and 
the interview were recorded in the same voice recorder the other presential 
interviews were. There were no quality problems in the audio and it could be 
transcribed just as the other interviews had been. 
The interviews were voice recorded in a device previously presented and 
after interviewees granted their agreement. The purpose was to ensure I 
would have access to the data generated in something more complete than 
memory and paper notes, which are highly dependable on what calls my 
attention during the interview itself. Moreover, the recordings allowed me to 
go back to the interviews as many times as needed, identify changes in their 
tone of voice, pauses and emphasis. Besides, this strategy gave me the 
option of transcribing the interviews and work directly with their very own 
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words. Then, in order to keep the data protected I changed the data from the 
recorder to a password protected hard drive.  
All interviewees agreed to be recorded and most of them refused 
confidentiality, allowing me to use their names and/or working positions at the 
time of the reform or at present time. However, I decided to use the 
strategies described at the beginning of this section to diffuse their identities 
in order to avoid differentiating between those who wanted anonymity and 
those who were not concerned about it, which could answer to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, most of their opinions are already known in their networks 
and the juvenile justice community, they have published papers and opinion 
columns on the topic and worked together many times in these ten years. 
Secondly, as previously stated, those strongly involved in the transformation 
process are a small group, they know each other, and they may have seen 
anonymity as useless in that context, something to be perceived more like 
hiding instead of privacy.  
Besides, as I had been directed to them by someone from the same network, 
they probably thought the group of friends or close co-workers would find out 
about their participation anyway. Fourthly, and this seems a strong motivation 
to me, is that maybe they refused complete anonymity so they could 
separate themselves and their work from the politicians who made this law 
something that was not how they wanted it to be. This is visible in the way 
the discourse is constructed: the legislators (and the Ministers of Justice) are 
portrayed as a ‘different’ group, the ‘others’, those who had no knowledge on 
the topic, those with no consideration of the UNCRC (excepting a few names, 
which were also repeated over the interviews). While experts had both 
knowledge and international support (Mostly UNICEF and other Latin 
American experts).  
Therefore, their participation in my research allows them to clarify to anyone 
who can doubt it that they were fighting for young people and a better justice, 
yet it was not their decision to make. They could advise but it was not 
binding, and they were lacking in real influence; as one interviewee stated: 
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‘there were few ears, they were heard but not listened to’ (R., 2017). Which 
again, is probably associated to the anger and frustration some have towards 
this process, and in order to make a clear difference they took this chance.  
Another issue associated with confidentiality is that in four interviews I was 
asked to keep something off the record. In two of them it was related to 
swearing, so I was allowed to use the information but not to quote those 
specific words. As in many languages, there are some swearing words that 
are quite common and soft and are used in informal or comfortable situations 
to make an emphasis (this was used by many interviewees). Yet, there are 
some other words that have a very strong connotation, and not very 
commonly used in regular conversations (unless joking with friends). 
Therefore, they show underlying anger and frustration, those I was asked not 
to quote, as they were an evident display of dislike towards other actors in 
the process or their actions, which, as already mentioned, was against the 
detached attitude they wanted to portray. 
In the other two circumstances the interviewees referred to information about 
the relationships between other actors in the transformation process, the way 
they interacted, and internal conflicts (for example telling me about fights 
between people that led to some political decisions to gain ground again). In 
those cases, the problem was not about the information itself. I was told that 
if I found any evidence, I could use it, and it was for me to know how things 
worked; what should stay off the record is the identity of who gave me that 
particular information. This relates mostly to the fact that the connection 
between the actors still continue and they probably do not want to have any 
conflicts with their networks. Sometimes interviewees, even though they were 
not politicians, belonged to some political parties and the knowledge was 
based on that connection. Thus, they did not want to harm their party, at least 
not in a public way where their friends and colleagues may feel offended, 
also because that information was basically gossip and/or their personal 
interpretation of what guided the actions of other people. 
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Another issue to consider was language. Chile is a Spanish speaking 
country. I am Chilean and Chilean Spanish is my mother tongue. In 
consequence, I am familiar with the culture, slang, expressions, and accent. 
Thus, even though my research is written in English, it was too artificial to 
speak in that language, it could also generate an awkward atmosphere. 
Besides I did not know if the interviewees spoke English and I wanted to 
promote a more spontaneous and fluid narrative, instead of a shorter and 
more deeply thought in-the-moment translation of what they felt like sharing. 
Other researchers, who have faced similar struggle (see for example: Smith, 
Temple and Edwards, 2002; Chen and Liu, 2008; Shklarov, 2009; Al-Amer et 
al., 2015) also recommend using informants’ native language in all 
communications when possible. This answers to a variety of elements, such 
as the amount of time it would take to translate everything, but also to the 
closeness and better understanding I would have of their intended meaning, 
because I had access to the cultural and social meanings as well. Therefore, 
the informed consent, the interviews and their transcriptions are in Spanish.  
In order to maintain faithfulness to the way things were said by interviewees 
and the meaning of their words, and thus the validity of my data, I decided to 
work with it in Spanish and then translate my own analysis. The advantage of 
resorting to translation by then is that I will be working with my own 
conclusions and ideas. Regardless of this, I will still need to translate the 
selected quotes. However, delaying translation until then increases chances 
of having a closer relationship and a better understanding of the meaning 
conveyed by my interviewees. The delay could also give me more time and 
deeper understanding to find a better both conceptual (Smith, Chen and Liu, 
2008) and grammatical translation of participant’s narratives. The purpose of 
the last one, is to keep consideration of participants’ emphasis, while 
recognising cultural, social or ideological elements shaping what they were 
saying.  
Besides, as Shklarov (2009) claims, based on her own experience in a 
similar situation (although between Russian and English): it is probably 
impossible not to start analysing at the same time of translation, because it 
90 
 
involves focusing on the meaning of interviewees’ words and what they were 
trying to convey. Hence, I intend to present quotes in a mixture of English 
and Spanish (for example translating most of it unless they use a particular 
expression, concept or word, which will be kept in Spanish and explained), 




The data generated and gathered was analysed following an adaptive theory 
approach (Layder, 1998; Bottoms, 2008). This implies the recognition of both 
grounded theory and Popper’s hypothetico-deductive model, where there is a 
flexible relation between theory and data results. The result is the generation 
of categories developed from the data, which are then reorganised with the 
purpose of increasing the level of abstraction, facilitating the analysis of their 
interrelation. This helps to generate theoretically informed knowledge, while 
promoting cumulative growth and development with the existent theory.  
The selection of this model relates to the fact that it allows the researcher to 
develop explanatory accounts while recognising it is not possible to approach 
research in a theoretically neutral way. Therefore, it works acknowledging the 
constant interaction between theory and data. At the same time, it allows the 
researcher to test theory. Moreover, ‘it attempts to trace the reciprocal 
influences and interconnections between people’s social acts and the wider 
social (systematic) environment in which they are played out’ (Layder, 
1998:20). Hence, it was suited to address all my research aims and to 
develop a comprehensive understanding and theoretically informed 
explanation of the Chilean juvenile justice reform and its interaction with the 
divergent and convergent influences.  
As the data was being gathered (documents) and generated (interviews), and 
based in adaptive theory, I proceeded to develop a pre-coding (Layder, 
1998). This means I identified some relevant sections and provisional codes 
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to organize my data. At this stage, this was mostly based in the elements 
identified in the literature as key in penal transformation. Then, once my 
fieldwork ended, I used NVivo for Windows under the licence of the 
University of Edinburgh. Using this software, I continued developing my 
codes and re-organizing the data into the factors the accounts of 
interviewees and the transcriptions of the political debates and presidential 
speeches associated to the Chilean juvenile justice reform. This allowed me 
to facilitate the discussion between theory and the empirical case study, their 
similarities and differences, challenging the reach of internationally 
developed knowledge applied to this local reality.  
Regarding the analysis of the Chilean context during the dictatorship and in 
the following 17 years of democracy up to 2007. This was analysed from the 
documents retrieved and literature on the topic following a historical 
sociology approach (Skocpol, 1984; Garland, 1985; Ariño, 1995). The 
purpose was to understand the underlying elements of a long-term process 
of social change (to be presented in chapter four). This was relevant because 
my research focuses in the process of formation of institutions, social 
relationships and modern ways of living, which cannot be understood without 
reference to their past development. 
In consequence, the following chapters of this thesis will present the analysis 
conducted under the selected approaches (historical sociology and adaptive 
theory). In them I will refer to the topics that my analysis evidenced as more 
directly connected, influential or shaping both the development of the need of 
a reform and the direction of the reform process itself. In doing so, I will 
address some elements mentioned in the wider literature of penal 
transformations, which have been identified as key in other contexts, such as 
neoliberalism for example. However, I will also refer to the specific context 
and time in which the reform took place. This will involve making connections 
with the situation of the Latin American region, but also in terms of the 
specificity of Chile as a country. Following this line, the understanding of 
broader concepts will also be presented based on the meaning they had in 
the particular time, place and culture, because as Melossi (2000) pointed out, 
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‘crime control’ can have a series of different meanings and emphasis. This 
will allow me to establish relations between the existent knowledge in penal 
transformation and the Chilean case. Assessing how effectively previous 
research explain these changes in a new context, and what the national 
process of transformation of the Juvenile justice System can say about penal 




The selected methods allowed me to gather a great amount of data, including 
personal experiences, about the transformation process from the tutelary 
system to the LRPA. It involved interviewing some of those who participated 
in the direction the change followed more than ten years ago, and also 
reading documents and reports produced at those times. As a result, I was 
able to develop a broad vision of the timeline and events together with the 
underlying relationships, knowledge and main thoughts regarding the juvenile 
justice reform.  
In this process snowballing proved to be a key strategy as it granted me 
access to my sample. All other means used had very little success. In fact, 
the lack of a gatekeeper who could provide me access to politicians made it 
impossible for me to interview them. I believe this has a lot to do with Chilean 
culture of distrusting outsiders and the fear of associating their image with 
negative elements that could give them a bad reputation, as it can be 
influential in how the press and then the public treats them. For example, 
regarding the public scandals already mentioned. I think this same fear 
influenced politicians to remain outside of any research that does not come 
from institutions with their own political views.  
This happened in a national context of general disappointment about 
traditional politicians, and where the control of youth crime is being referred 
in political discourses as new promises to bring security, as I will show in 
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chapters five and six. In consequence, politicians may have felt that 
participating in my research implied to defend themselves and their role in a 
process that happened more than ten years ago. At the same time, 2017 was 
a year of presidential elections in Chile, and in the final days of a 
government, the pressure on Senators, Deputies and also Ministers 
increased because they had to fulfil promises or try to challenge them (if they 
belonged to the opposition), while stating their support for future candidates, 
and making new coalitions.  
Another element to take in consideration as shaping my data, is that 12 years 
have passed since the law was implemented, and 29 since the ratification of 
the UNCRC. As I will show in chapters five and six, the general perception 
around youth offending and juvenile justice went already changing over the 
years of debates and discussion until its implementation. Hence, it is 
expected for people to view that process, their own experience but also 
juvenile justice, now that more years have passed, in different terms. At the 
same time, new events can affect what they consider relevant. For example, 
all the interviewees highlighted the need to improve the implementation of the 
law, focusing on the after-sentence stage, an aspect that was not in deep 
consideration during the legislative stage. 
Moreover, youth offending is a topic of broad discussion in the national 
context at the present time and during the election debates. At the time of my 
fieldwork (2017) justice was considered to be failing by the media and 
politicians, together with a perceived crisis of the National Service of Minors 
[Servicio Nacional de menores, SENAME] which just opened into discussion 
at the end of 2016 and broke massively in 2017, although in terms of child 
protection. Thus, institutionalisation was coming to be perceived as losing all 
rights for children, as a dangerous space that will turn them into dangerous 
criminals, also failing to stop criminal careers, making offences increase. 
Therefore, everything related to crime and to the situation of young people 
has been a trending topic in the national context. This has only escalated 
since then, turning more towards crime control, to the point this year (2019), 
the aula segura [Safe classroom] measure started being applied. This has 
94 
 
involved the presence of police officers inside schools, and even discussions 
regarding if a curfew should be declared for juveniles to avoid them being in 
the streets at night.  
Nevertheless, having all these issues present and given the flexibility of the 
methods selected I could adapt to the new circumstances. In the planning of 
my fieldwork I also thought about different options, such as focus groups or 
the analysis of the media (broadcasted news). However, the first option was 
not considered appropriate because of the complexity of gathering many 
experts and politicians in one place. They are people with highly busy 
schedules. Also, the thing that mattered the most to me was to understand 
the process of transformation. A focus group would have given me, probably, 
a lot of information regarding agreements and disagreements between these 
people, what they did or how they used to understand juvenile crime and 
justice. However, it would not grant me depth in term of their personal 
experience, the inner details they provided and their own personal views of 
past and present, making it harder to differentiate what could have influenced 
their current visions of what happened more than a decade ago.  
Regarding analysing the media, the media, as the most widespread 
communication channel between the public and politicians, contains personal 
opinions together with meaningful events of the time; and it was supposed to 
be accessible through the recordings in the archive of the Secretariat of 
Communication of the State of Chile. However, when I contacted the Archive, 
they denied having any material, and mentioned other organizations now in 
charge of the records. Nevertheless, the new organizations claimed not to 
have the years I needed either. This may relate to the re-distribution of the 
information keepers, due to the generation of new institutions and archives, 
and also to the government change. Since 2007 three more governments 
have had place, two of them with the same President who belonged to the 
political opposition (the right-wing) to those who had been in power for the 
previous 20 years (The Concertación, a centre-left coalition). Therefore, all 
the internal structure of many public institutions has completely changed, 
which can also be linked to the precarious handling of historical material as 
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evidenced in the documents’ subsection. As a strategy to solve this, I 
resorted to printed media, which I could find in microfiches in the National 
Library. Thus, I started going there during my fieldwork and learned how to 
request and use the materials.  
I tried this as an option to access the views of the politicians that were not 
replying to the invitation to participate in my research, and also to review the 
main events portrayed by the press in the context of the discussion of a new 
juvenile justice system. Initially I looked for the two most read newspapers of 
the time: El Mecurio and La Tercera. However, quickly I realised that if I 
covered the same 17 years I had identified as the period of transformation of 
the juvenile justice system, it involved 12,410 newspapers. If I reduced this to 
only the years of the legislative debate it was at least 5 years and thus 3,650 
non-digitalised newspapers. It proved to be a non-feasible line of research in 
the time and conditions of my fieldwork, and finally I decided not to work with 
them.  
Despite this, I accessed a great amount of public statements of politicians 
due to the documents I was retrieving, because many of them mention and 
quote information from the press. However, if possible, in the future I would 
still like to use the news, and to access the opinion of those who had to 
implement the LRPA and were already working in the field with the old 
system and during the reform. This could provide me institutional views on 
the debate and external opinions of those involved directly in the 
implementation of reform.  
Regarding things that could have been improved in my research during the 
preparation and fieldwork stage, I believe transcribing the interviews right 
after would have been extremely helpful. I tried to do it, but some days I had 
two interviews in different parts of the city, and I was also going to the 
libraries and scanning documents. Therefore, even though I made some 
connections with my notes and what I remembered from previous interviews, 
there were some links I did not make until transcription time, missing the 
opportunity to ask more about certain events and people. Also, resorting to 
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online requests for documents from institutions such as the Ministry of 
Justice and SENAME was not fast and not very helpful. I regret not having 
requested personal physical access to the archives to at least be sure there 
was absolutely no way of finding old documents.  
Finally, I was highly concerned about balancing tracking and accessing 
interviewees in an ethical manner, without harassing them or putting them 
off, which could also have a negative impact in my data generation if they 
eventually agreed to participate. I wanted to avoid their participation being 
the result of pressure instead of the interest to share their experience. Also, 
some of them had changed their field of work, some politicians for example 
were now in private companies, so it felt like forcing my entrance into their 
private lives when they had chosen not to have a public role anymore. 
Finally, I had the hope eventually I could find a more official way of talking to 
them, which never happened. Thus, I was not active enough to actually go 
and sit down there until I got a meeting to at least discuss the chance of 
actually talking to them (even though there were secretaries that answered 
my calls and dismissed any possibility many times).  
Despite all this, I was able to generate a great amount of data that allowed 
me to have a very clear notion of what happened before and in the reform 
process and how it happened. At the same time, the documents provided me 
the national context at the time, clarifying the political, social and economic 
situation of the country. The following chapters will dedicate to present the 
analysis of the data both retrieved and generated. This will involve making 
reference to the documents and the voices of the interviewees, relying on 
quotes as supporting evidence.  
In terms of structure, the findings chapters will begin by providing a clear 
account of the Chilean landscape. In the following chapter, I will address the 
political change from democracy to the authoritarian regime of the 1970s, the 
main changes the country faced over the dictatorship and the following 
transition to democracy in the 1990s. Likewise, the ‘Historias de la ley’, the 
presidential candidates government plans and the annual presidential 
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speeches allowed me to understand the role and drivers behind key political 
actors. Hence, I was able to generate an explanation of the reasons and 
timing behind the reform, to be addressed in chapter five. Chapter six will 
evidence the polity building process in which the new Juvenile Justice 
System was developed, defined and finally implemented, addressing the 
direction the reform followed and the main factors shaping it. Finally, chapter 
seven will talk about how the Chilean case challenges the broader literature 
on penal transformations, re-framing some and providing new elements to 



































Chapter 4: A new society: the base for the future Juvenile Justice 
  
On September 11, 1973 the history of Chile had a sudden turn from being 
one of the most democratic countries in the world (Hilbink, 2007), to entering 
a 17 years dictatorial military regime under the lead of General Pinochet. This 
dramatic change started with the bombing of the National Government 
Palace, La Moneda, by the air force of the country, and led to considerable 
changes of what Chile had been.  
What happened in the 1970s and 1980s generated the socio-political, 
economic and institutional base of the Chile that decided to reform the 
Juvenile Justice System after more than 70 years of tutelary approach. It also 
determined key elements of the reform process. For example, the military 
regime created a new national Constitution, thus a new way of making laws 
and creating public institutions. Furthermore, a new elite that remains in 
power to this day was born, and they, as it will be shown in chapters five and 
six, had a key role in the direction followed by the new Chilean juvenile 
justice.  
Moreover, the defeat of General Pinochet in the 1988’s plebiscite led to the 
formation of the political coalition of parties that opposed the authoritarian 
regime at that time: the Concertación. This coalition provided the presidents 
that ruled since democratic restoration in 1990 until 2010, thus including the 
whole period of discussion, legislation and implementation of the new 
Chilean Juvenile justice. From the end of the dictatorship and until the 
implementation of the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act [LRPA], there 
were four Concertación presidential governments: Patricio Aylwin (1990-
1994); Eduardo Frei (1994-2000); Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006); Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010).  
The dictatorship and posterior democratic order can be described as a time 
of socio-political and cultural restructuration and conflicting notions of what 
democracy means and involves. Amongst the many changes, it is possible to 
find a profound reform of the political and economic systems, and the deep 
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transformation of the interactions between citizens and of them with the state. 
This last point involved the renovation of social values and priorities, but also 
turning a very politically active citizenship into a nearly completely passive 
one, which later evolved into disinterest, widespread mistrust and 
hopelessness towards the political class and their actions. All these elements 
eventually marked the characteristics of the democratic order of the 1990s 
and 2000s. Moreover, the authoritarian regime left new economic, societal 
and political constrains. At the same time, there were few resources, and no 
solid network or positive communication between conflicting ideas.  
All these factors influenced an increasing need for a Juvenile Justice Reform. 
These factors also marked the characteristics the LRPA came to have, the 
expectations set on it, and the understanding of youth offending and crime, 
as by the end of the 1990s youth offending was an element of unprecedent 
focus for both the wider population and politicians (Dammert, 2005).  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify, explain and clarify the specific 
context in which the juvenile justice reform developed. Therefore, I will start 
by addressing the ideology of the authoritarian regime, together with the 
means used to impose it to the population. This will be followed by the main 
structural changes faced by the country. It will involve analysing the elements 
behind the development of an authoritarian government plan, and the 
reforms made to ensure their continuity into democratic times. Then, the 
drastic imposition of a new economic model will be covered, together with the 
birth of a new elite and a new poor class. The conclusion will address the 
new interaction between Chilean citizens and of them with the State after 
such a transformation of the country. The presentation and analysis will start 
from the authoritarian regime of the 1970s, also including the transition 
towards the 1990s’ democratic order, addressing how the dictatorship 





I- The imposition of radical changes: Pinochet’s dictatorship 
 
The authoritarian regime of the 1970s and 1980s was born from the plot of 
two main factions of the Chilean Armed Forces, the Navy and the Air Force 
(Valdivia, 2001). The purpose of the coup was to overthrow President 
Allende, the first democratically elected Marxist President in the world, and 
his radical social, political and economic reforms. Allende focused on 
strengthening the state, greater control of private property, egalitarianism, 
and reorganizing the social structure to prioritize the needs of the poor, 
working and middle classes (Wesson, 1982; Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993; Lawson, 2005; Livingstone, 2009; Palieraki, 2015).   
The first year of Allende’s governance went by with economic success and 
the fulfilling of many of his campaign promises: companies were nationalised, 
wages rose, the GDP grew, house for homeless were built, land was 
redistributed, inflation fell, and unemployment reduced (Wesson, 1982; 
Oppenheim, 1993; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005; Livingstone, 
2009).  
However, by 1972 Chile was facing budget deficit, inflation and debt 
(Oppenheim, 1993; Raczynski, 2000). The crisis worsened with the influence 
of the United States which openly opposed Allende’s government. The Nixon 
administration cut all economic aid and credits to Chile except to the Military 
(Wesson, 1982; Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig 
Report, 1993; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005; Livingstone, 2009). 
At the same time, political positions in the country radicalized. Allende’s 
supporters took independent action to hurry the implementation of his 
campaign promises: they occupied land and factories and called citizens to 
bring social change by force. Likewise, a small radical right-wing group, 
Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Freedom] took violent actions. Tensions 
increased because of complaints from business owners regarding 
nationalization policies of the Government. The result was the presence of 
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armed radical groups engaging in conflict in the streets (Lawson, 2005; 
Livingstone, 2009). 
To control this growing conflict, Allende declared a partial State of 
Emergency and asked for the participation of the Military in his cabinet. This 
responsibility fell on General Prats. However, he resigned and was replaced 
by General Pinochet, who in 1973 was appointed Commander in Chief of the 
Army. Not a month later General Pinochet brought the fall of Allende and 
became a dictator, even though some authors claim he did not participate in 
the plot (Valdivia, 2001; Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). 
The Armed Forces claimed, as justification for their actions, that President 
Allende, the Popular Unity [Unidad Popular, UP, the party coalition 
represented by the government], and his supporters were bringing chaos and 
conflict to the country. On the contrary, they intended to bring security, 
economic stability, discipline and authority back (Valdivia, 2001). Moreover, 
Allende’s actions had been declared illegal by a resolution of opposing 
members of the Congress in August 1973, calling for the Military to act 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). 
Therefore, the coup was also presented as a need to recover the rule of law 
(Hilbink, 2007). 
What is more, there was wide support amongst citizens to take radical action, 
as the country had been progressively divided and polarized in violent 
political conflict since the 1960s. According to Valdivia (2001), supporters of 
the coup saw it as much needed action to give a break in the economic crisis. 
Following Chaparro and Cumplido’s arguments (1982), it was mostly about 
bringing order and security, although they also mention the emphasis on 
reducing the national context of scarcity, where access to daily goods was 
limited and families had to queue to buy food and supplies. The media also 
supported the coup through campaigns creating fear, for example using 
radical messages such as ‘it is us or them’ (Rettig Report, 1993).  
Since the very beginning, the new rules were dedicated to halt all political 
action, to take full control over the country and to stop any opposition from 
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arising. This was accomplished through the display of military force and the 
movement of troops. Their fight against the left continued all throughout the 
authoritarian regime and extended eventually to anyone who criticised their 
government. For example, two lawyers were expelled from Chile in 1976 
upon returning from the 6th assembly of the Organization of American States 
where they discussed the Human Rights situation in the country (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993).  
The purpose of this section is to present the ideology of the authoritarian 
regime and the means used by the Armed Forces and the dictator to impose 
their own views over the country for the following 17 years. The use of these 
means, mainly legal mechanisms, Human Rights’ violations and repression, 
and media censorship and control, provided the military government with the 
power to do as they saw fit, and to carry radical transformations that replaced 
all previous logics of interaction between citizens and of them with the State.  
 
1. The ideology behind the authoritarian regime 
 
The Armed Forces rejected Allende’s government for what they blamed as 
lack of efficiency, their disagreement with the notion of class struggle and 
their preference for capitalism and private property from the late 1920s when 
Colonel Ibañez became president (Valdivia, 2001). There were also concerns 
about the national economy in general, and more specifically the impact of 
the economic crisis in resources allocated to the Armed Forces, as well as 
the halt on modernization (Oppenheim, 1993; Lawson, 2005). Finally, there 
was a tradition against communism, reinforced by training in 
counterinsurgency provided by the United States in Latin America against the 
USSR and the Cuban revolution in times of the cold war (Constable and 




Following from that, the Armed Forces directed their efforts to disband the 
support to the UP [Popular Unity, the coalition supporting Allende], and any 
leftist thinking. They began their rule by immediately quieting the leaders of 
the opposition. There was evidence of troops being sent to University 
campuses and political parties’ buildings, raids into factories or houses of 
known leftist figures in the supposed search of weaponry, and illegal 
detention in secret centres (for example Dawson Island in the south of the 
country, where former members of the UP government were sent right after 
the coup) (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and 
Sepúlveda, 2008). 
The reach and radicalization of their measures increased to the point that, 
according to the Rettig Report (1993), more than 20,000 Chileans left the 
country for political reasons in the first two years of the regime. For example, 
administrative staff were removed from public positions using Decree Law 22 
and 25, and by 1975, more than 40,000 people had been dismissed from 
government institutions (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar 
and Sepúlveda, 2008). What is more, through Decree Law 50, the State 
intervened in areas like education, imposing members of the Armed Forces 
as new rectors of the universities. This resulted in a process of cleansing 
where approximately 1,000 academics and over 20,000 students were 
expelled (Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008); and some fields of 
knowledge, such as sociology, social work and criminology for example, 
became highly controlled and even banned (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993).  
The core values of the authoritarian regime, at least in official speeches and 
documents at the time, were national unity and apoliticism. The first one, was 
presented as the most prized objective in the Declaration of Principles of the 
new authorities in March 1974. It acted as a justification for their actions, 
because Marxism was constantly blamed for bringing conflict and dividing 
society. The notion of social struggle was forbidden. This national unity, 
openly spread in public discourses and in the image the military government 
gave to the nation, was explicitly stated as a must. Actions against it were 
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equalled to anarchy, violence, indiscipline and deserving punishment (Rettig 
Report, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). For example, all the 
members of the Junta had to present a united front, despite the growing 
conflict and disagreement between certain members and General Pinochet 
(Valdivia, 2001).    
Being apolitical related to the blame the military attached to all politicians for 
allowing the country fall into chaos. Therefore, even though they were clearly 
against leftist ideas, they criticised all political parties. The right-wing was 
seen as prioritizing their own interests over the country, and as such they 
were not prepared to rule either (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Garreton, 
1982; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). In consequence, as soon as 
he took on power, General Pinochet banned all parties that had supported 
Allende’s government, that is communist, socialist or driven by leftists’ ideas 
(Decree Law 77). At the same time, all other parties entered a recess period 
(Decree Law 78). They were forbidden to act or engage in political 
participation at the expense of penalties. In 1977 through Decree Law 1,697, 
all political parties were dissolved. Being ‘political’, ‘communist’ or ‘leftists’ 
became insults, and anyone accused of being any of those could be at risk of 
losing their position. The government saw what they did not as politics but as 
protecting a country that was not prepared for democracy, and thus they 
were superior to the previous order (Hilbink, 2007). 
 
2. Legal Mechanisms 
 
After the coup, General Pinochet assumed the leadership of the State, and 
the Military Government Junta was created. The Junta was a group formed 
by four representatives of the Armed Forces’ branches and the Police that 
took the role of the Executive (Decree Law 1); they later assumed the 
legislative role (Decree Law 28). The Junta stated its purpose as the 
restoration of Chilean justice and institutions which were negatively impacted 
by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. They also claimed as their moral duty 
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to end with Allende’s ‘illegitimate’ government, which would not mean 
breaking with the independence of the judiciary, or workers’ rights (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 
2008).  
To accomplish these purposes and moral duties, the activity of the Congress 
was immediately stopped, closed and dissolved (Decree Law 27). Moreover, 
through Decree Laws 3 and 4 a State of Siege and Emergency were 
declared (to be understood as a State of War). The States of Exception were 
a permanent element of the authoritarian regime and were renewed for 
almost its 17 years (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; 
Lawson, 2005).  
Moreover, with the declaration of Chile in a State of Emergency came the 
predominance of National Security. This implied two main things: 1) the 
imposition of military values, such as order, discipline, hierarchy, authority 
and security, and 2) It allowed the armed forces to label the opposition as 
enemies of the fatherland (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Valdivia, 2001). 
This gave powers to the new head of the State, General Pinochet, to impose 
a country-wide curfew, to send the Armed Forces to the street, to detain 
people without need of legal process, restrain constitutional rights, and to 
forbid all actions he deemed unwanted, such as any demonstrations against 
his new rule, or of support towards the former president (Garreton, 1982; 
Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Lawson, 2005). 
Initially, the leadership of the Junta was to be rotated among the four 
representatives, who had also divided governmental administration according 
to branches. General Pinochet of the Army, in charge of security; General 
Leigh of the Air Force, responsible for social welfare; Admiral Merino of the 
Navy, in economy; and General Mendoza of Carabineros (paramilitary police) 
dealing with agriculture. However, in 1974, through the Decree Law 527, 
Pinochet assumed as Supreme Chief of the Nation, and eventually as 
President (Decree Law 806). This only increased his powers, making his vote 
mandatory for any modification, while decreasing the weight of the Junta’s 
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decisions. Decree Law 527 also granted the Commanders indefinite time in 
their positions, to be only removed by resignation, death or incapacity, which 
gave them extraordinary control over the future of their subordinates 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). The power of the 
heads of the authoritarian regime thus was increasing.  
All of this could happen through the use of the Decree Laws. These are 
constitutional mechanisms for the Executive Power to make laws without 
passing through the Congress, or when there is not a Congress, as it 
happened in the authoritarian regime. They allowed the imposition of General 
Pinochet’s rules without further discussion. This meant Pinochet could 
determine, for example, despite hierarchy and ranks in the Armed Forces, 
who would obtain a vacant role, dismissing those he thought not faithful to his 
rule (Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). Decree Laws also impacted on 
general civil rights, for example Decree Law 604 was designed to prohibit the 
entrance to Chile to anyone who could bring ideas or actions against the 
government (Rettig Report, 1993); or Decree Law 81 which gave the power 
to expel people from Chile (Hilbink, 2007). Thus, they gave appearance of 
legitimacy and legality to the new order, while increasing their powers 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). 
The severity of the regime’s repression, and its legitimacy, exacerbated with 
the attitude taken by those who could legally oppose them, namely the 
Judiciary (Rettig Report, 1993). Despite the authoritarian government having 
assured the independence of the Legal Power, Hilbink (2007) shows how in 
fact the Judiciary failed to defend Human Rights and respect law principles 
due to their own personal preferences, but mostly because of the effects of 
their legal philosophy and institutionality, where being involved in politics had 
negative connotations.  
Moreover, the President of the Supreme Court, Enrique Urrutia, immediately 
recognised the authority of Pinochet and the regime, and expressed the 
support of the judiciary in varied occasions (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Oppenheim, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). Administrative 
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barriers such as the still working 1925 Constitution were sorted quickly 
through the creation of new rules. For example, the Decree Law 788 in 1974 
explicitly stated Decree Laws to be considered amendments of the 
constitution if the documents clashed. After that, the judiciary accepted and 
endorsed the Decree Laws produced by the military government (Hilbink, 
2007).  
In fact, many judges and lawyers who rose their voices to defend Human 
Rights saw their careers ruined. Relevant positions were given to those who 
favoured the government policies, and the main legal measure to protect 
citizens, Habeas Corpus petitions, were systematically rejected. Confession 
under torture was accepted, the word of the repression agency, the 
Directorate of National Intelligence [Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional, 
DINA], was never questioned, and when they refused to attend to court or to 
provide evidence, the cases just died in court (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Hilbink, 2007). Moreover, the declaration of Chile 
in State of Siege and of Emergency allowed the use of Military Tribunals. 
This reduced the power of the judiciary, while increasing the authority of the 
Armed Forces to detain people for longer periods of time and take harsher 
measures, such as the death penalty (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Rettig Report, 1993; Hilbink, 2007). The following section will focus 
specifically on the harshest and more violent mechanisms used daily against 
the Chilean population.  
 
3. Human Rights violations 
 
Given the base of legality the authoritarian government had set for its rule, 
they had plenty of space to act. Their actions involved physical and 
psychological oppression, not only towards the left, but against regular 
citizens as well, forcing the stoppage of the freedom to express their views, 
restricting their liberties, violating their rights and cancelling their political 
participation. This was done through the Intelligence Agency of the military 
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government and led to widespread violence that was kept in secret and was 
never properly condemned nor prosecuted. This subsection will present how 
these Human Rights violations took place and their outcome in subsequent 
democratic times 
a) The ‘super powerful’ Intelligence Agency 
Most of the abusive actions of the military regime were staged by the 
Directorate of National Intelligence [DINA], created officially in June 1974 by 
Decree Law 521, published in a limited edition of the Diario Oficial4. 
However, there is evidence that they started to work before that (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). This independent public agency, 
created with the purpose to protect national security, depended, in paper, 
directly on the Military Junta. However, in practice it could only be controlled 
by the maximum authority of the country, General Pinochet (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993).  
The DINA has been associated to actions such as creating secret detention 
centres (torture camps); kidnaping, disappearing or murdering people; raiding 
properties without legal orders; and the appropriation of the goods and 
properties of those who fell in their hands (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). Amongst the torture means used, 
they went from beatings and rape to grill, suspension, immersion and the 
torture of family members to create psychological pressure (Rettig Report, 
1993).  
The first objective of the DINA was to eliminate the key figures of the MIR 
[Revolutionary Left Movement, in Spanish Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria]. This evidences how much it was a fight against leftist 
ideology, as the MIR was a Marxist group that had not joined the UP (Rettig 
Report, 1993; Palieraki, 2015). It was followed, in 1975 by the members of 
the Socialist Party, and finally in 1976 it turned against the members of the 
Communist Party (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; 
 
4 All Chilean laws and decrees are valid only after being published in the Diario Oficial. It was 
created in 1876 and works since then. It is controlled by the Interior Ministry.  
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Rettig Report, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). The order can 
be understood in terms of how actively they fought the regime after the coup. 
The MIR was the most radical fraction of Marxists. The Socialist Party also 
had a branch of more radical members who had actively engaged in armed 
resistance. The Communist Party had initially refused to take direct action 
against the Armed Forces, encouraging change through pacific means. 
Eventually their ideology changed, and by the mid-1980s, a branch of the 
party organised and started actively fighting the regime with actions such as 
planting bombs, and an attempt to kill Pinochet in 1986 (ibid).  
The DINA was organised by members of the Armed Forces, but it was a 
complex network of sections that initially employed over 400 people and it is 
said to have later employed thousands. It involved many civil volunteers who 
joined in the Civic Intelligence Brigade and took it upon themselves to report 
anyone whom they thought supported Marxism (Cavallo, Salazar and 
Sepúlveda, 2008). Members of the radical right-wing group Fatherland and 
Liberty were quick to collaborate with the DINA (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993). Moreover, some members of the same parties they intended to 
eliminate, unable to resist torture, ended up becoming informants (Rettig 
Report, 1993). Those who tried to denounce what was going on, regardless 
of their affiliations, faced consequences. For example, in 1977 a general who 
manifested openly his worry about the national Human Rights situation, faced 
immediate forced retirement (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). 
Amongst the key elements characterizing the work of the DINA, secrecy was 
essential. It was facilitated by the lack of need for official channels of actions 
or legal authorisations. The Decree Law that created the agency gave them 
enough powers to carry out detentions, demand information from any state 
institution and agency, and letting themselves decide whether to collaborate 
with other institutions, such as the judiciary (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993; Rettig Report, 1993). Secrecy was strengthened using illegal means 
such as false number plates in their cars, and misinformation strategies, for 
example stating in the media that people had died in gun battles that never 
took place (Rettig Report, 1993).  
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Their work was facilitated by the direct interaction between the head of the 
agency, the Colonel Manuel Contreras and General Pinochet (Cavallo, 
Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). This gave them the power to halt, suspend or 
destroy the careers of those who opposed them, keeping reports of most 
members of the left, but also of the Armed Forces and everyone who wanted 
to work for the government. Eventually, the DINA approval was needed 
before reaching important positions in the institutional structure of the regime 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). Therefore, they had 
different ways of making sure their power was clear and remained silently 
spreading.  
Furthermore, their power grew in what was called ‘Operación Condor’, an 
agreement between the dictatorships of the southern cone -Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay for example- to facilitate the prosecution of dissidents abroad. 
Amongst their actions we can find the murder of General Prats -the former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army- and his wife in 1974 in Argentina; or the 
attempted murder of Leighton, a member of the Christian-Democrats, and his 
wife in Rome in 1975 (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; 
Huneeus, 2000; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008; Livingstone, 2009). 
In 1977, the DINA was replaced by the National Central of Information 
[Central Nacional de Informaciones, CNI] (Decree Law 1876 dissolved DINA 
and Decree Law 1878 created the new agency). The change was a reaction 
to international pressure after the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie 
Moffit in Washington, DC, in the United States by the DINA. The former was 
a member of the Socialist party who had worked for Allende’s government as 
ambassador in the United States, having also served as Minister of Defence. 
He was imprisoned after the coup and exiled to the United States where he 
had a role opposing the regime from abroad. He was murdered along with his 
secretary with a bomb under his car, his driver, Moffit’s husband, survived. 
The plot involved false passports and the participation of Townley, a US 
citizen with experience in explosives. The United States determined Townley 
and Colonel Contreras to be responsible and wanted extradition. Townley 
was handed to the FBI, where he disclosed information about the DINA, 
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bringing a big media blow to the regime (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008).  
This generated a turn in the support the United States had held against 
communism and towards the authoritarian regime (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Livingstone, 2009). The result was the international focus 
over the violence of the Chilean dictatorship. That same year, the United 
Nations condemned Chile, with the support of 96 countries (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Hilbink, 2007; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). In 
consequence, the regime developed a series of actions to fight its negative 
image. Amongst these actions, we can find the dissolution of the DINA, 
public condemnation of their actions, and the creation of a new agency.  
However, the change was initially only a nominal reform, as the director, 
purpose and actions of the CNI remained the same as the DINA, at least for 
the first months, until Contreras was dismissed (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993). Even then, many of the employees were faithful to their former boss 
and to the secrecy of the DINA (Rettig Report, 1993). This led to the new 
director firing members of the agency. However, contrary to what happened 
in the DINA, the director of the CNI changed more than once. In those years, 
cases of corruption within the institution also came to be known (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). 
From 1977 until 1990 when it was legally dismantled, it was the CNI that 
staged the prosecution, murder and torture of the opposition. This time, the 
agency depended on the Interior Ministry. Initially, disappearances 
decreased meaningfully with the change. However, the levels of repression 
increased again around 1983 with the break of massive protests on the 
streets and the organization of the opposition in small guerrilla groups (such 
as the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front associated to the Communist Party, 
or the actions of members of the MIR who came back from exile) (Rettig 
Report, 1993).  
It is worth keeping in mind that even though the DINA and the CNI were the 
major institutions in charge of political repression, the intelligence of each 
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branch of the Armed Forces also played a part. There is evidence, though, 
that they did not get along with the DINA and many times they clashed, 
leading to conflicts, confusion and fights for recognition (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). One of the key 
agencies in the mid-1970s was the Joint Command, led by the Air Force 
(Rettig Report, 1993). The friction ended after the authorities of each group 
decided to make an agreement, and political repression continued without 
problems between agencies. Although some politicians, members of the 
Armed Forces, and civil actors inside the regime still disliked the DINA/CNI 
and the direction of Colonel Manuel Contreras (Cavallo, Salazar and 
Sepúlveda, 2008).   
b) Human Rights violations and the prosecution of dissidents 
The amount of violence of the military regime is not fully known, as the CNI 
and Armed Forces legally burned all information once the dictatorship ended 
(Lawson, 2005). Therefore, when President Aylwin assumed the first 
democratic government in 1990, he created the Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation to investigate the Human Rights violations under the 
authoritarian government, in what came to be known as the Rettig report. 
This Commission was able to conclude that the actions of the authoritarian 
regime involved torture, murder, illegal detention, forced exile and the 
disappearance of people. Estimates claim more than 3,000 deaths and 
disappearances and over 27,000 cases of imprisonment and torture. From 
1973 to 1975 the government detained more than 42,000 people for political 
reasons. The numbers decreased after that but were still high. It is also worth 
to know that about 50% of the victims had no political affiliations but they 
were mostly from poorer, vulnerable sectors (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993; Rettig Report, 1993). 
In the case of the ‘disappeared’, it usually meant they were illegally detained, 
taken to a secret detention centre, tortured, and then murdered; or they were 
murdered on the streets. They key point was denying the detention ever took 
place or claiming the person had been freed or transferred. Many of the 
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corpses were never found, some others appeared eventually floating on a 
river, or years later buried in unnamed spots. Up to this day there are many 
people who remain ‘disappeared’, with no clarity of what happened to them. It 
was a systematically applied method in the first years of the regime, though it 
decreased later in time (Rettig Report, 1993). 
There were also some cases of violence that became publicly known at the 
time when they happened. They rose to public attention for their severity, and 
outraged defenders of Human Rights. An example of this is the ‘Burned case’ 
[caso quemados], where two young students were set on fire when alive. 
Actions like these were likely to cause fear in the community, as they were 
unexpected and excessive. They also caused distrust, because spies of the 
DINA and CNI could be around, and any support for the victims could bring 
harsh consequences (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). 
Amongst the data available, Hilbink (2007) informs that between 1981 and 
March 1990, when democratic rule returned, the number of cases of torture 
and cruel treatment were over 6,000. The only institutions who properly cared 
for the situation within the country came from the churches. Together, they 
created the Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile, the National 
Committee for Refugees, and the Vicariate of Solidarity. They assumed the 
responsibility of providing both legal and social assistance and support to 
victims and families of victims of state violence. They also provided the space 
for family members of the disappeared to organise. According to the Rettig 
Report (1993), the Organization for Victims and Victim’s relatives started 
working in 1974 with only 20 members, by 1975 it had already 323 members. 
In the first two years of the Committee for Peace it handled over 7,000 cases 
and 2,342 Habeas Corpus5 (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). And by 1978, 
the Vicariate of Solidarity had documented 613 cases of ‘disappeared’ 
(Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008).  
 
5 Legal recourse that allows any person to report unlawful detentions to the court and 
request the immediate reconsideration of the legality of their detention.  
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The effects of State violence were probably heightened by the lack of 
consequences after they took place. Prosecution was always halted, using 
the excuse of the State of Emergency; or that it was in defence from the 
actions of armed subversive enemies. This was worsened by actions of the 
judiciary, where for example in 1975 the President of the Supreme Court 
openly denied that people disappeared. Habeas corpus or appeals of 
protection were declared inapplicable under States of Siege, and they were 
generally not investigated (Rettig Report, 1993). Moreover, to make sure they 
were never punished for their actions, General Pinochet and the Military 
Junta launched the now infamous Amnesty Law. 
In April 1978 through the Decree Law 2,191 the Amnesty Law came into 
effect. It was presented as an opportunity for reconciliation and unification of 
the country, as members of the left who had been imprisoned for their 
political crimes would be freed -albeit most of them were exiled (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1993). The law stated that all criminal actions committed 
under the State of Siege from September 1973 to March 1978 -with the only 
exception of the Letelier case- would not receive legal punishment (Rettig 
Report, 1993). The result was that all members of the Armed Forces who had 
participated in human rights abuses during those same years were now 
legally untouchable.  
c) The debt with Human Rights in democratic Chile 
Once Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990, the process to formally an 
officially prosecute the human rights abuses was slow. All attempts to modify 
the Amnesty Law or to clarify the past faced hostility from the conservative 
right-wing. They also risked the precarious balance of the relationship with 
the Armed Forces (Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 2007; Borzutsky, 2017).  
The Human Rights groups and family members of the disappeared and dead 
quickly requested the end of impunity and action from the democratic 
government (ibid). However, there was little general interest in the issue. The 
concern was limited to those who directly experienced some sort of 
victimization, as Pinochet’s supporters believed the actions of the military had 
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been in defence from terrorist actions, to protect the country, or a Marxist 
invention (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Borzutsky, 2017). Most Chileans 
identified as more pressing matters issues of health, poverty and labour 
opportunities (Álvarez, 2014).  
The first change was what came to be known as the ‘Aylwin doctrine’. Initially 
the courts refused to even investigate the Human Rights cases taken to 
them, using the excuse of the Amnesty Law. However, Aylwin claimed that 
for Amnesty to be applied, the case had to be investigated and the facts 
proven (Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 2007; Borzutsky, 2017). Nevertheless, in 
practice, this did not imply the clarification of events. The Armed Forces 
denied the actions of their soldiers until 2001; when they reported 180 
disappeared whose remains had been thrown to the sea. They made no 
mention to the cases of over 3,000 people killed and disappeared as claimed 
by the Rettig Report (Borzutsky, 2017). 
The denial was also mixed with open requests to leave the past behind and 
move forward, which was promoted by a variety of figures, from the 
Commanders in Chief of the different branches of the Armed Forces to 
Mayors and other political figures. They all presented the need to end the 
prosecution of Human Rights abuses as a matter of national unity (Álvarez, 
2014; Borzutsky, 2017).  
At the end, following Borzutsky (2017), what happened was the denial of 
justice and the search of only some truth. The Chilean National Commission 
of Truth and Reconciliation and its product -the Rettig Report-, or the Valesh 
Report in 2004, provided a description of what the victims had lived. They 
also involved compensation for victims or family members. However, the 
names of the perpetrators remained secret. The location of the disappeared 
was not discovered and there was no trial or a sentence for the great majority 
of them. In fact, most of the agreements to bring truth involved ending the 
trials and stopping prosecution soon after disclosure of information. To stop 
the trials was presented as mandatory to achieve reconciliation. 
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The situation changed when General Pinochet was detained in London in 
1998, and later extradited back to Chile under the charges of torture and 
conspiracy to torture. It forced the government of President Frei to face the 
issue (Borzutsky, 2017). Pinochet’s immunity was finally revoked in 2004, but 
in 2005 he was declared unable to stand trial. Later that year he was charged 
with fraud and by 2006 only a tax evasion case was on court. He died before 
being tried. The process shows how hard it was to push forward Human 
Rights cases against the military and the permanent debt of the transition; 
where the wants of those supporting the dictatorship ended being preferred. 
It also brought forefront issues such as impunity and how slow and inefficient 
the courts could be.  
 
The key element to keep in mind from this subsection is that the Armed 
Forces and the dictator were willing to take all actions to reduce their 
enemies. Their power expanded in the different realms of social life, 
impacting in the way to interact with the new authorities, also eroding the 
quality of social relations. The consequences for thinking differently, or 
supporting the opposition were harsh, the legality of the means bypassed, 
the authoritarian practices and enforcers untouchable. The magnitude and 
effects of the human rights abuses that took place have been mentioned in 
several documents (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Garreton, 1982; 
Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; 
Gobierno de Chile, 1996; Lawson, 2005; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 
2008; Livingstone, 2009; Schild, 2013; Palieraki, 2015). They left a 
permanent mark, not only in social trust, but also in the national strength to 
build resistance to the regime. Political entities had been banned and the 
only resource of regular citizens was to speak out, which brought them 
government approved chase, with secrecy and excess of power that was 
hard to fight. The result was the total crush of social groups, forcing them to 
the bottom of society while those close to the authorities rose.  
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Then, when the political landscape changed, the Human Rights debt did not 
become the central topic, despite being key in the democratic discourse. 
Little was done to effectively prosecute violations, bring justice or even 
officially recognise what had happened. In fact, it took two Presidents of the 
democratic period, and the detention of Pinochet in London in 1998, to see a 
more active attitude in the judiciary towards clarifying and prosecuting those 
cases where the Amnesty Law could be bypassed. 
 
4. Media censorship: allowing, expanding and legitimating the changes 
 
In order to keep ‘the enemy’ controlled, the military also took control of the 
media. The transmission towers of opposition radios were bombed and then, 
through the same Decree Law that had banned all leftist parties; their 
infrastructures were seized by the state. For example, Radio Magallanes, 
from the Communist Party, transmitted the last words of President Allende: 
the next day the Armed Forces destroyed their equipment (Cavallo, Salazar 
and Sepúlveda, 2008). The public communication channels of the opposition 
were thus blocked, and the government used their infrastructure to create 
Radio Nacional in 1974 (Skalpelos, 1991; Constable and Valenzuela, 1993).  
The control expanded though legislation. For example, with the Decree Law 
12 in 1973, stating that all information had to be confirmed by the Junta 
before reaching an audience, at the risk of military intervention. Old laws that 
had never or rarely been used were now in full power, such as the law 9,362 
of 1949, which allowed the President to restrict the freedom of the press for 
six months periods. (Skalpelos, 1991).  
At the same time, messages in favour of the military regime were the only 
ones allowed, and actively encouraged (Skalpelos, 1991). This strategy had 
the support of El Mercurio, one of the main news journals of the country 
owned by Agustín Edwards, a regime sympathiser who had received funds 
from the United States in order to campaign against Allende in the 1970’s 
presidential elections. El Mercurio was dedicated to promoting the military 
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government policies and reinforcing the official version of the national 
situation (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Livingstone, 2009).  
Nevertheless, control was mostly accomplished through television. As the 
number of households with a set increased dramatically in those years and 
political debate was prohibited, the channels were instead filled with soap 
operas and light shows (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). According to 
Lawson (2005), there was a complete cultural blackout, as even books, films 
and plays were banned and controlled; authors were forbidden the entrance 
to the country and artists were harassed (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Rettig Report, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). 
All messages against the military regime, criticizing their actions, mocking 
their members, or giving information they wanted to keep secret -such as 
human rights violations- resulted in actions from harassment to complete 
shutdown. For example, ‘Que pasa’ magazine, despite supporting the regime 
openly, made the mistake of publishing the story of a youth who had been 
kidnaped by the DINA. After that, the editor was attacked (Cavallo, Salazar 
and Sepúlveda, 2008). Moreover, some journalists and artists mysteriously 
died, disappeared or were detained in those years. This led to fear, which 
alongside the consequences of breaking the censorship resulted in a 
complex system of self-censorship (Skalpelos, 1991; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993) 
The effects of self-censorship were increased by the replacement from media 
state financing to ‘free’ market. Although the most widespread television 
channels and radio stations remained property of the government. What is 
more, the authorities reserved the right to decide who could own media, and 
new owners were bounded to the Decree Laws determining what could be 
transmitted (Garreton, 1982; Skalpelos, 1991).  
Despite all, in the 1980s opposition media started appearing again, such as 
the magazines ‘Apsi’ and ‘Análisis’, suspended again in 1984 under a new 
State of Siege (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). Initially, they were 
dedicated to reporting the Human Rights abuses, which granted them the 
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support of political parties that kept working underground (the Christian-
Democrats, for example), and professional associations (Rettig Report, 
1993). But it was only in 1986 that the first opposition newspaper was 
approved. However, even in the first democratic years the censorship laws 
were still in place. This allowed the military to take actions against journalists 
who criticised them or their actions, at least until the law was changed. And 
even after that, the media portrayals of the authoritarian regime, the silence 
over Human Rights’ violations and the lack of other perspectives remained, 
as most of the media continued in the hands of conservative supporters of 
the authoritarian regime (Oppenheim, 1993).  
 
This section has evidenced the means used by the military government to 
impose their ideology in the country, banning all options of official and 
unofficial opposition and retaliation. The creation of a legal apparatus that 
sustained their actions gave them an appearance of legality that convinced 
the common citizen who also ideologically rejected Marxism, Communism 
and Socialism, but would never support the level of violence displayed by the 
Armed Forces. Moreover, the secrecy of the actions of the DINA and the 
CNI, together with the misinformation spread by the media, allowed to 
perpetuate the notion of the failure of Allende’s government, the need of 
military intervention and the benefits of an authority like the one of General 
Pinochet and the members of the Military Junta. This strategy granted 
support and credibility to the regime, allowing them to keep spreading their 
power and start implementing changes in what Chile had been, while keeping 
the consequences of their actions hidden for all those who were not directly 
affected. The following sections will address these political, institutional, 
economic and social reforms and transformations that took place over the 





II- Institutional-Political changes 
 
As evidenced in the previous section, the ideology of the dictatorship was an 
intense rejection of leftist ideas, especially if they involved the reduction of 
private property. The authoritarian ideology was also based on contradictory 
aspects. For example, being apolitical even though their actions and 
decisions were political; bringing national unity, although there were direct 
actions to ban opposition. This may relate to the fact that General Pinochet 
and the members of the Military Junta did not have a government plan. This 
section will cover the transition from the coup to a more stable military rule 
that controlled the country for 17 years. This will be followed by the 
introduction of the institutional and political reforms made by the authoritarian 
regime that led to the continuation of their ideas and projects over democratic 
times. Where I will clarify the strategy used to alter the Chilean society 
permanently, constraining the subsequent rule.  
 
1. The institutionalization of the new ‘ideal society’ 
 
The actions of the Armed Forces were initially thought as transitory to bring 
stability and power back to civilians (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982). 
However, in 1974 Pinochet assumed as Supreme Chief of the Nation and 
presented his Declaration of Principles, where he stated the purpose of the 
regime was to rebuild Chile in moral, institutional and material terms. 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). The day before, the 
Military Junta had published their Guidelines for Action. The two documents 
did not match, thus evidencing discrepancies between the authorities of the 
dictatorship. Nevertheless, they both provided a social, political and 
economic plan (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Valdivia, 2001).  
In 1977, in an event organised by the Youth Front of National Unity [Frente 
Juvenil de Unidad Nacional, a political group formed by Jaime Guzmán in 
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1975 supporting the regime], Pinochet presented what came to be 
denominated as the Chacarillas’ Plan. It was a long-term timetable of the 
future of the authoritarian regime and the eventual return to civilian rule. It 
proposed a series of dates that showed an intention of remaining in power 
until 1985 (Garreton, 1982; Oppenheim, 1993).  
As a result, all over the authoritarian regime, democratic participation was 
almost completely halted, except for the consultation of 1978, and the 
referendums of 1980 and 1988. In 1978, with the purpose to show the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian regime to the international community after the 
UN condemned Chile for Human Rights abuses, Pinochet organised a 
consultation. There was no voter’s registration, Chile was under a State of 
Emergency, opposition demonstrations were forbidden, blank votes were 
counted as in support for the government and those trying to say something 
against the regime were harassed. On the contrary, there was massive 
advertising supporting Pinochet’s rule. Unsurprisingly, the consultation 
supported the authoritarian regime (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 2007; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). 
Another key measure was to renovate the 1925 Constitution, still in place in 
the country. In fact, the creation of a new constitution was one of the 
strongest legacies of the authoritarian regime. One that remains until this day 
and has involved a great deal of debate. In 1973, Decree Law 1,064 created 
a commission to draft a new constitution. They presented their final draft in 
1978. Decree Law 3,464 approved the text, which had been modified by 
General Pinochet. The Plebiscite of 1980 had the purpose of ratifying this 
new Constitution, and it was held in similar circumstances to those of the 
1978’s Consultation. The Christian-Democrats tried to organise opposition, 
but the coverage was minimum. Again, the result was as expected, the ‘yes’ 
won with 67%. The Constitution was implemented in 1981, and Pinochet 
gained eight more years in power, until 1988 (Garreton, 1982; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005; Hilbink, 2007). 
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The new Constitution presented the future of Chile as a ‘protected 
democracy’, it meant limited popular representation, where any party with 
doctrines against the family, pro-violence, totalitarian or under a class-
struggle paradigm were prohibited. Although it only referred to communist-
based political parties, as those supporting the dictatorship were allowed. It 
reinforced the use of authority to ‘protect’ Chile from violence and ideology, 
and explicitly stated a new democratic order was to be authoritarian, together 
with integrating, modern and authentic social participation (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Lawson, 2005). A 
contradictory statement that exemplifies the attitude of the military regime. 
The document had also a strong impact in the democratic order of the 1990s, 
as the following subsection will demonstrate.  
 
2. The transition to democratic rule: The legacy that determined the future of 
the Chilean democratic order 
 
Political activity started to slowly reappear from 1983, when after an 
economic crash, opposition labour leaders called for a strike that started a 
continued period of massive protests with the participation of students and 
housewives (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). This resulted in consequent 
increased repression, for example, creating the law 18,256 which punished 
those calling for public collective action in the streets (Rettig Report, 1993). 
However, it also led to a change in the interaction with the military regime, 
opposition media became more active and they united in the Democratic 
alliance. Even Jaime Guzmán, a strong supporter of the authoritarian regime 
and close to Pinochet, funded the Independent Democratic Union [UDI], a 
conservative right-wing party that remains until this day (Oppenheim, 1993).  
By 1985 there was open pressure to end with Pinochet’s rule, the Chilean 
people were demanding his resignation, and a group of 11 political groups 
with the support of the Church generated the National Accord for Transition 
to Full Democracy. The purpose was to reform the 1980’s Constitution and to 
return to democracy (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Lawson, 2005; 
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Hilbink, 2007). However, after the attempt against Pinochet’s life in 1986 by 
the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front [Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, a 
group that had separated from the Communist Party], a new State of Siege 
was proclaimed, and all possibility of agreement was halted. The original 
date proposed by Pinochet in the new Constitution was to be respected.  
 
a) The 1988 referendum 
 
The 5th of October of 1988 was the date set for the referendum. There were 
two options. ‘Yes’ to continue with Pinochet’s rule, and ‘No’ to open the door 
to civilian presidential elections to be held in 1989. The Constitutional 
Tribunal decided on an independent panel to count votes in order to respect 
the new Constitution and give legitimacy to their work and the result. 
Pinochet lifted the State of Exception and allowed exiles to come back. There 
was also support from the United States, providing funds to have people from 
each party in the voting tables, checking the votes count (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993).  
 
In 1987 registration opened for voters, and the government allowed all non-
Marxist political parties if they collected 35,000 registered voters’ signatures. 
14 centre-left opposition political parties joined in the ‘Concertación por el no’ 
and campaigned to vote ‘no’ in the plebiscite. They were the targets of 
violence, from harassment to bombs (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). 
Despite this, the ‘No’ won with 54,7%. Under these circumstances, the 
military agreed to return the political and administrative powers to civilians. 
Given the transition was decided in an administrative way instead of through 
revolution, it has been catalogued as peaceful for some, but also as shallow 
(Lawson, 2005). According to Biekart (2015), it was more a transition from 
authoritarianism than a transition to democracy. This, because the military 
placed certain conditions that have been termed authoritarian enclaves 




b) The authoritarian enclaves 
 
These enclaves set the permanent presence of the military in political life 
through the National Security Council, whose purpose was to provide advice 
to civil government but with veto power in representation of the Armed 
Forces (Garreton, 1982; Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 
1993). They also included the permanence of the 1980’s Constitution. The 
Constitution increased the power of private actors and property through the 
explicit focus on liberal economic rights (Valdivia, 2001; Hilbink, 2007; Budds, 
2013; Hanbeom, 2013; Kennedy, 2017). It granted further powers to the 
Executive over the Legislative through the creation of designated Senators’ 
seats (Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 2007); and extra powers to the 
conservative right-wing, through the reform in the electoral system, which 
made it more restrictive and favoured majoritarian coalitions (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Kennedy, 2017). Pro-military judges were appointed in the 
Supreme Court to serve until their death, the autonomy of the Armed Forces 
was granted, and a National Council for Television was appointed in order to 
keep control over the media (Garreton, 1982; Lawson, 2005; Kennedy, 
2017).  
 
According to several authors, these measures, along with setting almost 
impossible majorities in the parliament to accomplish amends made the new 
constitution almost impossible to reform substantially (Garreton, 1982; 
Oppenheim, 1993; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005; Kennedy, 
2017). Nevertheless, there were minor corrections based on agreements 
between the coalition of the conservative right-wing and the Concertación 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). In 
1989 Presidential elections were held again after almost two decades, and 
Aylwin, a Christian-Democrat representing the Concertación, was elected, 




Nevertheless, these authoritarian enclaves marked and constrained the 
institutions, politics and economy of the new order directly. They made it  
almost impossible to bring any radical changes that altered the basic 
structure left by the military regime. Moreover, the transition had been the 
result of a peaceful agreement, and still attained the support of the 44% of 
citizens who voted ‘yes’ in the plebiscite (Oppenheim, 1993); the right-wing, 
even those who had openly participated in the regime, had not lost their 
political privileges. They remained active and representing all those who still 
valued General Pinochet’s actions and the transformations he implemented 
(Ibid). In fact, the official understanding of the events that took place in 1973 
and in the following authoritarian regime was not replaced by the new 
authorities. Thus, the mindset of the dictatorship continued into the 
democratic period (Borzutsky, 2017). 
 
c) Constrains to the functions of democratic institutions and political 
parties 
In a democratic order, the Congress started to work again. But, as it had 
been closed for the entire dictatorship, elections for new Senators and 
Deputies were needed. In these elections, the Concertación won 72 of the 
120 seats in the Deputies’ Chamber and 22 out of 38 in the Senators’ 
Chamber. However, the authoritarian enclaves left nine appointed Senators, 
gaining control over the Senate despite election results. Some of them were 
important figures of the Armed Forces. Moreover, following the Constitution, 
Commander in Chiefs of the Armed Forced became Appointed Senators for 
life (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 2007; 
Borzutsky, 2017). For example, Pinochet became a Senator in 1998, when 
his self-appointed role directing the military was over, and remained in such 
role until 2002. This continued until 2005, when appointed Senators were 
eliminated through a constitutional reform promoted by President Lagos in 
the third Concertación’s government (2000-2006).  
Here, it is key to have in mind that the Chilean legislative process involves 
the two chambers of the Congress: Deputies and Senators. A majority in both 
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is mandatory in order to pass new legislation. Therefore, law making still 
needed majoritarian approval from the right-wing, or at least the support of a 
big part of the opposition. This resulted in the blocking of all legislation that 
had not been agreed before or was considered too radical or altering the 
conditions left by the previous regime (Vanden and Prevost, 2002). Amongst 
the legislations stopped or at least considerably slowed, we can find attempts 
of constitutional reforms in the first two democratic governments, with 
Presidents Aylwin and Frei; but also with the request by members of the 
government, other congressman and Human Rights association to stop 
Pinochet from becoming a Senator (Hilbink, 2007; Borzutsky, 2017).  
The Constitution also stated the implementation of the binominal electoral 
system, which acted as another tool to give advantage to conservative 
candidates to reach seats in the Congress. These seats represent districts: 
every district had two seats, and every party can present a maximum of two 
candidates; but for the same political party to win both seats, they need more 
than two-thirds of the votes instead of a simple majority. Otherwise, one of 
the seats goes for whomever obtained more votes, while the other seat is 
immediately placed to the party who reached the second place in the vote 
count, even if they have fewer votes than the second candidate of the same 
party that won the first seat. This implies that citizens vote for individual 
candidates, but the person elected depends on the candidate most voted for 
in the list most voted for. Thus, only one of the candidates was elected by 
majoritarian popular vote, unless the support for a given coalition was 
massive. The Concertación usually gained one seat, but they did not have 
enough votes for the second one, which was then appointed to the right-wing 
coalition, as they were the biggest opposition (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Lawson, 2005; Borzutsky, 2017; Kennedy, 2017).  
This system also promoted joining in two super-majoritarian coalitions 
(Borzutsky, 2017), given the little chances for small parties running alone. 
Furthermore, this system usually implied that the political elite did not renew 
easily. The tendency of Chilean politics towards the aggrupation of small 
parties in two big groups was strongly present for at least the period covered 
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in this research. In the first two democratic governments the Concertación 
remained strong, while the right-wing faced conflicts due to its own division 
(Oppenheim, 1993; Álvarez, 2014), the support of more neutral citizens 
towards the coalition that represented the new democratic order (Oppenheim, 
1993), and the lack of legitimacy for all those who had suffered the violence of 
the dictatorship. However, by the third presidential election in 1999, the 
scenario started to change.  
The first two democratic presidents had been from the Christian-Democrat 
party, while the Concertación candidate this time, Ricardo Lagos, was an ex-
member of the Socialist party, now member of the Democratic party [Partido 
por la Democracia, PPD]. This brought crisis inside the Concertación, and 
eventually the retirement of the Christian-Democrats from the coalition. At the 
same time, the right-wing postponed their differences. The ‘Pinochetist’ 
discourse had lost strength in 1998 when he was detained in London, 
allowing them to join forming the coalition Chile’s Alliance [Alianza por Chile], 
to support opposition candidate Joaquin Lavín, a member of the Democratic 
Independent Union [Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI]. The party 
created by Jaime Guzman that reunited the antidemocratic conservative 
right-wing. Lagos still won the election, but with a margin of less than 3% 
after a secondary process of election (Silva, 2001; Borzutsky, 2017).  
This has been related to disappointment with democracy and the 
Concertación administration (Weyland, 1999) -based on how they handled 
the Human Rights’ debt, and other elements such as corruption to be 
mentioned in greater detail below and in the following chapter; but also, to 
the fact that the right-wing left their conflicts and differences behind, joining in 
one super-coalition, adding their individual supports while the Concertación 
was starting to face crisis and division. Therefore, to group together could be 
considered more effective than working alone. However, this prevented 
radical positions (Kennedy, 2017), especially to the left, as the right-wing and 




The lack of a radical position to the left was also strengthened by the 
changes in the political parties after the dictatorship. For example, the 
Socialist Party gave up on Marxism and the social struggle, turning towards a 
more centre-left position with a focus on rights and distribution, but not with 
the same emphasis as before (Vanden and Prevost, 2002); they even 
abandoned their old logo for a more neutral one (Álvarez, 2014). This was 
probably the result of the dictatorship’s discourse, where Communism was 
associated to chaos, insecurity, loss of freedom, economic crisis and the 
‘enemy’. Despite this, Aylwin’s government was considered as moderate for 
the Concertación, but as radical Marxism in the eyes of the conservative 
right-wing of the country (Hilbink, 2007).  
Therefore, the Concertación did not want to be associated to an ideology that 
was strongly rejected by the opposition, but also feared by more neutral 
members of the community. As such, they united with centre-left parties like 
the Christian Democrats, the Humanists, and a less radical section of the 
Socialists; and they were clear in their focus on Human Rights and non-
violent or direct conflict (Oppenheim, 1993). This left out of the coalition those 
supporting more radical leftist actions and ideas, for example the Communist 
Party, the only ones that kept the Marxist roots, despite distancing 
themselves from the radical force they had been in the past (Vanden and 
Prevost, 2002). The result of these institutional constrains but also political 
decisions was that the radical left was effectively banned from political 
participation, the centre became the new left and the radical right-wing 
remained in powerful positions, especially in the Senate.  
d) The strength of conservative authoritarian figures 
Besides this electoral and legislative strength of authoritarian ideas, Pinochet 
remained a strong figure, engaging in public recrimination of any criticism to 
his rule, ranging from Human Rights violations to cases of fraud by his own 
son. He was still the Commander in Chief of the Army and directed public 
demonstrations of military man parading in the streets, quartering troops in 
the city and even rattling sabres to put pressure over the government when 
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their decisions could be considered a risk for military privileges, or the legacy 
Pinochet wanted to leave in the country (Oppenheim, 1993; Lawson, 2005; 
Hilbink, 2007; Borzutsky, 2017). These actions had a clear message: 
Pinochet still had a great amount of power, he controlled the Armed Forces, 
and if the new rule seriously limited him and his closest followers, he could 
act. Moreover, in several occasions he verbally threatened democracy 
(Borzutsky, 2017).  
Open support towards him remained at least until 1998, when his term as 
Commander in Chief of the army ended and he was detained in London. 
Moreover, up to 1998 the military retained a meaningful power over civilian 
rule, as they had not been prosecuted for Human Rights violations, and 
almost half of the population valued the previous regime as positive because 
it had ‘saved the country and national economy’. Pinochet was permanently 
presented as a hero. Open criticism towards his actions and the regime had 
also immediate response from an important fraction of politicians and 
Senators as well. Therefore, their discourse was very much alive, despite the 
regime change (Hilbink, 2007; Borzutsky, 2017). For example, reports 
regarding the Human Rights violations faced strong mediatic and street 
demonstrations from both the political opposition and the Military, reaffirming 
their support for Pinochet’s actions as a saviour of the nation (Oppenheim, 
1993; ibid).  
Conservative and authoritarian actors also permeated at a more local level. 
Chile is divided in Regions, and each one is subdivided in Municipalities, they 
are directed by a Mayor and involve a series of political positions and 
administrative staff. Before leaving the government, General Pinochet 
passed a series of legislations that made it harder to replace administrative 
staff, he also appointed the Mayors (Oppenheim, 1993). Therefore, 
Municipalities were also controlled by dictatorship supporters. Things started 
to change in 1992, when the first municipal elections were held. The support 
for the Concertación government was validated in this instance, as they won 
53.30% of the municipalities. Nonetheless, the right-wing was elected in 
many Municipalities as well (29.80%) (Bunker and Navia, 2010), especially in 
131 
 
those that reunited the business and the political elite that supported the 
regime, who are the richest and most powerful people in the country 
(Álvarez, 2014).  
e) The ruling style of the new governing coalition 
Oppenheim (1993) describes Aylwin’s ruling style in terms of conciliatory, 
moderate and privileging negotiation. The author highlights how the 
Concertación tended to compromise the views of their members and parties 
in order to work together, privileging democracy. For example, at the 
beginning, President Aylwin talked to General Pinochet in advance, looking 
to prevent open opposition and criticism (Borzutsky, 2017). 
The style followed by the governing coalition was one that avoided 
confrontation and challenge, and was based on consensus, compromise and 
pre-arranged agreements (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Lawson, 2005; 
Álvarez, 2014; Tsukame, 2016; Borzutsky, 2017; Kennedy, 2017). This 
brought issues that decreased the trust in their ability to govern but also in 
democracy, as many of their actions implied the denial of the past, or a series 
of slow cautious reforms that at the end of the day did not bring meaningful 
changes; and instead respected or kept building over what the authoritarian 
regime had left in place (Lawson, 2005; Borzutsky, 2017; Kennedy, 2017).  
 
Therefore, the conditions set by General Pinochet constrained directly the 
first democratic years; with most of the antidemocratic institutionalized 
features in place until 2005. The right-wing had been awarded with fixed 
positions in the Senate, obtaining a majority that could easily block new 
legislation that impacted on their interests. They also had the support of an 
electoral system that granted them a seat despite not obtaining majoritarian 
vote. At the same time, the Municipalities, that is, the local contact with 
citizens, were completely in their hands in the transition, and then quite a few 
of them remained in such position. Even the military maintained some of their 
veto power over civilian activities for years, impeding any open criticism to all 
the changes forced during the regime. In consequence, the right-wing had 
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not been delegitimised by the change, as they still had the support of almost 
half of the population.  
 
III- The transformation of the political economy of the country 
 
After obtaining political control of the country in the early 1970s, the military 
expanded their grasp to the economy. Following from Garreton (1982), 
Oppenheim (1993) and Budds (2013) Chile was the first country to 
implement neoliberal public policies in 1975, becoming the most radical case 
of it as well. Market principles extended to all areas, such as education, 
labour, health, the pension scheme and so on, replacing state and social 
regulation (Huneeus, 2000; Valdivia, 2001). By the 1980s most private 
companies belonged to five wealthy investment groups (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Lawson, 2005). This restructuration can be summarised 
as reducing the state, which refers to decreasing its power and reach, while 
giving it to private actors and institutions. This subsection will start with the 
imposition of a new model: Neoliberalism, followed by its consequences on 
daily life, the impact on a new way of interacting with the state and its 
permanence and legitimation over the transition to democracy in the 1990s.  
 
1. Neoliberalism: the implementation of a new model 
 
Since 1930, Chile had an economic model which depended on importing and 
industrialization under a well-protected and regulated market (Silva, 1993; 
Valdivia, 2001; Livingstone, 2009). President Allende had plans to reform it 
following the socialist agenda, increasing the power of the State through the 
expropriation of national and international companies (Wesson, 1982; 
Rackynski, 2000). However, business’ owners and the Armed Forces were 
absolutely against such plan (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993). The first complains of the Military started with the 
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reduction of funds for them (Lawson, 2005). It was quickly followed by 
Allende’s economic policies backfiring, which developed into a national crisis 
where inflation had reached 900%, and there was a 24,7% deficit of gross 
domestic product (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993).  
At the beginning, there was no defined economic posture in the new 
authoritarian regime. However, eventually, it came to two main postures: The 
nationalists and the Liberalists (Valdivia, 2001). The first ones wanted to 
strengthen the Chilean State, albeit respecting private property. The focus for 
them was on making national companies stronger and privileging national 
production over the liberalization to international private organizations. The 
liberalists, represented by the Chicago Boys, inclined towards the promotion 
of international investment and free-market economy. This subsection will 
cover the fluctuating process that ended in the prioritization and 
implementation of neoliberalism, and its main consequences. 
The Chicago Boys were a group of young economists from the Catholic 
University (in Chile), most of whom had followed postgraduate studies in the 
University of Chicago (in the United States). In 1972 they were asked to 
develop an alternative economic programme to the Popular Unity 
government, which came to be named ‘the brick’ due to its size. Early in the 
regime, the retired Captain of the Navy Roberto Kelly was appointed in 
charge of the Office of National Planning [Oficina de Planificación Nacional, 
ODEPLAN], he was familiar with the Chicago Boys. At the same time, based 
on connections and recommendations, Sergio de Castro, a leader of the 
group, became adviser of the Economic Minister, and later the Economy 
Minister and Finance Minister himself (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Oppenheim, 1993). Other members were given key positions such as 
advisors in the Central Bank (Valdivia, 2001).  
However, the predominance of their ideas was not immediate. It involved a 
complex process that was only possible because they had the support of 
General Pinochet. Even after the free-market paradigm won the battle, there 
was still some rejection within the Government. General Leigh, for example, 
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opposed to the free-market paradigm, seeing it as radical. The Minister of 
Economy at the early times of the military regime also disagreed, despite 
working directly with De Castro (Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). 
However, in 1978 General Leigh was forced to abandon the Military Junta, 
and opposition to the most radical liberal ideas decreased, as he was 
considered the strongest nationalist of them (Valdivia, 2001).  
The permanent rotation of positions inside the authoritarian government also 
helped to decrease the impact of critics to the model (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). At the same time, 
many key members of the Chicago Boys or people who were closer to their 
ideas, had accomplished high positions in different institutions and in the 
government, such as ODEPLAN, The Corporation to Promote Production 
[Corporación de Fomento a la Producción, CORFO], or in other Ministries 
(Montecinos, 1998). It was also facilitated by economic help from 
international private banks, institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Nixon and Ford administrations in the 
United States (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). This 
because international economic help started making suggestions and adding 
requirements to the loans, such as fiscal reform, spending restraint, making 
cuts in the public sector, stopping subsidies and keeping wages down 
(Vanden and Prevost, 2002). 
The initial assessment of the Chicago Boys regarding Chilean economy was 
about its excessive regulation, judging it as closed, with a tendency to 
inflation and paralysed in terms of growth. Their suggestions were to free 
prices, open the country to foreign trade and investment, encourage 
liberalization, promote natural resources exports, abolish labour laws, 
privatize state social services and companies, increase taxes and interests, 
reduce welfare and adjust it to the same free-market logic applied elsewhere 
(Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Silva, 1993; Montecinos, 1998; Huneuus, 
2000; Raczynski, 2000; Valdivia, 2001; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 
2005; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008; Livingstone, 2009; Budds, 
2013; Hanbeom, 2013; Schild, 2013). 
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In the 1970s, in the middle of the economic crisis Chile was facing, the 
measures suggested by the Chicago Boys were partially implemented, as 
they did not have full support yet. Around 1974 state spending decreased, 
fiscal deficit reduced to 11% of gross domestic product, and inflation lowered 
to 375% (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). However, they did not have the 
intended results with the expected efficiency, inflation was still high, real 
wages dropped and unemployment rose dramatically (Ibid).  
In 1975, Milton Friedman, an academic and economist of the University of 
Chicago who promoted free market, visited Chile and told Pinochet the 
economy needed more drastic measures. Pinochet placed De Castro as 
Minister of Economy and the ideas of the Chicago Boys received the support 
to implement what was known as the ‘shock plan’. National economy 
improved in what came to be called the ‘Chilean Miracle’ (Oppenheim, 1993; 
Silva, 1993; Valdivia, 2001; Lawson, 2005; Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda, 
2008; Budds, 2013). In that time, there was a drastic cut of public spending, 
private capital was stimulated, the banking system deregulated. The results 
were the elimination of fiscal deficit, the drop of inflation to 65%, the rise in 
production, a seven percent average annual growth, and the reduction of 
unemployment (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 
2007).  
The power of the Chicago Boys only grew after that. Their policies brought 
massive improvement to the national economy and the support of supporters 
of the authoritarian regime who had been previously reluctant to their 
economic approach. The united encouragement for the neoliberal agenda is 
clearly visible in the 1980’s Constitution, as it focused on economic freedom, 
private initiative and the reduction of the state, all principles that had not been 
present in the Declaration of Principles of 1974 for example (Rettig Report, 
1993).   
However, by 1982 the measures had backfired, foreign debt and inflation had 
increased dramatically, the same with unemployment; the family income had 
decreased; banks collapsed; industrial production dropped; and companies 
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went bankrupt (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Lawson, 
2005; Hilbink, 2007; Schild, 2013). Sergio De Castro was asked to leave his 
position, and the Government, against all free-market discourse, had to 
assume the responsibility over banks and companies to stop a full collapse of 
the economy (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 
2007). 
The economy was then handed to Büchi, the new Finance Minister. He 
applied more flexible strategies, albeit still under a free-market logic, and until 
1986 there was an improvement, but it crashed again in 1987 (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Hilbink, 2007). Silva (1993) classifies 
the implementation of neoliberalism in three major stages, a gradual one, 
before 1975; radical at the time of the ‘shock plan’, which ended in the 1983 
crisis, and a pragmatic neoliberal re-structuration. By then, the country had 
accepted the neoliberal paradigm, business blamed their own inability to 
adapt to the new dynamic context, and the new measures were built over a 
free-market logic (Oppenheim, 1993).  
 
2. A reduced State: privatization and the disappearance of welfare 
 
In the 17 years of authoritarian regime, there were two major stages of 
privatization. The first one in the mid-1970s, as part of the strategy that 
brought the ‘Chilean Miracle’. The second one, was in the late 1980s, before 
the return to democracy. Both times the businesses were sold at bargain 
price (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). Chile divested more than 400 public 
companies to private hands. The State sold more than 60% of the companies 
it owned. Although as it retained the main providers of the media, mining and 
energy, it still held 75% of Chilean production (Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993). All the industries nationalised by Allende were returned to their 
owners or sold by 1978 (Oppenheim, 1993). Many basic services, like water, 
were now provided by private companies (Budds, 2013). At the same time, 
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welfare was cut, and state responsibility was reduced to almost non-existent 
(Hanbeom, 2013; Schild, 2013). 
This neoliberal logic expanded to all realms, the health system was 
privatized, universities before free now asked student fees, and schools went 
from government to municipal responsibility, subject to the resources of the 
people living in the area. The authoritarian regime also implemented a labour 
reform which reduced the rights of workers and gave more benefits to 
companies (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Silva, 1993; Schild, 2013). 
Something similar happened with the pension scheme, now dependent on 
personal savings administered by private institutions (Valdivia, 2001).  
Those who benefited the most by the new privatization of services were 
people closely linked to the Chicago Boys (Garreton, 1982; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993). For example, in terms of expropriated land, only 1/3 
returned to their previous owners, but most of them were bought by people 
associated or with close contacts in the authoritarian government (Schild, 
2013). Moreover, despite all the reduction in public spending in all fields, the 
budged for the armed forces grew dramatically in the first decade of the 
authoritarian regime. By 1988 the budget for the military was more than for 
housing, health and education all together (Lawson 2005). 
The privatization of most state services, together with the new way of making 
politics of the authoritarian regime, erased most of the permanent 
communication means between citizens and the Government. There were no 
political parties, no representation, no activity of labour unions or community 
associations, as they had been explicitly banned. Even public meetings and 
co-participation between associations and politicians were explicitly 
condemned (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993). The 
Armed Forces centralised the power of the State in such way that it was 
almost impossible for regular citizens to channel their needs and demands. 
There was no communication between citizens and those making the 




3. The legitimation of neoliberalism in democratic times 
 
When the dictatorship ended, amongst the series of conditions left in the 
authoritarian enclaves, Chile had to remain faithful to neoliberalism. Such 
condition implied the support towards private business entrepreneurship, 
self-development, liberalization and a reduced State all over the following 
democratic years. Nevertheless, the Presidents from the Concertación not 
only accepted the condition imposed by Pinochet, they also embraced it, 
keeping a central focus on macroeconomic stability, low inflation, exports, 
and active participation in the global market (Weyland, 1999; Raczynski, 
2000; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Borzutsky, 2017). For example, the 
government of President Frei continued the privatization of public transport, 
water and copper (Lawson, 2005). 
The support for neoliberalism, beyond the conditions set by the military, can 
be understood as an element that linked the new government with the 
authoritarian right-wing (Weyland, 1999; Borzutsky, 2017). This granted them 
a tool for political negotiation despite not having majority in the Senate. For 
example, when the authorities presented projects to reform the Tax Law to 
the congress in order to generate more resources to address poverty 
matters, it would only be accepted if certain privileges were granted for the 
business elite, such as lower taxes or extra benefits (Oppenheim, 1993; 
Weyland, 1999). According to Chonchol (1996) and Weyland (1999) there 
was a conveniently adaptable conception of the State, as it was understood 
as a burden until the interests of the elite were at stake, then it was 
considered responsible to actively help them through financial aids, which 
had broader acceptance than social expenditures. 
Moreover, as it happened in the authoritarian regime, that gained support 
and was encouraged to stop the crisis and bring economic growth, the new 
government was concerned about the damage it could bring to democracy to 
fail in this matter (Garland, 2000). The hypothesis seems to have some value 
when we notice that the support for the Concertación decreased meaningfully 
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at the end of the second democratic government, with President Frei, after 
Chile felt the effects of the Asian economic crisis of 1997 (Silva, 2001). This 
was visible in the small margin of victory between President Lagos and the 
Democratic Independent Union [Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI, 
authoritarian right-wing party] candidate, Lavín in the 1999’s presidential 
elections. This notion is strengthened when considered that in the next 
presidential election, in 2005, the Concertación won again, after the average 
growth in Lagos government was still around 5.3%, bringing two years of 
economic success at the end of his term (Borzutsky, 2017).  
Furthermore, the permanence of Concertación governments for about 20 
years despite some right-wing actors reaching a lot of support, could be 
partially understood by this. The economic performance of Chile in the last 
years of authoritarian rule and in almost the first decade of democracy was 
considered outstanding and prosperous (Montecinos, 1998; Sapelli, 2000). It 
has been described as worth reproducing, especially when taking into 
consideration the economic crisis several other post-dictatorship Latin 
American countries were facing (Oppenheim, 1993; Weyland, 1999). 
Between 1991 and 2005 Chilean economic growth was higher than the world 
average (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006), with a 7.7 GDP growth under President 
Aylwin and 7.8 in the Frei’s period (Borzutsky, 2017). The participation of the 
country in the global market grew, and with it the importation of policies and 
practices of developed countries (Duque, 2007). This led to a new and 
unknown strength and stability in terms of national and international economy 
(Weyland, 1999; Silva, 2004).  
Therefore, in order to address the issue of legitimacy of the new democratic 
rule, approved by less than 60% of the population, the government focused 
on measures to keep the support of the elite and palliate the needs of the 
vulnerable population. This resulted in what came to be known as social 
market economy (Vanden and Prevost, 2002). This refers to the same old 
emphasis on liberal economy and privatization but mixed with increased 
spending to fight poverty.  
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This was possible due to the economic success Chile was facing, the 
prioritization of gradualist approaches, the decision to place social spending 
under fiscal responsibility, and a reform in the tax law made by President 
Aylwin, which granted important revenues (Weyland, 1999). It allowed the 
creation of new jobs and programmes to reduce poverty (Silva, 2004; 
Dammert, 2005 Borzutsky, 2017). By 1996, the number of poor people had 
reduced in more than 2 million people (Raczynski, 2000). However, the 
priority was still on macroeconomic growth, which meant the new state 
economic aids were few, directed towards highly specific groups, and in the 
shape of training or vouchers that required active demand by the users, for 
example funds to enhance individual capacity to overcome poverty (Weyland, 
1999; Schild, 2013). According to Hanbeom (2013) policy makers sacrificed 
welfare in order to compete in the market.  
Different authors coincide that these measures answered to compensatory 
purposes, with no broader notion of a national policy to address the 
underlying issues or improve people’s needs, but only highly visible 
symptoms (Raczynski, 2000; Ditzel, 2003; Hanbeom, 2013). In consequence, 
even when the issue of poverty was addressed quickly and effectively 
(Álvarez, 2014), the levels of inequality in both income distribution and labour 
conditions stagnated or worsened (Weyland, 1999; Raczynski, 2000; 
Schatan, 2001; Silva, 2004). 
The already hierarchical social organization was now unified by a strong 
entrepreneurship, which focused on private business and financial support. 
Their power strengthened further along the decade given the lack of qualified 
workers, employers’ guarantees and trade unions after their repression 
during the dictatorship, and the political leadership of economists who 
supported neoliberalism (Montecinos, 1998).  
Therefore, the democratic governments legitimized the neoliberal economic 
order imposed by the dictatorship. According to Gómez (2008), from this 
period onwards Chile can be described as a neoliberal advanced society, 
given its conservative politics (which tend to privilege right-wing and market 
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ideas over social guarantees), high media involvement, lack of political 
participation and social, economic and cultural fragmentation that led to 
individualist and competitive attitudes and practices. Citizens and their rights 
were now being built in terms of private consumption and their capacity to 
pay for them. This resulted in massive levels of consumerism (Lawson, 
2005), which probably increased given the new liberties, new trade 
agreements and the overall image on an improved national economy. 
  
IV- Social changes 
 
Chile was split into supporters or detractors of the authoritarian regime, which 
led to new ways of social division. High representatives of the left-wing had 
been evicted from any influential position, including politics and academy. 
Many had also been prosecuted, forcefully displaced within the city, exiled, 
had needed to run away from the country, were politically imprisoned or 
murdered. Hence, this elite group was wiped out of any power positions 
during the 1970s and 1980s, which extended to the first democratic years if 
their ideas were radical. At the same time, those close to the Armed Forces 
and the military government had access to powerful positions and better 
economic deals to buy state property or develop their own business. The 
expansion of neoliberalism also increased the gap between these two 
groups. The economic power was concentrated in the conservative right-wing 
and resulted in the exclusion of vast groups of the population (Chaparro and 
Cumplido, 1982). This section will be dedicated to address how the 
dictatorship led to a new poor class and a new economic and political elite 






1. Marginalization of social groups: making a new poor class 
 
Several authors highlight the dramatic levels of inequality, high concentration 
of resources and increased poverty in relation to the period before the 
authoritarian regime (Tsukame, 1992; Garland, 2000; Raczynski, 2000; 
Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005). By the end of the 1980s the 
income of the wealthiest 10% had increased in more than 80% (Constable 
and Valenzuela, 1993), while over 40% of the population was poor (Schild, 
2013). Condition also recalled by some of the interviewees who participated 
in this research:  
‘I started working in the government in 1990. I’m from the generation that took 
responsibility of this country with a 43% of poverty’ (C., 2017)  
‘Besides the dictatorship there was a very hard crisis that produced a huge 
amount of social problems: poverty, indigence, I don’t know, Chile fell 14 
points in the GDP’ (M., 2017) 
During the dictatorship there was also a reform in neighbourhood distribution, 
which implied the relocation of people and the creation of new marginalised 
neighbourhoods, better known as ‘poblaciones’ [This is the plural world, 
when talking about one neighbourhood the word is ‘población’] (Chaparro 
and Cumplido, 1982; Oppenheim, 1993). Some were the result of new land 
titles and building subsidies to battle poverty (about 30,000 families received 
the benefit), but others were forcibly removed (about 28,000). They were in 
isolated places, with poor commuting connections and access to services, 
and heavily guarded by the Armed Forces and the police (Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993). They were the arena for major arrests, violent repression, 
and events such as raids, or being stopped in the street for questions (ibid; 
Rettig Report, 1993). Some of them, as población ‘La Victoria’, became 
widely known for their resistance to the authoritarian regime and the 
recurrent action of the Military to keep them controlled (Schild, 2013).  
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These sectors acquired a dangerous reputation and became avoided. This 
impacted in the future of the families located there. Their properties lost 
value, and the stigma of belonging to a given población started to grow. It 
was also harder to find schools and health services to attend, and as people 
had been impoverished by the change, and many lost their jobs due to 
political affiliations or in the economic crisis of 1977, 1982 and 1987, there 
were no private resources to improve the area, and no State investment 
either (Raczynski, 2000).  
The situation worsened by the new culture dependent on credit that had led 
people to massive debt (Lawson, 2005). For example, according to the 
Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme 
(1998), in the 1980s Chile had almost three times the number of cars people 
had in European countries such as Germany 30 years earlier, when they 
were at a similar level of income. This situation made the gap between rich 
and poor even more evident. In fact, several authors highlight the dramatic 
inequality of Chile in both authoritarian but also democratic times 
(Oppenheim, 1993; Garland, 2000; Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Dammert, 
2005; Lawson, 2005; Borzutsky, 2017).   
The result was the creation of vulnerable groups and poverty. Their isolation 
contributed to the invisibility of their situation from a State that denied help. In 
fact, business owners, the old richer right-wing, and thus most military regime 
supporters lived in other areas of the city. In Santiago, at least, this meant 
living in specific communalities (Las Condes for example). In those places 
the presence of the Armed Forces disappeared quickly after the coup, and 
the only source of information about Chilean reality was the media and its 
official version (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993). This may explain why 
there are people that to this day believe the violence of the military did not 
happen. Moreover, under the neoliberal understanding of individual success, 
poverty could be considered the result of failing at performing properly or 
laziness, while wealth was the consequence of knowing how to play under 
the rules of the new game. Under this logic, there is no space to recognise 
the role of opportunities, access and facilities to reach the position they had. 
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Therefore, the situation of the marginalised continued worsening, and those 
who were in control kept their distance.  
 
2. The birth of a new elite 
 
After the coup, the key governmental positions were filled by members of the 
Armed Forces, or by young technocrats like the Chicago boys, but not by the 
old conservative right-wing proprietary elite. The Military criticised them for 
privileging their own greed over what is best for the country, and for falling 
into the polarized political conflict (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Cavallo, 
Salazar and Sepúlveda, 2008). Therefore, they did not represent the 
‘apoliticism’ that was so relevant for the new authorities. It became soon clear 
that they were not to have any special privileges (although they were at least 
protected from direct prosecution and human rights’ abuses). Moreover, as 
the authoritarian regime was a time of rapid, sudden and dynamic economic 
changes, some of the old business owners were left behind in economic 
terms as well.  
The new civilians in power have been identified to come from two big groups 
which according to Huneeus (2000) can be considered as just one: The 
Gremialistas or the non-democratic right wing and the Chicago Boys or the 
neoliberalists. The Gremialistas were a group with political participation at 
Students’ Federation level in the Catholic University (the same institution 
where most of the Chicago Boys studied, and about the same time as well). 
Amongst the key figures of this movement we can find their funder, Jaime 
Guzmán, who participated in the authoritarian regime advising General 
Pinochet. He wrote the Declaration of Principles of 1974, was one of the 
masterminds behind the 1980’s Constitution, and funded the UDI, the 
authoritarian right-wing political party working until these days. Miguel Kast 
was another key figure of the Gremialistas, he worked in the Office of 
National Planning [Oficina de Planificación Nacional, ODEPLAN]. Through 
him, a series of regime supporters were benefited with state scholarships 
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abroad to pursue studies in economics and finance to apply back in Chile. 
The agreements were mostly made with the Catholic University, which had a 
more conservative tradition and was the birthplace of the Gremialistas 
(Huneeus, 2000).  
They were characterised by their higher education, a clear focus on growth 
through economic liberalization, the reduction of the State, national 
modernization and efficiency. They also shared with the military their despise 
for socialist and communist ideas, the focus on private property, a 
conservative and predominantly religious vision of the world, a general 
discourse of being apolitical, and rejection towards democracy (Chaparro and 
Cumplido, 1982; Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; 
Valdivia, 2001). The result was the generation of a new elite. 
This new elite did not question Pinochet’s decisions. Most of them have been 
described as omitting or ignoring the Human Rights violations, accepting 
violence as it provided the context to implement their ideas without opposition 
(Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Huneeus, 2000). For example, Jaime 
Guzmán openly expressed his rejection to participative democracy (Valdivia, 
2001), and his support to States of Exception under the control of the 
Executive power (Huneeus, 2000).  
This generated a group of people firmly set in power and directed towards 
the same goal. Moreover, given how the authoritarian regime ended, through 
agreement instead of rebellion, the new elite could continue into the 
democratic political landscape of the 1990s. According to Constable and 
Valenzuela (1993) this allowed mediocre figures to reach positions of power, 
leading to a cult of privilege based on narrow access, connections and blind 
supports towards Pinochet’s ideology and actions.  
The lack of experience and preparation of the Armed Forces to direct and 
administrate a country helped these civilians to reach powerful positions in 
the regime structure (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Cavallo, Salazar and 
Sepúlveda, 2008; Budds, 2013). The Gremialistas provided them with a 
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political plan, and the technocrats (the Chicago Boys) with an economic 
strategy. 
Despite civilians accessing power through different means, eventually they all 
wanted the same. After the coup, they all worked towards a free-market 
economy, the liberalization from state controls to private property, the 
reduction of social spending and the banning of communism, socialism and 
opposition towards their measures, regardless of the means and the negative 
consequences of the implementation of their ideology (Chaparro and 
Cumplido, 1982; Huneeus, 2000).  
By the time the military regime ended, the Gremialistas and the Chicago 
Boys were in central positions both inside and outside the government. They 
were the new economic elite, strengthened by influences, greater access and 
internal information of future decisions (Garreton, 1982). At the time of the 
transition to democracy they had a solid network that carried on to 
democracy, and into the next generation of right-wing politicians. Moreover, 
they controlled banks and companies that used to belong to the State and 
were now private. In consequence, Gómez (2008) highlights how political 
power rested only in the hands of the elites, while the rest of society felt 
unrelated to it, with no place or space for participation, turning citizenship into 
an issue of market involvement.  
The result was what Iturralde (2010) has termed as ‘democracy without 
citizenship’. Marginalised groups remained that way, and the benefits of the 
new Chilean development remained within the elite that controlled both 
political and economic power together. This, in turn, reinforced the strength of 
private figures and institutions that controlled the marked, legitimising their 
power under democratic rule, over civilians’ active participation in the 
discussion. For example, in the 1990s the World Bank stated the need to 
reform the national legal bodies in order to make new agreements. Soon 
after the reform of the Chilean Penal Procedure was launched (Schild, 2013).  
Furthermore, the different weight private institutions and/or foundations had 
can also be understood in terms of the connections the owners, creator or 
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directors of those institutions had. As it had happened during the dictatorship, 
what mattered was to have a close connection with the elite. If someone 
knew the people in the top they could be heard. For example, Paz Ciudadana 
is a foundation created by Agustín Edwards Eastman the owner of ‘El 
Mercurio’ (the newspaper that supported the dictatorship), after his son was 
kidnapped. The foundation intended becoming the greatest reference 
regarding security through strategic alliances with public and private spaces 
and the media (Folch, 2002). By the Presidential elections in 1999, Paz 
Ciudadana had become a central actor in the new security policies of the 
Concertación governments, associating with the Interior Minister and 
launching programmes together, such as ‘Comuna segura, compromiso 100’ 
[Safe neighbourhood, 100 commitment] to finance projects to prevent 
offending (Ibid; Tsukame, 2016). Its political influence was actively 
highlighted by most of the participants in this research. They emphasized the 
key role the foundation had in the reform process of the Juvenile Justice 
System, despite having no direct experience with young people in trouble, a 
strong ideological bias, and having made mistakes with their data. All 
elements that will be addressed and evidenced in the following two chapters.  
Nevertheless, the influence of Paz Ciudadana is particularly associated to its 
connections with the elite, as other grass roots institutions that had had a key 
role in the last years of the dictatorship found themselves with no influence 
(Oppenheim, 1993). This was explained by one interviewee as the result of 
the many needs that needed solutions when democracy returned, stopping 
smaller grass roots organizations, or with less political connections, to 
coordinate efforts as they had done in the past: ‘The organizations were 
reorganising, many of them surviving with huge pressures and with 
emergency states everywhere, not only with institutionalized children, but 
also in other highly complex and painful sceneries. That resulted in that 
sometimes we came together, acted together and then disassociated; and 
we lost presence’ (O., 2017). But it could be more related to Lawson (2005)’s 
analysis, stating Chilean democracy exists on the base of elite pacts, in this 
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case about the maintenance of the market economy, which of course leaves 
no space for actors and demands outside this logic.  
 
V- New interactions between citizens and with the State: The 
making of an ‘apolitical’ society 
 
All through this process of socio-political transformation the values and 
interests of the Chilean society were changing and were now in line with this 
social market economy. The focus was on individual capacity to overcome 
poverty and triumph in a world where those successful had access to greater 
goods. As such, economic stability was a greater concern than Human 
Rights. Constable and Valenzuela (1993), highlight, for example, how some 
people support the dictatorship up to this day because it brought them 
wealth, while communism was associated to scarcity, even despite there 
being worse economic crises during the authoritarian regime itself.   
Moreover, as now expectations of consumerism were high and there was 
great inequality in terms of access, the inability to participate in the market as 
much as desired led to part of the population feeling left out or frustrated 
(Weyland, 1999; Tsukame, 2016). The predomination of modernization, 
individualism and consumerism replaced the political interests that had 
characterized Chile in the past (Borzutsky, 2017). Social concerns were 
privatised (Álvarez, 2014) and Chileans withdrew into their private lives 
(Weyland, 1999). Citizens did not count on the support from the State, and it 
came to be associated to failure to provide, dependency and laziness instead 
of basic needs to be granted. The focus was now on personal education, 
training and jobs that could transform individuals in active members of the 
market, instead of political or social activity, and with that, private property 
grew in personal value.  
Some other authors (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Garreton, 1982; 
Wesson, 1982; Schild, 2013) highlight how this new individualism can be in 
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fact considered the result of the successful strategy to stop citizens’ political 
participation. Before 1973, Chile was characterised by an active democracy 
(Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Wesson, 1982; Constable and Valenzuela, 
1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Huneeus, 2000, Vanden and 
Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005). However, through the import of market 
principles to politics, collective processes of participation and decision 
became individualised (Garreton, 1982). 
Moreover, the Armed Forces had launched a strong propaganda against 
politics. They presented themselves as a better alternative (Hilbink, 2007), 
and repeatedly emphasized how Chile was not ready for democratic civilian 
rule. The quest against citizens’ active political involvement was reinforced 
through the high levels of repression and coercion performed under the 
appearance of legality and national agreement. Garreton (1982) associated 
this violence of the military with the specific purpose of eliminating the 
previous social and political order, by stopping collective action and blocking 
their channels of communication with the State. Talking about politics had 
become a risk and dissenting openly from the government could bring harsh 
consequences. To this, we need to add the presence of undemocratic 
processes such as the referendums that took place during the authoritarian 
regime. For example, in the plebiscite of 1988, most Chileans claimed they 
were going to vote ‘no’ to Pinochet, however, most of them also believed he 
was going to win nonetheless (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993).  
According to Chaparro and Cumplido (1982), the strategy was successful in 
demobilizing and inactivating a big part of the Chilean society that used to be 
strongly involved in political life and civic duties. All this led to hopelessness 
and mistrust regarding the effects of future political participation. The result 
was the distance from political life in the new generations, who rarely 
discussed politics and stopped participation at university level, as elections of 
new student’s representatives had also been banned during the dictatorship 
(Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; Huneeus, 2000).   
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Organised activity, which used to be a common feature of the Chilean society 
was thus lost. This was amplified by the lack of coordination in the 
opposition, marked by the conflicts between political parties and radical 
postures before the coup, and the shifting between more aggressive and 
more pacifists means of fighting authoritarianism (Chaparro and Cumplido, 
1982; Oppenheim, 1993). Following from Lawson (2005), the spaces to 
create collective identity were eliminated, leaving just informal uncoordinated 
means. Thus, the new way of becoming citizens was through individual 
participation in the market.  
The legacy of the dictatorship in this matter was so strong, that even when 
the democratic times returned, citizens’ involvement in politics and 
participation in electoral instances remained low. The low participation was 
officially recognised around 1997, the same year Chile faced an economic 
crisis after the boom it had been experiencing for the last decade (Weyland, 
1999; Silva, 2001; Álvarez, 2014). Chile had become more pragmatic and 
individualistic (Oppenheim, 1993; Silva, 2001). The distant attitude to politics 
that Chilean citizens adopted was strengthened by corruption scandals in the 
first democratic years, where resources had been stolen or mishandled 
(Cleuren, 2007). After that, politicians came to be measured in administrative 
and managerial aspects. Politics became less about ideology, officially, and 
more about what politicians could convince citizens they were doing. This 
was specially promoted by the right-wing that had maintained the ‘apolitical’ 
discourse all over the dictatorship, and then imported it to democratic times 
(Álvarez, 2014). The result was little trust on political parties, the great 
majority of juveniles stopped participating in electoral register or voting, and 
as the years progressed more people felt disenchanted on the new 
democracy and the new elite (Weyland, 1999; Lawson, 2005).  
To summarise, the division of society, the actions of the DINA, the control of 
the media, and the creation of new neighbourhoods that separated those 
against from those in favour of the authoritarian regime erased the old 
solidarity and trust amongst citizens. Anyone could be a Marxist or a spy of 
the government. This was increased by the permanence of the authoritarian 
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elite into the 1990s’ democratic government, and the strong prevalence of 
authoritarian institutions and ideas. There was no interaction between 
citizens and politics anymore beyond the moment of the election. The 
communication channels had been closed and power remained in the elites 
controlling the market and politics. This led to a strong imposition of the 
status quo, while there was a weakening of social capital, cohesion and 
collective identity (Dammert, 2005). Therefore, Chile reached democracy in 
1990 in a context where individualism, fear, distrust, concern over economic 
issues were high, and the uncertainty of the new landscape could only 
increase those feelings. The following chapter will analyse how this particular 
context led to the birth and development of concerns about crime and 
































Chapter 5: From no one’s concern to a national problem: how Juvenile 
Justice and the need of a reform rose to the centre of national debate 
 
With the start of the 1990s, Chile had to face a series of changes driven by a 
key element: the transition to a democracy built over authoritarian institutions 
in a modern globalized world from which the country had remained nearly 
isolated for over two decades. This meant the Chilean context was shaped 
by the local conditions of this new setting, such as the authoritarian enclaves 
that allowed supporters of the dictatorship to remain in politics, but also 
influenced by global trends like the fluctuation of international markets and 
their impact on national growth or crisis, which in turn reinforced the 
inequality left by the authoritarian regime. The result was a strong anxiety 
and fear regarding the past, present and future of Chilean citizens. In 
consequence, the political elite needed to regain the trust they had lost from 
the citizenship, while addressing national and international pressures 
regarding the debts from the dictatorship and the need of a clearer and more 
stable future. 
Under these conditions, crime in general and youth offending in particular 
became the scapegoat for social concerns. There was a reductionism 
towards crime control solutions to deal with the socio-political problems 
brought by the two radical alterations Chile had lived in a relatively short gap 
of time (from democracy to authoritarianism in 1973, and to democracy again 
in 1989). As a result, security positioned as one of the key worries of Chilean 
citizens by the end of the first decade after the dictatorship. Offending was 
among the top three concerns of Chileans, while fear of crime became more 
important than job insecurity or economic stability by the 2000s (López, 2000; 
Dammert and Lunecke, 2002; Duce, 2004; Dammert, 2005). It was in this 
process of national reorganization that massive criticisms developed against 
the existing Tutelary System, and a new focus on how to deal with juveniles 
was born.  
According to some interviewees, the focus on juveniles increased 
dramatically with the appearance of crack in the streets in the late 1980s and 
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early 1990s, in the words of one participant: ‘in the transition to the 1990s the 
crack comes in and generates problems, I’d say, in the whole country, 
especially in poorer sectors’ (O., 2017). For politicians, it was a big part of the 
explanation for their offending behaviour, as the words of Deputy Guzmán in 
the Historia de la Ley 20,084 evidence: ‘We know it is drugs that makes 
people be more expandable and with greater levels of aggressiveness’ 
(2005:1035). However, there is not much evidence regarding the levels and 
demographic characteristics of substance misuse. Therefore, for some of the 
participants in this research, the issue of drugs was more generalised moral 
panic than anything else, as the words of J. (2017) illustrate: ‘At some point 
everyone went crazy in this country with the idea that everything was due to 
drugs consumption’. Moreover, to deal with this issue the government created 
in 1990 the National Council for Drugs’ Control [Consejo Nacional para el 
Control de Estupefacientes, CONACE]. Hence, the widespread concern 
about drugs does not explain a new Juvenile Justice System. Why did it 
change then? Why a system that had not been seriously questioned in more 
than 70 years became abruptly ‘repressive’ (K., 2017), ‘abusive’ (P., 2017), 
‘punitive’ (Deputy Bustos, 2004:233), and a ‘failure’ (Deputy Rossi, 
2004:245)?  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the timing of the reform, how did 
Chileans come to be concerned about youth offending to the point they 
decided to radically transform a system that had been in place for over 70 
years? I will argue that the reform of the Juvenile Justice System was an 
attempted solution to address legitimacy concerns, international pressures 
and represent the Chilean society that was being rebuilt, but under new rules.  
To evidence this, it is necessary to address a series of contextual elements 
interacting over the 1990s and early 2000s. To do so, I incorporated quotes 
from the interviews and the documents analysed that allow to illustrate the 
reality of the time, including the perceptions and concerns over the matter. 
Those documents are the Historia de la Ley 20,084, the annual speeches of 
the Concertación presidents at the time and the government programmes of 
the candidates for the 1999 and 2005 presidential elections.  
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In terms of structure, I will start by referring to the social insecurities and 
uncertainties that came with the transition to democracy and the social 
conditions in which Chilean citizens had been left. This will be followed by 
addressing the need to legitimate the democratic order, which faced 
precarious and fragile conditions. In a different section I will comment on the 
influence of international pressure. Finally, the critiques and sense of failure 
of the existent institutions of justice will be analysed. It was the confluence of 
all these elements that transformed the pressure to reform into priority.  
 
I- Social insecurities and uncertainties 
 
Under the new democratic order Chile had to face the fears of the past, 
brought by the imposition of the rules of the Armed Forces by force, but also 
the fears of the future consequences of the society the military had built. 
Moreover, change on itself was a reason for anxiety. Chile went from a small 
and poor country in the 1970s to an active open economy in a globalised 
world, participating in markets of places many had never even heard before, 
and in the middle of a technologic boom. The people who grew during the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s saw a completely different society from the one of 
the 1990s. The change had been fast and with little time to adapt and little 
power to have a voice in the direction these changes were following. 
Globalization and technology had reached the country and taken it by 
surprise, with not enough time to adapt to them, as the words of President 
Frei stated during his rule: ‘The speed of the economic and social progress 
contrasts with the delay in our political functioning’ (President Frei 1999:64). 
At the same time, over the authoritarian regime, Chile had radically turned to 
neoliberalism. This brought a change in national interactions, permeating 
from institutions to underlying logics and understandings of the State, 
citizenship and even young people. National priorities and values together 
with public and private services had been modified under this new paradigm. 
The result was a growing anxiety and feelings of insecurity which were 
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redirected from issues such as unemployment, lack of state support, loss of 
community life, and the individualization of responsibilities towards people’s 
behaviour, a logic that seemed to resonate in the country as all over the 
dictatorship all social problems were deviated to the actions of a few (the 
communist for example).   
In the new democratic times, Chile was still trying to find some balance and 
stability. There was a contrasting set of concerns and fears regarding an 
impoverished, austere past and an unpredictable and uncontrollable dynamic 
future. The present section intends to address the weight of these old fears 
and the new anxieties and uncertainties, and how the control of youth 
became the solution. 
 
1. Hangovers of the authoritarian regime: Fears about the past 
 
Once the authoritarian regime ended, people still had to face all the fears 
they had carried through it. Chile had been left with a 40% of poverty, a 
growing inequality (Schild, 2013), and with a series of basic needs that 
needed addressing. This context can be summarised in the words of one 
interviewee: ‘There were issues of scarcity, emergency state, common pots, 
having to supply in poor and excluded communities […] issues of education, 
basic health, care, entertainment, and basic things like roof and food’ (O., 
2017).  
Moreover, 1990s’ Chile had less government protection for workers and 
restrictions and controls over exploitative practices than before the 
authoritarian regime. The workers Unions that had helped to maintain and 
expand their rights had been disbanded or severely limited, workers’ rights 
had been reduced. It took years of Concertación governments to see some 
changes to guarantee a basic level of security to employees. For example, 
the 1987 Working Code of the country was reformed in 1994, and then again 
through a Decree Law in 2003.  
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In consequence, the economic situation, unemployment and inequality were 
in critical conditions after the authoritarian regime and over the first 
democratic years. What is more, poverty and the economic crises since the 
early 1970s had left a clear mark, and they were a central reference topic 
among politicians, as President Frei highlighted in his national speech in 
1999: ‘What maybe Chileans feel more directly: the increase in 
unemployment’ (p. 6). Or how Lagos commented on his government 
programme when running for President that same year: ‘The economic crisis 
multiplies the insecurity of the families, and makes them feel anguished, that 
once more the country is turning its back at them’ (1999:1).  
To summarise, citizens had been abandoned to their own luck, access and 
opportunities while all the means had been taken away from them and 
concentrated in the hands of a few. Their networks had been cut; mistrust 
had expanded, poverty and inequality predominated. Therefore, citizens did 
not necessarily feel as part of a community anymore. The social capital 
identified by some authors who talk about Chile before the authoritarian 
regime seemed to have disappeared (see for example Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Dammert, 2005; Borzutsky, 2017). The 
1988 referendum could have united people for a cause, but it had been 
decided and coordinated by the elite, and it had ended evidencing a national 
division. Thus, it had returned democracy to citizens, but not their previous 
civil and community involvement.  
The risks of this unequal landscape, together with the lack of social cohesion 
left by the authoritarian regime were recognised by the new authorities. And 
slowly, as the decade progressed, they started being connected to crime, as 
the words of Lagos in his presidential candidacy evidence: ‘With social 
inequality, frustration grows, and discouragement, and distress. Crime grows 
too. Solidarity, respect and braveness become weaker’ (Lagos, 1999:2). The 
need to develop a topic to engage the community was key, because following 
from the landscape presented in the previous chapter, Chileans had 
distanced and detached from politics, having little trust in the outcomes of 
their participation.  
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Therefore, to focus on crime and justice provided the political elite, both the 
Concertación and the authoritarian right-wing, with a tool to gain the support 
of the citizenship. If they managed to provide security, to soothe the fears 
and to grant stability, they could obtain citizens’ votes. However, if they failed, 
the support could be redirected towards the opposing coalition. The fear of 
the population and the displacement of their support towards those who 
offered concrete solutions was highly visible in the Major elections all over 
the decade (Álvarez, 2014). The strategy is also visible in the government 
plan of Lagos, as he used it as a way to engage with those who felt 
vulnerable:  
‘We Chileans know that when the State weakens the rule of the strongest 
predominates. Only those who have the personal means to defend 
themselves, to buy their health, buy the education of their children, housing, 
prevision and even security for their family remain standing. The rest remain 
doomed to save themselves as they can with their scarce resources’ (1999:2) 
To this, we need to add the fear of going back to the authoritarian regime, at 
least at the beginning of the 1990s. The past was glorious for some, but for 
most it represented poverty, fear of the Marxist threat or of the Armed Forces 
and the State, people dying and disappearing, the lack of knowledge and 
understanding of what was going on, the prohibition to speak. However, 
democracy had failed Chileans in the past. There was no way of promising it 
would never happen again. Especially after the demonstrations of the Armed 
Forces at the beginning of the decade, or when so many of the political 
figures kept being the same of the old times; with General Pinochet still in a 
powerful position for example. The distrust towards the political elite 
increased by a few national events of corruption that brought questions over 
the legitimacy, safety and trustworthiness of modern times (Álvarez, 2014). 
Corruption reached political discussion as well, as it influenced the mood of 
the electorate and fuelled the opposition. This made it even harder to feel 
confident of the strength of the new order and displaced some of the 
attention needed by topics such as social precariousness towards mutual 
critiques from political actors and reasserting each other’s roles, as the words 
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of President Lagos show: ‘Sadly, there are those who make efforts day and 
night in promoting negativism. They show us a dark country, pessimistic, a 
country that has nothing to do with the efforts each of us and all of our 
compatriots are achieving to come through’ (President Lagos, 2003:3). 
Moreover, with democracy, freedom soon became a conflicting issue. The 
term had been vastly used by the authoritarian regime talking about 
economy. But personal freedoms had been highly repressed. Now, suddenly, 
where people could not leave their homes after certain hour, they could stay 
in the streets all night. This brought tension over the actions of the other 
citizens they could not trust, negatively impacting over their tolerance to 
actions that, after so much oppression and control, now seemed disruptive, 
as one interviewee put it: ‘It is hard to be tolerant, so it is better for the law to 
put some order; the pacos6 come and solve things, the law comes and say 
something’ (E., 2017).  
This exemplified the loss of control over a society that had been overly 
restricted, especially in marginalised neighbourhoods, where it could be 
easily transformed into ‘disorder’, leading to the questioning of authority (from 
parenthood to the State). Their behaviour could also lead to questions about 
morals and values of those families that allowed children to be outside, a 
practice probably abandoned by many families in times of socio-political 
unrest. A similar scenario has been described by Pearson (1983). He pointed 
out the effect of the democratization of public spaces, especially the 
marginalised sectors of the population, where they generate more tension 
and fear, together with demands of more scrutiny and a stronger authority. It 
is not surprising then, as the same author describes, that the population 
turned the insecurity they felt in other aspects of their lives towards the 
behaviour of juveniles. As it was more visible and accessible. The argument 
seems to make sense in the Chilean reality as well, as there was a 
 
6 Informal term to refer to the armed police. Their official name is Carabineros. For some people it 
may be an offensive or derogatory term, although that is not necessarily the case. Very common in 
people who are more critical about the role of the institution, and uncommon in families of 
Carabineros or conservative families who supported authoritarian practices.  
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strengthening of legal actions against juveniles at the beginning of the 
decade (Cortés, 1991). Juveniles were a population that could be controlled. 
Public demonstrations were a specific element that brought conflictive views. 
They were a right. But they were also associated to uncivil, violent and 
disrespectful actions, as the reaction of the President of the Senate to the 
public demonstrations that took place in the 1999 annual speech of President 
Frei in the Congress illustrate: ‘The public force goes immediately to evict 
those who are protesting! This is a disrespect to democracy! We need to look 
for the unity in the country, not the conflict! Give the example!’ (President of 
the Senate Zaldivar, 1999:1-2). People speaking their voice generated fear, 
anxiety, the need to control.  
Therefore, this freedom had to be adapted to a society that was not so open 
anymore. The Concertación government identified this social concern, an 
addressed it in more than one occasion: ‘Our democracy evolves and that’s 
why our freedoms are more solid’ (President Frei, 1998:1); ‘We are not afraid 
of freedom!’ (President Frei, 1998:27). It became something that needed to 
be improved in order to transform Chile in what the political lead of the 
Concertación wanted: ‘A country more open to the world, freer and more 
tolerant in its democratic coexistence’ (President Frei, 1998:35).  
 
2. Anxiety over the future  
 
Eventually, the fears of another coup and going back to the past receded. 
The figure of Pinochet was losing strength, and the political class seemed to 
have found a balance. This balance was probably partially built in the 
conciliatory political strategy of the Concertación and the lack of prosecution 
for the Human Rights’ violations. Moreover, the national situation started to 
improve, such as employment for example (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993; 
Oppenheim, 1993; Lawson, 2005; Hilbink, 2007; Schild, 2013). However, 
Chileans were still anxious about the future.  
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For example, there were still risks of economic crisis hitting the country. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the economic strategy adopted by the 
Concertación governments was conservative. It represented neoliberal 
principles and values but took protective measures to reduce the negative 
impact of international markets. The strategy also involved keeping social 
expenses low. In consequence, citizens had little support to overcome their 
personal situation. Privatization had reduced their access to the means of 
social mobility as well. The result were widespread feelings of insecurity over 
conditions citizens could not control, such as: 
a) Modernity  
With the economic policies of the dictatorship and their expansion in 
democratic times Chile had reached modernity. This was accompanied by a 
general perception of national success promoted by the Concertación 
Presidents. For example, regarding the access of technology by President 
Lagos in his annual speeches: ‘We have the greater number of computers 
per head in Latin America’ (2000:5); ‘Ten years ago only 54 percent of 
households had a fridge, nowadays 82 percent has one’ (2003:4). To 
possess the last technologic commodities had become a symbol of social 
status. However, this progress was not for all and it often left many families 
indebted (Lawson, 2005). Hence, the possibilities to belong to the general 
community for those with no access to the new definers of identity and social 
hierarchy had been severed. It is not hard to imagine this situation fuelled 
feelings of exclusion and hopelessness. 
b) Globalization  
Once globalization arrived to Chile (after the country opened to contact with 
the outside world), the risks associated to it expanded quickly, especially in 
terms of economic security, which was addressed directly by Bachelet during 
her candidacy for presidency:  
‘In Chile and in all countries that globalise the opportunities are multiplied, but 
at the same the risks for people also increase. Thus, the strong request of a 
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more welcoming country is born, one which is able to reduce risks and the 
economic insecurity that impacts on wide sectors of the population’ 
(Bachelet, 2005:9-10) 
The government treated the future of Chile as openly and directly influenced 
by the outside world: ‘The globalization of the economy and communications 
are putting an end to our mindset of island and finis terrae, meaningfully 
influencing our paradigms of reference and action’ (President Frei, 1995:31). 
The development of feelings of insecurity and uncertainty under these 
circumstances is not surprising, as other researchers and the broader 
literature have found similar convergence of events causing similar feelings 
(see for example Garland, 2001 or Cavadino and Dignan, 2006).     
At the same time, the new access to television, cinema, and eventually the 
internet opened citizens’ homes to the wide world, especially now the media 
was not controlled by the authoritarian regime anymore. Therefore, fear 
increased with events in other nations that were now watched live. For 
example, the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in the United States, 
which happened the same day of the anniversary of the coup: September 
11th. President Lagos referred to it in the following terms: ‘The beginning of 
the 21st century is marked by uncertainty and fear’ (President Lagos, 2002:3). 
In consequence, the sudden jump to a modern globalized world brought a 
sense of lack of safety over Chilean citizens.  
c) Marginalization and precariousness 
As shown in the previous chapter, many families had been forcefully isolated 
by the Armed Forces, relocated within cities, their chances of finding jobs 
reduced together with their access to health, education, food, even green 
areas and public transport. Their neighbourhoods had become stigmatized, 
their living conditions reduced and with few chances of improvement as the 
wealth was concentrated somewhere else. Their possibilities of overcoming 
their situation, having access to satisfy their basic needs, and to be 
considered as citizens in the same quality than those living in other areas of 
the city were limited. Moreover, the same poverty in which many citizens had 
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been left and the reduced role of the State in work regulations kept the power 
of Unions away. ‘Problematic’ workers could be easily removed from their 
positions, existing a queue of desperate people waiting for a chance to make 
a living. There were, thus, many reasons for the Chilean population to feel 
worried about the future. For some it meant the lack of prospects, for others 
the risk and permanent struggle to avoid falling back into what they had 
managed to leave behind, and those who never had faced such conditions 
were probably scared of ever experiencing isolation and deprivation.  
These concerns were increased by another of the many consequences of the 
dictatorship: the individualisation of community life. The Armed Forced had 
spread mistrust through the secret actions of the DINA, and the national 
conflict had divided the Chilean society according to their alliances, political 
parties and the side they had supported since the 1970s. That had reduced 
the implicit trust in other members of the community. What is more, with the 
forceful displacement of groups of the population they had lost the local 
networks they had. They had been left impoverished, fearful, and alone. 
There were also few resources to generate a new sense of community, as 
during the authoritarian regime gatherings were prohibited, and there was a 
curfew that stopped people from using public spaces in between certain 
hours.  
The solution to stop being part of the marginalised lot and become part of the 
privileged society that had some sense of security in modern Chile, was to 
become active participants in the market. However, the chances were 
scarce. The new aids created in democratic times were directed towards very 
specific population under long bureaucratic regulations, and the focus was on 
their empowerment to reduce help as soon as possible. As such, the funds 
were not enough to obtain certain stability or to cover all their basic needs 
(Weyland, 1999; Schild, 2013). In consequence, they left the already poor 
population in a more vulnerable situation.  
The possibilities of starting a small business were also limited, as most of the 
national product was concentrated in the hands of a few private companies, 
164 
 
which controlled both the resources and the entrance to the market. At the 
same time, other sources of mobility were also restricted. The dictatorship 
had ended with free university education and had re-distributed schools to 
the responsibility of the local municipality. As a result, schools from poor 
neighbourhoods remained poor. There was also a boom of private and State 
sponsored education, broadening the gap between those who could and who 
could not afford them. Other opportunities for development were limited by 
the lack of neighbourhood infrastructure and the conservative economic 
policy implemented to reduce inflation, which allowed few ‘unnecessary’ 
expenses. Hence, the barrier to succeed for those already marginalised was 
almost impossible to surpass.  
Therefore, Chileans were living the consequences of various economic crises 
that had, for some, completely transformed the life they had before the 
authoritarian regime. Their possibilities to improve that situation had also 
been reduced, as most of the paths to social mobility had been limited or 
privatised, left to the rules of a market that had already excluded them. 
Moreover, the capacity to overcome poverty and of social mobilization had 
been displaced to individuals themselves. It was their own responsibility to 
find a job, reduce their expending, limit the reliance on credit and provide the 
conditions to maintain their future. The result was a series of individuals 
sharing spaces and concerned about their own precarious situations. There 
was no common plan or a sense of connection that could mobilise them to 
collectively demand for a change. Thus, there were generalized anxieties 
regarding their access to basic services such as health and education, but 
also to the goods that could provide them with status and a place in society, 
which also promoted feelings of isolation and exclusion. This broadened the 
gap between wealthy and poor families. The city was also divided in richer 
and poorer sectors, making the differences more evident and the solution all 
the more unreachable. Especially, because the elements that could have 
improved their situation had been left tied up by the authoritarian enclaves. 




d) Security  
Given the context and concerns already evidenced, insecurity started to 
appear, in general to start with, and eventually specifically regarding crime. 
Initially, concerns about security were presented by the politicians in terms of 
the freedoms of democracy or about protecting citizen’s rights, a discourse 
more in line with the Human Rights violations. For example, in the words of 
President Frei when talking to the nation: ‘Our purpose should be that by the 
beginning of the next century, no Chilean lacks how to protect their rights’ 
(President Frei, 1998:6). Eventually security became more about private 
property, social status, and thus the right to be protected from crime, a goal 
more reachable under the circumstances:  
‘The expansion of personal freedom must go hand in hand with greater 
security for the family and community. That is why we have transformed the 
fight against crime into a national priority and everyone’s responsibility’ 
(President Lagos, 2001:4) 
The Concertación governments then focused in fighting those feelings of 
insecurity and fear, and by the time Bachelet campaigned for presidency, 
which was the same year the juvenile justice reform was published, fear was 
on itself part of the government programme: ‘Fear and insecurity do not 
belong to the Chile we are building’ (Bachelet, 2005:64).  
In consequence, something needed to be done to placate the population. In 
this context, the reform of the justice system came as both the diversion and 
the solution. It implied clarifying the new rules of the game, as different 
Presidents of the Concertación put it: 
‘This crisis reaffirms the relevant regulating role of the State, which must 
possess the tools and authority needed to establish clear norms and to make 
sure these are thoroughly respected’ (President Frei, 1999:5-6) 
‘This implies also the capacity of a country that can, through clear rules, fix 
and stabilise; provide security’ (President Lagos, 2003:7-8).  
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The discursive concepts of fear and insecurity could be directly addressed in 
a crime control and justice rhetoric. Moreover, they could be re-framed in 
terms of daily activities, focusing citizens over the present instead of about 
the uncertain future. This of course left outside of the discussion all those 
elements in which both the government and the opposition could make no 
promises. A new up-to-date justice system could grant at least a base level of 
protection over some areas, especially regarding events such as a terrorist 
attack, violence, protests, the loss of hard-earned capital through mugging 
and robbery and so on. It was an official statement of the State regarding its 
concern over citizens’ rights, and a clear line of behaviours that were 
prohibited in this new order; clarifying what to expect from fellow citizens at 
the same time. As such, it united the government and the opposition. None of 
them could deal with the other concerns citizens had. The Concertación 
needed to make a new agreement with the population about what the 
Chilean society could look like; the opposition could reaffirm a certain notion 
of control. A new social pact of behaviour could legitimise the new order and 
with that, gain at least the initial trust to start addressing some of the other 
pending issues.   
This is not an unexpected development, as the effects of modernity and 
nations in crisis that generate anxiety in the population have been explained 
before (see for example: Pearson, 1983; Garland, 1985; Garland, 2001; 
Muncie and Hughes, 2002). In a society were public demonstrations had 
been prohibited for so long, rights to complain had been reduced and there 
were few mechanisms to overcome poverty and marginalization, it is not 
surprising the way out was the behaviour of those who were even powerless. 
Especially when those in the top of the hierarchy seemed to be untouchable. 
Young people and their behaviour seem to act as a scapegoat for the need of 
control that cannot be satisfied regarding people’s future. Especially in 
capitalist societies that have a strong focus on private power and individual 
responsibility. At the same time, with all other sources of stress, tolerance to 
disruptive behaviours is reduced, as one interviewee stated: ‘Childhood 
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issues require like, not a revolution, but political willingness, political 
agreements, citizens’ agreements, and Chile is not very tolerant’ (E., 2017). 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, strategies that offered certain 
level of security in the anxiogenic modern Chile had great success, and the 
government needed to offer some sense of security to obtain and maintain 
citizens’ support. In consequence, demands for greater control over juveniles 
started to take shape. As one interviewee highlighted: ‘The issue became 
much more complex with adolescents because the idea of control came to be 
installed’ (Q., 2017). The highly uncertain landscape of 1990s’ Chile 
demanded for some level of control, of protection, and as it seemed to have 
happened in England also in the past (see for example Pearson, 1983), the 
attention was displaced and refocused from all the sources of social insecurity 
to the insecurity of crime, particularly the one perpetrated by young people. 
Therefore, the attention started to be shifted from concerns about poverty, 
inequality and the uncertain future towards the more concrete behaviour of 
offenders in general and young people in trouble in particular.  
 
II- Legitimation of the new socio-political order 
 
Before the dictatorship, Chileans used to be proud of their strong democratic 
tradition (Chaparro and Cumplido, 1982; Wesson, 1982; Constable and 
Valenzuela, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Rettig Report, 1993; Huneeus, 2000, 
Vanden and Prevost, 2002; Lawson, 2005). However, between the political 
conflict right before and in the 17 years of authoritarianism, this disappeared. 
State institutions had failed Chileans in one moment of time or another, 
depending on their personal affiliations, from the time of Allende onwards. 
Politicians and order institutions had turned their backs at them or left the 
nation to uncertain and even unwanted hands.  
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Moreover, key to the Concertación route to the Presidential seat was the 
discursive focus on Human Rights. However, the actions taken to address 
this debt left everyone dissatisfied. The Armed Forces kept denying what had 
happened, not providing any answers to the families; the opposition kept 
highlighting the actions of the military and General Pinochet, unwilling to 
make the Constitutional reforms needed to address some of these issues. 
The government itself wanted to leave a discussion they could not solve 
without conflict behind. Therefore, the Human Rights were just a rhetorical 
route towards legitimation, and one that ran out quickly due to the lack of 
progress.  
At the same time, the opposition had been granted with the acceptance of 
the authoritarian enclaves and the continuation of many of their key figures in 
influential positions. Likewise, the authoritarian institutions had been 
validated by their continuation in democratic times. Chile had to wait until 
2005 to see the first meaningful reform to the 1980s’ Constitution. 
Furthermore, the cases of corruption that took place in the 1990s brought 
rejection and hopelessness towards political participation, distancing citizens 
from it while the elite remained. 
Therefore, there were few elements Chile could claim made it a democratic 
country. It was basically reduced to popular election for most, albeit not all 
political positions (appointed Senators for example). This point was also 
made by President Frei in the mid-1990s: 
‘The country lives the contradiction of an environment of democratic 
normalcy while experimenting, at the same time, the obstruction that comes 
from institutions with authoritarian origins, which do not have roots in our 
republican tradition’ (President Frei, 1995:33). 
This led to a new interaction between the political elites, but also in terms of 
the interaction with citizens. The oppression of the past was out of the 
question, the victims of Human Rights violations and more neutral citizens 
preferred a rule not based on repression, where personal freedoms for all, 
and not just for a few, were granted. Accordingly, a new political culture 
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needed to be developed. There was a space to redefine democracy, to 
shape how politics worked in modern democratic Chile, and to transform 
national institutions into the new logics. This could bring stability to the 
country but also earn the authorities the support of citizens.  
The present section intends to address the strategies to legitimate 
democracy over the 1990s and early 2000s and the strong impact of this 
process in the need to reform justice institutions. I will start by analysing what 
the new elites understood by democracy in terms of the institutional changes 
they needed to make, especially regarding crime control agencies. This will 
be followed by the new values of the Chilean society and how they also 
influenced this need to transform institutions such as the Justice Systems. In 
a later section I will refer to how concerns about crime reached the political 
sphere. Finally, I will cover how this all helped to legitimate the continuation 
of the political elite.  
 
1. The institutionalization of democratic principles 
  
Given the past events, the uncertain future and the political landscape 
already described, there was a crisis of trust in the country, as expressed by 
Concertación Presidents:  
‘Chile needs to make a great effort to regain trust, trust that has been 
damaged. Trust in public institutions, trust in the world of companies and 
businesses, trust in the world of Work Unions and workers, trust of Chileans 
amongst themselves’ (President Lagos, 2003:10) 
Citizens did not feel confidence in democracy, the government, or in key 
institutions that support and sustain the political order, such as justice. 
Following from that, state institutions needed to be legitimated in the eyes of 
the population. The present subsection will refer to some of the basic 
elements identified by the Concertación and the opposition to sustain a 
democratic order. These involve trust in the institutions, to grant the rule of 
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law and, of course, to protect and reinforce Human Rights. The purpose is to 
evidence how reforming the justice institutions (both the adult and youth 
systems) evolved to a need, but also became a strategy to address a series 
of issues regarding the basic characteristics democratic institutions should 
have.  
a) To build trust: Towards non-oppressive State control agencies 
After the participation of the Police and the Armed Forces in the violence of 
the regime, many avoided them, as interviewee explained: ‘the police 
tortures, the police abuses’ (H., 2017). Therefore, actions were needed in 
order to change the image of State control agencies to regain citizens’ trust. 
The government strategies included, for example, positively recognising the 
role of these institutions:  
‘I value the progress made by our Armed Forces, their patriotic disposition 
and professionalism, hierarchy and discipline. We aspire to their full inclusion 
into the democratic system in conditions of absolute normalcy; in the best 
tradition of the Republic’ (President Frei, 1998:20) 
They also made direct reforms in Carabineros7, both with the purpose to 
adapt them to modern times and to reconnect them with the community, as 
the words of Bachelet during her candidacy for president demonstrate:  
‘We want the police to be in the streets and not in the police station. We 
aspire Carabineros to become part of the community again, of the 
neighbourhood life; and that they are recognised and respected by the 
neighbours’ (Bachelet, 2005:66) 
Nevertheless, the mistrust in the justice system and crime control institutions 
remained. It was not only because they had been openly coercive 
institutions, allies of the authoritarian state, but also because they did not 
represent the new democratic citizenship, if they ever did in the past. They 
kept the old characteristics, such as the lack of transparency or no right to 
 
7 The national armed police 
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defence. Therefore, there was a questioning of the capacity of the justice 
system to actually bring justice to people, instead of the historical impunity. 
This, in turn, had consequences for how effective justice institutions could be, 
point made by President Frei in his 1998 annual speech: ‘We know how 
dangerous this can be. When the people do not have trust in justice, the law 
is worthless’ (1998:5). 
This concern was also expressed by Lavín, the presidential candidate of the 
UDI [Democratic Independent Union, the authoritarian right-wing and 
opposition of the Concertación], in his government plan in 1999:  
‘The problems of justice translate, first, in a sense, and then in an attitude 
against the system. An attitude that prefers the solutions driven by their own 
hands before turning to the system; because they do not see the real utility of 
doing so’ (Lavín, 1999:30) 
This was particularly relevant as trust was needed to have citizens support, 
their participation, to implement new measures and even to make institutions 
work properly. At the same time, the discussion needed to be brought to the 
present time, displacing the discourse from the past failures. A reform of the 
justice system answered to those needs. New institutions and procedure, 
despite not necessarily having immediate trust, could at least avoid the deep-
seated rejection the old crime control agencies had. They also implied a new 
set of rules with the promise of greater control over the actors of the system. 
The old penal procedure left the judge in charge of investigation and 
sentencing, giving them massive discretion powers with very little control, 
while the future of young people in need of protection or in trouble were 
decided solely by the judge of minors. Now, they could all be replaced by 
prosecutors and defendants and new guidance limiting the abusive actions of 
other crime control agencies, for example the period of time the police could 
detain someone before informing the Guarantee Judge.  
Likewise, political discourses took the issue of trust and reframed it in terms 
of a basic need for the new system -the future- to work; in Lagos’ words: ‘It is 
proven that when the people trust in their police, and the police trust in the 
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people, offenders leave’ (President Lagos, 2001:4). This asked citizens to 
make a leap of faith, not over a broken past, but over the hope of the future, 
resource that had been used before in the plebiscite to win with the ‘no’. 
Thus, allocating this responsibility in all citizens, involving them in a process 
that had always been distant, secretive, and imposed through repression.  
It is not odd then, that the reform had the support of both the government and 
the opposition. Those who had supported authoritarianism in the past valued 
the Armed Forces and the police. They wanted those institutions restored to 
their former glory. Moreover, to change their image was not only up to their 
personal conviction, but it was also good for their future connections with said 
institutions. A reform also reinforced order, but in a context that had the 
support of citizens, which could make it more effective and legitimate.  
b)  To implement the rule of law and democratic principles 
Directly linked to the previous issue of trust, came the need to adapt the old 
authoritarian principles to others more associated to democratic values. For 
example, through the reinforcement of the separation of the Judiciary with the 
Executive and the Legislative, which strengthened the notion of the Justice 
System as neutral instead of politicised. Notion that had been put into 
question by the attitude of passive support to the authoritarian regime 
showed by the judiciary (Hilbink, 2007). Transparency was another key 
aspect, as Bachelet highlighted in her government programme regarding the 
reform of the Penal Procedure of the country that took place in the early 
2000s: ‘The Penal Procedure reform has been a big step towards 
transparency and speed of penal procedures’ (Bachelet, 2005:81). 
Accordingly, due process had to be granted, as one interviewee commented: 
‘In the decade of the 1990s, after the dictatorship, it was a time of winds in 
favour of greater Human Rights protection, including the rules of due 
process, the right to defence. They influenced a lot in protecting, or 
promoting, a change in the Procedure System, and to go from an inquisitive 
to an adversarial system’ (J., 2017).  
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Therefore, a complete renewal could state the institutional commitment to 
democracy and its basic principles, understood as an ‘impartial and efficient 
justice system’ (President Frei, 1999:28), ‘without discrimination’ (Lagos, 
1999:23), a ‘transparent, responsible, participative, and with a sense of 
authority’ (Lagos, 1999:24) State administration. As Bachelet highlighted in 
her government programme: ‘The Penal Procedure Reform strengthened the 
rule of law and provided the fundaments of justice’ (Bachelet, 2005:64). 
Moreover, it allowed the redefinition of the key concepts driving the Chilean 
democracy, such as ‘responsibility by the people’ (President Frei, 1998:18), 
or ‘to guarantee equal opportunities’ and ‘equal treatment to all people’ 
(Lagos, 1999:24). 
To frame the discussion in these terms was especially important as the 
Constitution and the electoral system left by the authoritarian regime could 
not be easily changed, being a permanent obstacle for democratic legitimacy. 
According to Gómez (2016), what Chile did then was to choose the reform of 
the justice system as the strategy. It was the solution, as it strengthened and 
institutionalised the rule of law again. Some interviewees also referred to this, 
though through a different understanding. For example, O. (2017) associated 
the need to address these pendant issues through the legal system because 
‘We were coming out from the dictatorship, all this generation […] we were 
formed in a strong social authoritarianism. Issues were solved in the penal 
realm’. While C. (2017) associated it to a cultural Latin American tradition 
instead: ‘It was in a sense a very political movement at the end, and I believe 
it was mistaken; in the sense you were promoting something which is very 
Latin-American, which is that changing the laws you could change the 
situation of the people; and it doesn’t work like that’. All these ways of 
understanding the need to adapt national institutions to the new order, 
though, imply the tendency or preference to reform the justice system to deal 
with a series of social and political issues that could be considered beyond its 




c) To protect Human Rights 
The respect for Human Rights was the key element to differentiate between 
the democratic project and the actions of the authoritarian regime. In the 
previous chapter I mentioned the two commissions created to clarify the 
Human Rights violations (Rettig and Valech Commisions). They had granted 
the recognition of the stories of many victims as well as economic aid. 
Nevertheless, both documents faced a lot of negative comments from the 
opposition and the Armed Forces. Moreover, as they did not refer to the 
identities of the perpetrators, as Borzutsky (2017) stated: there was ‘some 
truth but no justice’ (p. 90). 
This lack of concrete results regarding the national validation of the 
experiences of the victims only increased the social division on the issue, and 
instead of becoming an element of union and validation of democracy, it 
impacted on citizens’ trust towards the Concertación government (Borzutsky, 
2017). At the same time, there were no meaningful actions or measures 
against the judiciary for their failure to protect Human Rights, nor for their 
subsequent failure to prosecute them and bring justice in the early 
democratic years.  
Therefore, in order to sustain the Concertación discourse around Human 
Rights and democracy, given they could not or would not address more 
directly the issues of the past, they needed to make sure to protect them for 
the future. The Concertación needed to answer somehow to the demands for 
more justice of the population, and to give strength to their own interests of 
expanding democracy, as recognised by President Frei in the annual speech 
of his last year in the role: ‘Nowadays, the leaders of Concertación have in 
their hands a great responsibility: To give an answer to the great majority of 
Chileans who want more democracy, more freedom and more justice’ 
(President Frei, 1999:66). 
In consequence a reform of the justice institutions could provide the 
government with the opportunity to make a statement of Human Rights 
protection and democracy, while the Human Rights debt and the 
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authoritarian institutions remained. For example, as this statement of 
President Frei illustrates:  
‘I have the certainty that with this programme of reforms the democratic 
system will gain legitimacy, the Chilean State will protect better the daily 
respect of Human Rights and our legal institutions will provide security, 
protection and justice as expected by citizens’ (1995: 13) 
Another example can be found in Lagos’ government programme, as part of 
his strategy to gain electoral support:  
‘We commit to keep driving laws and ratifying international agreements that 
allow to strengthen Human Rights. We will continue with the Penal Procedure 
reform’ (Lagos, 1999:25) 
The role of the reform of justice institutions to validate democratic concerns 
regarding citizens’ rights can also be evidenced in the legislative discussion 
of the reform of the juvenile justice system, being presented as a symbol to 
evidence the commitment of the authorities to rights’ protections, point 
directly made by Deputy Uriarte: ‘The sign that must be given to society, is 
that in all areas [the authorities] will always defend the rights of the people, 
and respect the action of the judges’ (2004:264).  
Moreover, in 1990 Chile ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
[UNCRC]. The document provided the Concertación with another source to 
validate their democratic government. What is more, the UNCRC brought an 
unprecedent focus on children’s rights. However, it is clear this document 
does not have one single possible application, and that following its 
recommendations can lead to a huge variety of juvenile justice systems and 
childhood policies, as visible in all the countries that have ratified the 
document and the different institutions they have built.  
As expected, in Chile the understanding of the UN Convention and of 
children’s rights was shaped by the local values and culture, which were 
strongly influenced by authoritarianism and neoliberalism. Moreover, market 
principles and the notion of a reduced State had permeated all institutions 
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and policies in the country, thus limiting the possibilities to implement the UN 
Convention recommendations nationwide. Therefore, it is worth trying to 
understand the influence of this international agreement, if any, in practical 
terms 
i. The appearance and impact of the UNCRC 
In a conservative society, like the Chilean one, children and the family are 
amongst the central elements to be protected. This is visible, for example, in 
the comments of Deputy Ibáñez in the legislative debate of the Adolescents’ 
Penal Responsibility Act [LRPA]: ‘I find it key to reinforce everything related 
to family […] we are reaping the frivolous way in which we have treated the 
family in Chile; the thoughtlessness and underrating of marriage and the 
family as the path for human perfection’ (2004:256).  
This new focus on children’s rights brought to general attention how the 
Tutelary System contradicted the international guidelines. This is a point 
made by most interviewees who highlighted how ‘There wasn’t a formal 
recognition of the notion of rights in these individuals’ (B., 2017), or how ‘they 
don’t have right to a lawyer when they commit a crime, they can be imprisoned 
for years’ (P., 2017).  
Initially, it was the concern of just a few experts, but eventually it expanded to 
the political realm as well, as Deputy Bustos evidenced:  
‘The current minors’ legislation contradicts, in many different ways, the 
constitutional regulation and the principles of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child […] it has resulted in a punitive tutelary system which doesn’t 
submit to the constitutional controls and permanently violates the rights it 
ensures […] procedures without trial, the application of measures without the 
involvement of lawyers, imprisonment measures that violate the legality 
principle’ (2004:233).  
In consequence, most interviewees identify the UN Convention as the trigger 
of the discussion towards a new juvenile justice system, categorizing it as a 
‘breaking point’ (N., 2017). Moreover, the influence of the UNCRC increased 
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as there was a notion of international pressure or the international image of 
Chile being at stake for not fulfilling its requirements. For example, in the 
words of Deputy Burgos:  
‘This structural reform is based in that the current legislation of minors, in not 
few areas, is in contradiction with the dispositions of the political constitution 
and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child; and in some 
cases, it violates directly those norms; which locates us -as Deputy Riveros will 
mention-, in a very complex situation in terms of international law’ (2004:250) 
The pressure strengthened by the presence of reports of the UN Committee 
making specific comments on the matter. As one interviewee put it: ‘The 
committee on the rights of the child kept pressuring. They kept saying, Mr. 
State you are owing in terms of your international commitments, there’s no 
clear distinction between kids, adolescents and adults’ (H., 2017). 
This pressure was also visible in the actions of UNICEF to promote juvenile 
justice reforms, not only in Chile but in all Latin America. For example, they 
generated guidelines and united experts of many countries of the region to 
reform the old Tutelary Systems into Juvenile Justice institutions according to 
international standards (A., 2017; L., 2017; I., 2017; F., 2017). In the words of 
one interviewee: ‘It was a time in which Latin America in general promoted a 
lot the issue of legal reform as the radical change in the situation of children, I 
mean, a time of great influence of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 
(C., 2017). 
Moreover, the postulates of international guidelines regarding the treatment of 
youth offending also received extra attention given other institutional changes 
taking place in the country. For example, regarding due process and the need 
to leave behind the secrecy of the old criminal system, guaranteeing the rights 
of all the participants in the process. Nevertheless, these changes in the 
national culture and order also influenced how the UNCRC was incorporated 




ii. Neoliberalism and authoritarianism shaping the understanding of 
children’s rights 
The UNCRC brought a new understanding of young people to the country. 
Mainly, as ‘subjects of rights instead of objects of others’ rights’ (Deputy 
Bustos, 2004:233). Before that, as shown in chapter one, young people used 
to be considered objects of the State. However, through the neoliberal lens, 
and under the remarked focus on individual responsibility, the notion of rights 
came to be equalled with responsibilities. For example, in the words of 
Deputy Bustos in the legislative debate: ‘The law project under discussion, 
precisely, establishes young people are subjects of rights. They are people 
and thus they also have responsibilities according to their development and 
needs’ (2004:280). Discursively they became inseparable. For some, they 
were the same. For others it was impossible to have one without the other 
(‘Today, we make them not only subjects of rights, but also of duties’ (Deputy 
Soto, 2004:262).  
The Convention also presented juveniles as developing beings. However, 
given the past notion of them as unable children or full adults they were 
permanently compared to the adult population instead of being understood 
as a group with its own characteristics. For example, even when they were 
identified as presenting more opportunities for rehabilitation and offending 
prevention, it was in relation to adults’ behaviour, as the words of Senator 
Espina illustrate: ‘Practically all adolescents are susceptible to be 
rehabilitated; instead, it is almost impossible to do it with a professional adult 
offender’ (2004:498). In consequence, they were identified as the right 
moment to stop and prevent future crime before they ‘destroy their lives’ 
(Deputy Monckeberg, 2004:268). 
At the same time, the UNCRC involved a series of suggestions of how the 
State could guarantee children’s rights. However, Chilean neoliberalism 
would never allow such welfare display. Thus, national political economy also 
set the conditions for the implementation of the international agreement. For 
children to receive support from the State, they had to become participative 
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or prospects of participative members of society, that is, active involvement in 
the market. Therefore, to grant them State aids they came in exchange of 
responsibilities. It was only through that lens that it made sense they required 
procedural guarantees when facing a justice system that was, under the 
tutelary approach, for their own protection.  
Thus, young people had gained a voice that was not allowed in the existing 
justice institutions. In consequence, a reform was needed, one that granted 
this recognition of them as almost adults though not yet. As Muncie and 
Hughes (2002) highlighted, juveniles tend to be defined by what they lack. 
Situation expressed in the demands for a specialised juvenile justice, which 
can be summarised in the words of Deputy Saa: ‘A special kind of justice 
because the characteristics of adults are not consolidated yet’ (2004:358). By 
the end of the legislative discussion, this notion of adultized young people is 
more evident, as it was less tempered by children’s rights discourses. The 
result was the dismissal of most of the UNCRC suggestions on the matter, 
while in practice the ‘adult system’s’ dispositions predominated. The process 
was summarised by one interviewee: ‘The project goes deforming and it 
distances more and more from the standards of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and it gets closer and closer to, let’s say, an adult penal law, 
harsh, where specialization goes losing place and logics of an adult penal 
law start to directly rule’ (H., 2017). 
This way of understanding young people and the suggestions of the UNCRC 
led to a very interesting way of fulfilling the agreement. Instead of developing 
a childhood policy, which was hinted a few times in the Congress discussion 
(for example: ‘The needed adaptation we have to make, as a State, of our 
current regulation of childhood’ (Minister of Justice Bates, 2004:239)), the 
solution was to reduce everything to the justice system. By doing this, the 
Chilean State saved resources from the creation of more institutions and a 
network of services. So, for example, if a child needed drug treatment, it 
could be provided through the justice system, or, if they could not comply to 
the education system, they could receive training in a controlled environment 
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according to the needs of the labour market. The expectations over the new 
juvenile justice system are visible in the words of Deputy Guzmán:  
‘It is logical to lower the age of penal responsibility to 14 years of age, as long 
as the legislation points to the social reinsertion of these children and 
adolescents. That is why we need programmes of education, training, and to 
battle drugs and alcohol addictions’ (2005:1035) 
At the same time, the new juvenile justice institutions could provide the 
bureaucratic barrier to select what citizens needed what kinds of aids and 
who could be left out from State support. If they needed protection because 
their rights had been violated there was the Family Court. All other children 
who were out of justice institutions could be considered to ‘cope’, and it could 
be assumed their rights were being guaranteed in the essentials, the details 
could be fixed through, for example, meals in schools.  
Some members of the parliament and participants in this research criticised 
the reduction of a childhood policy to a juvenile justice system. They 
summarised the situation as ‘indifference’ (H., 2017), ‘neglect’ (O., 2017) and 
‘lack of interest’ (P., 2017; M., 2017). However, at the end what 
predominated was the detachment of real and deep socio-political concerns 
over children’s rights, which is visible in the critique presented by the 2015 
report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding chile. In 
consequence, these were understood only as a series of norms, instead of a 
new way of community interaction. There was a prioritization of a penal 
approach, as the words of the Surrogate Minister of Justice Arellano evidence: 
‘It is much better to invest public policy money in adolescents’ penal 
responsibility than in any other mechanism to fight crime’ (2005:1041), 
instead of a national programme that involved the resolution of their basic 
needs from varied state actors (as the Ministry of Health or Education), or a 
national entity of protection. In the words of one interviewee: ‘The Convention 
becomes very strong, but it stays focused on the legal aspects only’ (Q., 
2017). Children’s rights had been reduced and the UNCRC 
recommendations, as Muncie and Hughes (2002) commented before 
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although in a different context, were given only secondary consideration. It 
makes sense then to conclude that the UNCRC was not really the starting 
point for a juvenile justice reform, but the need to legitimize the new political 
order was what drove politicians to use it as a rhetorical tool for national and 
international support. This need was strengthened by the pressure of a 
regional movement that could impact on Chile’s international image and 
interaction with neighbour countries. This is not to deny that the UNCRC had 
a role in the reform process, but it was more of a base for the experts, while 
politicians treated it as only discourse. 
 
Therefore, the reform of the justice system can be understood as the symbol 
to define and represent the Chilean democracy, where old discourses about 
justice, protection, security and rights could be re-presented in new ways; as 
one interviewee stated: ‘Soledad Alvear8 […] realises the Penal Procedure 
reform can be the transformation seal they required in terms of justice’ (M., 
2017). To erase the old justice system and create a completely new 
procedure and institutions granted the government and the opposition the 
opportunity to move from issues none of them wanted to discuss to a new 
battlefield. One that represented them both, because it was about rights and 
control. At the same time, it provided the chance to institutionalise 
democracy, taking its driving principles to become the values of new, modern 
institutions. Likewise, it allowed to expand notions of rights to other fields, 
offering a way to deal with the situation of children and young people, all 
while avoiding falling into measures that distanced from the neoliberal logic of 
a reduced State that had the support of all the political elite, being then 




8 Minister of Justice in the government of President Frei (1994-1999) 
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2. The new social values of the Chilean society 
 
The changes experienced by the Chilean society brought a series of new 
values and principles. There was a new focus on private property, protected 
by the 1980’s Constitution; but also issues like modernity, efficiency, efficacy 
and individual responsibility were now key in ways they had not been before 
the 1970s. The authoritarian regime had led the Chilean society to prioritize 
those values, and the Concertación had embraced and decided to build over 
them. In consequence, for the government and the opposition to gain greater 
legitimacy in their quest towards stable power, they needed to represent, 
respect and reinforce what had become part of the national culture. The 
purpose of this subsection is to analyse the role played by these values into 
the development of a need to reform the old Tutelary System for a new Law 
of Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility [LRPA].  
a) Individual responsibility 
The replacement of the feeling of community to individual responsibility was 
not only in terms of social mobility and wealth, but it extended to all realms. 
There was a marked reinforcement on embracing the democratic order, 
abandoning all notions of the paternalism from the past. Point highlighted in 
different occasions by Concertación presidents. The new social discourse 
can be summarised by the words of President Frei in his national speech in 
1998: ‘If we failed yesterday, it was for each one’s responsibility. If we 
progress today, the merit also belongs to each one of us […] the future keeps 
the promise of our own responsibilities’ (p. 34). 
Following this trend and as Muncie (2012) evidenced in a different context, 
individuals and communities also received the responsibility of crime 
prevention and stoppage. Quite in line with what Garland (1996) described as 
a ‘responsibilisation strategy’. This new notion is visible, for example, in 
President Lagos speeches right before the LRPA went to Parliamentary 
discussion: ‘Neighbours will have funding for their projects to recover public 
spaces and to create surveillance committees, but they must commit to reject 
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disorder and impunity in their neighbourhoods’ (President Lagos, 2000:15). 
This, of course, becomes another source of anxiety to the ones previously 
described.   
Moreover, as Garland (1985) expressed, under a free market society, 
offending and poverty became individual choice. Juveniles, who used to be 
perceived as unable and thus a State responsibility under the Tutelary 
System, also became responsible for their actions. Suddenly they were 
accountable for their offending or disruptive acts. As Deputy Saa stated, 
there was a change in the ways young people were understood by society: 
‘We are completely changing the traditional way to see these children; we are 
making them responsible of their behaviours’ (2004:359). Under this 
perspective, the Tutelary System failed, as the Minister of Justice of the time, 
pointed out: ‘The tutelary legislation […] highly faulty, lacking all concept of 
making the other responsible’ (Ministry of Justice Bates, 2004:239). The 
result was the radical clash between the justice system that dealt with young 
people from a protection ethos and one of the core principles of modern 
neoliberal democratic Chile.  
b) Efficiency and efficacy 
Individual responsibility was not the only value that had taken predominance 
over both State administration and the expectations of the general 
population. Efficiency and efficacy were also new basic principles 
strengthened by the ‘consumer’ – ‘service provider’ relationship established 
by the authoritarian right-wing Majors in the early 1990s (Álvarez, 2014).  
Following the ‘apolitical’ discourse of the military government, the 
authoritarian right-wing promoted less ideologized politics (at least in 
rhetorical terms) and turned the attention towards what politicians did. A good 
example of this are Mayors’ elections, starting with Joaquín Lavín, member of 
the Democratic Independent Union [Unión Demócrata independiente, UDI] 
who became known after his performance as Mayor of Las Condes, one of 
the richest municipalities in Chile. Silva (2001) and Ávarez (2014) described 
how he privileged a discourse of efficiency, which was based on residents of 
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the Municipality being understood as clients paying through their taxes for a 
service that should then guarantee answers to their demands. Lavín 
presented himself as apolitical and uninterested in political debate. He, like 
the Chicago Boys of the early 1970s, was also an economist who later 
studied in the University of Chicago and worked closely with the authorities of 
the dictatorship, such as Jaime Guzmán. He privileged a technocratic 
neoliberalist approach, favouring managerial administration, and just as the 
Concertación, he promoted a style based on consensus, avoiding 
confrontations (Silva, 2001). This made Lavín a successful candidate, who 
competed with a very small margin for the presidential elections of 1999. He 
continues as an active politician to this day, having served as Minister and 
Mayor in other periods as well.  
In consequence, performance to these expectations could either bring 
political support or be penalized in the next elections. Therefore, State 
institutions had to adapt to these core values. They needed to change to 
satisfy the ‘customers’ each moment more aware of their new ‘rights’ and the 
possibility to voice and act on their discontent. 
One of the institutions that failed to guarantee efficiency and efficacy on its 
performance was the Tutelary System, as the words of Lavín in his 
government programme in 1999 illustrate: ‘Chile needs a change! It needs 
fast and efficient justice which works for all. We need to perfect the system, 
to modernise it, to increase its coverage to reach all’ (1999:30). Lavin’s words 
reverberated strongly, because the Tutelary System had other failures. For 
example, according to the Ministry of Justice Bates over the legislative 
discussion of the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act [LRPA], it was 
‘inefficient to reach the prevention and punishment goals required’ 
(2004:241). Accordingly, citizens were unsatisfied. And as one interviewee 
commented: ‘In Chile there was this need to guarantee efficacy and 
efficiency’ (N., 2017). Therefore, something needed to be done to adapt 




c) Becoming ‘productive citizens’ 
Under these socio-political conditions, there was also a strong focus on 
promoting these values and principles to the new generations. To transform 
all citizens into productive and active participants in the economic system 
was associated to guarantee its perpetuation. Opinion visible in the words of 
Deputy Ibáñez in the legislative discussion of the LRPA: ‘These young 
people are in conditions of being rehabilitated; the country needs that they 
are, so they can fully integrate in the honest and productive activities of 
society’ (2004:255). 
However, if family education was not transforming young people into 
committed workers who could adapt and accept the cheap labour, low 
protection and high credit to guarantee the expected self-regulation of the 
market, how could they become the citizens the neoliberal society needed? 
Education, perhaps, could seem to be the proper field for this training. 
However, as previously discussed, the authoritarian regime had conducted 
dramatic education reforms which left too much freedom to private actors and 
institutions. The hands of the State were thus limited. Crime control and 
punishment, which are symbols of authority and sovereignty (Muncie, 2012), 
were the only fields where the government still had the upper hand, and in 
fact it was expected of them to do something. 
Hence, the juvenile justice system could become the institution that was 
needed to deal with all the other issues that could not be easily addressed by 
any other State or private body, as Deputy Luksic commented in the LRPA 
debates: ‘We must assume the responsibility of their formation and 
rehabilitation’ (2004:257). It could ‘educate’ to the new social rules all those 
who had already deviated, while at the same time control and limit their 
disruption. This goes in line with what Donzelot (1979) mentions about formal 
means to transmit guidelines about social behaviour, one of the foundations 
of the tutelary logic already present in the country. Given this was part of the 
cultural understanding of juveniles, it was easier to believe the institution 
needed a reform instead of all the principles behind it. Moreover, this allowed 
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to keep dealing with sovereign issues by maintaining a sense of authority and 
formation over citizens in general and the new generations in particular.  
d) Security 
Given the anxiogenic context of the 1990s and 2000s security had become a 
social right to protection, as President Frei proclaimed in his second year of 
governance: ‘We conceive security as a collective and solidary right’ 
(1995:27).  
As Wacquant (1999) commented, the influence of the neoliberal Washington 
consensus shaped the penal realm as well, especially in Latin America. 
Therefore, a new juvenile justice could be the solution to a series of problems 
and needs that had arisen in the Chile of the 1990s. A new juvenile justice 
could make sure State institutions modernized and represented the social 
values the authoritarian regime had tried so hard to implement into the core 
of the Chilean culture. It could expand the legitimacy of the national political 
economy, and it could educate children to follow that lead regardless of what 
their parents, who had lived in a different society, could teach them. If they 
did not adapt to the new social rules, they could be sent to the juvenile justice 
system where they could be transformed into ‘citizens of good’ (Deputy 
García, 2004:260) according to national individualistic expectations. All 
without investing too much on them or the social factors that explained their 
behaviour (also identified as a neoliberal consequence in Wacquant (1999)’s 
work).  
Moreover, if the Concertacion wanted to keep their political position, they had 
to represent and protect the Chilean values in all realms where they had 
some influence, because this could constitute another source of connection 
with the population. As it has been previously stated, their influence over the 
institutions left by the previous order was constrained. But in the justice 
system they had greater freedom of action. Thus, the justice system could 
again become a symbol of change, representing modernity and the new 
government while diverting the attention from all those other institutions that 
kept working under the logics of the past. 
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3. Struggle for representation: the legitimation of the political elite  
 
In the early 1990s, the Concertación had received over 50% of citizens’ 
support; they also had international approval. At the same time, the right-
wing was fragmenting, they had to reorganise, and had lost the officially 
predominant hand they had in making the decisions. Where in the past, no 
one could oppose them, now they had become the opposition. However, as 
already mentioned in chapter four, cases of corruption started to appear 
(Álvarez, 2014), and the Concertación started fragmenting, while the right-
wing strengthened. For example, the Christian-Democrats separated from 
the coalition, while National Renovation and the UDI joined in their own 
Chile’s Alliance at the end of the decade. Furthermore, they had the support 
of over 40% of the population, who had voted to continue under the rule of 
General Pinochet (Oppenheim, 1993). They had not been politically nor 
economically discredited, and the authoritarian enclaves granted them 
majority in the Senate and other political seats through the binomial electoral 
system (as explained in the previous chapter).  
Therefore, even though the government kept gaining most electoral seats, 
did not have full support, nor fill this gap as time progressed. At the same 
time, the right-wing had the strength of faithful followers; many of whom had 
a strong investors’ capacity. Following from that, they organised as an active 
opposition soon after their defeat in the 1988 referendum. They only needed 
the arguments to balance the scale towards their candidates instead of 
towards the Concertación, while avoiding sore topics that could be used with 
more strength against them later. This banned a series of issues, such as 
Human Rights, or the faulty functioning of the institutions they had left, and 
even corruption as the Armed Forces had been involved in more than one 
episode. Therefore, their main options were what they had been known and 
admired for in the past: the focus on economy through economic growth and 
employment; and citizens’ control.  
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Economic growth granted them a permanent topic of debate. However, they 
could not extract as much from it as they perhaps wanted. The Concertación 
had embraced the neoliberal model, respected private actors, and even 
encouraged both national and international investment. The government’s 
attitude might have been too economically conservative for some (Weyland, 
1999), but poverty was decreasing, and for years Chile kept an outstanding 
growth of about 7.7 points in the GDP (Borzutsky, 2017). Moreover, the 
Concertación also presented the topic in their favour and as a critique 
towards the opposition, as the word of Bachelet in her government 
programme at the time of her candidacy for presidency illustrate:  
‘The dictatorship, in its alliance with neoliberalism, dedicated great efforts to 
reduce the size of the State, disregarding its public role, disqualifying its 
workers. One of the key tasks the Concertación has taken responsibility for, 
with the rectification of the economic model, had been to reclaim the role of 
the State’ (Bachelet, 2005:76) 
This left only their marked focus on control. According to one interviewee, 
there was then a transference from the internal enemy they had openly 
fought in the authoritarian regime, to the criminal: ‘From 1990, when the 
dictatorship ends, a very concrete and peculiar phenomenon starts. Society 
translates the centre of their worry, imposed with a biological bias from the 
dictatorship as the internal enemy, the terrorist, to have another internal 
enemy all the time. That is the place now occupied by crime’ (R., 2017).  
This transfer of the focus of control and the rise of security started with some 
events that arose national attention, which according to Tsukame (2016), 
made the right-wing feel insecure as they had not felt since the times of 
Allende. In 1991, the actions of some extremist groups ended in the murder 
of Jaime Guzmán and the kidnapping of the son of Agustín Edwards, the 
owner of ‘El Mercurio’, the newspaper supporting the authoritarian regime. 
The events were labelled as terrorism and opened the topic of security to be 
politically used by the right-wing all through the decade (López, 2000; 
Candina, 2005).   
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By 1992, Mr. Edwards had created Paz Ciudadana, a foundation dedicated 
to research and influence policies about justice, crime and security which 
purpose was described in the previous chapter and the extent of its influence 
will be shown in chapter six. By the 1993 Majors’ elections, the right-wing put 
in the front of the discussion the need to control the crime threat and 
guarantee security in local policies. It started with Mayor Lavín implementing 
extra protection measures in Las Condes Municipality trough subsidies for 
Municipal guards on the streets and rising fences (Álvarez, 2014). This was 
mostly possible because Las Condes was one of the richest Municipalities in 
the country, existing differences of access to these security measures 
according to the resources of the community and market-led interactions. 
Under any circumstance, crime allowed a short-term focus with more visible 
actions, such as a greater number of police officers in the streets.  
Before these events, crime had not been the focus of the discussion, while 
security had been treated mostly in terms of National Security. Moreover, as 
it had been a topic discursively dominated by the authoritarian rhetoric, the 
conservative right-wing had already the tools to revive ‘the need to control 
the threat’ only now towards daily crime instead of Marxism. Furthermore, as 
this had never been part of the Concertación presentation card, more in line 
with Human Rights discourses, it provided a weakness of the government 
and a strength for the opposition, which could now direct the debate, setting 
the base for future political discussion.  
Therefore, the first thing to keep in mind in the rise of crime, security and 
justice as new focus of national concern, is that these were not born from a 
demand of the general population. It was instead imposed by the political 
elite of the opposition, as one interviewee put it: ‘The most conservative 
sector involved the UDI [the authoritarian right-wing], and they had patented 
security as a topic for political debate’ (A., 2017). 
The strategy was highly successful, for example with Lavín almost defeating 
the third Concertación President Ricardo Lagos in the 1999 presidential 
elections. The UDI candidate strongly referenced crime and justice in his 
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government programme, highlighting the need to end with the ‘party of the 
offenders’ and to ‘send clear signals against crime’ (1999:4). 
This strategy was also used in other political elections, in the Senate for 
example, as one of my interviewees highlighted: ‘Espina had just been 
elected with first majority in the Senate using a very strong discourse around 
security. He had no incentive to stop that discourse’ (A., 2017). 
To retaliate to Lavín’s presidential campaign, Lagos made similar promises, 
in his own style, to address the issue of crime: ‘The government of Ricardo 
Lagos will fully assume the legitimate distress of families regarding the size 
and seriousness of the crime phenomenon […] The government of Ricardo 
Lagos will have among its priority tasks the protection of the security to live 
and the goods of people through the integral fight against crime’ (Lagos, 
1999:19). Once he was elected, he focused the discussion around building 
more prisons and the promise of increased use of incarceration (Dammert 
and Díaz, 2006; Morales, 2012): ‘When in this government we finish building 
those ten prisons, we will have built the equivalent to all Chile has built in 
terms of prison all over history’ (President Lagos, 2002:9-10) . 
Once the Concertación joined the ‘security approach’, the result was an ever-
escalating process where security, justice and crime became key elements in 
all public campaigns, regardless of the political position in the debate 
(Álvarez, 2014). This is not so visible in the first Concertación government, 
but it became clearer in the second one, with President Frei (1994-2000). He 
highlighted on more than one occasion how hard it had been to progress in 
the areas that had been controlled by the opposition in the past (health, 
education, the National Constitution). For example in his 1998 speech, after 
the Asian economic crisis had hit the country: ‘If we have not been able to 
progress, it has been because sections of the opposition have been reluctant 
to change […] If the opposition insist in closing the door, the country will 
know who are those who do not want to progress towards democratic 
consolidation’ (President Frei, 1998:31)  
191 
 
Therefore, the Concertación needed to develop further in an arena of 
competition imposed by the opposition. Thus, President Frei started to 
emphasize the need to protect citizens, and to fight against adult and youth 
crime (being the first one making this distinction) as well as drug abuse (De 
Ferrari, 2006): ‘Crime, terrorism and drug trafficking are a threat for national 
coexistence that the government has fought; and will keep fighting with 
firmness, energy and responsibility’ (President Frei, 1995:27). It resulted in 
measures to strengthen the legal punishment towards certain actions, such 
as receiving stolen property with the law 19,413 in 1995, or rape under the 
law 19,617 in 1999; the strategic plan of Carabineros in 1995, a programme 
orientated to strengthen the police; a project to build more prisons in 1997, 
and in 1999 to incorporate the ‘quadrant plan’, which divided and organised 
the areas to be guarded by the police, so they could know the people living in 
the community. President Frei also suggested to ameliorate the penal 
system, modify the penal procedure and provide more resources and 
personnel to the armed police (Carabineros) and civil police (Policía de 
Investigaciones [PDI]) (López, 2000; Dammert and Lunecke, 2002; Candina, 
2005; Morales, 2012). It was in Frei’s government that the Penal Procedure 
reform came to be discussed and accepted. According to Duce (2004) and 
Morales (2012) it was widely supported. López (2000) added that this had to 
do with the similarity between the left and right-wing in measures to tackle 
crime. 
By the fourth Concertación government, with President Bachelet (2006-
2010), the issue had reached even farther, building more prisons and linking 
crime and security to other areas of public policy: ‘We will actively work to 
protect citizens and attack the deep causes of violence and crime. Citizens’ 
security is basic in the social protection system we are going to build’ 
(Bachelet, 2005:64). 
 
To address crime control, justice and security were thus gaining strength 
since the return to democracy. It became key not only to gain supporters, but 
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also to attack the other candidates at all political levels, as one interviewee 
recalled: ‘Every time we had elections, security was one of the first things 
everyone offered. They all critique who is governing for not doing anything, 
and they offer [to do something]’ (A., 2017). This can also be related to the 
fact that other reforms that could strengthen the power and legitimacy of the 
Concertación government were constrained by the socio-political structure 
left by the authoritarian regime. Thus, as Gómez (2016) stated in her 
research about the quality of the rule of law in Mexico and Chile, Chile went 
for a legal/judicial reform. The best way to strengthen the government was to 
change the justice laws. 
 
III- International image 
 
Besides all the national and internal conflicts, the dictatorship led to negative 
perceptions of Chile abroad. The Human Rights violations and the harsh cut to 
democratic rule brought criticism and condemnation by the UN and many 
countries. Once the democratic rule was established, the political elite was 
adamant to gain international favour, as the words of Lavín in his 1999 
candidacy highlighted: ‘Chile wishes to be respected by the world’ (Lavín, 
1999:34). Furthermore, national prestige was directly linked in their imaginary 
with global economic participation, and hence with success: ‘The key is to 
understand that keeping positive international relations and be a respected 
country in the world is good for everyone. It allows us to access new 
opportunities and to improve our life quality’ (Lavín, 1999:35). Thus, a 
negative image was understood as a factor that could damage institutional 
and financial trust, limiting Chile’s access to other markets.  
The connection between the image of Chile, democracy, Human Rights and 
access to markets had some ground. The nationalization strategy of Allende 
and later actions of the authoritarian regime led to the rejection of 
international governments to support Chile and subsequently to investors and 
international businesses leaving as well as markets being blocked (Wesson, 
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1982; Rackynski, 2000). Consequently, the democratic context provided the 
opportunity to re-interact with these markets. In order to attract these markets 
and erase the negative past image, Chile had to present itself differently. As 
a result, the legitimacy of the new authorities depended not only on the 
institutionalization and protection of Human Rights, but also in being seen by 
the international community as doing so, as different Presidents of the 
Concertación recognised: 
‘In the international sphere, in a context of economic globalization, Human 
Rights are our presentation card. A country that respects Human Rights has 
nothing to hide, and can relate with all men whatever their status, class or 
condition’ (President Frei, 1995:40).  
‘Since we recovered our democracy in 1990, we Chileans started a 
successful process of international reintegration’ (Bachelet 2005:97) 
Human Rights had become a discursive tool to improve the country’s image 
and grant its legitimacy, reaching for the economic goals they intended and 
so badly desired. I claim the discourse was more a tool than real concerns 
over the matter because, as previously illustrated in the current and previous 
chapter, there were not many changes regarding the situation of people who 
had been victimised during the dictatorship. Neither public nation-wide 
condemnation for the actions of the Armed Forces, nor an official apology 
were provided (Hilbink, 2007; Borzutsky, 2017). However, there was a 
permanent emphasis in political speeches regarding the success in 
integration to international markets or generating trade agreements. For 
example: ‘We are one of the most open economies in the world. That is why 
we are fully interested in free trade and the instruments that promote it in 
between nations’ (President Frei, 1998:20). 
As it has been previously mentioned, the military government and the 
Concertación government saw their legitimacy and support as strongly 
depending on economic success. But a positive international image could 
offer more than that, for example in terms to validating how trustable they 
were, as the words of President Frei demonstrate: ‘A sign of the trust in this 
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country is that last year we received international investment up to eight 
times more of what we had in 1990’ (President Frei, 1998: 24). 
Or for example, to gain support of the population towards new strategies, 
policies, or the future of their government, as President Lagos hinted: ‘The 
prestige Chile has earned in the world makes it mandatory to take 
responsibility’ (President Lagos, 2003:5). 
This gave power to international monetary institutions to put some conditions 
and make suggestions. Chile, not wanting to jeopardize a positive interaction 
would make at least a visible effort to implement them, as President Frei put 
it: ‘This [international trust and investment] is our most precious capital and 
we are not going to risk it under any circumstance’ (1998:24). 
In this context, there was direct pressure from institutions like the Inter-
American Bank, for Chile to reform the old Justice System to a more modern 
one, adapted to the characteristics of international models and with a strong 
focus on due process. This was clarified by some interviewees, who 
attributed a key role to these institutions in the beginning of the discussion of 
a new Criminal Justice: 
‘At the end it was because the Inter-American bank, specially the IBD […], 
The UNDP and the Ford Foundation, they wanted to generate a rights’ 
space. But there were other interests as well […] they needed to have 
security to invest, to generate secure spaces’ (N., 2017). 
This can be associated to what Lavín said in his government programme 
when running for president in 1999: ‘Legal security is a basic condition for 
national economic development’ (1999:31). The notion of a more effective 
justice system could decrease the risks of investing and sending people from 
other countries to Chile, as certain levels of security and trust in their 
institutions could be granted. A reform of that magnitude could show political 
agreement, stability and a willingness towards the goal of both protecting the 
rights of goods’ owners, but also of goods’ providers. It was a good strategy, 
and again, it evidenced the UNCRC was not the real starting point of 
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concerns over the failure of the previous juvenile justice system and the need 
of a new one, even if it was a strong part of the rhetoric.  
Following from this, to reform the justice institutions provided two key 
elements in terms of Chile’s international image. It could make the country 
look more adapted to modern times, it could transform Chile in a globalized 
country, following standardized international rules and guidelines, with solid 
open institutions. At the same time, it could satisfy the international critiques 
regarding the need to protect Human Rights. To change from the old 
inquisitive to an adversarial justice system implied granting a due process, 
and with that the notion of respect for the rights of the accused and the 
transparency of procedures. In consequence, a reform of the justice 
institutions could give a ‘safe’ image to the country. Even though the 
government and the opposition did not necessarily want to take democracy in 
the same direction or understood it in the same way, they needed to build the 
reputation of Chile as a trustworthy and safe democratic country, the justice 
system being a tool for this. 
 
IV- Growing concerns about crime control and justice 
 
Generalized concerns about security and crime started with the return to 
democracy, and led to a complete reform of the ethos, institutions and 
procedure of the justice system in what came to be known as: ‘One of the 
deepest transformations of the Chilean State since its consolidation in mid-
19th century’ (President Frei, 1999:28). How did it come to happen? How did 
the country reach the decision to completely transform the justice system, 
even though they built over what already existed in other areas? According to 
one interviewee, this can be explained as a natural process of the evolution 
of society once basic needs are covered: ‘When Chile starts growing our per 
capita income increases. We start solving poverty issues, massive and 
systematic violations disappear; we have a democracy, and well, 
expectations and demands start changing’ (F., 2017). Therefore, this could 
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be associated to the amelioration of the economic situation progressively 
during the 1990s, where people were able to start worrying about other 
things, such as quality of life. 
However, so far we have evidenced a series of social and political conflicts 
where to redirect national attention towards justice institutions and their 
reform was a suitable strategy. It could provide citizens with palliatives for 
their fears, give a second chance to the trust issues, legitimate the new 
government and the political elites. Nevertheless, artificially redirecting social 
anxieties towards crime may not have been so successful. The present 
section intends to evidence how the reform was also strongly influenced by 
elements directly associated to the offending and justice landscape. It was 
facilitated because all over the 1990s there were increased perceptions of 
high levels of crime. Moreover, in those years, there was a reform of the 
Penal Procedure of the country. This allowed to face many of the critiques 
against justice institutions and granted - at least the rhetorical representation, 
of - the new social and democratic values, proving to be a helpful measure. 
In turn, this arose strong criticism against the old juvenile justice, the Tutelary 
System. Leading to political action for its reform.  
 
1. Perceived high levels of crime 
 
Based on a series of studies, from the late 1980s, and at least until the early 
2000s, there was a widespread notion that crime in general and youth 
offending in particular had increased in quantity and violence levels both 
dramatically and permanently (Cortés, 1991; Folch, 2002; Mettifogo and 
Sepúlveda, 2004; Dammert, 2005; Méndez and Barra, 2008; Morales, 2012). 
A think tank of the authoritarian right-wing -Freedom and Development 
[Libertad y Desarrollo]– claimed that between 1977 and 1996 robbery 
increased by 120% (López, 2000). According to Paz Ciudadana (2002) 
between 1990 and 2000 robbery increased in 39% and robbery with violence 
in more than 200%. 
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The general perception of increased crime was also well expanded and is 
repeatedly visible in politicians’ public speeches and debates, for example in 
the words of Deputy Ibáñez: ‘In the last years there has been a huge 
increase of youth offending. Young people have entered, quite early, into the 
world of crime’ (2004:255). Moreover, according to some interviewees: ‘The 
issue of security between 1994 and 2005, or 2004, totally changed the 
temperature, it became one of the main demands of the population’ (F., 
2017). The main expressions of the time related to the need of ‘mano dura’ 
(iron fist) against delinquency; together with the notion of the juvenile justice 
as a ‘revolving door’, because juveniles were understood to enter the system 
just to be freed immediately and without a sentence (Tsukame, 2016). 
However, there was little knowledge about both real public opinion and youth 
offending, to be addressed in greater detail the following chapter. Moreover, 
there was another group of researchers and authors that claimed that in fact 
crime was not in the rise. Some sources showed an unstable trend of ups 
and downs (López, 2000; Dammert and Lunecke, 2002; Candina, 2005). 
While, Candina (2005) highlighted that between 1991 and 1994, the period 
when public discourse against crime became stronger, the rates of robbery, 
the most common crime in the country, actually decreased. According to the 
author, what increased dramatically were the robbery reports, together with 
demands of greater control and security. Morales (2012) provides a good 
notion of how crime report changed over time, stating reports of property 
crime had been following a decreasing trend since 1985 to reach their lowest 
point in 1995. But, between 1973 and 2003 these reports tripled, increasing 
exponentially between 1998 and 2003.  
Therefore, even though there is contradictory information regarding Chilean 
crime rates at the time, and that the most dramatic figures to evidence this 
problem came from conservative right-wing think tanks, the general notion, in 
the political realm at least, was that crime had increased and that the general 




2. The reform of the Penal Procedure 
 
The Chilean justice system was old and outdated; in the words of one 
interviewee: ‘We were very behind because Chile faced together the delay of 
the dictatorship plus 20 or 25 years of previous delay. It was too much, like 
40 years’ (M., 2017). There were also widespread beliefs of the justice 
system as ineffective, slow and too soft, encouraging impunity, bureaucracy 
and not improving security (López, 2000; Dammert, 2005; Candina, 2005). As 
one interviewee summarised: ‘there’s perception of insecurity and the system 
works like hell, you understand? I believe that’s institutional weakness (E., 
2017)’; or how President Frei put it in a formal speech: ‘The goal of the 
reform is to change, to modernize our penal procedure, which after almost a 
century without a single renovation had lost effectiveness’ (President Frei, 
1998:6). 
Therefore, they needed to be modernized. They needed to be adapted to the 
new times and priorities of the population and the government. The 
discussion started in relation to the Penal Procedure, that dealt with adult 
offenders and young people declared with discernment. As the words of 
President Frei evidence:  
‘There is a wide consensus in political and social sectors. Nowadays, no one 
denies that the current penal procedure is an institution that does not goes in 
line with a modern and democratic State’ (President Frei, 1995:13) 
In consequence, as stated in chapter one, the Penal Procedure reform 
discussions started. And it was a radical transformation of what it had been 
before, going from inquisitorial to adversarial, from secret to public, creating 
new institutions, guaranteeing accused rights and creating the figure of the 
Guarantee Judge to make sure they were respected. The new procedure and 
institutions started working in the year 2000 and it took until 2005 for it to be 
implemented all over the country.  
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Those changes made more evident the lack of rights guaranteed in the Tutelary 
System. Point directly made by one interviewee: ‘There was a broad agreement 
than the system of minors was clearly out of everything, I mean, it didn’t 
accomplish the due process standards, it wasn’t ensuring what the adult system 
ensured for adult people’ (L., 2017). Therefore, this opened the door for critiques 
about the differences between institutions and how the one dealing with 
juveniles had a more aggressive procedure and more punitive consequences. 
The results were demands to guarantee at least certain basic procedural rights 
for juveniles, just as in the ‘adult system’, as Bachelet stated in her 
government plan when running for President in 2005: ‘The implementation of 
the Penal Procedure Reform had generated the need to broaden the 
structure and principles of the new system to the penal justice of young 
people’ (Bachelet, 2005:82).  
The need of a new justice system became more evident in 2004 with the 
creation of the Family Court that took as its mission the protection of children 
and young people. Hence, the principles of the UNCRC were part of its core 
ethos. They dealt with all cases where there was suspicion any of the rights of 
a child were being violated. All decisions had to be made in consideration of 
the child’s best interests, again increasingly evidencing the failures of the 
Tutelary System, though by then the new Juvenile Justice was in the middle of 
its legislative debate 
 
3. Notions of failure and critiques to the Tutelary System 
 
From the early 1990s a series of critiques towards the Tutelary System 
started to take shape. The UNCRC brought to attention the rights not being 
granted nor respected by the tutelary procedure and institutions. However, 
according to one of the experts interviewed in this research, this was a 
concern for just a few: ‘At that time this was something that didn’t exist, no 
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one thought of a legal reform, no one saw a problem of fundamental rights in 
there’ (M., 2017). 
However, eventually, the Penal Procedure reform and institutional changes in 
the judiciary made more evident these rights’ violations, particularly in terms 
of the excessive harshness of ‘protection’ measures. Therefore, the new 
‘adult system’ evidenced a ‘contrast’ (Deputy Bustos, 2004:233) and 
‘inequality’ (Deputy Rossi, 2004:245) between justice systems. These 
institutional changes also led to questions of effectivity in the performance of 
the tutelary institutions in comparison to the results when dealing with 
offenders but also regarding the treatment of victims. Deputy Uriarte 
summarised this critique: ‘Everyone knows that both the offender and the 
victim, in the present situation, do not receive from the justice system an 
adequate response’ (2004:356). 
Therefore, just as the UN Convention was identified as a ‘breaking point’ in 
the debate regarding a juvenile justice reform, the Penal Procedure Reform 
has also been identified by some interviewees as what ‘made it [the juvenile 
justice reform] possible’ (M., 2017). This is not only in an abstract sense, but 
also in terms of material possibilities, as the LRPA is built over the same 
institutions created for the Penal Procedure reform, and the possible 
infractions juveniles can commit come from the same Penal Code. The 
procedure is also the same, the main difference being the variety of penalties 
between the two systems.  
The most common critique coming from the political and public opinion 
realms was the lack of responsibility. The tutelary system was accused of not 
rendering young people responsible for their actions and what needed to be 
amended. The words of Senator Novoa are a good example of the existing 
emphasis on this aspect:  
‘Nowadays we are in the worst of the worlds. Under 16-year-olds who 
present violent offences, very serious, they are not criminally liable, and in 
the case of those between 16 and 18 years of age, the great majority are 
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declared as not criminally liable, so they do not assume their penal 
responsibility’ (2004:509). 
This responsibility was the result of the change in the way in which young 
people were considered, partially brought by the UNCRC notion of young 
people as developing beings towards adulthood, but mostly as a result of the 
cultural reading Chile made of the Convention. Juveniles were not children 
who could not determine right from wrong anymore. As previously hinted, 
they were nearly adults, as summarised by Deputy García: ‘When we talk 
about minors with no discernment, we need to keep in mind that nowadays 
children of eight or nine years of age have a spectacular capacity. Children 
are more awake’ (2004:259). This goes in line with what Muncie (2012) 
comments about welfare-based juvenile justice systems shifting to justice-
based systems with a focus on their responsibility and adultization. 
Hand in hand with these critiques the notion of ‘impunity’ was also 
expanding. The widespread political and social use of the concept had been 
born from the lack of consequences for the Human Rights violations 
committed by members of the Armed Forces and supporters of Pinochet. 
Although its social meaning had been switched - just as Human Rights - 
towards less conflictive understandings, the Tutelary System was blamed for 
causing impunity by not making young people responsible for their actions. 
This perspective can be summarised in the words of Deputy Uriarte: ‘There is 
a dominant impunity in the system, strengthened for underage people over 
the statement of their irresponsibility’ (2004:357).  
However, the Tutelary System was claimed to be extremely punitive by the 
participants in this research, as one interviewee put it: ‘Under the pretty name 
of protection there were all types of rights violations’ (P., 2017). For example, 
through the permanent institutionalization of a young person regardless of 
their behaviour (as the same measure could take place both in cases of 
protection or offending or when the young person was considered ‘at risk’, 
which was not clearly defined). Therefore, as shown in chapter one, through 
protection measures, children and young people could be locked in a youth 
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centre for much longer than imprisoned under the adult system. From where 
did this sensation of impunity appeared?  
According to Couso (2009), it came from the rhetoric used. As they talked 
about protection instead of punishment, the general feeling was that young 
people who presented offending behaviour were not being held accountable 
for their actions. As a result, it spread the impression that the tutelary system 
was useless to both stop and prevent offending behaviour, as Senator 
Espina highlighted: ‘Nowadays young people begin a criminal career 
knowing, in practice, that nothing is going to happen to them’ (2004:498). 
Couso’s argument gathers strength when taking into account the words of 
Minister of Justice Bates: ‘It is assumed that adolescents have responsibility, 
which makes possible the imposition of penal punishments’ (2004:240). This 
means the general understanding was that there was no punishment under 
the Tutelary System because juveniles were not officially made responsible 
for their actions. Now, under the new understanding of young people, this 
could change.  
Therefore, there were too many elements adding up against an institution 
that did not represent Chileans anymore, and which failed to satisfy both 
national demands of punishment and expert and international rights’ 
requirements. Hence, a reform was presented as the solution to end with all 
these critiques. The UNCRC suggestions could appear fulfilled (‘We protect 
the rights of children and youth by adapting our legislation to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (Lagos, 1999:13)); it could reduce the 
gap with the procedural rights contained in the Penal Procedure Reform 
(‘Similar to the adult penal procedure currently in Chile’ (Senator Zaldivar, 
2005:969)); it could address problems of efficacy (‘The text known and 
generally approved by the Constitution Commission and by the Chamber was 
agreed with the purpose of reaching improved levels of efficacy in the fight 
against crime’ (Deputy Uriarte, 2004:356-357)); could adapt to the 
responsibilisation demands (‘It should be specifically mentioned that a key 
element of this project is the responsibility for the offences committed’ 
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(Deputy Forni, 2004:345)); and could solve the feelings of impunity (‘It came 
to be installed the idea this law was going to end with impunity’ (C., 2017)). 
 
V- The reform of the Juvenile Justice System: the strategic 
solution for the problems of the new democracy 
 
In this chapter it is possible to see how concerns about crime and security in 
general and youth offending in particular went gaining strength since the 
return to democracy in the 1990s. The result was the birth of a growing need 
to radically transform the previous juvenile justice. This change was 
influenced by a series of factors strongly related to the transformations 
brought by the dictatorship and the subsequent return to democracy. These 
two major alterations of the political order of the country generated very 
particular conditions for political debate and participation. Chileans had been 
pushed away from political life in the 1970s and 1980s. But then, in 
democratic times, their participation was needed again: to legitimate the new 
democracy; to gain citizens’ attention and interests; and to compete in a 
more even ground for the political power to make the decisions regarding the 
future of the country. Politicians needed to engage the wider population; 
however, they were limited in the ways of doing so.  
There were a series of topics that could be considered almost forbidden, 
because even when they were discussed they had stalled and only showed 
the weakness of both the Concertación and the authoritarian right-wing. 
There were institutional constraints as well. The military government and its 
authoritarian enclaves left few options for the government to carry meaningful 
reforms. In this context, the right-wing rose issues of security and control, 
topics they had been known to dominate during the entirety of the 
dictatorship. It became a successful strategy for political struggle in the 
Chilean society due to a series of factors, such as its weakened social 
capital, its strong commitment to neoliberalism, the remarked focus over 
individual participation and national participation in the global market for 
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status, and the sequels left by the wounds of the past now mixed with the 
uncertainties of the future. All elements that increased citizens’ feelings of 
vulnerability, fear and insecurity regarding precarious stability and social 
status. These feelings were also magnified by the effects of suddenly facing 
a modern globalised world, where the political or economic instability of other 
nations could impact in the national reality with little control on citizens’ part 
and little support of a State that had privatised most of its services. 
Therefore, they were welcoming and even demanding of a new social 
agreement; one adapted to the requirements and demands of a fast-
changing technological world in which the old justice system was now 
obsolete.  
A new justice system presented itself as the solution to a series of 
representation issues. Without the limitations left by the authoritarian regime, 
the justice institutions could be expanded, defined and discursively presented 
with enough flexibility to adapt to all social and political needs. The justice 
system became then the tool to channel issues of ‘rights’, ‘security’, ‘values’, 
‘modernity’, distancing them from where they had been born towards a more 
concrete ground that had a concrete and specific solution: the creation of one 
single apparatus of social control. It could protect the democratic principles, 
to be re-defined according to the characteristics of the debates and the 
political positions of the actors; it could represent the cultural and social 
values, leaving enough space for them to be understood in more than one 
way; they could partially assume the debts both government and opposition 
wanted to leave behind; and moreover, it could validate democracy and the 





Chapter 6: A new Juvenile Justice System 
 
The previous chapter addressed the developments of the need to reform the 
juvenile justice system, the increased public anxieties about youth behaviour 
and the political competition between actors and political parties to legitimate 
their public role and to provide something new. The present chapter intends 
to address what drove the reform in the direction it followed. Therefore, I will 
focus on the elements that shaped the discussion and the final result 
(understanding this as the law implemented in 2007). In doing so, I will cover 
the main directing influences including sources of knowledge, but also of 
power. The purpose is to answer the following questions: who determined the 
characteristics of the new law? What voices were heard in the process? 
What advice followed? What models? And in particular, why those and not 
others?  
To do so, I will start by addressing the direction followed by juvenile justice 
populist politics after the struggle for political legitimation shown in the 
previous chapter. This will involve analysing what was feeding the debates. 
This will be followed by the analysis of how polity building worked in Chile all 
over the reform of the Juvenile Justice System. Finally, I will refer to the 
result of all these struggles for power on the shape the new Juvenile Justice 
came to have. This chapter, similar to the previous one, will build on quotes 
of the interviews and the key documents analysed for this research. The 
documents quoted involve the ‘Historia de la ley 20,084’, the ‘Historia de la 
ley 20,191’, the annual presidential speeches and the government 
programmes of the presidential elections of 1999 and 2005. When I talk 
about the legislative debate or just the ‘Historia de la ley’ I will refer to the one 
of the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act [LRPA]. I will explicit directly 
when talking about the ‘Historia de la ley 20,191’, which modified the 




I- Politicization of crime control and justice: The predomination of 
populist approaches 
 
As showed in the previous chapter, concerns over security and crime were 
installed by the authoritarian right-wing in the early 1990s. The topic provided 
the space to legitimise certain practices, criticize the new government and 
thus build the image of the different political groups both nationally and 
abroad. It was only after that that citizens seem to have engaged in the 
discourse and actively demanded more security and a better crime control 
system. This led to the generalized notion of a public that demanded answers 
from politicians regarding youth offending, crime control and punishment, as 
the words of Deputy Burgos in the legislative debate of the LRPA show: ‘This 
[the juvenile justice system reform] addresses the key of a problem that 
worries Chileans, especially in the last months, due to the public declarations 
of candidates to President of the Republic: Citizens’ security’ (Deputy 
Burgos, 2005:1095).  
Juvenile justice had gone from being no one’s concerns to ‘A problem that, in 
the last time, has revealed in an extremely harsh way which seriously 
concerns our society’ (Senator Novoa, 2004:507), becoming the centre of 
political discussion. This is visible, for example, in the complaint risen by 
Deputy Hales during the debates: ‘There is a political discussion because 
some claim the Concertación only wants to caress the offender. Beyond 
these little things of those who want to gain electoral profit from this issue…’ 
(2005:1037). In consequence, and as the previous chapter evidenced in 
relation to legitimize the new political elite, juvenile justice gained increasing 
presence. This politization of the topic was also recognised by some actors 
during the legislative process of the Adolescents’ Penal Responsibility Act 
[LRPA], for example, in the words of Deputy Burgos: ‘The closer the elections 
are; there is a real fight to present and accept initiatives related to citizens’ 
security’ (2004:348).  
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In consequence, this section intends to address this politicization of juvenile 
justice and how this, in turn, influenced the shape the new law came to have. 
To do so, I will start by referring to the growing focus over the topic in the 
increasingly fierce political disputes. This will be followed by the role of other 
key actors of the political scenery, such as the media and public opinion. The 
resulting populism will then be discussed.  
 
1. Juvenile justice as a tool for political leverage 
 
Youth offending evolved to become a topic for political competition between 
the Concertación and the right-wing, between the Executive and the 
Legislative powers, and between the two chambers of the Congress. 
Candidates could always use it as a tool to emphasize their capacities and 
criticise the opposition. This was highlighted, for example, by Senator Ruiz-
Esquide: ‘It hurts me that youth offending is treated not as a youth problem 
but as an element for political debate, as if with this the government or the 
opposition could win’ (2004:513). Moreover, the laws are finally decided by 
the Legislative, where each Chamber make their own changes and 
modifications. Then, the implementation is mostly dependent on actions from 
the Executive. Hence, if anything failed at any stage, it could also be used for 
political purposes. The words of Senator Espina in the discussion of the law 
20,191, which modified the LRPA before its implementation in 2007, 
evidence how this worked:  
‘In first place this is a law that should have been implemented a year ago. 
Back then the Minister of Justice, Mr. Bates, assured us that all the new 
institutions on juveniles’ penal responsibility were going to be working. When 
Mr. Solís became the one in charge of those duties, in the government of Ms. 
Michelle Bachelet, he confessed nothing of what had been promised was 
ready […] These are very serious crimes! I don’t see what explanation will be 
given to the country when they are informed that the author of a crime of rape 
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with murder, for example, won’t be arrested a single day, not a single day! 
[…] I won’t become an accomplice of this!’ (2007:29-31) 
Therefore, disputes between political actors for representation and support 
(I.e. power) drove the level of attention on youth offending, the opinions 
allowed and the direction of criticism. Initially, the topic was addressed more 
generally, focusing on issues such as drugs prevention, the strengthening of 
the police and building more prisons, elements visible in the speeches of the 
Presidents in the 1990s and early 2000s presented in chapter five. However, 
in time, it became more directly and more aggressively referenced. By the 
1999 presidential elections, it was active part of the campaigns of the two 
strongest candidates, who dedicated specific sections of their government 
programmes to the topic. The right-wing candidate Lavín, in particular, made 
a strong emphasis in all the failures of the justice system and all the 
expectations in a reform, his words have been thoroughly presented over this 
work, for example: ‘people lose trust because they know that for every 100 
criminal cases like robbery and rape, only four reach a sentence’ (Lavín, 
1999:30). 
The use of Juvenile justice in open confrontation and hostilities reached its 
peak when the LRPA was in the Senate for discussion (the second legislative 
stage, the first one being the discussion in the Deputies’ Chamber). This 
happened in 2005, a year when the President, 20 out of 38 Senators’ seats 
and the 120 seats of the Deputies’ Chamber had to be elected. Once again, 
the strongest candidates were those representing the Concertación and 
Chile’s Alliance [Alianza por Chile, the right-wing coalition].  
This resulted in the increase of open challenges between opposing political 
parties, highlighting each other’s failures, what represented them and the 
promises that could satisfy voters at all levels. An example of these attacks 
can be seen in the words of Deputy Cardemil regarding President Lagos 
government a few years later when discussing the law 21,191: 
‘The issue is that the Concertación is considering each time more legitimate 
the use and abuse of all the resources of the State, as if they were property 
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of the ruling coalition, with the purpose of perpetuating their power. This 
started taking shape in the government of Ricardo Lagos and involves 
communicational abuse, communicational demagogy. […] Nothing was 
fulfilled. That’s why the government of Mr. Ricardo Lagos has ended being 
similar to a Hollywood’s decoration, where the only real thing is the façade of 
the places, but there’s nothing behind (Deputy Cardemil, 2007:71). 
Accordingly, to demonstrate ruling capacity, the LRPA draft started being 
promoted to the next stage faster, debates were cut and postponed with the 
sole purpose to add speed to the process, as the secretary of the Senate 
summarised:  
‘It is worth mentioning that the Commission emphasizes that, in order to 
make the legislative process of this law faster, they decided to generally 
approve it, and to leave for a later stage the detailed analysis of the norms’ 
(Secretary Hoffmann, 2004:496). 
This sudden speed is in itself quite telling, considering that the juvenile justice 
reform had been delayed since 1995 when the first draft was written, just to 
wait while the Penal Procedure Reform was debated, approved and started 
its implementation, until 2002 when it was finally presented to the Congress. 
In fact, it is possible to see references to the speed of the legislative process 
in the government programme of the main candidates for the 2005 
presidential election: Piñera (RN), Lavín (UDI) and Bachelet (Concertación).  
The need to make things progress faster or to propose populist measures to 
deal with crime increased not only because of the election period itself, but 
also due to internal conflicts within political groups. For example, the RN 
[National Renovation] and the UDI [Independent Democratic Union], the two 
major right-wing political parties, presented separated candidates, and only 
joined in the coalition Chile’s alliance [Alianza por Chile] to support Piñera in 
the second round against Bachelet. The Concertación was facing similar 
struggles, as one interviewee put it:  
210 
 
‘We kept having problems with the Concertación that was falling apart, right? 
With the Radical Party. The Minister Gómez was very upset, of course, 
because he had been kicked out of the Executive. In the Senate’s discussion 
he didn’t give us the votes’ (G., 2017). 
The quote refers to the decision of members of the coalition to not support 
the Executive in the modifications to the law draft being discussed, 
supporting instead the opposition. Therefore, the landscape was of political 
tension at all possible levels, where the power was slipping through their 
fingers due to the spreading mistrust and disappointment in democracy 
described in previous chapters. This led to rapid changes in terms of the 
dynamic between voters and candidates. For example, the small gap 
between the UDI and the Concertación candidates in 1999 has already been 
mentioned. However, in the 2005 presidential elections the candidate to 
continue to second round was Piñera instead of Lavín. The trust over visible 
actors of the past was decreasing. In consequence, the candidates needed 
to change their approach, to offer something new while dealing with their 
promises and debts from the past and the public demands of greater 
security. Lavín had been a presidential candidate for already three periods, 
he was a known traditional figure of the conservative right-wing. Piñera 
instead was a newer figure, a rich businessman that offered important 
connections to improve the economic situation of the country, while also 
controlling crime. Thus, offering security in varied aspects. Regarding 
Bachelet, she focused on increasing public participation (Cleuren, 1997). She 
chose to present herself as closer to people, promising public consultation 
over key topics, while reinforcing security and crime control as a shared need 
(Bachelet, 2005).  
At the same time, President Lagos’ government, made sure that, although a 
series of debates had been postponed and thus there was no full agreement 
regarding the new law, it was not ready to be implemented, and it faced new 
changes before its implementation in 2007, the LRPA was still approved 
during the election period. This was described clearly by an interviewee:  
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‘The law is published the last year of President Lagos government, with a 
series of deficiencies that we could foresee they were complex, let’s say, with 
a country structure that obviously couldn’t comply with the restorative, re-
integrative intentions that the adolescents penal responsibility law had’ (O., 
2017). 
This situation strengthens the notion of the Juvenile justice System reform as 
a political tool introduced in previous chapters. It could be considered that the 
speed of its approval, despite all the work that was still needed, was a 
strategy to satisfy voters concerned about youth offending, validating the 
actions of President Lagos’ government on the matter. This in turn could 
increase the trust in another member of the same coalition. The strategy 
worked as Bachelet won the elections.  
As shown in chapter two, the literature evidences that when there is a crisis 
of legitimacy, it is attractive to be seen as doing something, which usually 
takes the shape of punitive or authoritarian attitudes to battle what the 
majority of voters perceived as the undesirable other (Garland, 1996; Muncie 
and Hughes, 2002). In the context presented in chapter five, where the new 
political elite, political order and the government needed validation, crime 
became a key tool. But as democracy went progressing and the 
differentiation between the government and the opposition based in the 
authoritarian against the democratic project faded, they needed to use the 
tools they had to gain further legitimacy and power over the other political 
group. Hence, they kept relying on youth offending and offering more and 
more punitive measures, as it had proven to work in the past and Chile was 
already considered stable, democratic and a competitive market. For 
example, the candidate of RN, Piñera, explicitly supported the 
implementation of ‘zero tolerance’ and of ‘three strikes’ policies (Piñera, 
2005:54, 59). In the same programme, he also mentioned the need to reduce 
conditional freedom and to strengthen the police, elements also mentioned 
by Bachelet in her own government programme, which had a meaningful 




The punitive direction debates went increasingly following was associated by 
experts and actors of the justice system to the predomination of right-wing 
ideas. Although they do recognise right-wing politicians were not the only 
ones promoting a tougher approach. For example: ‘What predominates is the 
highly repressive view of a political sector in particular, a lot more identified 
with the right-wing, obviously, but not fully external to other Parliamentarians 
from other political currents’ (R., 2017).  
As expected, the Congress was not free from these battles for representation 
either. They also faced elections and looked for the reaffirmation of their 
previous work and the suitability to remain in their positions or to promote 
them towards other members of their political parties and coalitions. 
Unsurprisingly, the result was an escalating contest of populist controlling 
and harsher approaches. At the same time, the already stated dynamic of the 
Concertación’s willingness to compromise and make agreements, led to the 
sacrifice of aspects of the law project more in line with the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child to privilege discourses about security and punishment 
to continue in the same line of the political debates, instead of challenging 
them. This situation was mentioned by most interviewees, and can be 
summarised in the words of J.: 
‘In the Senate, pro-security is clearly the criteria with more weight, and 
there’s a prioritization. I think we have to be clear about it, we were closing a 
government and ready to start another. So the political pressure of both 
sides, the pressure to whatever publish it [the new law], or to detain it, and 
thus hurt this government with this idea they couldn’t fight youth crime. All of 
that impacted in that the law progressed, I don’t know if quickly, but willing to 
generate agreements that sacrificed a lot of the law project’ (2017). 
This can be explained in different ways. It can be understood as the result of 
an escalating struggle following what resulted more successful at election 
times. It can also be seen as the consequence of having still a great number 
of authoritarian right-wing adepts in the Congress. For example, one of the 
Senators of the five members in the legislative commission in charge of the 
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LRPA in that Chamber had been appointed under the authoritarian enclaves. 
Hence, supporting right-wing ideas as well. This idea takes force when we 
consider the Senate was stated as the main responsible by all interviewees 
in this research of having turned the LRPA project into ‘harsher’ (E., 2017), 
‘chaotic and dependant on the adult process’ (L., 2017) and ‘perverted on its 
main aspects’ (J., 2017).  
 
Thus, juvenile justice became an increasingly politicized topic, ever-present 
now in political discourses. In this process political attitudes and struggles led 
the reform in a more punitive direction with a growing sense of urgency. This 
resulted in the sudden speeding of a process that had been treated slowly 
and the privilege of a focus on security and control over the suggestions of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child [UNCRC]. Moreover, in a 
context where the political elite was fragmenting, and a Concertación 
government was coming to its end, wishing to increase their political 
presence in the future, the opposition had the upper hand. If the 
Concertación did not reach an agreement with the right-wing and they 
blocked the legislation, Lagos’ government would not have the honour of 
being the responsible of reforming the juvenile justice system, but whoever 
won the elections at the end of the year.  
 
2. The Media 
 
The role of the media was also recurrently highlighted by the participants in 
this research and strongly visible in the parliamentarian discussion. For 
example, in the words of Deputy Uriarte: ‘Yesterday we could see on a TV 
show the case of a minor of under 14 years of age who has been detained 23 
times for different offences, and he is still free’ (2005:1098). The media acted 
as the provider of information about youth offending in the country and 
abroad. It nurtured politicians’ views and opinions on the matter, fuelled 
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emotions such as fear, insecurity and anger towards juveniles, and 
exacerbated demands to do something about it. That something being to 
increase control and reduce liberties. As one of the interviewees exemplified:  
‘We had some articles, in fact we had to hurry the process, we had the 
pressure an Informe Especial [TV show] was coming the next day of the 
investigative commission, and the Contacto [TV Show] was very negative, 
with a strong emphasis on the critics to the system, so we said: after this 
Contacto we are going to have serious problems to make agreements with 
the Mixed Commission, they are going to destroy us, our parliamentarians 
are going to tell us to fuck off’ (G., 2017). 
Young people had been transformed in the new ‘internal enemy’ (R., 2017), 
and were being portrayed as the ‘greatest danger against people’s security’ 
(Deputy Saa, 2004:253). 
Here, it is worth to remember the role of the media all over the authoritarian 
regime, where only those who actively supported the government of General 
Pinochet or those who at least respected the censorship laws survived. 
Moreover, as mentioned in chapters four and five, members of the political 
elite were still media owners in democratic times. Showing one of the many 
ways in which the authoritarian right-wing still directed the discussion about 
youth offending and the need of a reform. For example, as it happened with 
Agustín Edwards, ‘El Mercurio’ and Paz Ciudadana.  Therefore, they could 
promote their message though seemingly from a different source. This 
strategy allowed the further expansion of their interests. The result was the 
spread of punitive attitudes and populist decisions, regardless of the national 
reality and the words of experts and actors of the system to be addressed in 






4. Public opinion 
 
In all this process public opinion was heavily mentioned, or at least what 
surveys and the media showed as public opinions and what politicians 
understood it to be so. Politicians claimed they were paying attention to the 
demands of the population. While according to the interviewees it was the 
voice of the public together with politicians was led the reform process: 
‘There was a pressure from citizens, because they want systems of penal 
prosecution that are efficient and effective, where youth crime is of course 
another element of worry to the community. So sure, the state had an internal 
concern around giving the message to the community about effectively doing 
something about youth crime’ (H., 2017). 
Nevertheless, it is worth to keep in mind public demands had been started 
and fuelled by the right-wing through their speeches and mediatic 
information. Therefore, as stated in the previous chapter, it was the political 
elite that imposed concerns over youth offending, which in turn led to 
increasing requests for a juvenile justice reform. This is visible in the 
continuous reference to public opinion made by Deputies and Senators in the 
legislative debate, as Deputy Soto claimed: ‘Society pressures us to publish 
this law as soon as possible’ (2004:363).  
These public pressures and demands were identified as requesting harsher 
measures: ‘The phenomenon of youth offending was highly influenced by the 
general perception of citizens regarding general crime. There was pressure 
for a harsher system’ (R., 2017). Point also mentioned by Deputy Hales in 
the legislative debate: ‘The people ask for punishment for offenders; this 
project propose penalties for adolescents who commit offences’ (2005:1038). 
However, at the same time, the general population is described as 
‘ambivalent’ by various interviewees (P., 2017; N., 2017; C., 2017), 
emphasizing how the focus on juveniles was strictly limited to request more 
active measures to control their misbehaviours. But there was little 
involvement or plain rejection to have youth centres close to their localities, 
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or regarding juveniles needs and the guarantee of their rights on a daily 
basis.  
Therefore, public opinion seemed to have followed the pattern evidenced in 
international research (Indermauer and Hough, 2002). This means they are 
not such a strong actor, but mostly the representations or the widespread 
belief of what the ‘general population’ demands, regardless of what they 
actually know and think about the topic at discussion (Green, 2009). In 
consequence, they become another resource to grant the lead in a series of 
social issues by a determined group -the already existent political elite-. In 
consequence, politicians used the penal realm to be seen as doing 
something in a series of social issues, diverting attention from what was left 
unattended or the inappropriateness of the solution. This allowed the elite to 
obtain a political support that came, mostly, from intense passing emotions of 
fear and rage, instead of actual knowledge, debate or prolonged well-thought 
concern on the matter.  
The result was a populist approach in juvenile justice, which in turn promoted 
fast and strong measures that seemed like ‘doing something’ instead of 
effective policies. As Goldson (2002) emphasised, political priorities have 
more impact over policy formation than expertise does. This led to a radical 
reform from the tutelary institutions dedicated to ‘protection’ towards 
institutions that allowed the new focus on strengthening punishment, 
surveillance, reduced diversion and reinforced imprisonment. That is, despite 
having new rules that respected the rule of law and a new procedure that 
allowed them a defence and a trial, the situation for young people in trouble 
did not change much. Juveniles were still subject to a meaningful emphasis 
on their removal from the community to be locked in centres under the 
custody of the State, they were still subject to wide State control, and there 
were not many other sentencing options available.  
Of course, that is not to say everyone supported these harsher measures, as 
voices rose against them (such as Senator Ruiz-Esquide for example). 
However, they were dismissed while public demands and politicians support 
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for more punitive approaches predominated. To those demands it is 
attributed the reform that took place, the characteristics of said reform, and 
the moment in time when it happened. 
 
5. Populism and Juvenile justice as a scapegoat 
 
Given the previous analysis, it seems then that the juvenile justice reform 
was born from elite driven pressures and interests to find a scapegoat to all 
the new anxieties and feelings of insecurities, it could also act as a diversion 
(just as the Penal Procedure reform had) over all the issues still hanging from 
the transition from dictatorship to democracy, and in doing so provided a tool 
for the political conflict between two forces that seemed unable to fully gain 
support from citizenship. In time, the demands of a reform were also 
reinforced by experts who did not agree with the tutelary approach and the 
pressure of the UN Committee and UNICEF regarding the clash between 
their suggestions and the tutelary institutions, but also, by public pressure 
and the media (also driven by political interests). The result was the 
prioritisation of political and populist decisions, which led to the reduction of a 
childhood policy towards a juvenile justice system, as evidenced in chapter 
five, and a new system that relied over ‘adult justice’ principles, actors and 
institutions, as shown in chapter one.  
In this process it is worth wondering why certain voices were more listened 
than other, why the demands of the authoritarian right-wing predominated? 
Why populism and more punitive perspectives triumphed? According to 
Garland (1996) punitive responses are a symbol of weak State authority. This 
makes sense in the Chilean case as the country was still struggling in the 
legitimation of its democracy. Moreover, according to the interviewees, and 
as evidenced in Piñera’s government plan, there was some influence of 
some specific models, for example regarding ‘three strikes’ and ‘zero 
tolerance’. The following section then will dedicate to analyse the polity 
building process of the reform and the main drivers within it that shaped the 
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‘final’ product in 2007 when it was implemented. In doing so, it will address 
what determined some voices, actors and models had more impact than 
other in the reform process.  
 
II- Juvenile justice Polity building 
 
All through the development of the perceived growing need to reform the 
Juvenile Justice System, the design of the project, its legislation and final 
approval there were a series of actors and institutions battling for the 
recognition of their own ideas. Initially, those who supported the Tutelary 
System opposed a reform, claiming the main problems could be solved by 
‘strengthening what we have’ (M., 2017), as one interviewee put it. 
Eventually, due to the need to legitimise the new democratic regime and the 
pressure of UNICEF, and the UN Committee, voices in favour of reforming 
the Tutelary System prevailed. By 1995 drafts were being written. However, it 
still took until 2002 for the law project to be sent to the Congress for 
legislative discussion.  
The participants in this research claim the discussion of the project was 
deferred from 19989 until 2002 because the Penal Procedure Reform was 
‘priority’ (H., 2017; J., 2017), and all other issues were ‘delayed’ (M., 2017; 
C., 2017). For example: ‘The Penal Procedure reform goes first hierarchically 
and then it comes this’ (M., 2017). This talks about some actions and ideas 
being left behind while some others take predominance. For example, to 
address crime control and adult offending in a first step and the radical 
transformation of juvenile justice later on, building over the same institutions 
instead of, as some participants in the process suggested, having ‘a panel 
formed by a penal judge, a family judge and a non-lawyer judge even’ (G., 
2017). 
 
9 Year when the last draft was sent, which was then published in the book ‘Infancia, ley y 
democracia en América Latina’ edited by García Méndez and Beloff 
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Therefore, the reform of the Chilean juvenile justice system evidences a 
constant struggle between different institutions, actors and interests. All in a 
context where the lack of consideration for professional, research of 
academic knowledge predominated, to be shown along the chapter. It also 
highlighted the prioritization of the beliefs and ideas of a certain political 
group and what was understood as public opinion (which had been promoted 
under populist strategies) over the rest. This section will intend to evidence 
the interests that predominated in the making of the new law itself. Doing this 
involves analysing power distribution in policy making in Chile, and the key 
elements that gave more strength to certain fractions of power over others.  
It is worth analysing then, why certain notions were able to displace others to 
the point the final result was considered as radically different from the law 
draft sent to discussion by all interviewees? The law project went from three 
years of maximum imprisonment penalty to 14 and 15 year-olds and five 
years maximum imprisonment penalty for 16 and 17 year-olds to a new 
maximum of five and 10 years respectively. It also went from no minimum 
imprisonment term to one year minimum. And the specialization criteria was 
never put into practice, because prosecutors are not officially trained to treat 
young people differently from adults in court, and the same people see adults 
under the penal system and young people under the LRPA with no 
differentiation.  
Therefore, the perception of most interviewees, as the words of H. already 
evidenced in the previous chapter, was that:  
‘The project goes deforming and it distanced more and more from the 
standards of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and it got closer and 
closer to, let’s say, an adult penal law, harsh, where specialization lost its 
place and logics of an adult penal law start to directly rule’ (H., 2017). 
The answer to why some ideas prevailed over others lies in the distribution of 
power to make decisions and redirect the law debates, together with what 
influenced those with the power to decide, in terms of how they understood 
youth offending and what juvenile justice institutions should do or represent. 
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It also had a lot to do with the authorities being seen as doing something, 
more than the quality of what they were doing. The present section intends to 
evidence how these sources of influence worked and how the interaction 
they had with people with different levels of power impacted on the Juvenile 
justice System that replaced the Law of Minors.  
Hence, the present section will be dedicated mostly to the legislative debate 
where the shape of the law, its regulations and procedure were defined. 
However, it will not necessarily follow a chronological order, because the 
main element is to clarify the influences and power conflicts directing the 
process. In consequence, I will start by analysing the power distribution in the 
legislative discussion among the different actors and institutions. It will be 
followed by the connections between them and how that nurtured their 
decisions. The final subsection will dedicate to analyse what voices were 
heard and why.  
 
1. Power distribution in the legislative stage  
 
The law project changed considerably in each stage of the legislative 
process, evidencing differences between the two Congress Chambers over 
the final law10, being the Senators those with more leverage in the final 
LRPA. This situation can be summarised in the description provided by one 
of the participants in this research, which also represents the opinion stated 
by all other interviewees:  
‘There is a key moment in the discussion, which is when the law project 
finishes the first procedure, in the Deputies’ Chamber, where even when it 
had some changes and the reduction of some of the positive spaces I 
 
10 In Chile the laws need to be approved by the two Chambers of the Congress, Deputies 
and Senators. This means the project needs to be approved by the Chamber that initiated 
the legislative process. In the case of the LRPA it was in the Deputies’ Chamber. Then, it 
goes to the other Chamber, in this case the Senate. If modified and approved, the project 
goes back to the original Chamber. If the modifications are accepted the Law is published. If 
not, a Mixed Commission with Deputies and Senators is formed to make a decision.  
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mentioned, it kept being a project on those lines: strong diversion measures, 
moderate punitive responses. But when it goes to the Senate, given the 
political-institutional constitution of our Congress, it is in the Senate where, I’d 
say, the law project is perverted in its main aspects’ (J., 2017) 
The legislative process still involved the creation of a Mixed Commission with 
both Senators and Deputies trying to find an agreement, but as one 
interviewee stated, it did not really altered the changes imposed by the 
Senate, in his own words: ‘The main responsibility was in the Senate. Then 
the Mixed Commission approves the project in general, a few discussions, 
but the final project is quite similar’ (R., 2017). 
This demonstrates a difference in the work of the two Chambers. It was in the 
Senate where the project turned more punitive, distancing from what experts 
wanted for the new juvenile justice system or what the UNCRC 
recommended. These were elements interviewees considered were well 
represented in the initial draft: ‘I think the Executive did a great starting job by 
submitting a project in line to the mandatory prescriptions of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child’ (R., 2017). 
Likewise, the work of the Deputies’ Chamber was praised by the interviewees 
as something still in line with what they expected from the new Juvenile Justice 
System, as the words of L. (2017) evidence: ‘It was a good project and a good 
project comes out from the chamber [Deputies]. In terms of the principles that 
inspired this group of people, which had a strong base in the formation of 
Human Rights and a strong base in the formation of childhood rights, youth 
rights, and they knew a lot on the topic’.  
The result evidences the power distribution of the legislative Chambers: The 
opinion of the Senate predominated. This is particularly interesting when 
keeping in mind that, as explained in chapter four, one of the authoritarian 
enclaves left by the dictatorship were the appointed Senators, who remained 
in place at the time of the legislative discussion of the Adolescents’ Penal 
Responsibility Act. This granted the authoritarian right-wing with the majority 
in the Commission in charge of the LRPA, as there were two Concertación 
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Senators, two right-wing Senators and one appointed. As already stated in 
previous chapters, this position was eliminated in 2005, the same year the 
law was approved, but all the discussion had been with them still in place. 
This continuation of the actors of the authoritarian regime over 15 years after 
the dictatorship ended talks about this struggle to legitimise democracy under 
the rules set by the dictatorship, but also about the continuation of 
authoritarianism into democracy. The Senate can thus be considered a key 
political institution filled with powerful political actors.  
The interviewees also mentioned conflicts between the Executive and 
Legislative powers, which can be summarised in the following words: ‘The 
[Deputies’] Chamber was strongly influenced by the Executive’ (I, 2017). 
Most interviewees claim, and it is visible in the law drafts in the ‘Historia de la 
ley’, that there were more similarities between the initial efforts of the 
Executive and the project approved in the Deputies’ Chamber before going to 
the Senate. However, interviewees also highlight the lack of leadership of the 
Executive over the legislation in general, as the words of L. (2017) exemplify: 
‘There was not much leadership from the government, and I would say […] if 
I could identify the big responsible on this, it was kind of the Executive, given 
the role they have as co-legislators’. Here it is worth to remember that the law 
was approved and published in a year of tight presidential elections. 
Therefore, the interest of the Concertación was more on having a product 
than on the characteristics of said product.  
These mixed feelings towards the role of the Executive could relate to the 
fact that, even though the Executive can send law projects and 
representatives to participate in the discussions, the laws are voted and 
decided, at the end of the day, by the parliamentarians in the Commissions 
they form and by the Chambers. Therefore, the influence of the Executive 
can be understood mostly in terms of drafting and political agreements, a 
strategy already described in chapters four and five as popular amongst the 
members of the Concertación.  
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Under any circumstance, it is key to keep in mind that the Executive was 
criticized for a ‘deficient performance’ (C., 2017). But the final result is 
attributed, by all participants in this research, to the Senate and the decisions 
made in that legislative stage, which ‘dismantled’ (L., 2017), ‘perverted’ (J., 
2017) and ‘erased’ (R., 2017) many of what Deputies had done and that had 
the experts’ approval (which will be described in greater detail in a later 
section). It was their opinion that predominated. 
In fact, the main responsibility that can be attributed to the Executive in the 
law that was approved was the willingness to sacrifice aspects of the project 
to gain speed, as shown in chapter five, which created the circumstances for 
more punitive approaches to predominate in the debates despite they did not 
have the support of the whole Chamber (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2005). 
There was no time to fight them and propose something else. As one 
interviewee explained:  
‘When the law is approved against our suggestions as a commission, it’s 
finally approved in the Parliament, I had a meeting with the Minister in his 
office a few days later and the Minister said to me: I received the order from 
the President at it was: ‘Minister, the Adolescents’ Responsibility Law won’t 
be postponed a day’. There was a very tense political and media climate in 
terms of youth violence, youth offending and the impunity of the youngsters’ 
(O., 2017).  
Although some parliamentarians kept the hope the law would have to go 
back to the Congress for some modifications and planned to use that chance 
instead, as Deputy Guzmán explained it: 
‘We are clear [we know] that at the moment of applying the law there is going 
to be a detection of many mistakes and gaps that will require some fixing. A 
law of this nature requires adaptation, so it will have to come back to the 
National Congress. That’s why I remain calm’ (2005:1101). 
Of course, the legislative process determined by the Constitution also plays a 
part here, as it is a convoluted process with rules such as that if the project 
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does not obtain the majority of votes in certain circumstances, instead of 
continuing in debate, it is rejected. For example, if the project after 
modifications is rejected by the Chamber in which it was presented for 
discussion for the first time, it has to start from scratch again and cannot be 
presented for a full year. Only if the project was started by the President, they 
can ask the project to go to the other Chamber. Likewise, if there is no 
agreement between the two Chambers a Mixed Commission with both 
Deputies and Senators is formed. If after modifications the project is rejected 
it meant there will not be law in all aspects rejected. The process can be 
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In this way, if the juvenile justice reforms did not receive a majority of votes, it 
would be rejected and would have to be entirely redrafted, delaying its 
presentation for at least one more year. This forced the Chambers to approve 
elements many, albeit not the majority, disapproved, just to avoid the risk of 
the whole law being rejected or having a juvenile justice system where many 
of its dispositions were not regulated or clearly defined. This situation is 
evidenced by Senator Viera-Gallo at the end of the discussion of the LRPA:  
‘After a long debate the Commission, with four votes against zero –because 
there was no other solution –agreed the maximum penalty for an adolescent 
older than 16 years of age and younger than 18 years of age is of 10 years of 
imprisonment’ (2005:963-964). 
The Senator expressed his dislike for the measure, but it was accepted 
anyway by the majority of the Commission where he participated. This 
system gave more leverage to those who had less to lose by letting the law 
stay back, be rejected or continue in debate, in this case, as it has been 
previously stated, the authoritarian right-wing. They could take a rigid attitude 
because they had enough presence on the Chamber to do so and stop the 
laws promoted by the government if the proposed agreements did not 
convince them.  
Interestingly, the law did go back to the Congress for modifications, under the 
law 20,191 in 2007. However, four of the five Senators identified as key 
responsible of shifting the LRPA towards a more punitive approach were in 
the new Commission again. To them we need to add the presence of 
Senator Larraín [UDI], who started the Indicación, that is the request to 
amend the law in certain aspects, and who was strongly active in the debate. 
The discussion included extensive criticism of the Concertación governments 
of Presidents Lagos and Bachelet, as we can see for example, regarding the 
unfulfillment of Bachelet’s campaign promises regarding some aspects of 
juvenile justice:  
‘I want to remind you all that the implementation of this law, the law 20,084 
was one of the elements of the Presidential campaign of President Bachelet. 
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In 2005 citizens were promised that, given the sad start of many youths in the 
crime world, measures were going to be taken, they were going to be 
punished, but they were also going to receive the possibility to rehabilitate 
[…] No one could deny the good of the law. It was approved, the presidential 
election won by the candidate that promoted the implementation. So, it was 
the government’s turn to do their job’ (Deputy Turres, 2007:68) 
The criticism referred to the law not being ready for implementation, 
disregarding the role of the Legislative on that situation claiming they would 
not assume the political consequences for the delay, as Senator Espina 
exclaimed: ‘I will not become an accomplice of this!’. 
Moreover, in 2006 there were massive students’ demonstrations all over the 
country to protest against the education system left by the authoritarian 
regime. The media was filled with images of young students against the 
police or being detained, bringing the issue of security and a juvenile justice 
system forefront again. At that point, again, the Executive played a central 
role. Due to political pressure, the decision was hurried once more, and 
implementation, despite the conditions were not ready, could not be delayed, 
as an interviewee recalled: ‘Back then we knew the law had many problems 
[…] But Solís11 told us: ‘look, you can do whatever but the law is not going to 
change, we are with the implementation now, so we cannot mess with the text’ 
(M., 2017). Therefore, political pressure of being seen as doing something 
was bigger than doing it correctly, as the words of D., evidence: ‘There was a 
pressing need to approve the law to give a sign to the public opinion that we 
were doing something in terms of youth crime’ (2017). 
Therefore, in the reform process of the LRPA the document was presented 
by the Executive and written by the experts. It had some minor alterations in 
the Deputies’ Chamber to be dramatically modified in the Senate who gave to 
it its final shape despite the opposition of Concertación and leftist members 
of both Chambers. Nevertheless, the situation could have had a different 
result if the Executive had not been so willing to hurry the process to the 
 
11 Minister of justice at the time 
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point of sacrificing key aspects of the law, to be addressed in a later section. 
Then, when a second chance rose through the Indicación Larraín, it was 
started by members of the authoritarian right-wing to make the LRPA 
harsher. In this process there was a strong presence of legislators from the 
right-wing. There was also political pressure coming from their criticism to the 
capacity of the Concertación to fulfil their promises regarding the 
implementation of the juvenile justice system. The result was a fast process 
which focused more on the populist result of having a new punitive law than 
in the feasibility of its implementation, the success of its application or the 
quality of the project. 
 
2. An unknown landscape and the predomination of political views 
 
Besides political interests, the lack of knowledge over the topic at discussion 
played a key role. This lack of expertise in Latin America was also 
commented by Beloff and Langer (2015) when talking about juvenile justice 
in the region, while interviewees directly highlighted the lack of research 
regarding youth offending in Chile: 
‘Where are the studies about crime? Where? In the 1970s, 1960s, of the 
time, nothing. There was the system here and there, and poor people, and a 
thousand ideological stuff, or on the other side Chileans as the thief race 
[laughter], but of everything there was very little’ (M., 2017). 
As a result, there was plenty of space for politicians and the general 
population to legitimise their own personal views and opinions on the matter, 
regardless of the accuracy of such claims. In the words of one interviewee: 
‘Today a guy who is a cabinetmaker can talk about criminology. The time 
when we were the ones talking about this is over. Everyone has an opinion 
now, knowing or not knowing, there is nothing concrete’ (M., 2017). 
Moreover, the role of personal experience or beliefs was increased by the 
way the Chilean Congress works. Deputies and Senators do not need to be 
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experts on the matters at legislation. They are politically elected actors, 
except in the case of appointed Senators. Thus, they represent political 
parties, the geographical location that elected them, or their own interests. 
What is expected is that they have advisors that can provide them with the 
knowledge needed to make the legislative decisions, which in the case of the 
juvenile justice discussion was not of much help, as one interviewee pointed 
out:  
‘The majority had little knowledge. I’m not one of those who expect politicians 
or Parliamentarians to have plenty of knowledge. I kind of hope they have good 
eye to pick advisors. But there was a lack of knowledge in general’ (J., 2017). 
Following from that, it was repeatedly emphasised by the participants in this 
research that most Deputies and Senators were simply ‘ignorant’ on the 
matter (P., 2017; A., 2017; F., 2017).  
Perhaps the lack of evidence and solid knowledge on national context right at 
the period of discussion of a new law may be surprising for some. However, 
in Chile it can be understood from history. As chapter four stated, in the 
authoritarian regime a series of areas of knowledge had been banned, 
including sociology and criminology. Thus, leaving little space for research. 
Moreover, trying to access government information could end in death, a lot 
of data was erased and what was left was not really trustable after being 
handled by General Pinochet’s team.  
Moreover, as we saw in chapter four, government positions were reserved to 
those supporting the authoritarian regime, despite their individual area of 
expertise. This is visible in the division of the National Ministries between the 
Armed Forced in the military government Junta, but Constable and 
Valenzuela (1993) also evidence how many actors got or lost their positions 
in the government just because of this. An extreme example of this is 
General Leigh, who after having conflicts with General Pinochet was kicked 
out of the Junta, despite the Decree Laws that made it almost impossible to 
happen. Therefore, knowledge or expertise were clearly not needed. The 
only field with an exception was economy, led by the technocrats, who also 
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supported the authoritarian regime. Once democracy returned and political 
parties re-organized. The old actors remained. Again, under the principle of 
commitment and faith, whatever to the dictatorship through the authoritarian 
right-wing, to the economic model, or to the Concertación, as the major force 
against the past. Once again, ruling was about supporting groups.  
At the same time, there was a lot of pressure for a reform, little time to make 
changes, citizens who felt disappointed by democracy, cases of corruption, a 
tight control on national economy, and a weakened State. Thus, leaving 
research for the future or for the private actors who could and were interested 
in affording it, instead of as a key responsibility of public institutions. The 
effect of all this probably increased by factors such as the exile, death or 
disappearance of many leftist-thinkers, academics and experts; while those 
who had survived had been stripped of all power and position for years. 
There was fear in the population, there were other priorities, and there was a 
lack of access to government data which was also low quality.  
In consequence, the generalised perception of increased youth offending 
was permanently reminded with mention to dramatic statistics referenced in 
the legislative debate, for example by Deputy Monckeberg: ‘From 1995 to 
2002 offences perpetrated by minors have increased dramatically: 700% in 
robbery with violence and 400% in theft. It has also increased the rate of 
crimes perpetrated by females, and let’s not even begin to talk about high 
school juveniles’ (2004:268). Although there is no evidence to validate such 
claim, and the Deputy in question provides no source for his information, 
which is also not shared by anybody else.  
Overall, experts opposed to most of the notions, understandings and 
measures proposed by members of the parliament. For example, the focus 
on individual responsibility was highly criticised: ‘There was a critical view of 
the guilt of other people without a minimum capacity to understand that some 
actions, symptoms, signs are expressions of the adaptation of these people 
to contexts of harm, exclusion, problems, scarcity, and trauma. Here if you 
behave wrongly is because you took the decision of doing so’ (O., 2017). 
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However, experts’ voices were not really heard, and the political priorities 
continued their way, even replacing and erasing many of the elements of the 
LRPA draft that were in line with the UNCRC guidelines. For example, 
through adding a minimum length to imprisonment sentences, reducing 
diversion measures and doubling the maximum penalty from five to 10 years 
of incarceration (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2007).  
Therefore, even though experts did have an active participation as the people 
who wrote the law draft, and they had the opportunities to go and present 
evidence or rise some issues in the Congress, they repeatedly expressed 
difficulties to influence those making the decisions: Parliamentarians. Who 
are described as prioritizing institutions that were more in line with their 
previous mindsets than reliable information contradicting such perspectives, 
situation evidenced by a few interviewees: ‘They even operate from distrust: 
if the person from the Defendant or from UNICEF or ‘that’ academic, then it 
must be the opposite. And believe me, I saw that happen’ (J., 2017). 
This goes in line with the continuation of authoritarian practices of the past as 
well. As Cleuren (2007) highlights in his analysis of ‘local democracy and 
participation in post-authoritarian Chile’, most policy-makers in Chile consider 
people ignorant, NGOs not representative of their voices, and citizens’ 
participation inefficient. 
Moreover, due to cultural influences from the past, there were some 
remnants of the tutelary way of understanding young people as well. For 
example, the State was still seen as in charge of ‘rescuing’ them (Deputy 
Saa, 2004:358) from the life they had before or understanding punishment as 
a way of protecting them, as Senator Espina claimed:  
‘It has been said the project raise the sentences defined by the Deputies’ 
Chamber and that it has a repressive character […] I ask your attention to 
demonstrate that  the project is absolutely protector of minors […] The minor 
is absolutely subjected to the whole network of State protection in terms of 
education, social integration and prevention of drugs and alcohol abuse. 
231 
 
There has never existed in Chile such a high level of protection for minors as 
the one proposed in this project’ (2005:964-965). 
Therefore, a paternalistic understanding to re-educate them remained, as it 
was hinted in the first chapter. For some interviewees, this meant a lack of 
interest for the reality of young offenders, reinforcing the notion the focus on 
young offenders was a political tool instead of a serious concern about the 
needs of this population. For those interviewees the debate was mostly a 
show:  
‘The great majority [of parliamentarians], I’d say they had a pretty 
irresponsible attitude, and quite neglectful, I almost dare to say that many of 
them voted without having ever read [the law project], because they had a 
previous idea, because they had a political-values conviction’ (O., 2017).  
This evidence the prioritization of certain voices over other, in what was 
reduced to a conflict between rights and security, as one interviewee 
explained: ‘We had the huge wave towards security, especially this idea of 
young offenders, we have to do something with them. So, we had those two 
positions, the populist politics and the one on the side of international human 
rights’ (A., 2017). Experts identified themselves in line with the rights’ 
approach, mostly represented by the UNCRC. While politicians, who kept 
their populist focus on security continued in the same line. The perception of 
the participants in this research is that politicians’ rhetoric won the battle and 
continued over children’s rights recommendations: ‘What you could see was 
a very favourable landscape for repressive measures. Parliamentarians 
wanted to gain points by presenting the harsher projects, more punitive, more 
penalizing. All without looking at the overall system, and without considering 
resocialization’ (D., 2017). 
This, of course, rises questions of what lied behind the focus on juvenile 
justice. If it was not going to be nurtured by evidence, the Chilean reality, the 
wellbeing of juveniles in trouble, to respect their rights according to the 
UNCRC, what was the purpose of all this debate? It seems to be, once more, 
that what was driving this sudden interest on the issue, and the 
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overwhelming need to do something about it was more based on political 
intentions than in the real national situation. Perception that increases when 
considered that between 1995 when the need to fully reform the juvenile 
justice system is widely recognised, to the moment when the drafts written 
since then are finally presented to the Parliament, in 2002, there are seven 
years. And from there to the actual implementation of the law there were five 
more years of spread sessions and debates. Hence, it seems the urgency 
was mostly rhetoric, as the process only gathered speed at the end, with 




The previous subsection described the reliance on anecdotal information and 
the lack of research about youth offending and juvenile justice. Nevertheless, 
it is important to dedicate some time to analyse the sources of knowledge 
available, what drove their selection and the influence they had in all the 
actors that determined the conditions and characteristics of the new Juvenile 
justice System. The first element to keep in mind is that the information, 
evidence and knowledge that influenced the LRPA can be partially 
understood in terms of access and availability. It was shaped by the 
connections between actors and different institutions, and even different 
international models.  
For example, the suggestions of the UNCRC reached a strong discursive 
presence due to the process of legitimation of democracy already described, 
but also, as shown in chapter one, because of an active presence and 
pressure of UNICEF in the Latin American region. UNICEF did not only 
generated pressure over Chile to reform, but it also united a small and tight 
community, as one interviewee explained: ‘One of the variables developed in 
the Latin American region relates to the creation of a scientific community, 
which influenced most of the Latin American reforms. This scientific 
community was very small but also very close’ (H., 2017). They promoted 
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juvenile justice reforms in Latin-America all over the 1990s, after many 
countries had left behind their authoritarian regimes, ratified the UNCRC, and 
developed guidelines, also contacted one of the key experts who wrote the 
law drafts of the LRPA before the legislation, Miguel Cillero. In that 
community, for example, he met Carlos Tiffer, the person who promoted the 
Juvenile justice reform in Costa Rica, model strongly used by the Chilean 
reform. This talks about a connection between certain actors, approaches 
and international experience to be used as a model. 
At the same time, it raises some questions regarding the factors behind the 
weight different institutions had. The interviewees mentioned a series of 
institutions that played a part; ‘UNICEF was very important, Opción12 was 
very important, Hogar de Cristo13 was very important, Paz Ciudadana had its 
part too, from what I remember, and in fact all of them participated in one or 
another way in the experts’ commission’ (L., 2017). But why those institutions 
over other NGOs that also worked with young people in trouble? The answer 
lies in their connections. 
For example, the expert previously mentioned, Miguel Cillero, who 
participated writing the drafts, worked in the Hogar de Cristo, the place where 
the person in charge of the Minors’ Department of the Ministry of Justice from 
2004 until 2008, Francisco Estrada, had also worked. Moreover, Estrada had 
also previously worked in Opción, another institution widely mentioned as a 
key participant in the reform process.  
Regarding Paz Ciudadana, for example, as previously mentioned the 
institution was connected to politics as it had been created by a supporter of 
the authoritarian regime who also owned the biggest conservative newspaper 
in the country: ‘el Mercurio’, which established a fast and solid connection 
 
12 NGO that works with SENAME providing programmes for intervention with young people 
in need of protection or under rehabilitative measures by the Chilean Juvenile Justice 
System.  
13 Charity that focus on issues of poverty and marginalization. Institution where many of 
those who participated as experts in the LRPA reform process started working in 
programmes that helped young people in trouble.  
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between the Paz Ciudadana and the media. Moreover, one of the Deputies14 
at the time with widespread participation in the legislative debates, had been 
chair of Paz Ciudadana before. The institution had been created with the 
purpose of studying crime from a technical perspective outside from political 
interests (Folch, 2002). However, despite this stated objective, the institution 
worked with politicians and remained close to them, following a similar 
pattern of the ‘apolitical’ attitude presented by other influential institutions 
created by supporters of the authoritarian regime and part of the discourse of 
the authoritarian government.  
The influence of the institution is visible in the words of President Lagos: 
‘Some private institutions, such as Paz Ciudadana Foundation, have made 
great contributions’ (President Lagos, 2000:15). This evidences what 
networks could do to position institutions in the centre of policy making. Paz 
Ciudadana had been created by a supporter of the authoritarian right-wing, 
nevertheless, it was referenced as a key contribution by a Concertación 
President. By being close to the political elite it was possible for them to 
influence decisions and constitute as a respectable source of information, 
while other institutions that lacked such connections were perhaps left 
outside of the discussion, or as it happened with the opinion of the Public 
Defendant, less taken into consideration by legislators. 
From the information generated in the interviews and what key documents as 
the ‘Historia de la ley’ could inform me, I realised there was a complex, dense 
network of relationships and influences underneath the reform. I have 
consolidated this information into networks maps, which I present below. The 
purpose of the maps is not to mention all possible institutions and actors, as 
it would be even more complex to understand, and much more space would 
be needed. The purpose is to summarise the interactions between the key 
institutions and actors that repeat along the process. 
 
14 María Guzmán, member of National Renovation [Renovación Nacional, RN], right-wing 
political party to which Piñera, the candidate for presidency that competed with Bachelet in 
second round in 2005, also belonged. Piñera since then has been elected president twice 
(2010-2014 and 2018-until present). 
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For example, in the Deputies’ Chamber there are 120 Deputies. However, I 
only mention seven. That is because those seven were repeatedly named 
and identified as key actors in the reform process. Something similar 
happened with The National Service of Minors [Servicio Nacional de 
Menores, SENAME], that had much more staff involved in the process. 
Nevertheless, in the legislation process the names that kept appearing and 
were recalled by the participants in this research are the ones in the maps. 
Therefore, in these networks maps it is possible to find the most visible faces 
and representatives of certain institutions at the time. 
I have divided the information in three maps to facilitate the understanding of 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Network Map 1: Institutional network 
Institutions (green) and key people involved in the change process (Blue: politicians; Red: experts; Yellow: employees 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Network Map 2: Professional network 
* Working relationships between actors. Brown: Working relationship; Light brown: Member of the expert committee that 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Network Map 3: Political and influence network 
Interaction between institutions and actors. Lines: Brown: work; Yellow: family; Grey: Dislike/disapproval; Black: ambivalence; Dark 
blue: Admiration/respect; Light blue: Friendship. Dark green: Influence. Purple circle: wrote the project drafts. Red star: influenced 






As the three networks map evidence, the connections between actors and 
institutions are complex and hard to follow. The first network map shows the 
main institutions mentioned so far, plus a few identified as relevant by 
interviewees. It also provides the names of key actors associated with those 
institutions. For example, the Presidents are those associated to the reform 
process. Aylwin is not included because even when there were legal reforms 
in his term, they had little to do with juvenile justice directly and interviewees 
did not associate his term to juvenile justice changes. Despite it was under 
his government that the UNCRC was ratified by the country. At the same 
time, the Judge of Minors A. L. Prieto appears associated to the Legal 
Power. Of course, the Legal Power involves a series of institutions and staff. 
Nevertheless, she was the only Judge of Minors actively mentioned as 
participating in the reform discussions, representing the old system. She 
even appears mentioned in the ‘Historia de la Ley’. Although after the first 
stage her role seems to fade.  
The first map refers to the working relationships between actors and 
institutions. In it, it is possible to see that many actors worked in the same 
institutions and how many of them also changed workplace along the 
process. However, they kept being closely linked to the reform process. 
Hence, the small group of actors moved around the same reduced number of 
institutions, evidencing how tight the key network of actors and institutions 
was.  
The second map shows the working relationships between actors of the 
reform. This was considered helpful as the network map summarises a 17 
years process. Hence, not all were involved at the same time, or interacted 
directly to each other in relation to the Juvenile Justice System. Therefore, it 
helps to clarify if they worked together at some stage. The only elements 
purposefully not added from the information gathered is that the Deputies 
and Senators worked together and that they were also participating in the 
legislative debate, as it has been constantly mentioned along the chapters 
and it avoids the confusion of even more elements in one image. The map 
also shows the key actors that participated in the Committee to assess the 
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implementation of the law in 2006 and 2007, and those who participated in 
the legislative discussion directly.  
The third map addresses the type of relationship between actors to each 
other and towards certain institutions. It evidences from family relationships 
to those of respect, ambivalence and disapproval. These were determined 
based on the opinions of the interviewees and what the interaction between 
parliamentarians in the transcriptions of the debates of the LRPA could 
inform. It also shows the influence of certain people, organizations and even 
countries over the process. In fact, a wide amount of the information 
researched and used to design and discuss the new juvenile justice was 
based on other international experiences. Though this was through a 
selective process, as not all countries were considered. Here, it is relevant to 
point out that the countries referenced vary between interviewees and those 
more widely mentioned in the legislative debate. So, for example, most 
experts identify mainly other Latin American countries (Costa Rica and Brazil 
in particular) and Spain, a point illustrated directly by one interviewee: ‘It was 
understood they took into account the law 5/2000 from Spain, the Brazilian 
statute, which is older because it is from 1991, and the youth penal law from 
Costa Rica’ (E., 2017). Germany was also mentioned in more than one 
occasion. Some others added some general reference to France and 
Belgium, though their influence did not reach far within the project.  
Regarding the influencing models in the Parliament, however, the countries 
more referenced were Canada, the United States and England. An example 
of how international experiences were references and used as arguments is 
provided by Deputy Leal:  
‘The international experience is so dramatic that the English Parliament 
discussed the possibility of lowering the age of penal liability from 12 to 10 
years of age. In fact, some members suggested to leave it at eight years of 
age. That means that the youth criminal phenomenon in England is so big 
that it has not given any results to set the age of penal responsibility at 12 
years of age’ (2004:283).  
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As the quote evidences, and as stated in the previous subsection, the 
knowledge of parliamentarians was mostly anecdotal. Deputies and Senators 
did not mention any source for their information, nor a deep analysis of 
specific understanding of the underlying conditions of youth offending and 
juvenile justice in the referenced countries. Therefore, it seems they acted as 
support for their personal interests and beliefs instead of the other way 
around. Just as it had happened with the institutions most referenced, invited 
and more heard in the debates all during the reform process and its 
legislative stage.  
This, of course, raises questions about the countries’ selection. Why Costa 
Rica and Brazil instead of Peru and Argentina? Why Germany while France 
and Belgium were dismissed? The answer, just as with local actors and 
institutions, is access and networks. The experts drafting the project had 
closer connections with those countries. For example, one of the key experts 
had studied in Spain, while the expert who led the juvenile justice reform in 
Costa Rica had studied in Germany, and as mentioned at the beginning of 
this subsection, he was in direct contact with the Chilean experts through 
UNICEF, and the reform in his country was used as a reference when writing 
the Chilean project.  
On the contrary, the presence of the western English-speaking world is 
mostly due to Paz Ciudadana that had an approach in that line. Just as 
previous supporters of the authoritarian regime had followed the United 
States in relevant political matters before, as the Chicago Boys. For example, 
according to one interviewee (E., 2017) and as visible in the book of the ten 
years of the institution (Folch, 2002), Paz Ciudadana had direct connections 
with some actors of the United States’ crime control policies, such as New 
York’s Major, Giuliani. Therefore, the selection of certain countries as models 
to follow in the reform was not hazardous, but a product of what people in 




The key element to notice is that most people, institutions and ideas in the 
reform process were connected in one way or another. The experts knew 
each other from before the reform started, those who wrote the draft had 
worked together before or belonged to the same institution. The actors 
selected to draft the law or participate in the debates formed part of the 
process because of the connections they had, because they knew someone 
else who was part of the process. Thus, it is not surprising that all experts 
interviewed in this research had similar views on the reform, as mentioned in 
chapter three, as they had worked together in the past, developed their 
careers in similar times, conditions and institutions, and joined the reform 
process by this affinity between them. This evidence another aspect of the 
Chilean culture, also visible since at least the authoritarian regime: the 
relevance of who you are and who you know to come to take part in powerful 
decision-making processes, as my own experience as a researcher and to 
access my sample already had shown me. 
Interestingly, the networks in this reform process also divided in the two main 
opposing groups previously mentioned in chapter three and above in this 
same chapter. Experts who had been united by UNICEF or had previously 
worked with vulnerable young people tended to reference and represent the 
ideas of the UNCRC and focus on children’s rights. They were also closer to 
other Latin-American experiences, together with some influence from Spain 
and Germany. On the contrary, politicians with no previous knowledge or 
experience in the topic united around ideas of security supported with 
reference to western English-speaking countries like the United States or the 
United Kingdom. They privileged information provided by the media and Paz 
Ciudadana as more valid or reliable than other sources. This was 
summarised by one interviewee: ‘The interest of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child was being covered by the scientific community and by 
smart operators, and the interest of citizens’ security was being covered by 
the community and by parliamentarians directly’ (H., 2017). 
This does not mean that all politicians thought the same way, of course, but 
their personal knowledge or experience on the issue at discussion played a 
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central role. For example, Deputy Bustos is identified by all interviewees as 
another experts, he had publications including a book regarding juvenile 
justice. He also defended the principles of the UNCRC all over the legislative 
debate and opposed the shift towards harsher measures. It is worth to notice 
that he studied in Spain and Germany and lived in those countries after being 
exiled during the authoritarian regime. Therefore, it is possible to see the 
same connections over and over again.  
The two opposing groups can be summarised by different terms, such as 
experts and politicians, although that could imply a rigid distinction that we 
already evidenced was not like that. It could also be referred as those who 
supported tough measures they associated to greater security and those who 
privileged the protection of young people’s rights and the suggestions of 
international agreements, according to one interviewee they could be 
described  as ‘the populist politics and the one on the side of international 
human rights’ (A., 2017). But also, they can be identified as the group with 
knowledge and the group with power to really make the decisions. 
 
4. Voices being Heard 
 
It is possible to conclude then that there was a prioritization of the voices of 
the political elite and what they believed to be the public demands, over other 
actors of the system. This was summarised by one of the participants in this 
research and agreed by many others (such as H., D., C., K., G.), for 
example: ‘The technical reasons were disposed and what predominated was 
the political decision to, first, fulfil the government’s commitment of starting the 
system, of answering to the social pressure demanding it to be implemented 
and not to keep postponing, basically that’ (R., 2017). 
This leads us to questions of power and who, at the end of the day, is making 
the political decisions in terms of crime control, and in what are those 
decisions based. It was already evidenced how interviewees claimed that, 
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even though they identify some failures in their performance, they had a 
focus promoting diversion and rights instead of punishment, which was not 
taken into account by legislators beyond being the base structure for the law. 
In their discourse it is also possible to see a confrontation of two main 
elements: knowledge and power. As shown in the previous subsection, there 
was little information regarding the situation of youth offending in Chile, and 
Parliamentarians tended to disregard experts’ opinions, especially when they 
did not match their anecdotic and ideologized understandings.  
Interviewees also identified the perception of public opinion as another major 
force directing the law, with the power to influence politics, as one 
interviewee commented: ‘At the time of proposing answers or solutions to 
these problems those who are more listened to are precisely the community 
and Parliamentarians. Of those who make, design public policies and 
approve them, they are the most heard’ (H., 2017). Or at least as a source of 
pressure to whom politicians felt indebted, as another interviewee 
highlighted: ‘I believe there were citizens’ concern regarding youth offending. 
From the political perspective only, it’s reasonable the government had tried 
to show [the LRPA] as a fighting instrument against youth offending’ (C., 
2017). While other interviewee associated the weight of public opinion to the 
issue of political support, already described in previous chapters: ‘I believe 
that was weighted more was the social pressure to maintain the harshness of 
the project and the political commitment of those who design the rules at the 
end, the Parliamentarians, a political authority that answers to the electorate’ 
(R., 2017). Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that public concerns 
regarding youth crime and justice had been born and fuelled by politicians 
and the media, which was highly close to the political elite. 
Therefore, it seems that, at the end of the day experts were more worried 
about children’s rights and a new procedure focused on their guarantees and 
diversion, while Deputies and Senators were more concerned with satisfying 
public opinion and granting their support. Although this is to be expected, 
under this populist way of working, the power lay in both perceptions of public 
opinion and the political elite. In the case of the LRPA in particular, the 
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Senate was key despite their understanding about youth offending was 
nurtured by anecdotal knowledge, the media and an institution created by a 
supporter of the authoritarian right-wing, the resort to populism to obtain 
electoral support, and the same values and principles that had permeated the 
Chilean culture all over the authoritarian regime. This included reduced 
participations of those who did not belong to the political elite. This left out of 
greater influence the role of experts, and the unknown real wants of the 
general population.  
The terms and characteristics of the reform were ultimately decided by some 
members of the Executive, Deputies and mostly Senators, who transformed 
the base provided by the experts (although they could still have some impact 
later on in the implementation, which goes beyond the scope of this 
research). This on itself is not necessarily a good or a bad thing, it could be 
considered as more democratic and promoting a less elitists style of 
governing. Nevertheless, the key problem is the lack of basis for the 
decisions finally made, which went directly against the criticism that already 
existed regarding tougher approaches and also against all knowledge 
available. 
 
III- The new juvenile justice: what resulted from the reform process? 
 
The reform of the Juvenile Justice System involved a process where the 
understanding of young people, the institutions, the procedure, the actors of 
the system, the expectations, and even the opinion of the system itself 
radically changed. It is worth then to make some comments on the new law 
in terms of what the changes meant for the document, but also with the 
hopes and expectations placed on it, beyond what was shown in the first 





1. Two different ways of being punitive 
 
All during the reform process, interviewees claimed the law went becoming 
more and more punitive, as the interviewee B. (2017) expressed: ‘The 
parliamentarians in the context of the discussion of the projects, they were 
always looking at make stronger punishment measures, to reduce the 
answer options outside the system while privileging imprisonment’. The 
result, in the words of another interviewee, was that: ‘If you compare the 
original project in 2002 with the one approved in 2005, you see many 
contents of specialization in 2002 and a text way more neutral in 2005. The 
Parliament doesn’t take a clear stance regarding definitions, reiterations, joint 
crimes, more regulation of preventive measures, different standards to 
procedural way outs, etcetera. That was present in 2002, but in the project 
the Parliament approved it wasn’t’ (A., 2017). 
Hence, there was a progressive change in the drafts in each stage of the 
legislative process. What interviewees described, also visible in the ‘Historia 
de la Ley’, is that concerns about providing feelings of security to the public 
came first and the focus on children’s rights ‘disappeared’ (C., 2017), or at 
least considerably decreased. Some parliamentarians, such as Senator Ruiz-
Esquide for example, kept an attitude and discourse of strong support to the 
protection of children’s rights and rejection of punitive measures all through 
the reform. But the voices of resistance to the harsher direction the law was 
following did not have enough support to predominate (Congreso Nacional 
de Chile, 2005).  
Nevertheless, when providing their personal opinions on the matter, the 
overall perception is that there was indeed improvement, the LRPA is defined 
as ‘good’ (L., 2017), ‘adequate to international trends’ (H., 2017), and that it 
‘helps to deal with the great majority of the offences’ (R., 2017). Although 
some interviewees provide a more nuanced perception, claiming ‘it was the 
best possible project’ (M., 2017).  
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This raises questions about the recurrent criticism against the direction the 
LRPA drafts were following and its final result for implementation, for 
example according to D. (2017): ‘At the end the law doesn’t accomplish its 
purpose, with its main emphasis, which I insist is not punitive, its 
reintegration’.  
This notion of the LRPA not fulfilling experts expectations and regarded now 
as a punitive system with a series of failures (for example in terms of penalty 
determination (E., 2017)), can be explained by the changes the project went 
facing in each legislative stage, which brought the juvenile justice system 
closer and closer to the adult system, instead of a specialised system that 
was what the writers of the law project had in mind, according to most 
interviewees (H., 2017; R.; 2017; A., 2017; J., 2017; I., 2017; F., 2017; O., 
2017).  
For example, based in the ‘Historia de la Ley’ (2005) and supported by 
interviewees comments, in the Deputies’ Chamber a minimum of one year for 
all imprisonment sentences became mandatory, element proposed by the 
right-wing but eventually agreed by the Executive and the rest of the 
Chamber, as one interviewee described:   
‘But [Deputy] Forni turns the argument the other way and said: It [the 
sentence] won’t accomplish it [its goal] if the youngster is going to be only 
three months inside [prison/youth centre]. That was true, so a minimal stay of 
a year. That provoked a huge annoyance in the world of NGOs, even 
UNICEF had a reaction against it. For me, after some time it didn’t seem like 
a bad agreement. That was an agreement the UDI in the Deputies’ chamber 
was willing to take, and that seemed reasonable to me. I will have a 
maximum, but I also want to have a minimum’ (G., 2017). 
Then, in the Senators’ Chamber the criteria of the adult penal system were 
prioritised while specialisation elements were erased, as one interviewee 
recalled: ‘In the senate everything becomes chaotic, the catalogue changes 
and it’s definitely dependant on the adult process, they also add the 
accessory punishment’ (L., 2017). At the same time, they increased the 
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number of offences that could have imprisonment as a sentence reducing the 
diversion options available in previous versions of the draft, situation also 
commented by another interviewee: ‘There was a pretty clear emphasis in 
the principle of freedom, imprisonment as the last resource. The penal 
response was basically constituted by measures that didn’t restrict freedom, 
reserving that for the most serious offenses. That was also radically modified 
in the Senate, establishing imprisonment as an applicable answer under any 
circumstance’ (R., 2017). The most criticised change was the drastic 
increase in the maximum reclusion penalties (‘From a maximum of three 
years of imprisonment, we ended up with 10’ (E., 2017)), which, as 
mentioned in the previous section, went from three years for juveniles 
between 14 to 16 years of age and five for adolescents between 17 and 18 
years of age to five and ten years respectively (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 
2005).  
Moreover, after the LRPA was finally approved in 2005, it was reformed 
again in 2007 with the Law 20,191 commonly referred as Indicación Larraín 
based on the name of the UDI Senator that motioned its legislation. Through 
that law the conditions of young offenders became even more restrictive 
while encouraging reclusion. For example, increasing the mandatory 
minimum time of imprisonment to two years for all over five years sentences, 
situation also highlighted by one of the participants in this research: ‘a new 
modification of the law 20,084 which was the result of all this discussion. In 
this modification there were more restrictions, for example, to the possibility 
of applying substitution of the penalty before a determined time of 
imprisonment of the young person had passed’ (B., 2017). 
Therefore, despite interviewees do recognise the LRPA as an improvement, 
they mention in several occasions their disappointment. This ambiguity can 
be understood by two main elements. Firstly, in comparison to the Tutelary 
System, as many interviewees expressed, for example: 
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‘I left with the sensation we had progressed a lot, you know? I mean not only 
separating children, and the specialization in the intervention, and to install the 
rights’ approach. I think it was a great step’ (P., 2017) 
‘It was a huge progress, right? A radical change, right? The subject [young 
person] is seen as someone we need to worry about’ (Q., 2017) 
Secondly, from the perception much more could have been done, the feeling 
of missing an opportunity to have a project in line to their expectations, in the 
words of one interviewee: ‘For me it’s way better of what we had, the problem 
is that we missed a great opportunity, I believe, to do something better’ (C., 
2017). Situation they saw possible at the beginning with the first drafts, which 
they claim could have become ‘the best law in Latin-America’ (G., 2017). But 
instead, it became a punitive system closer to the adult penal regulation, 
unable to reach its goals properly and distant from the suggestions of 
International guidelines. 
 
2. Expectations versus possibilities 
 
The new juvenile justice system was expected to at least partially address 
the elements that had led to the need of and demands for a reform. The 
future success of politicians was tied to the capacity to implement what they 
had consistently claimed to be the answer to the concerns of the population, 
or the criticism to the opposite political coalition would worth nothing. Hence, 
the new juvenile justice was the opportunity to reaffirm democratic 
commitments, as Deputy Araya stated: ‘The Government, through the 
Minister of Justice and SENAME, has made a huge effort to reform and 
obsolete system which, no doubt, will help us to progress in a more stable 
rule of law, a more democratic State which provides more spaces to all 
sectors’ (Deputy Araya, 2004:277). 
It was also used to rhetorically present themselves as in line with children’s 
rights, despite how much of the UNCRC suggestions had been dismissed. 
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For example, by adding consideration to due process: ‘This initiative has 
more guarantees regarding the young offender, who will have both a lawyer 
who defends him and a due process’ (Senator Viera-Gallo, 2004:502). 
At the same time, it could give physical presence to the efforts to impair the 
new controls over citizenship, to promote the education of ‘good productive 
citizens’ and reinforce the new order. The new law acted as a clarification 
and public statement of the new social rules and expectations of what 
citizens needed to follow, as Deputy Burgos emphasized: ‘In this initiative 
there is a future public policy; in the sense that, as a society, we are going to 
clearly express we do not play dumb with what happens with young 
offenders’ (2005:1034). This of course implied making sure the interests in 
prevention and rehabilitation were being covered. Intentions summarised by 
Deputy Meza in the legislative debate: ‘With the approval of this project we 
will reduce the serious offending in which young people participate. But more 
important than that, we will be helping to generate conscience, to discover 
new men, in summary, to rescue for our Chile men and women who 
contribute from their potential to the development and growth of each one of 
their children’ (Deputy Meza, 2004:262). 
Likewise, it could keep the promise to bring juvenile justice to modern times, 
as Deputy Luksic emphasised: ‘This project is progress, because it locates 
us a little bit in the same conditions of what is happening globally in this 
matter’ (Deputy Luksic, 2004:258). Together with granting the values 
expected of public service providers in modern times, such as efficacy as 
Deputy Uriarte noted: ‘The text known and generally approved by the 
Constitution Commission and by the Chamber was agreed with the purpose 
of reaching improved levels of efficacy in the fight against crime’ (2004:356-
357). Or security, as highlighted by Deputy Burgos: ‘This project is a great 
step in the fight to have more citizens’ security. It is in this kind of discussions 




All while fixing the identified failures of the Tutelary System, for example in 
terms of mixing children in need of protection and those who displayed 
offending behaviour, as Deputy Uriarte noted: ‘The second reason to approve 
this project is that it separates definitively the process of protection of minors 
at social risk and the imprisonment and rehabilitation system for minor 
offenders’ (2005:1098). Stopping impunity: ‘It is precise that there is clarity 
regarding the ending of impunity’ (Senator Coloma, 2005:972). Or making 
young people responsible for their actions: ‘We are about to make the young 
person responsible for their offences and, at the same time, to establish a 
mechanism that differentiates the responsibility of the adolescent from that of 
an adult; which allows to work on their social insertion and in the early 
stoppage of crime careers’ (Surrogate Minister of Justice Arellano, 
2005:1041-1042). At the same time, as Arellano’s words demonstrate, the 
LRPA could send the sign young people and adults were treated differently, 
despite how much that difference had decreased as the law draft progressed.  
Therefore, the resulting new juvenile justice system allowed the political elite 
to address a series of debts with the new order, the situation of young people 
in problem and in terms of the national and international image of the 
country, while being seen as listening to the demands of the general 
population on the topic. 
Once the law was approved, but before it was implemented, various experts 
joined in a Commission that had to analyse the applicability of the new 
juvenile justice system. They produced two reports, one in 2006 and one in 
2007, the same year the law was reformed through the already mentioned 
Law 20,191 and had to start working in the whole country. The conclusion in 
both reports was the same: the institutions and actors of the system were not 
ready for implementation. In the words of one interviewee who participated in 
those Commissions: ‘In the reports we presented to the government and to 
the Senate we said the conditions weren’t ready to implement the law in 
2007’ (J., 2017). This situation was also widely recognised and amply 
criticized by most interviewees, for example: ‘The infrastructure wasn’t there, 
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the programmatic offer didn’t exist, the demand exceeded the capacity to 
perform’ (R., 2017). 
During the interviews, the participants in this research emphasised in 
different occasions their disappointment regarding the implementation of the 
law, and how it could not fulfil its goals under the given circumstances, or 
how it was impossible to have good results despite the written law itself: ‘The 
project had strengths and weaknesses, but it was a project you could work 
with, so the main moment was implementation, and the implementation is 
disastrous’ (F., 2017). In this quote is also possible to see the ambiguity 
towards the law mentioned in the previous subsection. The negative 
perception experts and actors of the system had on the initial implementation 
also altered their opinion on the document that was approved, nuancing their 
criticism, which sometimes appear stronger and sometimes directed towards 
something else (such as the implementation in this case).  
Under any circumstance, it seems the new Juvenile Justice System carried 
the weight of numerous expectations and purpose. It had to deal with the 
concerns about security and impunity risen all over the 1990s; the social 
values of responsibility, modernity and efficiency; the international 
commitments that had a direct impact on Chile’s image to the world; and the 
populist campaign promises that had been developed over the years. It also 
had to help one side or another of the political projects in conflict, be the 
basis to legitimate the new order by setting the new rules under a democratic 
environment, and of course be successful in prevention, crime control and 
rehabilitation.  
However, the conditions were not ready for such variety of goals in one 
single document. There was no childhood policy or social welfare 
infrastructure to support some of the expectations set on the LRPA. 
Moreover, after the institutional crises Chile had lived and the resources of a 
weakened State building all that was needed and training all the professional 
from whom such a variety of outcomes was expected was almost impossible 
to fulfil. The result was a messy document that tries to deal with everything 
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but in fact does not clearly state what to do under a series of circumstances, 
for example in terms of the specialised treatment of juveniles, as one 
interviewee summarises: ‘The regulation that allowed the Prosecution, the 
Defence and the Legal Power to decide how to fulfil the principle of 
specialization without any other legal requirement than training, I think that 
was a mistake’ (M., 2017). The result, just as the process that led to its 
development, was a political instrument instead of a conscious Juvenile 
justice regulation and system that had the security of the population, the 
prevention of youth offending, their rehabilitation or most of the discursive 
practices sold to the general population or the wellbeing of young people at 
heart. This is also visible in the critiques and comments contained in the 
2015 Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, where they 
recommended to address all recommendations that had been unconsidered 
in their 2007 report, highlighting other failures of the LRPA associated to the 
lack of budget, standards, protocols and procedures, together with concerns 
regarding its repressive attitude while not fully incorporating the Rights of the 
Child or respecting the best interest of children in all areas (Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, 2015). In consequence, it was more of a symbol of the 
new political order and the embrace to modern times than a juvenile justice 
system. 
 
IV- The juvenile justice reform 
 
The LRPA is the result of a convoluted process of the political struggles 
between two main forces, one trying to legitimate the new democratic order 
and the other trying to prolong and legitimise the practices of the 
authoritarian regime. These struggles took place in a specific context 
dominated by the rules and people set by the dictatorship, including the 
changes they implemented in the country, such as neoliberalism, but the 
conflict was also fed by the effects of democratization, such as the sudden 
clash with modernity and the outside world. The resulting reform was also the 
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result of a series of influences, which involve regional experience mixed with 
the recommendation of international agreements by a group of experts who 
shared a similar view. It was then modified by politicians who answered to 
internal and social pressure to remain in power and satisfy the electorate that 
granted them their privileged position. This situation derived in populist and 
punitive strategies.  
Such strategies had a strong reliance on similar international approaches, 
particularly in the United States, a country especially close to the neoliberal 
right-wing. As history has evidenced, they shared networks and affinity given 
the political economic approach of both nations and the privilege for 
authoritarian measures. According to Miller (2016) the lack of accountability 
together with reduced citizen’s engagement and effective participation in 
politics leads to punitive and repressive practices as imprisonment. The 
author refers to the United States and its democratic order, but that part of 
the argument could also be applied to Chile. Moreover, Miller states that 
accountability implies citizens must know who to hold accountable, situation 
that does not happen in Chile either, as everyone denies their responsibility 
and tend to blame others as shown in the statements provided by some 
members of the Parliament, and as there are no channels for political 
participation in the general population (Clauren, 2007). The practice to resort 
to punitive measures has also been described as common when States 
redefine themselves in the penal realm, distancing from other social aspects 
(Wacquant, 1999). For example, with reducing welfare in neoliberal States, 
strengthening instead their identity as crime control and security reinforcers, 
such as in Chile.   
It is interesting to notice that policies such as ‘zero tolerance’ did not become 
a reality at the time. However, they helped to shift the discourse in a more 
punitive direction, decreasing the impact of the UNCRC suggestions and 




It seems to be that in Chile, what drove the juvenile justice reform, the 
process of change and the result was more than anything else the product of 
politics and political forces, the result of the consequences of the 
authoritarian regime and the needs in the transition to legitimate the new 
democracy and ruling elite. The needs the LRPA was supposed to satisfy 
could have been addressed, at least partially, by other means. For example, 
through a childhood protection policy. Moreover, even the cultural principles 
to which the Juvenile justice System needed to be adapted could have been 
addressed differently. Efficiency, for example, could have been ensured by 
establishing appropriate connection between State institutions and 
coordinating the work of the Ministry of Health and Education with the 
Juvenile Justice System, which did not happen. Following the same line, 
evidence was disregarded, the experience of the actors of the system 
unconsidered, young people themselves were not really questioned about it. 
Juvenile justice in Chile was not about granting rights to young people in 
trouble or improving their situation, ensuring their rehabilitation. For the 
political elite that generated the need, directed the discussion, modified the 
project, and determined its final characteristics, it was a statement of power 





Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusion 
 
This research set out to explore the radical transformation of the Chilean 
juvenile justice system that took place in the mid-2000s, where the system 
changed from a tutelary approach to one focusing on penal responsibility. 
The purpose was to explain this specific process of change, the reasons 
behind the decision to reform and the reform drivers shaping the result; to 
analyse to what extent research and theory of penal transformations can help 
to explain this case; and to contribute to the theoretical discussion of the field 
with empirical research. 
In order to study this particular case, I used semi-structured interviews with 
key actors in the juvenile justice reform process, and the analysis of 
documents such as the ‘Historias de la ley’, presidential speeches and 
government plans of candidates to presidency which contained the political 
statements of the time regarding the legislative discussion and the national 
mood around youth offending and justice. However, in order to understand all 
drivers in the reform process, I also studied the national social, political and 
economic context through history in the periods of the authoritarian regime 
(1973-1989) and during the first democratic years until the implementation of 
the new juvenile justice (1990-2007).  
This thesis shows that the Chilean juvenile justice reform is the result of a 
series of contextual historical, political and socio-cultural elements. It 
answers to the intertwined effects of an authoritarian past that transitioned 
and expanded to the 1990s’ democratic order, the sudden encounter with a 
modern globalized outside world, and an uncertain future. All elements that 
shaped the social organization, the political culture and citizens’ needs and 
expectations. 
The previous chapters have presented what the literature says about penal 
transformations; the methodology used in this study; the Chilean context, the 
reasons behind the decision to reform the juvenile justice system and how 
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that reform took place. This chapter will focus on what the Chilean case adds 
to the discussion on penal transformations. 
 
I- The Chilean case 
 
The reform of the Chilean juvenile justice system, even though it was 
implemented in 2007, was the result of a process that started with the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy in 1990. As mentioned in 
chapters one and five, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
[UNCRC] is considered the starting point of reform by both experts and 
politicians. However, the analysis presented in previous chapters suggest 
that the real starting point was the need to legitimize the new democratic 
order. The ratification of the international agreement and the efforts to take it 
into public discussion and official discourses does not relate to the wellbeing 
of juveniles, but to the strengthening of the democratic project. In 
consequence, the influence of the UNCRC was more as a means to change 
the international image of a country with a recent history of widespread State 
violations against Human Rights than a basis of what the new juvenile justice 
had to look like.  
This is visible in the lack of real practical commitment with the suggestions of 
the UNCRC and other international agreements on the matter. For example, 
a childhood policy was never developed in the country. Moreover, even the 
articles 37 and 40 of the UNCRC, that were permanently referenced all over 
the legislative discussion (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2005), were 
eventually displaced to privilege more punitive practices than the ones 
initially intended in the first drafts or the project approved in the Deputies’ 
Chamber in 2004 (more strongly reliant in the 1998 draft of the project, which 
was written by juvenile justice experts in coordination with UNICEF).  
The strength of this need to legitimize the new democratic order can be 
understood if we take into consideration that over 40% of the population still 
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supported the authoritarian regime. Moreover, a series of social, political and 
economic changes imposed by the military government continued untouched 
into democracy, and an important part of the authoritarian elite remained as 
part of the new ‘democratic’ political elite. The authoritarian enclaves, the 
widespread neoliberalism, the lack of prosecution for Human Rights 
violations, and the levels of poverty and inequality in the country marked the 
present Chilean democratic order. Thus, without addressing any of these 
elements, the new authorities had to find a way to gather and maintain their 
support.  
There was no evidence of an increased problem of youth crime, no evidence 
that there was sense of a problem in youth crime among the public at the end 
of the dictatorship or at the beginning of democracy. Instead, it was created 
by the elites and transmitted through new elite owned media, what Sozzo 
(2016) denominates ‘from above’ when talking about the expansion of crime 
concerns in Argentina after their own dictatorship. In consequence, it could 
serve as a strategy to divert attention to problems of crime and therefore 
away from other problems (such as inequality) while gaining citizens’ support 
and keeping the focus on democratic concerns (such as the rights to security 
and due process). For example, the ‘general perception’ of increased and 
more violent youth offending over the 1990s and early 2000s is based in 
notions such as crime rates in a country that had not reliable measure 
systems before the 1990s, and any contrasting with the information provided 
by a dictatorship that kept most of their dealings in secrecy does not offer a 
fair starting point. Moreover, there was no real knowledge of what regular 
citizens actually thought about crime or the quality of their experiences.  
Nevertheless, the strategy worked, and crime became one of the top three 
concerns in national polls (Dammert and Lunecke, 2002; Dammert, 2005). As 
chapter five evidenced, this was the result of a series of anxieties and 
insecurities Chileans were facing with the transition. This also talks about 
how people respond to fear and uncertainty, which has been evidenced in 
other societies as well (see for example Pearson, 1983 or Garland, 1985). 
Young people tend to become the centre of attention and control when other 
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areas of life cannot be controlled or regulated. This probably relates to the 
role attributed to young people as the future of society, and how their 
behaviour has been historically thought to reflect the local moral values. In 
consequence, youth offending is more than just about youth offending. 
Instead, it is a more pervasive civic institution about building society, which is 
what places it as a central object for polity building. The role of juvenile 
justice institutions becomes even more central in societies in transition, as 
they are facing more intensive periods of re-design, while developing the 
direction they want to follow. In turn, that requires the legitimacy that grant 
the authorities the support for the new social project. Thus, juvenile justice 
has a symbolic social and political power. 
In this context, the paradox of a juvenile justice that only re-shaped the 
punitiveness of the tutelary approach into the setting of a modern, rights and 
responsibility-based system, it is not surprising. The chance of a juvenile 
justice based in the respect of international guidelines about children’s rights 
as contained in the first drafts drifted, while in a national context of new 
democracy and widespread Human Rights rhetoric, to one that privileged 
punitive measures. While having other options, overcontrolling and 
paternalistic logics of the past that promoted long-term imprisonment of 
juveniles under the custody of the State remained, only this time under a 
more acceptable apparatus of institutions and procedures that respected the 
rule of law as symbol of democracy. This is the result of the predomination of 
authoritarian views, rules and practices which mediated and shaped 
democracy, in a setting where children’s rights were not a real interest but 
the need to legitimise the new political order, the international image of Chile 
and to build a new social project dominated the political agenda. Only under 
these particular circumstances the privilege of elite networks over more 





II- Chilean exceptionalism: the interaction between the broader 
literature and the Chilean case 
 
Based on the reform process of the Chilean juvenile justice system, it is 
possible to look at the literature of penal transformations from a new 
perspective. Chile offers a series of conditions that differ from what the 
literature describes about penal transformations that have followed and 
privileged a more punitive direction. For example, Chile did not have an 
influencing case such as the murder of two-years-old James Bulger by two 
ten-year-olds that fuelled the discussion about youth offending, as it 
happened in England (Green, 2008). Chile was also experiencing 
outstanding economic growth and decreasing poverty, which makes a 
difference to the reality of crisis presented in other transitional Latin American 
countries (Chevigny, 2003; Pinheiro, 2007; Sozzo, 2016), as shown in 
chapter two. Moreover, the general context was of political stability, another 
difference to other Latin American examples (Cleuren, 2007; Becket and 
Godoy, 2008), and there were no meaningful concerns about immigration as 
in transitional Greece (Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2016), or terrorism as in post 
dictatorship Spain (Medina-Ariza, 2006).  
However, there were other elements in Chile the literature associates with 
punitive developments, such as a neoliberal political economy, the influence 
of international punitive policies such as ‘zero tolerance’, and political conflict 
between parties that derived into populist ways of dealing with crime. But do 
they explain the reform of the Chilean juvenile justice system and the punitive 
direction this reform followed? The answer is that they were influencing 
factors, but instead of helping to explain the reform, they are actually one 
more of the visible symptoms of the conditions of the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy already described. This is key, because 
comparative theoretical research tends to focus on more visible factors, 
without necessarily understanding the dynamics of how they work or what 
they mean in a given local context. This implies that relying on such general 
overviews can lead to misjudgement of the influence of these elements.  
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For example, Chile, as most Latin American and European countries, was 
receptive to ‘zero tolerance’ policing. The country added it to public political 
speeches, and right-wing candidates to presidency (Lavín and Piñera) 
considered it as part of their government plans. It could then be said that 
Chile followed the same trend that other countries in the matter (such as 
Wacquant (1999) describes for France and Germany). But those candidates 
were not elected, and the policies were not implemented. It could then be 
said that Chile rejected those policies and took a different path, which is not a 
faithful description either. The policies were not implemented because the 
Concertación still had, even though not for much, the majoritarian support of 
the population after years of economic success and political stability. 
However, ‘zero tolerance’ rhetoric did impact in public debates about crime. 
Slogans such as ‘revolving door’ and ‘iron fist’ dominated the dialogue and 
Concertación presidents in two terms build more prisons than the whole 
authoritarian regime. Thus ‘zero tolerance’ policies were not implemented 
from the book, but they did influence the direction crime control and 
punishment followed.  
Something similar happens with neoliberalism, which chapter two showed it 
is usually associated with more punitive approaches in crime control and 
State punishment. In Chile neoliberalism is one more of the many hangovers 
of the authoritarian regime. There is a connection between the social values 
promoted by this model of political economy and the military government, 
such as the prioritization of individualism, responsibilization, and private 
property. Therefore, their expansion does not answer to neoliberalism alone. 
Moreover, neoliberalism was implemented in the dictatorship through force. 
Instead of following a negotiated process mediated between citizens and the 
government, it was simply imposed. In consequence, there were no 
strategies to minimize the effects on regular citizens, such as State aids for 
example.  
On the contrary, water, health and retirement pension became private for 
most (except for members of the Armed Forces), who had to adapt to the 
new circumstances without a right to protest. Similarly, the changes in the 
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relationship between citizens and the State, their distance and passivity in 
political life, cannot be simply attributed to neoliberalism and the reduction of 
the State through privatization. This change was also the result of the 
permanent repression of the Armed Forces and the elimination of channels of 
communication between citizens and the government through the blocking of 
the media, the control in public spaces, the centralization of authority in the 
figure of the dictator, the reduction of local powers, and in short the 
prohibition to speak about certain topics. This notion dictatorship was the real 
force behind all the changes described in this paragraph is strengthened 
when we consider that once in democratic times, neoliberalism did not lead 
to further reduction of State support, at the time of the discussion of the new 
juvenile justice system, Chile had in fact more State aids, growth and 
employment than during the authoritarian regime.  
This is not to deny the strong presence of neoliberalism in Chile, or to 
question the prioritization of private business’ interests instead of workers or 
the existence of marginalization in the country. However, this thesis shows 
that in Chile what seemed to have more weight, again, was the transition 
process and the continuation of authoritarianism. Neoliberalism being one 
more of the authoritarian enclaves instead of the cause of the national social, 
economic and political landscape. 
Moreover, as already mentioned in chapter five, the anxieties and 
uncertainties attributed to late modernity, as described in chapter two, do not 
quite fit in the Chilean example. A general overview of the country could 
evidence the notion of widespread feelings of fear and insecurity, or the 
predominant role of crime attributed to late modern societies. However, when 
taking into account the transitional context of the country, the heightened 
levels of poverty and inequality, the past failure of democracy, and the 
actions of the authoritarian regime, it is not surprising Chilean citizens would 
be anxious about the new government, the new political rule and social 
conditions. In this context, to attribute all of this to late modernity seems a 
reductionism of the local history. Though as Becket and Godoy (2008) 
highlighted, Garland (2001) did not develop the concept thinking about Latin 
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American transitional societies and he has not used it with this purpose 
either. 
Therefore, a methodology that allows an in-depth analysis of these 
processes of reform is the best way to approach and understand the 
underlying dynamics between elements as complex and so hard to define as 
modernity or globalization, which together with culture and social 
organization are usually taken for granted. Thus, most research does not 
explain how they work in the jurisdiction under study. For example, Chile did 
not have the chance to go progressively adapting and evolving to the modern 
globalized world. The country went from under tightly controlled interactions 
with the outside world for almost 20 years to being suddenly hit by it, which 
only fuelled the fears and anxieties already described for the local social and 
political context. Brandariz-García (2018), described this for Spain as the 
‘dromological’ experience of change. This refers to experimenting the 
transformations the world had progressively developed but in a compressed 
way. Spain was also isolated and controlled by its own dictatorship, and 
when it ended, they had to suddenly and quickly adapt to all the changes the 
democratic countries in the European region had gone through. Chile would 
have also experienced this ‘dromological’ change, making the jump from the 
Chile of the late 1960s to the modernity, globalization and strong rules of 
international markets in the 1990s.  
The influence of convergent trends such as international Human Rights 
discourses was also shaped by the divergent local characteristics of Chile. 
For example, the UNCRC was read through the lens of the new neoliberal 
and authoritarian values. Moreover, the justice principles being promoted by 
the international document were mediated by the previous justice institutions. 
For example, the structure of the institutions and procedure of the new 
Chilean juvenile justice system rely on those designed for the adult 
procedure. Similarly, the new responsibility approach inevitably mixed with 
some notions that came from the tutelary approach. At the same time, the 
Constitution that defined the rules to make new legislation had been the 
result of the military government.  
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Therefore, in Chile, it is only when taking into consideration the transition 
from dictatorship to democracy, from an isolated and closed society to an 
open liberal organization that the influence of convergent trends can be 
understood, especially when comparing their effects in long standing 
democracies or other transitional societies. This implies the understanding of 
the present reality. That is the influence of previous political, crime control 
and justice institutions, the culture, the political economy, and their interacting 
dynamics, which have been thoroughly discussed in the previous chapters. 
The study of past struggles, knowledge, ideas predominating public and 
expert discourses, and even the distribution of power to make the decisions 
are key aspects to be analysed. In consequence, the literature cannot simply 
be applied to a new context.  
 
III- Contributions of this research to the field of penal 
transformations 
 
This research provides a new case study that has not featured in the broader 
literature of penal transformations, helping to understand the reform process 
of the juvenile justice system that took place in Chile in the second half of the 
1990s and great part of the 2000s, and how juvenile justice becomes the 
object of efforts to build legitimacy in transitional contexts. In doing so, it 
contributed to the recently growing literature regarding State punishment in 
the global south and in Latin America, but also regarding societies with 
recent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. This is relevant as 
most of what is known has been developed in and for western developed 
democratic countries in the global north, and thus it falls short to provide 
suitable explanations outside those contexts. This because elements that are 
often taken for granted, such as modernity, are not well understood in new 
local settings, as they interact and are shaped by the local reality. Similarly, 




Moreover, the Chilean case provides new elements to take into 
consideration. As I have shown in chapter five, juvenile justice can be used 
not only to distract the population, but also to validate new social values, a 
new democracy, a legitimate State, and to promote trust under a rhetoric of 
rights protection. It can also be used to project a national image abroad. 
Concerns about juvenile justice can be built over the fear and anxieties that 
in times of change can be easily turned towards those who represent the 
future and are more easily controlled. This can all be generated just using 
words, beyond the need for local evidence and research. In fact, this gap of 
knowledge can be exploited to create problems of crime that do not 
necessarily exist, or to claim popular support without really knowing people’s 
actual experiences, feelings and thoughts on the matter. This thesis also 
evidenced how using rhetoric and reading the world from biased eyes, not 
really understanding what the UNCRC actually implied, can lead to using the 
same rights discourse and turn it into something that promotes more punitive 
practices. That is, the contrary of what they intend.  
Chapter six showed the relevance of the dynamics of polity building. For 
example, the key role of networks, and how they can be used to validate 
authoritarian practices and ideologies in democratic times, or how being in a 
position of authority provides more access to participate in certain projects 
(over other suitable options) and more credibility in the eyes of the general 
population, compared with actual knowledge in the matter (even the one 
supported by international institutions such as UNICEF). What is more, 
interestingly enough Chile had to adapt to the newly arrived modernity and 
globalization, however, the mode of adaptation strengthened rather than 
transformed the existing policy networks and connections. In consequence, it 
highlights issues of power distribution, how networks determine what voices 
are being heard, and how all of that weights more than the failures of the 
previous system. The role of the media can also be understood from a 
different perspective, evidencing how its influence under the hands of the 
same people, and to support the same status quo, modify in terms of 
authoritarian and democratic times. For example, during the dictatorship it 
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promoted the support for the military government and apoliticism, while in 
democracy it politicised the issue of crime to spread similar ideas of control, 
diverting attention from more pressing matters, and thus serve the same 
interests of the authoritarian elite, only in more open ways adapted to the 
new times.  
This research also adds empirical evidence to the relevance of local 
diverging factors in mediating the impact and even understanding of 
convergent influences. This suggests the limitation of the extent to which 
theory can be generalised, and suggests that more knowledge about a 
particular jurisdiction is needed for meaningful comparative research.  
In the same line, this research suggests a different methodological approach 
of the study of the evolution of crime control and State punishment and how 
they become a key topic for polity building. Most studies are theoretical and 
sometimes comparative. However, this does not allow a thorough 
understanding of the underlying dynamics of influence between the different 
elements shaping the debates and actual developments. In consequence, I 
suggest in-depth empirical research can be more productive. I used semi-
structured interviews and documents, but there are other options such as 
ethnographies, focus groups, or media research may also be illuminating. It 
is only by accessing the processes of reform, instead of only the results, that 
the struggles, power divisions, models, abandoned ideas, and underlying 
reasons for each of the small changes in each step can be clearly grasped, 
making evident why the final product has that particular shape. This could 
allow a better understanding of reform processes, and avoid confusion, 
oversimplification or reductionism regarding the role and interaction between 
the local characteristics and global pressures, between factors that promote 
convergence or divergence amongst jurisdictions.  
As shown in chapter two, the object of study proposed in this research was 
also different to most research in this field, which is based in imprisonment 
and/or crime rates. However, by looking at juvenile justice instead, it is 
possible to grasp a better sense of the general processes of transformation 
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and reform a society is going through, including notions of the future, the 
socio-political project, how crime is often symbolic of broader social anxieties, 
and that a big juvenile justice reform can act as a scapegoat in times of 
transition. Therefore, the focus on juvenile justice provides a broader 
perspective of the causes behind the decision to reform and the direction 
State punishment is following, and it is highly revealing of broader cultural 
drivers and socio-political projects. 
Nevertheless, more research about penal transformations in societies that 
have experimented recent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy is 
needed. Studies about countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, but 
also Greece and Spain claim to have turned more punitive and populist 
regarding crime control and punishment as well. All of them being recent 
democracies. However, they differ in the reasons they attribute to these 
developments. Albeit most of these studies are also based on imprisonment 
and crime rates, they seem to imply different paths, processes and what this 
punitivism means or how it expresses. This, because as shown in chapter 
two, Spain, for example, followed a different approach for years, distancing 
from Franco’s regime, this changed only in the early 2000s due to the 
presence of terrorism (Medina-Ariza, 2006), while in Argentina, Sozzo (2016) 
has described certain closeness between the government and the authors of 
‘zero tolerance’, but these policies followed a more ambivalent path, 
becoming central mostly in periods of political and economic crisis.  
This could mean there is an issue regarding how punitiveness is defined, 
which could be addressed by the methods suggested when studying the 
processes of reform. But this also rises questions regarding how these 
different societies have reached an apparently similar result. Does it mean 
populism and punitivism are simply the result of generalized convergent 
trends? Or that all countries that share a same model of political economy 
end up in the same situation despite other divergent local elements and 
pressures for convergence? However, there are exceptions to this (see for 
example Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Pratt, 2008a; 2008b). Greece and 
Spain are European countries, while Argentina, Guatemala, Brazil and Chile 
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are Latin American. Economic crisis has been described for all the countries 
but Chile. At the same time, the neoliberalism of Spain, Argentina and Chile, 
for example, is different and the interaction between citizens of each 
countries and their States are different as well.  
The common element is that they are recent democracies after harsh 
authoritarian governments. However, at least in Chile, most crime control and 
State punishment accounts and research do not refer to the dictatorship, they 
do not state the lack of information regarding that period, or the previous 
violence faced by the Chilean society. As shown in chapter five, they built on 
perceptions of increased levels of crime in the early 1990s, which went only 
increasing without questioning of how little was known from before that, or 
how safe Chile was, comparatively. Therefore, perhaps is a common practice 
in democracies with a strong influence from the authoritarian rules, elite, and 
ideology to avoid making reference to that historical time. However, this 
make all analysis incomplete, presenting the characteristics of a society in a 
vacuum instead of the result of specific dynamics that can make possible to 
understand why they act in the way they do. Moreover, by denying or 
omitting the past, they may attribute causal effects to elements that are just 
one more symptom that feeds into the whole dynamic, but is not what shaped 
it, as it happens with neoliberalism in Chile, despite all it has been written 
about the influence of political economy in punitive developments.  
Furthermore, to understand that past that shaped the societies that focus on 
crime control and punishment as polity projects to build the future, can help 
to understand the different developments. For example, Argentina has 
followed a much more ambivalent interaction with punitive practices, which 
seem to be more in line with what the literature has described regarding 
moments of crisis (Sozzo, 2016). In contrast to Chile, they condemned the 
actions of their authoritarian regime, prosecuted key members of the Armed 
Forces, and gave national recognition to the victims of Human Rights 
violations. However, in Chile, where the logics and people of the dictatorship 
continued into democratic times with few alterations, there was no national 
validation of the victims, and Pinochet remained untouched until his death, 
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the country followed a somewhat different trajectory. In Chile there was a 
permanent increase of populism regarding crime, which led to the 
continuation of punitive and authoritarian practices despite the new ‘rights’ 
discourse, because security from crime also became a right, and children 
rights were equalled to responsibilities.  
Therefore, punitive and populist developments in societies that have 
experienced recent transitions from authoritarianism to democracy seems to 
be the result of the strength and influence of the authoritarian past, and about 
validating the new political order under such conditions. All other factors 
would be shaped by the values and principles that go with the repression, the 
control, the imposition of an authoritarian State, and cultures that adapt and 
naturalize some aspects of that context, or that simply take distance and feel 
too disappointed and powerless to actively participate in shaping the country 
they want to live in. It would be extremely interesting then to study these 
penal transformations from the perspective of regular citizens.  
Other elements that are worth taking into consideration and that could not be 
part of this study, would be to access the experiences of the children and 
young people that go through the system, especially those who experienced 
both the tutelary and the responsibility approaches. The opinion of the actors 
of the system that interact directly with young people about the reform project 
and the final result could provide very interesting feedback regarding the 
expectations versus the reality of the reform process as well. To look at the 
implementation is another aspect that requires attention, not only because 
most of the participants in this research blame the implementation for the 
failures of the LRPA, but because there are important changes between what 
the document of a law says, and what can be done in the spot with the 
resources available. Implementation is a dynamic process that tells about 
how the written dispositions are interpreted once in the field, and what 
practices develop and become part of the justice system just by the force of 
habit, experience or training, elements that policy makers are not necessarily 
aware they happen. Finally, more evidence regarding the process of reform 
of other realities could allow to perfect the method to study penal 
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transformations and would provide material to conduct thoughtful evidence-
based comparisons to test what is known and to identify the influence and 
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from the data?  
YES         NO    
 
If YES, are further measures necessary 
to protect data subjects? 
 
Could this research adversely affect 
participants/ data subjects in any other 
way? 
YES         NO   
 
If YES outline the risks. What steps will 




4  POTENTIAL RISKS TO RESEARCHERS 
At any stage in the research could 
researchers’ safety be compromised? 
(e.g. will it involve travel to high risk 
areas, dangerous activities, or risky 
individuals or groups?)  
YES         NO    
 
If YES, what procedures have been put 
in place to deal with potential 
problems? 
It may be that depending on the situation of 
my interviewees (for example being old, ill, or 
with limited mobility), I would have to go to 
their houses to conduct the interviews. If that 
is the case I will make sure that there are at 
least two different people who know about my 
location, my phone number and are in position 
of going to pick me up if needed. This can be 
done using my family, friends and colleagues 
network in the country, who are spread around 
the city, thus it is highly likely that I will be 
close to some of them. Despite this, I will 
privilege to conduct the interviews in places 
such as the office of my interviewees if they 
have one, rather than their homes. I will also 
carry a phone with me all the time. 
 
The institutions such as the parliament or 
public libraries that will give me access to 
archives are public places in central and secure 
areas of the country, which also have security 
guards and cameras. These places are only 
open to the public during working hours. 
Therefore, I will not be late at night in any of 
them. I know Santiago and Valparaiso really 
well, as such I also know which ones are the 
dangerous areas of the city and I will not need 
to go to those places. The public transport 
between my accommodation and the public 
institutions I may need to attend is direct and 
safe.  
 
I will decrease any possible risks by always 
letting the people living with me and friends or 
colleagues located close to the place where I 
am going know where I am. I will not go late at 
300 
 
night alone, and will avoid carrying my 
computer or any expensive technological 
element that may generate unwanted 
attention. If any technology is needed at some 
point (such as a recorder for the interviews) it 
will be carried in a normal regular bag, so it 
cannot be identified from the outside.  
 
Finally, I will be in contact with my supervisors 
every two weeks by e-mail and we will skype 
once a month as a standard rule. 
To the best of your knowledge, could 
any institutional or personal conflicts 
of interest arise from this research?  
YES         NO    
 
If YES please explain.  
Do any of those named above need 
training to enable them to properly 
conduct the proposed research safely 
and in accordance with ethical 
principles? 
YES         NO    
 
If YES what training is needed?  
Does the research require a risk 
assessment evaluation (e.g. if your 
safety may be compromised, or if your 
travel or other insurance requires it)?  
IF YES please contact the RKO 
Manager.   
YES         NO    
 
Do the researchers named above need 
to be cleared through the 
Disclosure/Enhanced Disclosure 
procedures? 
IF YES please contact the RKO 
Manager.   
YES         NO   
 
5 INFORMATION AND CONSENT 
What information will be provided to 
participants prior to their consent? 
A letter or presentation about the project, the 
researcher and the context of the research will 
be sent together with the e-mail of 
presentation and request of participation. 
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(e.g. information leaflet, briefing 
session) 
Moreover, the possibility of asking for more 
information if needed will be clearly expressed. 
Before asking their consent it will be make sure 
they understood the written document 
provided by verbally addressing the 
information provided in the presentation 
letter. Likewise, it will be clearly specified both 
verbally and in the written informed consent 
that they can stop the interviews or refuse to 
participate at any point without adverse 
consequences. Also the possibility of 
identifying information in the status of ‘off the 
record’ during the interview will be clearly 
stated.  
 
The informed consent will clarify that 
anonymity cannot be fully ensured due to the 
public role some of the interviewees had in the 
process of the LRPA. However, it will also be 
clearly stated that access to the primary data 
(transcripts, audio recordings), will be only 
available to me and my supervisors. Likewise, 
they will be allowed to state the position, 
heading or name under which they want to be 
identified in any written and verbal document 
produced during or after the PhD.  
Can you confirm that participants will 
be informed of their right to withdraw 
from the study at any time and for any 
or no reason at all? 
YES         NO    
 
If NO, please explain  
Will it be necessary for participants to 
take part in the study without their 
knowledge and consent?  
YES         NO    
 
If YES, please explain  
Will written consent be obtained from 
all participants/ data subjects?  
If NO, explain why.   




For examples of written consent forms, 
see [link] 
If research involves participants from 
any of the vulnerable groups listed in 
section 2, what arrangements will be 
made to ensure informed consent? 
The research refers to the Chilean case study. 
Therefore is expected that participants will 
speak Spanish instead of English. This does not 
represent a problem because the researcher is 
Chilean, sharing the same native language 
including local expressions and slang. 
6 DATA PROTECTION 
Will any part of the research involve 
audio, film or video recording of 
individuals? 
YES         NO    
 
If YES, please describe Audio recording of the interviews conducted in 
order to facilitate the data analysis. 
How will the confidentiality of data, 
including the identity of participants, 
be ensured? 
Due to the political position or the key role of 
the interviewees in the process of 
transformation to be researched, they can be 
easily identified. In order to address this, 
interviewees will be provided with an informed 
consent explaining the use of the data to be 
generated and the conditions and 
characteristics of the research. It will be clearly 
mentioned both verbally and in written form 
that they can withdraw at any point and that 
they can state before or during the interview if 
there is some information they do not want to 
be part of the research. It will be specified as 
well that they can refuse to be recorded or ask 
me to stop recording at any point. I will also ask 
them how they want to be described in the 
research. Some of the interviewees may share 
similar roles and/or political position at the 
time, thus this will help to give them some level 
of anonymity. I will not share the information 
of any interviewee with other interviewees, 
and if required, I can block part of my 
dissertation for publication with the University 
Library. All the information will be saved and 
coded immediately based on the form of 
description selected by the interviewee. 
Therefore, unless they want it that way, their 
names will not be present in any file or 
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document, even within the stored data. As the 
interview will be audio recorded, as soon as the 
interview is over the audio file will be stored in 
the hard drive and erased from the recorder. 
This, together with the security measures 
adopted to protect the data (encrypted, 
password protected devices and the University 
secure storage) will increase the protection of 
the information given and the identities of the 
interviewees. Finally, I will have ongoing 
discussions with my supervisors and 
permanent communication to address any new 
issue that may arise.  
Who will have access to the data? (e.g. 
researcher only, members of research 
team, supervisor)  
The researcher and both supervisors. 
How and where will the data be stored 
and in what format? 
The data will be stored in a personal hard drive 
which will be kept in a locked drawer. It will 
also be encrypted in my laptop for daily work 
and will re-main in the University server under 
my personal account as a student. The format 
will be the generic one for each kind of file 
recommended by the University of Edinburgh, 
information obtained in a workshop of 
research data management provided by the 
Senior Research Data Officer.  
What security arrangements have you 
put in place for the data? 
The data will be anonymised and stored under 
codified files, kept in a safe place such as a 
password protected laptop and hard drive. It 
will be also stored in the university servers, 
which are secure and protected. The files will 
be encrypted. 
Please confirm that you will retain the 
data for the length of time required by 
the University’s Data Management 
policies:  
• For staff: 10 years after the 
end of the project 
• For students: for the duration 
of the project 
YES          
How will the data be disposed of when 
it is no longer required? 
Electronic data will be deleted and paper data 
will be shredded when no longer needed.  
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7 DATA USAGE 
How will the results of the research be 
used? 
The results will be used in the production of my 
PhD dissertation. 
What feedback of findings, if any, will 
be given to participants? 
If participants require it, they will receive a 
brief report with the main results. They will 
also have access to the final product of the 
dissertation  
Is any information likely to be passed 
on to external companies or 
organisations in the course of the 
research? 
YES         NO    
 
If YES, please describe  
Does  your project require copyright 
for use of images, photography, audio 
or video services, or third party 
release?  
If YES, see generic legal agreements 
here 
[link] 
YES         NO    
 
8      COLLABORATIVE WORKING 
Does your research involve 
collaboration with other academic/ 
non-academic partners, and/or 
employing others such as guides or 
translators? 
YES         NO    
 
If YES:  
i)  what steps will be taken to ensure 
that all individuals adhere to UoE 
research ethics and integrity 
standards? 
 
ii) Please confirm the ownership of 
intellectual ideas and research 
outcomes, as well as the specific 
conditions in which these might be 
shared, will be agreed upon by all 
collaborators ( e.g. this might include 
agreement of authorship, recognition 




of other contributions, 
acknowledgement of sponsors.)   
9        CONFIRMATION  
I confirm that I am aware that I can 
seek advice from the Research Ethics 
and Integrity Committee at any stage 
of the research. 
YES         NO    
I confirm that, should my research 
change so that the responses to these 
questions are no longer applicable, I 
will seek further ethical approval.  
YES         NO    






















Fieldwork Assessment Form FA1 
(Refer to Notes for Guidance before completing this form) 
School Assessment No.  
Title of Fieldwork Activity: Penal transformations: The case of the Chilean 
juvenile justice system.  
Location(s) of Work: Chile (Santiago and Valparaíso) 
 
Duration (incl. dates From / 
To) : 
From 13th January until 12th June 2017 
 
Brief Description of Fieldwork: 
The present project intends to address processes of penal transformation in both theoretical 
and empirical perspective. In order to do so the project will be focused on the specific case 
study of the drastic reform of juvenile justice in Chile that took place in the years 2005-2007. 
The broader aim of this study is to assess and extend current theories of penal 
transformation by examining how systems change in an unexplored (Southern) context.  
In order to do this I will conduct interviews with key actors in the reform process. It will also 
involve a documentary analysis of national reports, surveys, and official information 
regarding the economic, political, social and criminal situation of the country related to the 
reform of the juvenile justice system. This implies access to archives in Chile. Therefore, 
fieldwork will imply visiting the public libraries of institutions such as the parliament of the 
country in the city of Valparaiso, and talking to the people involved in the process of 
transformation. Due to the location of the parliament and that most of the state institutions 
are in Santiago, fieldwork will imply travel between the two cities (which are connected by 





Hazard Identification: Identify all the hazards; evaluate the risks (low / medium / high) 




Hazard (s) Risk 
L / M / 
H 
Control Measures Risk 
after 
Control 
L / M / H 
Physical Hazards (e.g. 
extreme weather 
conditions, cliffs, caves, 
mountains, marshes, 
quicksand, fresh / 




L I will not be facing any of those 
elements in my fieldwork.  
 
Biological Hazards (e.g. 
poisonous plants, 
venomous / aggressive 




L I will not be facing any of those 
elements in my fieldwork.  
 
Chemical Hazards (e.g. 
pesticides, dusts, 
contaminated soils, 




L I will not be facing any of those 
elements in my fieldwork. 
 
Man-made hazards (e.g. 
machinery, electrical 
equipment, vehicles, 
insecure buildings, slurry 




L I will not be facing any of those 
elements in my fieldwork. 
 
Personal Safety (e.g. lone 
working, attack on person 
or property, first aid) 
L The fieldwork implies work in 
libraries and state institutions. 
All of them are open to the 







Thus it will not imply late lone 
working and it will be conducted 
in public but secure and 
protected institutions. I grew up 
in Santiago, therefore I know the 
demographic organization of the 
city and the best ways of 
travelling between places. The 
public transport is secure and 
easy to use.  
Regarding the interviews, places 
like the offices of interviewees 
will be privileged over more 
private places such as their 
houses. However, some of the 
interviewees may be quite aged. 
Therefore, it may be needed at 
some point to conduct the 
interview in their houses. If that 
is the case, I will make sure 
some of my family and friends 
network in the country are 
aware where I am going and for 
how long I am expected to be 
there. If possible, I will ask 
someone to pick me up. I will 
always be with my phone while 
on field. Besides, it is really 
common in Chile to leave in 
gated communities or in flats 
complex which involve the 
presence of a security guard in 
the main entrance. I will 
introduce myself to them if 
needed. 
Regarding the presence of 
elements that may increase risk 
of being harmed in any way 
(such as robbery), I will not take 
with me any expensive elements 
(such as computers or big 
cameras), and my belongings 
will be always hidden inside a 
normal bag.  
Finally, the location of first aid 
centres in the city is well known 
for me, together with the houses 
of everyone I know that can be 
of help if needed. I will also e-
mail my supervisors every two 
weeks to let them know how 
everything is going and I will 
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skype them once a month as a 
standard rule. 
Environmental impact 





L The pollution levels of Santiago 
are not damaging for me, 
because I grew up with them. 
They have never impacted on 
my health.  
 
Other hazards (e.g. 
procedural, manual 





L I will not be facing any of those 
elements in my fieldwork. 
 
*Continue on separate sheet if necessary 
Emergency Procedures: Specify arrangements for first aid, special emergency 
procedures, survival aids, communication, etc.) 
I know the emergency number of the police, firemen, and ambulances in Chile, 
together with the location of GPs, hospitals and private clinics. The city also has 
drugstores every few blocks and there is always an expert inside them. I will carry my 








Additional Information: Identify any additional information relevant to the fieldwork 
activity, including supervision, training requirements, information, specialist equipment 
or clothing, inoculations, etc.  
I will keep contact with my supervisors every two weeks using e-mails and once a 











Contact Information: Include details of both the University designated contact and 
on-site contact. 
University Name: Tel. Contact: 
 
On-site Name: Carolina Gutierrez Tel. Contact: +56 992784149 
+56 2 28857313 
Address of residential base: 
Don Bosco 3861-B, San Miguel, Santiago, Chile. 
 
 
Has necessary training and information been 
given? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Is there adequate provision for those with health 
problems or disabilities? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Are there adequate First Aiders available?   
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Is there suitable supervision (i.e. Staff to Student 
ratio)? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Is permission required to work on site? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Are there suitable travel arrangements and 
licensed drivers? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
311 
 
Is adequate insurance cover in place?  
(Contact Finance Office for advice, 50-9154) 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Have all participants submitted next of kin 
information to field trip organiser / School Office? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
Have route notification schedules been provided to 
Police or Coastguard? 
 
Yes  No  N/A  
 
Assessment carried out by: 






Title (e.g. Group Leader, Lecturer, Research Student, etc): 
 
 
Assessment Authorised by Head of School / Fieldwork Supervisor: 















































Annex 2: Informed consent ‘Transformaciones penales: El caso del 
Sistema de justicia juvenil chileno’ 
 
Actualmente me encuentro realizando mi proyecto de investigación como 
candidata a Doctora en Criminología en la Universidad de Edimburgo. Me 
gustaría saber sobre el proceso de transformación en el sistema de justicia 
juvenil chileno en los años 2004-2007, cuando la Ley de Responsabilidad 
Penal Adolescente [LRPA] fue discutida, aprobada e implementada. Dado su 
rol en dicho proceso, el conocimiento que pueda proveerme me será 
extremadamente útil para desarrollar mi tesis.  
 
Su ayuda en esta investigación será altamente apreciada. Esto implica una o 
dos entrevistas que se agendarán de acuerdo a su disponibilidad. La duración 
de las entrevistas es de aproximadamente una hora, pero esto también puede 
coordinarse de acuerdo a sus tiempos y necesidades.  
 
Tengo presente que es complejo asegurar completo anonimato dado al perfil 
público de su rol en el proceso de la LRPA. Por tanto, pretendo tomar medidas 
para mantener cuanta confidencialidad sea posible. Por ejemplo, acceso a la 
información primaria (transcripciones o grabaciones) solo se compartirá con 
mis supervisoras, la Doctora Anna Souhami y la Profesora Lesley McAra en 
caso de que ellas lo soliciten. Asimismo, usted podrá definir bajo qué 
rol/cargo/posición/nombre/género ser referido durante la investigación y en los 
productos que de ella surjan y su participación no será compartida con otros 
entrevistados. La información analizada será utilizada en mi proyecto de tesis 
para obtener el grado de Doctora en Criminología en la Universidad de 
Edimburgo y subsecuentes publicaciones asociadas.  
 
Si usted está de acuerdo, quisiera grabar esta entrevista. Sin embargo, la 
grabadora puede ser apagada en cualquier momento. Asimismo, usted puede 
detener la entrevista y cancelar su participación en mi proyecto en cualquier 
momento y sin consecuencias.  







Daniela Rodríguez, correo electrónico: 
Yo acepto ser entrevistado para la presente investigación. Comprendo que mi entrevista 
no puede asegurar anonimato de forma definitiva, pero se tomarán medidas para 
mantener toda la confidencialidad que sea posible. Comprendo que la información será 
utilizada como parte de la investigación para doctorarse en Criminología en la Universidad 
de Edimburgo. Comprendo que puedo retirarme de este estudio en cualquier momento. 


































Annex 3: Interview quotes in Spanish 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
‘No es una crítica a ninguna persona que haya estado en el cargo, es un 
tema institucional’ (M., 2017) 
‘Toda la riqueza de la discusión que se dio en la cámara de diputados, que 
fue muy buena y de muy buen nivel y en términos de conceptos que están 
en todo sistema de justicia juvenil y todo estaban súper bien instalados en la 
primera versión del proyecto, agarra el último año súper político, súper 
permeado por elecciones en un, con donde siempre los jóvenes y la 
delincuencia juvenil es un tema que se le ve así como una amenaza, un 
monstruo negro, digamos y todo lo demás, y en el senado empieza a 
desmantelarse el proyecto y a convertirse en lo que finalmente queda’ (L., 
2017) 
‘Yo realmente dejé mi asesoría ahí, entre otras cosas porque me di cuenta 
que no, que ya no había, digamos, mucho interés’ (I., 2017) 
‘A mi no me cabe ninguna duda de que la ley es positiva, pero sin que 
dispusiera de un andamiaje institucional acorde con el espíritu y los objetivos 
de la ley.’ (D., 2017) 
‘Hubo pocos oídos, los escucharon pero no los oyeron mucho’ (R., 2017) 
 
Chapter 4: A new society: the base for the future juvenile justice 
 
‘Yo entré al gobierno el año 1990, soy de la generación que asumió este 
país con 43% de pobres’ (C., 2017) 
‘Pero aparte de la dictadura fue una crisis muy dura que produjo enorme 
cantidad de problemas sociales de pobreza, de indigencia, de no se, Chile 
cayó 14 puntos en el PIB’ (M., 2017) 
‘Eran organizaciones que estaban rearmándose, sobreviviendo muchas de 
ellas, con unas presiones enormes y con unos estados de emergencia que 
se disparaban por todos lados, no solamente los niños privados de libertad, 
sino que también en otros escenarios tremendamente complejos y muy 
dolorosos, y eso hacía que de repente nos juntáramos, hacíamos algunas 




Chapter 5: From no one’s concern to a national problem: how Juvenile 
Justice and the need of a reform rose to the centre of national debate 
 
‘En la transición hacia la década de los ’90 aparece la pasta base y se 
genera una dificultad yo te diría, de envergadura en el país, sobre todo en 
los sectores más pobres’ (O., 2017) 
‘En algún momento entró la locura en este país de que todo se debía al 
consumo de drogas’ (J., 2017) 
‘Represivo’ (K., 2017) 
‘Abusivo’ (P., 2017) 
‘Habían temas de carencia, de estado de emergencia, de ollas comunes, de 
teniendo que suplir en comunidades pobres y excluidas […] temas de 
educación, temas básicos de salud, de cuidado, de entretención, y de 
cuestiones básicas como vivienda y alimentación.’ (O., 2017) 
‘Cuesta ser tolerante, entonces mejor que la ley ordene, que vengan los 
pacos y solucionen las cosas, se pronuncie o venga la ley.’ (E., 2017) 
‘El tema de infancia también requiere como, no hacer una revolución, pero 
también voluntad política, acuerdos políticos, acuerdos ciudadanos y Chile 
es muy poco tolerante’ (E., 2017) 
‘El tema comenzaba a ser con los adolescentes especialmente, a ser más 
complicado, porque ahí se trataba ya de comenzar a instalar ya la idea de 
control’ (Q., 2017) 
‘La policía tortura, la policía abusa’ (H., 2017) 
‘En la década de los ’90 post dictadura, fue una década que claramente 
habían los vientos a favor de mayor protección de los derechos humanos, 
incluyendo las reglas del debido proceso, el derecho a defensa influyeron 
mucho en proteger o promover un cambio al sistema procesal y pasar de un 
sistema inquisitivo a un sistema adversarial’ (J., 2017) 
‘Veníamos saliendo de la dictadura, todos de una generación […] formadas 
en un autoritarismo social importante, las cosas se resolvían dentro del 
dominio de lo penal’ (O., 2017) 
‘Entonces fue, en algún sentido, un movimiento yo te diría al final muy 
político también en que yo creo equivocado también, en el sentido de que se 
propiciaba algo que es muy latinoamericano que es que cambiando las leyes 
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tu podías mejorar la situación de la gente, algo que no es así digamos’ (C., 
2017) 
‘No había un reconocimiento formal de la noción de derechos respecto a 
estos sujetos’ (B., 2017) 
‘Que no tengan derecho a un abogado cuando cometen un delito, que los 
puedan meter por años encerrados’ (P., 2017) 
‘Punto de quiebre’ (N., 2017) 
‘El comité de los derechos del niño seguía presionando, le seguía diciendo 
señor estado usted está al debe en sus compromisos internacionales, no hay 
una distinción clara entre niños, adolescentes y adultos’ (H., 2017) 
‘Esa fue una época en la que en américa latina en general se impulsó mucho 
el tema de la reforma legislativa como un cambio radical en la situación de 
los niños, o sea, fue una época de gran influencia de la convención sobre los 
derechos del niño’ (C., 2017) 
‘El proyecto se va desnaturalizando y cada vez se aleja mas de los 
estándares de la convención de los derechos del niño y se acerca más a los 
que es un derecho penal de los adultos digamos, puro y duro donde la 
especialidad va cada vez perdiendo más espacios y donde derechamente 
empiezan a imperar las lógicas de un derecho penal de adultos’ (H., 2017) 
‘Indiferencia’ (H., 2017) 
‘Negligencia’ (O., 2017) 
‘Falta de interés’ (P., 2017; M., 2017) 
‘Toma digamos mucha fuerza la convención, pero se queda muy apegada a 
la convención judicialista en exceso’ (Q., 2017)  
‘Soledad Alvear […] se da cuenta de que la reforma procesal penal puede 
ser el sello de la transformación que se requiere en temas de justicia’ (M., 
2017) 
‘En chile había necesidad de garantizar eficiencia y eficacia’ (N., 2017) 
‘A partir del año 1990 con el término de la dictadura comienza un fenómeno 
bastante particular y concreto en que la sociedad traslada su centro de 
preocupación que había sido impuesto con un sesgo biológico de la 
dictadura como el enemigo interno ese terrorista a tener siempre un enemigo 
interno que en el fondo es el lugar ocupado por la delincuencia’ (R., 2017) 
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‘el sector más conservador incorporaba la UDI y los que habían patentado a 
nivel personal el tratamiento de la seguridad ciudadana como tema pa’ rédito 
político’ (A., 2017)  
‘Espina recién había salido primera mayoría en el senado, con un discurso 
muy fuerte de seguridad ciudadana, no tenía ningún incentivo pa’ dejar de 
tener ese discurso.’ (A., 2017) 
‘Para las elecciones siempre el tema de seguridad ciudadana es uno de los 
primeros y todos ofrecen, critican al de turno porque no hace nada y ofrecen’ 
(A., 2017) 
‘En el fondo es porque al banco interamericano, sobre todo al BID […] PNUD 
a la fundación FORD les interesaba generar espacios de derechos, pero 
había otras también, otros intereses […] necesitaban tener seguridad para la 
inversión, generar espacios de seguridad’ (N., 2017)  
‘Cuando Chile empieza a crecer, nuestras tasas, nuestro ingreso per cápita 
sube, empezamos a resolver problemas de pobreza, las violaciones masivas 
y sistemáticas desaparecen, tenemos una democracia, que bueno, 
empiezan a cambiar las expectativas y las demandas’ (F., 2017) 
‘El tema de seguridad entre el año ’94 y el año 2005, o el año 2004 cambió 
radicalmente la temperatura, pasó a transformarse en una de las principales 
demandas de la población’ (F., 2017) 
‘Muy atrasada porque Chile unió al retraso de la dictadura 20 o 25 años de 
retraso anterior digamos, entonces fue mucho, fueron 40 años’ (M., 2017) 
‘Hay sensación de inseguridad y el sistema funciona como las pelotas 
¿entiendes? Yo creo que ahí hay debilidad institucional.’ (E., 2017) 
‘Había mucho consenso en que el sistema de menores claramente estaba 
fuera de todo. O sea que primero no tenía, no cumplía con estándares de 
debido proceso, no aseguraba en el fondo lo que la reforma procesal penal 
aseguraba pa’ los adultos’ (L., 2017) 
‘En ese tiempo esto era un tema que no existía, del punto de vista que nadie 
pensaba en una reforma jurídica, nadie veía un problema de derechos 
fundamentales ahí.’ (M., 2017) 
‘La hizo posible’ (M., 2017) 
‘Bajo el bonito nombre de la protección se cometían todo tipo de violaciones 
de derechos’ (P., 2017) 
‘Se instaló mucho más la idea de que esta ley lo que iba a hacer al final era 
terminar con la impunidad’ (C., 2017)  
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Chapter 6: A new Juvenile Justice System 
 
‘En el senado claramente prima el criterio más pro seguridad, y prima 
además, y esto yo creo que hay que decirlo, que estábamos cerrando el 
gobierno, un gobierno y prontos a entrar al otro, entonces la presión política 
de ambos lados por sacar el proyecto o porque no saliera y por lo tanto 
machacarle a ese gobierno que no lograba enfrentar la delincuencia juvenil, 
también hizo que se fuera sacando esto, no se si rápidamente pero 
generando consensos que sacrificaron al proyecto de ley en buena parte 
digamos’ (J., 2017) 
‘Seguimos teniendo problemas con la concertación que se desbancaba ¿no? 
El partido radical con el ministro Gómez que había quedado muy molesto 
porque lo habían sacado del ejecutivo por supuesto, en la discusión en el 
senado, no nos dio los votos’ (G., 2017)  
‘Se promulga durante el último año del gobierno del presidente Lagos con 
una serie de deficiencias que nosotros presidíamos que iban a ser 
complejas, digamos, con una estructura país que no, a ver, que 
evidentemente no iba a poder cumplir con la pretensión restaurativa, 
reparadora, de reinserción que tenía la ley de responsabilidad penal 
adolescente.’ (O., 2017)  
‘Lo que prima es una visión bastante represiva de un sector político en 
particular, bastante más identificado con la derecha evidentemente, pero que 
no están ajenos otros parlamentarios de otras corrientes políticas’ (R., 2017) 
‘Más duro’ (E., 2017) 
‘Caótico y dependiente del proceso adulto’ (L., 2017) 
‘Pervertido en sus aspectos principales’ (J., 2017) 
‘Tuvimos algunos reportajes de hecho la tramitación la tuvimos que apurar, 
la presión que tuvimos fue que iba a salir un informe especial, un contacto al 
día siguiente de la comisión investigadora y que el contacto venía muy malo, 
estaba poniendo mucho énfasis en las críticas al sistema y nosotros dijimos, 
después de ese contacto nos va a costar mucho más llegar a acuerdo con la 
comisión mixta, nos van a sacar la cresta, nuestros parlamentarios nos van a 
mandar a la cresta.’ (G., 2017)  
‘Enemigo interno’ (R., 2017) 
‘Había una presión ciudadana de que la ciudadanía quiere sistemas de 
persecución penal que sean eficientes y efectivos donde la criminalidad 
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juvenil claro, es una preocupación más para la comunidad. Entonces claro, 
el estado tenía una preocupación interna en torno a decirle a la comunidad 
de que estaba efectivamente enfrentando la criminalidad juvenil’ (H., 2017)  
‘El fenómeno de la delincuencia juvenil estaba muy teñido por la percepción 
general de la ciudadanía respecto a la delincuencia en general. Entonces 
también se presionaba por un sistema que fuera más duro’ (R., 2017) 
‘Potenciar lo que tenemos’ (M., 2017)  
‘Va primero la reforma procesal penal jerárquicamente y después viene este 
tema’ (M., 2017) 
‘Un tribunal compuesto por un juez penal, un juez de familia y un juez no 
letrado incluso’ (G., 2017) 
‘el proyecto se va desnaturalizando y cada vez se aleja mas de los 
estándares de la convención de los derechos del niño y se acerca más a los 
que es un derecho penal de los adultos digamos, puro y duro donde la 
especialidad va cada vez perdiendo más espacios y donde derechamente 
empiezan a imperar las lógicas de un derecho penal de adultos’ (H., 2017)  
‘Hay un momento clave de la discusión que es cuando el proyecto de ley 
pasa de su primer trámite que fue en la cámara de diputados, donde si bien 
tuvo cambios y algunas reducciones de estos espacios positivos que yo te 
decía, seguía siendo un proyecto que mantenía esas líneas: salidas 
alternativas fuertes, respuestas punitivas más o menos moderadas. Pero 
cuando pasa al senado, dada la composición político institucional de nuestro 
congreso, en el senado es donde finalmente, diría yo pervertido el proyecto 
de ley en sus aspectos principales’ (J., 2017) 
‘La responsabilidad fundamental estuvo en el senado. Luego la comisión 
mixta en general aprueba el proyecto, discusiones más, discusiones menos 
pero sale el proyecto más o menos similar’ (R., 2017) 
‘Yo creo que el ejecutivo hizo un buen trabajo inicial enviando un proyecto 
que estaba bastante acorde con las prescripciones obligatorias de la 
convención de los derechos del niño’ (R., 2017) 
‘Era un buen proyecto y sale un buen proyecto de la cámara en esos 
términos, en término de los principios que inspiraban a este grupo de 
personas que tenía una fuerte base digamos en formación en derechos 
humanos y una fuerte base en formación de derechos propios de la infancia, 
de la juventud, y que conocía bastante de este tema.’ (L., 2017) 
‘Yo creo que la cámara estuvo bien influida por el ejecutivo’ (I., 2017) 
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‘Sin mucho liderazgo por parte del gobierno, yo ahí te diría, si ahí me 
permites nombrar así, o sea si yo pudiera identificar un gran culpable en este 
tema fue un poco el ejecutivo en términos del rol que le cabe como co-
legisladores digamos.’ (L., 2017) 
‘Cuando se aprueba en contra de nuestra orientación como comisión, se 
aprueba finalmente en el parlamento, me junté con el ministro en su 
despacho unos días después, el ministro me dijo: yo recibí la orden de la 
presidenta que fue: Ministro, la ley de responsabilidad adolescente no se 
posterga un día. Había un clima país, político, mediático muy tensionado 
respecto al tema de la violencia juvenil, la delincuencia juvenil, la impunidad 
de los jóvenes.’ (O., 2017) 
‘En ese momento nosotros sabíamos que la ley tenía muchos problemas […] 
Pero Solís nos dijo: miren ustedes pueden hacer lo que sea pero la ley no se 
cambia, ustedes están con la implementación, o sea no podemos meternos 
con el texto.’ (M., 2017) 
‘Hubo una urgencia por aprobar la ley para darle una señal a la opinión 
pública de que estábamos haciendo algo en materia de delincuencia juvenil’ 
(D., 2017) 
‘¿dónde están los trabajos sobre criminalidad? ¿Dónde? De los ’70, ’60, de 
la época, nada, había el sistema, el sistema acá y los pobres, mil cosas 
ideológicas, o pal otro lado, la raza chilena ladrona [risas], pero todo muy 
poquito.’ (M., 2017) 
‘Hoy día un tipo que es ebanista habla de criminología, ya se nos acabó el 
período en que éramos nosotros los que hablábamos y al hablar era como 
bueno, no hay caso, ya no es así. Todo el mundo opina, sabiendo o no 
sabiendo, no hay una forma concreta’ (M., 2017) 
‘La mayoría tenía poco conocimiento, si, yo tampoco soy de los que espere 
que los parlamentarios o los políticos tengan pleno conocimiento, yo más 
bien espero que tengan buen ojo para elegir asesores digamos, pero había 
poco conocimiento en general’ (J., 2017) 
‘Yo te diría que con una mirada de crítica hacia la culpabilidad de las 
personas, sin una capacidad mínima de entender que hay unas conductas, 
síntomas y signos que son expresión de la adecuación de esas personas a 
contextos de daño, de exclusión, de problemas, carencias y trauma. Acá si 
tu te portas mal es porque tomaste la decisión de portarte mal digamos’ (O., 
2017) 
‘Incluso operan desde la desconfianza: si esto lo está diciendo el señor de la 
defensoría, o el señor de UNICEF o la señora de unicef o la señora 
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académica tanto, entonces esto debe ser al revés. Y créeme que eso me 
tocó verlo casi expresamente.’ (J., 2017) 
‘La mayoría yo te diría que tenían una actitud bastante irresponsable y 
bastante negligente, yo casi me atrevería a decir que muchos de ellos 
votaron sin jamás haber leído, sino que porque ya tenían una idea 
preconcebida, porque tenían una convicción valórica-política’ (O., 2017) 
‘Hay una gran ola en pos de la seguridad ciudadana, en especial, los niños 
delincuentes algo tenemos que hacer con ellos. Entonces teníamos por esos 
dos lados, tanto la política más populista como del lado de los derechos 
humanos internacionales’ (A., 2017) 
‘Lo que se veía era un clima muy favorable a medidas de carácter 
represivas, en que los parlamentarios querían anotarse ranking de quien 
presentaba los proyectos más severos, más sancionadores, más 
penalizadores; sin mirar el conjunto del sistema y sin mirar la dimensión de 
resocialización’ (D., 2017) 
‘Una de las variables que se desarrolló en la región latinoamericana dice 
relación con la creación de una comunidad científica y esa comunidad 
científica fue la que movió buena parte de las reformas en Latinoamérica, y 
esa comunidad científica era pequeñita pero muy cara digamos’ (H., 2017) 
‘UNICEF fue muy importante, de opción fue muy importante, del hogar de 
cristo fue muy importante, paz ciudadana tuvo su rol también; así de los que 
recuerdo, y de hecho todos ellos integraron, de alguna manera u otra, la 
comisión de expertos.’ (L., 2017)  
‘La ley se plantea que toma en cuenta la ley 5/2000 española, el estatuto de 
Brasil que es más antiguo porque es del año 1991 y la ley penal juvenil de 
Costa Rica’ (E., 2017)  
‘El interés convención de los derechos del niño de alguna manera estaba 
cubierto por la comunidad científica y por operadores inteligentes y el interés 
de seguridad ciudadana estaba siendo cubierto por la comunidad y por los 
parlamentarios derechamente, por los parlamentarios’ (H., 2017) 
‘La política más populista como del lado de los derechos humanos 
internacionales’ (A., 2017) 
‘Las razones técnicas fueron desechadas y lo que se levantó fue una 
decisión política que lo que pretendía era, primero cumplir con el 
compromiso del gobierno de turno de poner en marcha este sistema, de 
responder a la presión social que quería que se implementara y no seguir 
postergando, básicamente eso, básicamente eso’ (R., 2017) 
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‘A la hora de analizar problemas, a la hora de proponer respuestas o 
soluciones a esos problemas son justamente los que más se escuchan son 
la voz de la comunidad y la voz de los parlamentarios, de los que hacen, 
diseñan las políticas públicas y las aprueban, son los más escuchados.’ (H., 
2017) 
‘Yo creo que había una preocupación ciudadana por la delincuencia juvenil, 
del punto de vista político estrictamente hablando es razonable que el 
gobierno haya tratado de mostrarlo como un instrumento de lucha contra la 
delincuencia juvenil’ (C., 2017) 
‘Creo yo que ahí que lo que prima es básicamente la presión social en 
términos de mantener la dureza de un proyecto y el compromiso político de 
quienes finalmente hacen el diseño normativo, que son los parlamentarios, 
una autoridad política que responde al electorado’ (R., 2017)  
‘Los parlamentarios en el marco de la discusión del proyecto, que buscaban 
siempre elevar la sanción, limitar las posibilidades de respuesta en medio 
abierto privilegiando respuestas del sistema cerrado.’ (B., 2017) 
‘Si tu comparas el proyecto original del 2002 con el texto que se aprobó el 
2005 uno ve varios contenidos de especialidad en el 2002, un texto más bien 
neutral el 2005, donde no se moja mucho el parlamento respecto de las 
definiciones, reiteración, concurso, mayor regulación de cautelares, un 
estándar distinto para las salidas procesales, etcétera. Eso, claro, el 2002 
estaba, pero en el proyecto que aprobó el parlamento no estaba.’ (A., 2017) 
‘Se adecuaba a la tendencia internacional’ (H., 2017) 
‘Adecuada para la gran, gran mayoría de los casos’ (R., 2017) 
‘Es el mejor proyecto posible’ (M., 2017) 
‘Al final la ley no cumple con su propósito, con su énfasis central, que insisto 
no es punitivo, es reinserción’ (D., 2017) 
‘Pero Forni le da vuelta y dice: tampoco se cumplirá si un cabro va a estar 
tres meses adentro, es cierto, entonces una duración mínima de un año. Eso 
al mundo de las ONGs les provocó mucho, mucha molestia, incluso UNICEF 
sacó una reacción en contra, y a mi con el tiempo no me pareció, no me 
habría parecido una mala fórmula. Pero ese es un tipo de acuerdo al cual la 
UDI en la cámara de diputados estaba dispuesta a llegar, que me parece un 
acuerdo súper razonable, súper razonable, o sea voy a tener máximo, pero 
también quiero tener un mínimo.’ (G., 2017) 
‘En el senado empieza a quedar la crema, cambia el catálogo, lo vincula 
definitivamente al proceso adulto, se mete la sanción accesoria’ (L., 2017) 
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‘Había un acento bastante mas claro en el principio de la libertad, de la 
privación de libertad como último recurso, la respuesta penal estaba 
básicamente constituida por penas no privativas de libertad, reservando esta 
última a las infracciones más graves, cuestión que fue también modificada 
radicalmente en el senado estableciendo la privación de libertad como una 
respuesta aplicable en cualquier circunstancia’ (R., 2017) 
‘De máximo tres años de privación de libertad, terminamos con 10’ (E., 2017) 
‘Hubo una nueva modificación de la ley 20084, producto de toda esta 
discusión. Y en esta se restringió, por ejemplo, la posibilidad de aplicar 
sustitución de condena antes de que hubiese pasado un cierto período de 
privación de libertad del adolescente.’ (B., 2017) 
‘Yo salí con la sensación de que habíamos avanzado harto fíjate. O sea, el 
solo separar a los niños, especializar la atención, y instalar el enfoque de 
derechos a mi me pareció un gran paso.’ (P., 2017) 
‘Era un gran avance, ¿no cierto? Un cambio te diría bastante radical ¿no? en 
que el sujeto se visualiza como un sujeto del cual hay que preocuparse’ (Q., 
2017) 
‘A mi me parece que esto es mucho mejor que lo que había digamos, lo que 
pasa es que igual se perdió una gran oportunidad, creo yo, para haber hecho 
algo mejor.’ (C., 2017) 
‘La mejor ley de Latinoamérica’ (G., 2017) 
‘En los informes que nosotros le presentamos al gobierno como al senado, 
por mayoría, nosotros dijimos que no estaban todavía las condiciones para 
partir el año 2007’ (J., 2017) 
‘La infraestructura no estaba, la oferta programática no existía, la demanda 
yo creo que superó la capacidad de ejecución’ (R., 2017) 
‘Tenía fortalezas y debilidades el proyecto, pero era un proyecto sobre el 
cual podíai trabajar y el tema entonces se juega en la implementación, y la 
implementación era un desastre’ (F., 2017) 
‘la norma que permitió que finalmente el ministerio público, la defensoría y el 
poder judicial decidieran como va a cumplir con el principio de 
especialización sin más exigencia legal que la capacitación, yo creo que eso 





Annex 4: Documents’ quotes 
 
Chapter 5: From no one’s concern to a national problem: how Juvenile 
Justice and the need of a reform rose to the centre of national debate 
 
Historia de la ley 20,084 
‘Sabemos que son drogas que justamente hacen ser más expansivas a las 
personas y con mayores niveles de agresividad’ (Deputy Guzmán, 
2005:1035) 
‘Punitivo’ (Deputy Bustos, 2004:233) 
‘Un fracaso’ (Deputy Rossi, 2004:245) 
‘La señal que debe dar la sociedad es que en todo ámbito defenderá 
siempre los derechos de las personas y respetará la acción de los jueces.’ 
(Deputy Uriarte, 2004:264) 
‘Me parece indispensable reforzar todo lo que diga relación con la familia […] 
estamos cosechando la forma frívola con que se ha tratado la familia en 
Chile; la desconsideración y desvalorización del matrimonio y de la familia 
como los caminos de la perfección humana.’ (Deputy Ibáñez, 2004:256) 
‘la actual legislación sobre menores contradice, en distintas materias, la 
normativa constitucional y los principios consagrados en la Convención de 
los Derechos del Niño […] ha dado a lugar un sistema punitivo tutelar que no 
se somete a los controles constitucionales y vulnera permanentemente los 
derechos que la Carta Política consagra […] procesos sin forma de juicio, la 
aplicación de medidas sin la participación de abogados, las sanciones 
privativas de libertad que vulneran el principio de legalidad.’ (Deputy Bustos, 
2004:233) 
‘Esta reforma estructural se fundamenta en que la actual legislación de 
menores en no pocas materias entra en contradicción con las disposiciones 
de la Constitución Política y de la Convención Internacional sobre los 
Derechos del Niño, y, en algunos casos, vulnera directamente dichos 
cuerpos, lo que nos pone, además -como lo hará presente el diputado señor 
Riveros-, en una situación muy compleja respecto del derecho internacional.’ 
(Deputy Burgos, 2004:250) 




‘El proyecto de ley en tramitación, justamente, consagra que los niños son 
sujetos de derecho, que son personas y, por tanto, también tienen 
responsabilidades de acuerdo con su desarrollo y sus necesidades.’ Deputy 
Bustos, 2004:280) 
‘Hoy no sólo los hacemos sujeto de derechos, sino también de deberes.’ 
(Deputy Soto, 2004:262) 
‘Prácticamente todo adolescente es susceptible de ser rehabilitado; en 
cambio, resulta casi imposible lograrlo con el delincuente profesional adulto.’ 
(Senator Espina, 2004:498) 
‘Destruyan sus vidas’ (Deputy Monckebers, 2004:268)  
‘Un tipo de justicia especial, porque todavía no tienen consolidadas las 
características del adulto.’ (Deputy Saa, 2004:358) 
‘La adecuación necesaria que debemos hacer como Estado respecto de 
nuestra actual regulación destinada a la infancia.’ (Minister of Justice Bates, 
2004:239) 
‘Es lógico bajar la edad de plena responsabilidad penal hasta los 14 años, 
siempre y cuando la legislación apunte a que estos niños, adolescentes, 
sean reinsertados socialmente. Para eso, se requieren programas de 
educación, de capacitación laboral, contra la adicción a las drogas y al 
alcohol.’ (Deputy Guzmán, 2005:1035). 
‘Es mucho mejor invertir los dineros de una política pública en 
responsabilidad penal del adolescente que en cualquier otro mecanismo de 
combate a la delincuencia.’ (Surrogate Minister of Justice Arellano, 
2005:1041) 
‘Estamos cambiando absolutamente la manera tradicional de ver a estos 
niños; estamos haciéndolos responsables de sus conductas.’ (Deputy Saa, 
2004:359) 
‘La legislación tutelar […] altamente defectuosa, desprovista de todo 
concepto responsabilizador.’ (Ministry of Justice Bates, 2004:239)  
‘Ineficacia para alcanzar los fines de prevención y sanción que se le exigen.’ 
(Ministry of Justice Bates, 2004:241) 
‘Estos jóvenes están en condiciones de ser rehabilitados; el país necesita 
que lo sean y que se integren completamente a las actividades honestas y 
productivas de la sociedad.’ (Deputy Ibáñez, 2004:255) 




‘Gente de bien’ (Deputy García, 2004:260) 
‘En los últimos años ha habido un aumento inmenso de la delincuencia 
adolescente. Los jóvenes han entrado, precozmente, al mundo de la 
delincuencia.’ Deputy Ibáñez, 2004:255) 
‘Todos sabemos que tanto el infractor como la víctima, en las condiciones 
actuales, no reciben de parte del sistema de justicia una respuesta 
adecuada.’ (Deputy Uriarte, 2004:356) 
‘Hoy día estamos en el peor de los mundos. Los menores de 16 años que 
cometen delitos muy violentos, muy graves, no son imputables, no 
responden penalmente. Y, en el caso de los menores entre 16 y 18 años, la 
mayoría son declarados inimputables, por lo que tampoco asumen su 
responsabilidad penal.’ (Senator Novoa, 2004:509) 
‘Cuando se habla de menores que no tienen discernimiento, hay que tener 
presente que hoy los niños de ocho o nueve años tienen una capacidad 
espectacular. Los niños están más despiertos.’ (Deputy García, 2004:259) 
‘Impunidad imperante en el sistema, reforzada, en el caso de los menores de 
edad, sobre la base de la afirmación de su irresponsabilidad.’ (Deputy 
Uriarte, 2004:357) 
‘Hoy en nuestra sociedad los jóvenes inician la carrera delictual a sabiendas 
de que, en la práctica, no les pasará nada.’ (Senator Espina, 2004:498) 
‘Se asume que los adolescentes detentan responsabilidad, lo que puede 
habilitar la imposición de sanciones de carácter penal.’ (Minister of Justice 
Bates, 2004:240) 
‘Es similar al procedimiento penal de los adultos vigente en Chile.’ (Senator 
Zaldivar, 2005:969) 
‘El texto conocido y aprobado en general por la Comisión de Constitución y 
por la Cámara, fue concordado con miras a alcanzar mejores niveles de 
eficacia en la lucha contra el delito’ (Deputy Uriarte, 2004:356-357)  
‘Debería indicarse expresamente que un elemento fundamental de este 
proyecto es la responsabilidad por las infracciones cometidas.’ (Deputy 
Forni, 2004:345) 
Annual Speech President Frei to the Congress 21st May 1995 
‘La globalización de la economía y de las comunicaciones está poniendo fin 
a nuestra mentalidad de isla y de finis terrae, influyendo sustantivamente en 
nuestros marcos de referencia y acción.’ (President Frei, 1995:31) 
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‘El país da cuenta de la contradicción de vivir en un ambiente de normalidad 
democrática, y experimentar a la vez una obstrucción proveniente de 
instituciones de origen autoritario y sin raíces en nuestra tradición 
republicana.’ (President Frei, 1995:33) 
‘Tengo la certeza de que con este programa de reformas el sistema 
democrático ganará legitimidad, el Estado de Chile protegerá mejor el 
respeto cotidiano de los derechos humanos y nuestras instituciones 
judiciales ofrecerán la seguridad, la protección y la justicia que de ellas 
espera la ciudadanía’ (President Frei, 1995:13) 
‘Concebimos la seguridad como un derecho colectivo y solidario.’ (President 
Frei, 1995:27) 
‘La delincuencia, el terrorismo y el narcotráfico representan una amenaza 
para la convivencia nacional que el Gobierno ha enfrentado y continuará 
enfrentando con decisión, energía y responsabilidad.’ (President Frei, 
1995:27) 
‘En la esfera internacional, en un contexto de globalización económica, los 
derechos humanos son nuestra carta de presentación. Un país que respeta 
los derechos humanos y no tiene nada que ocultar puede relacionarse con 
todos los hombres, cualesquiera que sean su estirpe, clase o condición’ 
(President Frei, 1995:40) 
‘Existe un amplio consenso en los sectores políticos y sociales. Hoy nadie 
objeta que el actual proceso penal es una institución que no se condice con 
un Estado moderno y democrático.’ (President Frei, 1995:13) 
Annual Speech President Frei to the Congress 21st May 1998 
‘Nuestra democracia evoluciona y por eso son más sólidas nuestras 
libertades’ (President Frei, 1998:1) 
‘¡No tenemos miedo a la libertad!’ (President Frei, 1998:27) 
‘Un país abierto al mundo, más libre y tolerante en su convivencia 
democrática’ (President Frei, 1998:35) 
‘Nuestro propósito debería ser que, a comienzos del próximo siglo, a ningún 
chileno le falte cómo defender sus derechos’ (President Frei, 1998:6) 
‘Valoro los progresos realizados por nuestras Fuerzas Armadas, su patriótica 
disposición y su carácter eminentemente profesional, jerarquizado y 
disciplinado. Aspiramos a su plena inserción en el sistema democrático, en 
condiciones de absoluta normalidad, en la mejor tradición de la República’ 
(President Frei, 1998:20) 
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‘Sabemos lo peligroso que esto puede ser. Cuando la gente no confía en la 
Justicia, poco vale la ley’ (President Frei, 1998:5) 
‘Responsabilidad de las personas.’ (President Frei, 1998:18) 
‘Si ayer fallamos, fue por la propia responsabilidad de cada uno. Si hoy 
progresamos, el mérito es también de cada cual […]  futuro que guarda la 
promesa de nuestra propia responsabilidad’ (President Frei, 1998:34) 
‘Si no hemos podido avanzar, se ha debido a que sectores de la Oposición 
han sido renuentes al cambio […] Si la Oposición insiste en cerrar las 
puertas, el país sabrá quiénes son los que no quieren avanzar en la 
consolidación democrática.’ (President Frei, 1998:31) 
‘Somos una de las economías más abiertas del mundo. Por eso nos 
interesan vitalmente el libre comercio y los instrumentos que lo promueven 
entre las naciones.’ (President Frei, 1998:20) 
‘Signo de la confianza depositada en el país es que el año pasado llegaron 
inversiones extranjeras ocho veces superiores a las que tuvimos en 1990.’ 
(President Frei, 1998:24) 
‘Éste es nuestro valioso capital y no lo pondremos en riesgo bajo ninguna 
circunstancia.’ (President Frei, 1998:24) 
‘El objetivo de la reforma es cambiar y modernizar nuestr’ proceso penal, el 
cual -tras casi un siglo sin haber experimentado renovación alguna- había 
perdido eficacia.’ (President Frei, 1998:6) 
Annual Speech President Frei to the Congress 21st May 1999 
‘La velocidad del avance en materias económicas y sociales contrasta con el 
retraso de nuestro funcionamiento político’ (President Frei, 1999:64) 
‘Aquello que quizás más directamente sienten los chilenos: el aumento del 
desempleo’ (President Frei, 1999:6)  
‘¡Que la fuerza pública proceda de inmediato a desalojar a quienes están 
realizando manifestaciones! ¡Ésta es una falta de respeto a la democracia! 
¡Hay que buscar la unidad del país, no el enfrentamiento! ¡Den el ejemplo! 
(President of the Senate Zaldivar, 1999:1-2) 
‘Esta crisis reafirma la importancia del papel regulador del Estado, el que 
debe contar con las herramientas y la autoridad necesarias para establecer 
claras normas de funcionamiento y lograr que ellas se cumplan cabalmente’ 
(President Frei, 1999:5-6) 
‘Un sistema de justicia imparcial y eficiente’ (President Frei, 1999:28) 
330 
 
‘Hoy, los dirigentes de la Concertación tienen en sus manos una gran 
responsabilidad: dar respuesta a la mayoría de los chilenos que quieren más 
democracia, más libertad y más justicia.’ (President Frei, 1999:66) 
‘Una de las más profundas transformaciones que experimentará el estado 
chileno desde su consolidación a mediados del siglo XIX’ (Pesident Frei, 
1999:28) 
Annual Speech President Lagos to the Congress 21st May 2000 
‘Disponemos del mayor número de computadores per cápita de América 
Latina.’ (President Lagos, 2000:5)  
‘Los vecinos tendrán financiamiento para sus proyectos de recuperación de 
espacios públicos y para crear comités de vigilancia, pero deberán 
comprometerse a rechazar el desorden y la impunidad en sus vecindarios.’ 
(President Lagos, 2000:15) 
Annual Speech President Lagos to the Congress 21st May 2001 
‘La ampliación de las libertades de las personas debe ir acompañada de 
mayor seguridad para las familias y las comunidades. Es por eso que hemos 
hecho del combate a la delincuencia una prioridad nacional y una tarea de 
todos’ (President Lagos, 2001;4) 
‘Está probado que cuando la gente confía en su policía, y la policía confía en 
la gente, los delincuentes se baten en retirada’ (President Lagos, 2001:4) 
Annual Speech President Lagos to the Congress 21st May 2002 
‘Comienzo de un siglo XXI marcado por la incertidumbre y el temor’ 
(President Lagos, 2002:3) 
‘Cuando en este gobierno estén terminados esos 10 recintos penales, se 
habrá construido en materia carcelaria, el equivalente a todo lo que Chile ha 
construido en materia carcelaria en su historia.’ (President Lagos, 2002:9-10) 
Annual Speech President Lagos to the Congress 21st May 2003 
‘Desgraciadamente, hay quienes se empecinan día y noche, en predicar el 
negativismo. Nos muestran un país oscuro, pesimista; un país que no se 
condice con los esfuerzos que cada uno de nosotros y cada uno de nuestros 
compatriotas están y estamos realizando para salir adelante’ (President 
Lagos, 2003:3) 
‘Hace diez años, sólo el 54 por ciento de los hogares contaba con 
refrigerador; hoy el 82 por ciento’ (President Lagos, 2003:4) 
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‘Esto se refiere también a la capacidad de un país que permite con reglas 
claras, fijas, estables, dar seguridad’ (President Lagos, 2003:7-8) 
‘Chile debe hacer un gran esfuerzo por recuperar confianzas, confianzas que 
han sido melladas. Confianza en las instituciones públicas, confianza en el 
mundo de la empresa y de los negocios, confianza en el mundo de los 
sindicatos y los trabajadores, confianza de los chilenos entre si.’ (President 
Lagos, 2003:10) 
‘El prestigio que Chile ha ganado en el mundo obliga a tomar 
responsabilidades.’ (President Lagos, 2003:5) 
Government Plan candidate for presidency Lagos, 1999 
‘La crisis económica multiplica la inseguridad de las familias y las hace 
sentir, con angustia, que una vez más el país le vuelve la espalda’ (Lagos, 
1999:1) 
‘Con las desigualdades sociales crecen las frustraciones, el desaliento, el 
desconsuelo.  Crece también la delincuencia.  Y se debilitan la solidaridad, el 
respeto, el coraje.’ (Lagos, 1999:2) 
‘Los chilenos sabemos que cuando se debilita el Estado termina por imperar 
la ley del más fuerte. Sólo quedan en pie aquellos que poseen medios 
propios para defenderse y comprar su salud, comprar la educación de sus 
hijos, la vivienda, la previsión y hasta la seguridad para su familia. Los 
demás quedan condenados a salvarse como puedan con sus escasos 
recursos.’ (Lagos, 1999:2) 
‘Sin discriminación.’ (Lagos, 1999:24) 
‘Transparente, responsable, participativa y con sentido de autoridad.’ (Lagos, 
1999:24) 
‘Garantice la igualdad de oportunidades’ ‘el igual trato a todas las personas’ 
(Lagos, 1999:24) 
‘Nos comprometemos a seguir impulsando las leyes y a ratificar los 
convenios internacionales que permitan fortalecer la vigencia de los 
derechos humanos. Continuaremos con la reforma al proceso penal’ (Lagos, 
1999:25) 
‘El gobierno de Ricardo Lagos asumirá a fondo la legítima inquietud de las 
familias por la magnitud y gravedad que presenta el fenómeno de la 
delincuencia […] El gobierno de Ricardo Lagos tendrá entre sus tareas 
prioritarias la protección de la seguridad de la vida y de los bienes de las 
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personas mediante un enfrentamiento integral de la delincuencia.’ (Lagos, 
1999:19) 
‘Protegeremos los derechos de los niños, niñas y jóvenes, adecuando 
nuestra legislación a la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del niño.’ 
(Lagos, 1999:13) 
Government Plan candidate for presidency Lavín 1999 
‘Los problemas de la justicia se traducen primero en una sensación y 
después en una actitud anti-sistema. Una actitud que prefiere la autotutela o 
la solución por la mano propia antes que recurrir al sistema, pues no se ve la 
utilidad real de hacer esto último’ (Lavín, 1999:30). 
‘¡Chile necesita un cambio! Necesita una justicia rápida, eficiente y que 
funcione para todos. Hay que perfeccionar el sistema para modernizarlo y 
aumentar su cobertura llegando a toda la gente.’ (Lavín, 1999:30) 
‘La fiesta de los delincuentes.’ (Lavín, 1999:3) 
‘Señales claras y firmes contra la delincuencia.’ (Lavín, 1999:4)  
‘Chile desea ser respetado por el mundo.’ (Lavín, 1999:34) 
‘La clave está en entender que mantener buenas relaciones internacionales 
y ser un país respetado por el mundo es algo favorable para todos, porque 
permite acceder a nuevas oportunidades de mejorar las condiciones de 
vida.’ (Lavín, 1999:35) 
‘La seguridad jurídica es una condición fundamental para el desarrollo 
económico del país.’ (Lavín, 1999:31) 
Government Plan candidate for presidency Bachelet 2005 
‘En Chile y en todos los países que se globalizan se multiplican las 
oportunidades, pero al mismo tiempo aumentan los riesgos para la gente. 
Así, surge con fuerza la demanda por un país más acogedor, capaz de 
reducir los riesgos y la inseguridad económica que afectan a amplios 
sectores de la población’ (Bachelet, 2005:9-10) 
‘El miedo y la inseguridad no pertenecen al Chile que estamos 
construyendo.’ (Bachelet, 2005:64) 
‘Queremos que los policías estén en la calle y no en la comisaría. Aspiramos 
a que el carabinero vuelva a ser parte de la comunidad, de la vida de barrio, 
y que sea conocido y respetado por los vecinos.’ (Bachelet, 2005:66) 
‘La Reforma Procesal Penal ha sido un gran paso en transparentar y agilizar 
los procesos penales.’ (Bachelet, 2005:81) 
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‘La Reforma Procesal Penal fortaleció el Estado de Derecho y sentó las 
bases de la justicia.’ (Bachelet, 2005:64) 
‘La dictadura en su alianza con el neoliberalismo dedicó grandes esfuerzos a 
reducir el tamaño del Estado, despreciando las funciones públicas, 
descalificando a los funcionarios. Una de las tareas fundamentales que los 
gobiernos de la Concertación han asumido en la rectificación del modelo 
económico ha sido reivindicar el rol del Estado.’ (Bachelet, 2005:76) 
‘Trabajaremos activamente para proteger a la ciudadanía y atacar las causas 
profundas de la violencia y la delincuencia. La seguridad ciudadana es parte 
imprescindible del sistema de protección social que vamos a construir’ 
(Bachelet, 2005:64) 
‘Desde que recuperamos la democracia en 1990, los chilenos iniciamos un 
exitoso proceso de reinserción internacional.’ (Bachelet, 2005:97) 
‘La aplicación de la Reforma Procesal Penal ha generado la necesidad de 
ampliar la estructura y principios del nuevo sistema a la justicia penal de 
adolescentes.’ (Bachelet, 2005:82) 
 
Chapter 6: A new Juvenile Justice System 
 
‘Apunta al fondo de un tema que preocupa a los chilenos, en particular en 
estos últimos meses, a propósito de diversas declaraciones públicas de 
candidatos a la presidencia de la República: el de la seguridad ciudadana.’ 
(Deputy Burgos, 2005:1095) 
‘Un problema que en el último tiempo se ha manifestado en forma 
extremadamente dura y que preocupa sobremanera a nuestra sociedad.’ 
(Senator Novoa, 2004:507)  
‘Existe una discusión política, porque algunos afirman que la Concertación 
sólo quiere hacer cariño al delincuente. Más allá de esas pequeñeces de 
quienes quieren sacar provecho electoral del tema…’ (Deputy Hales, 
2005:1037) 
‘Mientras más se acercan las elecciones, se produce una verdadera 
competencia por presentar y acoger iniciativas que tengan que ver con la 
seguridad ciudadana.’ (Deputy Burgos, 2004:348) 
‘Me duele que la delincuencia juvenil se pondere no como un problema de 
los niños, sino como objeto de debate político, como si con esto ganara el 
Gobierno o ganara la Oposición.’ (Senator Ruiz-Esquide, 2004:513) 
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‘Cabe señalar que la Comisión deja constancia de que, para agilizar la 
tramitación de esta iniciativa, resolvió darle su aprobación en general, 
postergando para una fase posterior el análisis pormenorizado de sus 
normas.’ (Secretary Hoffmann, 2004:496) 
‘Ayer, se pudo ver en un programa de televisión el caso de un menor de 14 
años, que ha sido detenido 23 veces por diversos delitos, y que aún así 
sigue en libertad.’ (Deputy Uriarte, 2005:1098) 
‘Son el mayor peligro que atenta contra la seguridad de las personas.’ 
(Deputy Saa, 2004:253) 
‘La sociedad nos presiona para que dictemos prontamente esta ley.’ (Deputy 
Soto, 2004:363) 
‘La gente pide castigo para los delincuentes; la iniciativa propone sanciones 
a los adolescentes que cometen ilícitos.’ (Deputy Hales, 2005:1038) 
‘Tenemos claro que al momento de aplicar la ley se detectarán vacíos y 
errores que requerirán corrección. Una ley de esta naturaleza requiere 
adecuaciones por lo que deberá volver al Congreso Nacional. Por eso, me 
quedo tranquila.’ (Deputy Guzmán, 2005:1101)  
‘Después de un largo debate, la Comisión, por 4 votos contra 0 -porque no 
había otra solución-, aceptó que la pena máxima para un adolescente mayor 
de 16 años y menor de 18 sea de 10 años de privación de libertad.’ (Senator 
Viera-Gallo, 2005:963-964) 
‘Entre los años 1995 y 2002 los delitos cometidos por menores de 18 años 
han aumentado dramáticamente: 700 por ciento en robo con violencia y 400 
por ciento en hurto. También ha aumentado la tasa de delincuencia juvenil 
en mujeres. Y para qué decir en jóvenes de la enseñanza media.’ (Deputy 
Monckeberg, 2004:268)  
‘Se ha sostenido que la iniciativa eleva las penas establecidas por la Cámara 
de Diputados y que es de carácter represivo. […] pido a los señores 
Senadores que, por favor, presten atención, para demostrarles que el 
proyecto es absolutamente protector de los menores […] el menor queda 
sometido a toda la red de protección del Estado en materia de educación, de 
reinserción social y de prevención de consumo de drogas y alcohol. Nunca 
ha existido en Chile un nivel tan alto de amparo para los menores como el 
dispuesto en este proyecto.’ (Senator Espina, 2005:964-965) 
‘La experiencia internacional es tan dramática que en el Parlamento inglés 
se discutió la posibilidad de rebajar la imputabilidad penal de 12 años a 10 
años. Incluso, algunos miembros de la Cámara propusieron dejarlo en 8 
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años. Eso significa que el fenómeno delictual en Inglaterra a nivel juvenil es 
tan grande que no ha dado resultado fijar la imputabilidad juvenil a los 12 
años.’ (Deputy Leal, 2004:283) 
‘El Gobierno, a través del Ministerio de Justicia y del Sename, ha hecho un 
tremendo esfuerzo por reformar un sistema obsoleto y que, sin duda, nos 
ayudará a avanzar en un estado de derecho que sea más consolidado, más 
democrático y que entregue más espacios a todos los sectores.’ (Deputy 
Araya, 2004:277) 
‘Esta iniciativa será más garantista respecto del joven delincuente, quien 
dispondrá tanto de un abogado que lo defienda como de un debido proceso.’ 
(Senator Viera-Gallo, 2004:502)  
‘En esta iniciativa hay una política pública de futuro, en el sentido de que, 
como sociedad, vamos a expresar concretamente que no nos hacemos más 
los lesos con lo que pasa con los jóvenes delincuentes o infractores.’ 
(Deputy Burgos, 2005:1034) 
‘Con la aprobación de este proyecto reduciremos la comisión de delitos 
graves en que participen menores de edad. Pero más importante que eso, 
estaremos ayudando a formar conciencias, a descubrir nuevos hombres, en 
definitiva, a rescatar para nuestro Chile hombres y mujeres que contribuyan 
con sus potencialidades al desarrollo y crecimiento de todos y cada uno de 
sus hijos.’ (Deputy Meza, 2004:262) 
‘Esta iniciativa constituye un avance, en términos de situarnos un poco a la 
altura de lo que ocurre a nivel mundial en esta materia.’ (Deputy Luksic, 
2004:258)  
‘El texto conocido y aprobado en general por la Comisión de Constitución y 
por la Cámara, fue concordado con miras a alcanzar mejores niveles de 
eficacia en la lucha contra el delito’ (Deputy Uriarte, 2004:356-357)  
‘Este proyecto es un gran paso en la lucha por tener más seguridad 
ciudadana. Es en este tipo de discusiones donde se determina el futuro de la 
seguridad ciudadana del país.’ (Deputy Burgos, 2005:1096) 
‘La segunda razón para aprobar este proyecto es que separa definitivamente 
el proceso de protección a menores en riesgo social del sistema de reclusión 
y rehabilitación de menores infractores a la ley’ (Deputy Uriarte, 2005:1098) 
‘Es preciso que exista nitidez en cuanto al término de la impunidad.’ Senator 
Coloma, 2005:972) 
‘Estamos por hacer al joven responsable por sus delitos y, al mismo tiempo, 
por establecer un mecanismo que diferencie la responsabilidad del 
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adolescente de la de los adultos; que permita trabajar en su inserción social 
y en la interrupción temprana de las carreras delictuales.’ (Surrogate Minister 
of Justice Arellano, 2005:1041-1042) 
Historia de la ley 20,191 
‘En primer término, se trata de una ley que debió entrar en vigencia hace un 
año. En su oportunidad, el Ministro de Justicia, señor Bates, aseguró que 
toda la nueva institucionalidad sobre responsabilidad penal juvenil iba a estar 
en funcionamiento. Cuando asumió como titular de esa Cartera el señor 
Solís, durante el Gobierno de doña Michelle Bachelet, nos confesó que nada 
de lo prometido se había cumplido […] ¡Se trata de delitos gravísimos! Y no 
veo qué explicación se va a dar al país cuando se le informe que el autor del 
delito de violación con homicidio, por ejemplo, no estará un día detenido. ¡Ni 
un día! […] ¡no me haré cómplice de eso!’ (Senator Espina, 2007:29-31)  
‘El tema es que en la Concertación se está estimando cada vez más legítimo 
el uso y abuso de todos los recursos del Estado, como si fueran de 
propiedad de la coalición gobernante, con el objetivo de perpetuarse en el 
poder. Esto que empezó a tomar cuerpo durante el gobierno de Ricardo 
Lagos, incluye el abuso comunicacional, la demagogia comunicacional […] 
Nada de eso se cumplió. Por eso el gobierno de don Ricardo Lagos se ha 
terminado pareciendo a los decorados de Hollywood, en que lo único real 
son las fachadas de las locaciones y detrás de ellas no hay nada.’ (Deputy 
Cardemil, 2007:71) 
‘Quiero recordar que la entrada en vigencia de este cuerpo legal, la ley 
20.084, fue uno de los temas de la campaña presidencial de la candidata 
Bachelet . El año 2005 se le prometió a la ciudadanía que, atendido el 
lamentable ingreso de tantos jóvenes al mundo de la delincuencia, se iban 
tomar medidas, que se les iba a sancionar, pero que también se les iba a dar 
la posibilidad de rehabilitarse […] Nadie podría discutir las bondades de la 
ley. Se aprobó, y la elección presidencial fue ganada por la candidata que 
promovía su entrada en vigencia. Entonces, le correspondía al Gobierno 
hacer su pega.’ (Deputy Turres, 2007:68)  
Annual Speech President Lagos to the Congres 21st May 2000 
‘Algunas entidades privadas, como la fundación Paz Ciudadana, han hecho 
grandes contribuciones.’ (President Lagos, 2000:15) 
Government Plan candidate to presidency Lavín, 1999 
‘La gente pierde la confianza porque sabe que de cada 100 causas 
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